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MANAGING THE NEXT DELUGE: A TAX SYSTEM
APPROACH TO FLOOD INSURANCE
CHARLENE LUKE† & AVIVA ABRAMOVSKY‡
***
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has fallen short in
fulfilling its promise as a social safety net for flood loss victims. In place of
the NFIP, this Article proposes a mandatory social insurance plan that
would harness the strengths of the federal taxing authority to provide basic
relief for flood losses occurring at an individual’s primary residence. Any
plan for addressing flood loss must navigate hotly debated, competing
views about government intervention, redistribution, private markets,
environmental protection, and property rights. This Article argues that
government intervention in flood loss relief is inevitable, at least in the
foreseeable future, and that the focus of that intervention should be on the
ex ante provision of a social safety net. The program proposed in this
Article is also intended to provide additional levers for addressing the
complexities of flood loss, including the reduction of negative
environmental externalities, and to provide the impetus needed for
harmonizing existing tax provisions and grant programs.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Early on the morning of August 30, 2015, the life of Alice and her
son will change forever when floodwater rips through the ground floor
apartment rented by Alice. Miraculously, Alice will have sufficient
†
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warning of the imminent collapse of a dam that she and her son will be able
to escape with their lives.1 Many of the personal possessions that will be
destroyed in the disaster are irreplaceable — the first baby tooth lost by her
son and saved by Alice, the family photographs that Alice never has had
the time or money to digitize and upload to the cloud, the souvenirs Alice
purchased on a road trip taken many years ago when times were better.
Alice will, however, be able to take some comfort in the knowledge that
with each paycheck she has received over the past three years, she has been
participating in a national flood loss security plan — a plan that will now
help her in making a dignified fresh start.
If, however, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
continues on its present course, the outcome for Alice may well be very
different. Without new legislation, the program will not even exist in 2015;
in 2010 the program briefly lapsed,2 and in 2011 the program has been
extended for multiple short-term periods with the most recent extension
ending on December 23, 2011.3 Even if Congress acts to extend the current
version of the NFIP, Alice will almost certainly not have purchased flood
insurance because of the low participation rates associated with the NFIP.
Instead, Alice will likely be scrambling for ad hoc, piecemeal post-disaster
assistance.4 She may think back to the news coverage of ten years before5
1

See Henry Fountain, Danger Pent Up Behind Aging Dams, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 2011, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/science/22da
m.html?pagewanted=all (“[O]f the nation's 85,000 dams, more than 4,400 are
considered susceptible to failure . . . .”).
2
See Rebecca Mowbray, Lapses in National Flood Insurance Program Bring
Policy Renewals to a Halt, NOLA.COM (June 30, 2010, 6:53PM), http://www.n
ola.com/business/index.ssf/2010/06/lapses_in_national_flood_ insur.html.
3
As of December 21, 2011. See Resolution Making Further Continuing
Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 112-68 (extension through Dec. 23, 2011); Resolution
Making Further Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 112-67, 125 Stat. 769
(extension through Dec. 17, 2011); Consolidated & Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55 § 101, 125 Stat. 552 (extension
through Dec. 16, 2011); Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-36
§ 130, 125 Stat. 386 (extension through Nov. 18, 2011); Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-33, 125 Stat. 363 (extension through
Oct. 4, 2011); National Flood Insurance Program Reextension Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-250, 124 Stat. 2630 (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4026)
(extension through Sept. 30, 2011). Additional extensions have been proposed,
including one that would extend the NFIP through May 2012. See H.R. 3628,
112th Cong. (2011); S. 1548, 112th Cong. (2011).
4
See Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories:
Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1473
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and realize that she has become trapped in her own version of Hurricane
Katrina.
Flood losses are only likely to escalate in the coming years.6
Before the next massive flood occurs7 — indeed before the next flood that
devastates an individual life occurs — Congress should enact a new
program for flood loss relief that provides a better social safety net than the
current NFIP. This Article suggests a mandatory social insurance plan that

(2007) (“Too often, those who suffer most are the poorest members of society. . .
.”). Cf. Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insurance Against Terrorism—And
Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 268, 277 (2003) (predicting that “public and charitable
relief will more likely be forthcoming if there is (or is perceived to be) less than
full private insurance.”).
5
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, and the levees failed
on August 30, 2005. See Joseph B. Treaster & N.R. Kleinfield, Hurricane Katrina:
The Overview; New Orleans Is Inundated As 2 Levees Fail; Much of Gulf Coast Is
Crippled; Toll Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005 at A1, available at http://q
uery.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE4DF1731F932A0575BC0A9639C
8B63&pagewanted=all; Joseph B. Treaster & Kate Zernike, Hurricane Katrina
Slams into Gulf Coast; Dozens Are Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/national/30storm.html?pagewa
nted=all.
6
See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR
WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISK IN A NEW ERA OF
CATASTROPHES 4 (2009) (explaining that “development in hazard-prone areas and
increased value at risk” are key factors and climate change is “of growing
concern”); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 6 & n. 12 (2006) (describing
how development has increased the cost of floods, though “global warming or
cyclical climate changes may explain part of this increase”).
7
Since the original draft of this article was written, near-record setting water
levels along the Mississippi River have exacted their toll, including the opening of
spillways to flood purposefully rural areas in order to avoid catastrophic losses in
larger metropolitan areas. See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Flooding Takes Vast
Economic Toll, And It’s Hardly Done, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A11;
Campbell Robertson, Louisiana Spillway Opened to Relieve Flooding, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/us/15spillway.html; A.G.
Sulzberger, As Missouri River Rises, Control Efforts Take Shape, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 2011, at A14. See also CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI
RIVER STORIES: HOW THE ROAD TO UNNATURAL DISASTER IS PAVED WITH WELLINTENDED LAWS (forthcoming 2011), for more on the history of flooding along the
Mississippi River.
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would harness the strengths of the federal taxing authority8 to provide basic
relief for flood losses occurring at an individual’s primary residence.9 Any
plan for addressing flood loss must navigate hotly debated, competing
views about government intervention, redistribution, private markets,
environmental protection, and property rights. This Article argues that
governmental intervention in flood loss relief is inevitable, at least in the
foreseeable future,10 and that the focus of that intervention should be on the
ex ante provision of a social safety net. The program proposed in this
Article is also intended to provide additional levers for addressing the
complexities of flood loss, including the reduction of negative
environmental externalities,11 and to provide the impetus needed for
harmonizing existing tax provisions and grant programs.
Part II of this Article discusses the NFIP’s program for personal
property12 and outlines problems associated with the program. Overall, the
8

See Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy After Hurricane Katrina,
in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 203, 217 (Ronald
J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006) (briefly raising the possibility of a premium tax
approach and stating that it is a “potentially superior approach”).
9
The business and investment property flood losses will be addressed in a
future Article.
10
See Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of
Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835,
875 (2006) (“Although the flood insurance program has serious deficiencies, no
one seriously suggests that management of this market should revert to the
states.”); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 536-50 (1986) (discussing market versus government solutions in the
presence of market failure); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4; George L. Priest,
Government Insurances versus Market Insurance, 28 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK &
INS. 71 (2003); Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and
Instruments for Government Intervention in Natural Disasters, in ON RISK AND
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 89 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds.,
2006). See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) for discussion of the more general
question of when government intervention is appropriate.
11
See Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 224, 231-32 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (complete shift of risk to insurer “could lead the insured
to be irresponsible because he or she bears no cost of a loss”).
12
The NFIP also authorizes business coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012;
Commercial Coverage: Business Property Risk, FLOODSMART.GOV,
http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/commercial_coverage/business_prop
erty_risk.jsp (last updated Aug. 25, 2011, 4:18 PM) (overview of currently
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NFIP fails to provide an adequate safety net as numerous individuals
continue to fail to purchase flood insurance.13 If the NFIP were to charge
actuarially fair premiums,14 the resulting increases would likely lead to
even lower participation in the program among those least economically
able to self-insure.15 At the same time, some individuals file repetitive loss
claims, causing a significant financial drain on the program and potentially
exacerbating environmental costs.16 The budget woes of the NFIP are
compounded by the outsourcing of flood insurance sales and claims
adjustments to private insurance companies.17 These private insurance
companies charge the NFIP a flat rate for these services without having to
account for actual costs.18
The NFIP’s problem areas are relatively easy to enumerate, but
the path to crafting a better approach is more complex. Part III discusses
some of the obstacles facing any plan designed to mitigate and compensate
for flood loss. Flood losses are difficult to diversify; individuals have an
incentive to purchase flood insurance only for their most at-risk property;
and individuals may be motivated to take less care in their decisions with
available business coverage). Discussion of NFIP business coverage as well as
business-related tax provisions is outside the scope of this Article.
13
See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Has The Time Come for Comprehensive
Natural Disaster Insurance, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 175 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006) (For Louisiana
parishes hit by Katrina, “the percentages of homeowners with flood insurance
ranged from 57.7 percent . . . to 7.3 percent. . . . Only 40 percent of the residents in
Orleans parish had flood insurance.”).
14
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1063T, NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS
FINANCIAL & OPERATIONAL ISSUE, at 5-6 (2010) (finding that NFIP “is, by design,
not actuarially sound”).
15
See id. at 3 (explaining that taking steps to “make premium rates more
reflective of long-term flood risks . . . . would raise rates and potentially reduce
participation in NFIP.”).
16
See id. at 1 (“Only 1 percent of policies . . . account for 25 to 30 percent of
claims.”).
17
Before the massive flooding of 2011, the NFIP was already deeply in debt,
largely because of the catastrophic losses of the 2005 hurricane season. See id.
(“As of August 2010, NFIP’s debt to Treasury stood at $18.8 billion.”). Before the
2005 hurricane season, the program had generally balanced out. See KUNREUTHER
& MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 110-11.
18
See Aviva Abramovsky, Insurance and the Flood, in LAW AND RECOVERY
FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 83, 97 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009); see
also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 8-9.
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respect to flood costs because of the availability of coverage. These three
difficulties — known respectively as correlation,19 adverse selection,20 and
moral hazard21 — represent classic concerns in the formation of insurance
markets. Part III also briefly considers possible cognitive obstacles to the
provision of flood loss relief.22 For example, because flood risks are
difficult to conceptualize, individuals will have problems taking the steps
necessary to engage in adequate preparation, and government officials
charged with aiding community preparation will be subject to the same
challenges.23

19

See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE
ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 262 (2002) (explaining that by 1928 “[h]aving learned
that individual flood risks were often highly correlated . . . insurers had apparently
decided that the prospect of catastrophic flooding rendered this particular risk
uninsurable”); Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of
Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 820 (2005) (“Natural disasters are highly
correlated, and difficult to ‘uncorrelate’ because those who are not at high risk do
not seek to transfer their risk.”); see also infra Part III.A for discussion regarding
why even national, private insurance companies face correlation difficulties with
respect to flood loss.
20
See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance Adverse Selection and
Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 378 (2003) (arguing that “risk
classification itself can create a kind of adverse selection” since insurers may
“select risks in a manner that is adverse to the insurance pool”); Kaplow, supra
note 10, at 543-44 (explaining that pricing to cover high-risk individuals will cause
lower-risk individuals to drop out, which will cause insurance companies to
increase rates again and so motivate even more lower-risk individuals to drop
coverage, and so on until it is possible that “no insurance would be offered”).
21
See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237,
239 (1996) (explaining that in economic literature the term “refers to the tendency
for insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of
loss.”); Kaplow, supra note 10, at 537 (with insurance “actors have less incentive
to avoid” losses); Kunreuther, supra note 13, at 183 (“[D]isaster assistance is
purported to create a type of Samaritan’s dilemma: providing assistance after a
catastrophe reduces the economic incentives of potential victims to invest in
protective measures prior to a disaster.”).
22
See infra Part III.B.
23
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (“A rational, risk-neutral consumer
would purchase coverage at an actuarially fair price that is equivalent to the
expected loss. . . . In practice, the story is apparently not that simple.”); Kaplow,
supra note 10, at 548 (stating that the “strongest case for some government
response to risk is presented by situations in which certain actors underestimate the
likelihood of loss”).
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Part IV argues that utilizing tax system components may provide
a strong course for meeting the complexities of flood loss coverage and
mitigation, though it also discusses the challenges that would face such an
approach. Additionally, Part IV presents an outline of such a tax-system
infused flood loss security program. The proposed program would be
administered jointly by the Treasury (IRS) and Homeland Security
(FEMA) and would mandate minimum coverage for all individuals as to
the contents of their primary residences.24 Coverage for a home’s structure
would also be mandatory but should be designed to limit repetitive loss
claims. Rewards as well as penalties could be built into the system in order
to better manage flood preparation and community participation. For
example, the proposed flood security plan could charge rates that allow for
tax refunds in the case of good results — e.g., no claim filed in a particular
year.25 Income tax refunds appear to be highly satisfying given the amount
of over-withholding that occurs in the income tax system.26
Part V explores the current patchwork of tax rules as they relate
to post-disaster assistance, pre-disaster flood mitigation grant programs,
and insurance payouts. Part V also recommends steps for harmonizing
these rules with the proposed flood loss security program. Part VI is a brief
conclusion.
II. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)27 is administered by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),28 which is a part of
the Department of Homeland Security. The NFIP has roots dating back to
the early 1950s29 and the early legislation introduced structural components
24

Mandates have long been recognized as a solution to the adverse selection
problem. See infra Part III.A. If such a mandate is, however, politically
unpalatable, coverage could be mandatory for high and moderate risk residences
while opt-out coverage could be available for lower-risk residences. See infra Part
IV.B.
25
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238 (describing insureds’
preference for rebates over deductibles).
26
See Lee Anne Fennell, Hyperopia in Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL
PUBLIC FINANCE 141, 148-52 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006).
27
42 U.S.C. §§ 4011-31 (2006).
28
See 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a).
29
See HOWARD KUNREUTHER & DOUGLAS C. DACY, THE ECONOMICS OF
NATURAL DISASTERS 259 (1969), for more on the history behind the NFIP; MOSS,
supra note 19, at 262-63; Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92; David A. Grossman,
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that, while well intentioned, contribute to the weakness of the NFIP today.
This Part provides an overview of the current state of the program.
A. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
Early flood insurance legislation attempted to motivate
communities to take flood mitigation steps by tying the availability of
insurance coverage to community adherence to floodplain management
regulations.30 Even today, individuals are not able to participate in the
NFIP unless their communities agree to abide by various regulations
intended to mitigate flood loss.31 As to communities who fail to participate,
federal grants, disaster relief, and federal mortgage insurance are
“unavailable for the acquisition or construction of structures located or to
be located” in high-risk areas.32 Currently, over twenty thousand
Flood Insurance: Can a Feasible Program be Created?, 34 LAND ECON. 352
(1958).
30
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4022, 4102 (2006) (community participation
requirements). The regulatory requirements are extensive. See 44 C.F.R. pts. 60,
64; FEMA, Floodplain Management Requirements: A Study Guide and Desk
Reference for Local Officials, FEMA (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.fema.go
v/plan/prevent/floodplainfm_sg.shtm; Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92.
31
42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (2006); see Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood
Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE
AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125, 131 (1998) (Howard
Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr., eds.) (discussing responsibility of local
community in “adopting and enforcing these floodplain management standards”).
Relatively few individuals would be affected by the non-participation of the local
community because “[m]ost flood-prone communities that have elected not to
participate are communities whose areas of serious flood risk are either very small
or have few if any structures.” Id. at 129; FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: MANDATORY PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 2 (2007),
available at www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2954 (“If a community
does not participate in the program, property owners in that jurisdiction are not
able to purchase federally backed flood insurance.”). Individuals living in nonparticipating communities would have to rely on post-flood government assistance
or on the virtually nonexistent private flood insurance market. Abramovsky, supra
note 18, at 126 (“[P]rivate insurers do write limited amounts of flood coverage,
usually for commercial insureds”).
32
See 42 U.S.C. § 4106 (2006); see also FEMA, supra note 31, at 2. A 1968
Act did contain a short-lived penalty at the individual level that had community
participation implications: if the individual’s community participated and the
individual failed to purchase flood insurance coverage after one year, then such
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communities participate.33 Since 1990 communities have also been able to
elect to comply with stronger standards through the Community Rating
System.34 Participation in the Community Rating System program yields
credits that have the effect of reducing flood insurance premiums
throughout the community.35 Currently, nearly twelve hundred
communities participate in the Community Rating System program, which
while representing only 5 percent of all NFIP communities includes
approximately 67 percent of NFIP policyholders.36 In spite of widespread
community participation, individual residents will not necessarily have
flood insurance because, as will be discussed more fully in the next section,
purchase of coverage is largely optional.37
Participation by a community in the NFIP does not, of course,
ensure that a local community is actually compliant.38 FEMA must
determine whether local building codes and permitting processes on their
face adhere to the federal guidelines and must also examine whether
communities actually follow facially adequate ordinances.39 Communities
may further complicate FEMA’s job by pushing back against guidelines

individuals were to be denied post-flood federal assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 4021
(repealed); see also Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92-93.
33
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 4.
34
42 U.S.C. § 4022(b); see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 135-36
(describing system).
35
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 135. Credits are based on “estimated
reduction in flood and erosion damage risks resulting from the measures adopted
by the community under the program.” 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b)(3).
36
Email from William L. Trakimas, Director of Natural Hazards (Sept. 8,
2011) (on file with authors) (“Currently 1192 communities participate nationwide .
. . receiv[ing] a discount which is about $292M annually.”). In 1998, roughly 900
communities participated, which similarly represented 5 percent of NFIP
communities but included over 63 percent of NFIP policyholders. Pasterick, supra
note 31, at 137.
37
See infra Part II.B.
38
See, e.g., KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that
“25 percent of the insured losses from Hurricane Andrew in 1992 could have been
prevented through better building code compliance and enforcement”); see also
Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster
Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604
ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2006) (describing how many
local governments fail to enforce the minimum building requirements need to
participate in the NFIP).
39
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131.
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whose implementation they perceive to be too costly.40 New floodplain
management regulations often contain transition rules or grandfather
provisions,41 possibly in order to minimize political fallout. The political
dimensions of putting a community on probation or pulling NFIP
eligibility42 may also constrain enforcement.43
Even assuming full compliance with floodplain regulations, the
regulations, in conjunction with other flood loss mitigation programs, may
have unintended consequences. Individuals may be overly confident in the
ability of federal, state, and local authorities to manage flood loss through
artificial containment and diversion projects and thus increase the direct
and externalized costs of floods. That is, development may increase in
areas that have been rendered “safe” through community planning.44
(Alternatively, development may occur first under the assumption that with

40

See Peter G. Gosselin, On Their Own in Battered New Orleans, in ON RISK
15, 22-23 (Ronald J. Daniels
et al., eds., 2006) (describing among New Orleans residents that regulation changes
would make it difficult to maintain flood insurance eligibility); see also DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 343-47, 473 (2003) (describing formation of interest
groups and agency capture).
41
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 14.
42
See 42 U.S.C. § 4023 (2006) (disallowing flood insurance coverage for
communities violating state and local land use law); 44 C.F.R. § 59.24 (2010)
(suspension regulations); 44 C.F.R. § 61.16 (2010) (additional premium charged in
communities on probation); 44 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2010) (violations of state and local
zoning law); see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (describing probation and
suspension process).
43
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (“[T]here has never been a
comprehensive assessment of the level of compliance nationwide or of the overall
effect of program standards on local development patterns.”).
44
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (discussing how
government actions may make residents feel safe when in fact they remain
vulnerable); Burby, supra note 38, at 176 (federal policy in New Orleans
contributed “directly to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina” by encouraging
development in hazardous areas and diverting resources away from areas that
could have benefitted from improvements); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1518
(describing the “foolhardiness of . . . attempting to keep the water away from the
people through artificial flood control”); Scales, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing how
“[f]lood control projects merely buy time” but also attract “[r]esidential and
commercial development . . . often resting on long-term assumptions about the
suitability of the area for development”).
AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA
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increased development, loss mitigation will be undertaken.45) Individual
homeowners and renters may then rely not only on visible governmental
mitigation efforts but may be further reassured by the presence of
developers. If, however, the safety measures fail (or fail to materialize) the
flood costs will be even higher because of the increased development.46
The failure of the levees in New Orleans is among the most vivid examples
of the risk of relying on manmade structures to turn back nature.47
Although individuals residing in New Orleans had the option to purchase
flood insurance, the majority of residents did not do so and were not
required to do so48 (the same would almost certainly hold true in any U.S.
community49). Individuals may well not have understood that risk was still
present in spite of (or because of) the levees.50
45

Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POLITICAL ECON. 473, 477 (1977) (“[T]he
rational agent knows that, if he and others build houses there [in the flood plain],
the government will take the necessary flood-control measures. Consequently, in
the absence of a law prohibiting the construction of houses in the flood plain,
houses are built there, and the army corps of engineers subsequently builds the
dams and levees.”); see also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at
262 (describing Nobel Prize-winning work of Kydland and Prescott, including
flood plain example showing “that a discretionary policy, which may be optimal
given the current situation, may not necessarily result in a socially optimal policy
in the longer run”).
46
See generally Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4; Scales, supra note 6, at 13
(“[F]loodplain management (rather than floodplain abandonment) encouraged
development and, thus, concentrated rather than dispersed economic risks of
flooding.”).
47
The 2011 flooding along the Mississippi river is also illustrative of this
lesson. See Editorial, A New Flood, Some Old Truths: The Mississippi Tells Us,
Again, To Change The Way We Manage Water, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2011, at A22
(“Years of mismanagement of the vast Mississippi River ecosystem—the relentless
and often inadvisable construction of levees and navigation channels, the paving
over of wetlands, the commercial development of flood plains . . . have made the
damage worse than it might otherwise have been. . . . Nobody ever beats the
river.”).
48
See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 877 (“[T]he percentage of homes
with flood insurance policies in coastal parishes of Louisiana affected by Hurricane
Katrina ranged from 7% in St. James Parish to 57.7% in St. Bernard Parish, with
only 40% of homes in Orleans Parish having this coverage.”); Scales, supra note 6,
at 15 (“[F]ewer than one-in-ten residents along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi are
believed to have held flood insurance prior to Katrina.”).
49
See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S
MARKET PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS xvi (2006)
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While flood mitigation programs have unintended consequences,
halting mitigation programs is likely to be even more problematic. First,
mitigation does work51 albeit only up to a point — though often an
unknown point at that. Second, outright prohibitions on development by the
federal government are problematic,52 and once development has occurred,
and if the potential disaster is big enough, the federal government will find
it politically untenable to fail to provide any mitigation.53 Even assuming
developers understand the riskiness of their building projects, they may be
able to shift the flood risk to the ultimate owners and tenants,54 who are
sure to elicit (and likely to deserve) a more sympathetic response than the
original developers. Thus, continuance of flood mitigation programs,
including community participation, appears to be an uneasy necessity,
though steps could clearly be taken to use mitigation more judiciously and
development prohibitions less sparingly.55 As will be discussed in Part IV,
even though this Article does not directly address the role of developers
(“Even though approximately one-third of NFIP policies are written outside
SFHAs [high-risk areas], the market penetration rate outside SFHAs is only about
1 percent.”).
50
See infra Part III.B (discussing possible reasons, including cognitive
shortcuts and biases, for low participation in flood insurance).
51
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131-32 (discussing how flood plain
regulations have, at least in the Midwest, “discourage[d] floodplain development
through the increased costs in meeting floodplain management requirements and
the cost of an annual flood insurance premium”); David Welky, When the Levee
Doesn’t Break, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2011, at A25 (arguing that “the extent of the
[2011 Mississippi flood] damage probably won’t come close to the losses of life
and property seen in the historic flood of January 1937. . . .—proof that after nearly
75 years, the federal government has finally gained the upper hand on a river
system once thought uncontrollable.”).
52
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (noting rejection by NFIP of federal
override of local regulation because the NFIP “has consistently taken the position
that federal land use regulation at the local level is illegal, and, in any case, would
be unworkable”).
53
See Kydland & Prescott, supra note 45, at 477 (theorizing that the “the
rational agent knows that, if he and others build houses there [in the flood plain],
the government will take the necessary flood-control measures”).
54
Cf. Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131-32 (discussing report in Midwest
suggesting that “[d]evelopers have the added incentive of wanting to avoid
marketing flood-prone property.”).
55
See id. at 154 (noting “vital connection between the availability of flood
insurance and the local community enforcement of floodplain management
provisions”).
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and other commercial enterprises, integrating residential flood loss
coverage with the tax system could provide an opportunity to craft
additional levers for balancing social safety net concerns with constraints
on unwise development.
B. INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION
Individuals are required to purchase flood insurance only in a
limited set of circumstances. Regulated lending institutions,56 governmentsponsored enterprises for housing (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and
federal agency lenders57 must require flood insurance as a condition to
closing on loans secured by property in high-risk flood zones.58 “High-risk”
indicates that there is a 1% or greater chance of a flood in a particular
year59 — that is, the property lies within the one-hundred year flood plain.
56

42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(10) (2006) (includes “any bank, savings and loan
association, credit union, farm credit bank, Federal land bank association,
production credit association, or similar institution subject to the supervision on a
Federal entity for lending regulation”). The statute directs the federal entities for
lending regulation to promulgate regulations applicable to these institutions. These
federal entities have adopted such regulations. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 22 (2010) (by
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); 12 C.F.R. § 208.25 (2010) (Federal
Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. pt. 339 (2010) (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation); 12 C.F.R. pt. 572 (2010) (Office of Thrift Supervision); 12 C.F.R. §
614.4920 (2010) (Farm Credit Administration); 12 C.F.R. pt. 760 (2010) (National
Credit Union Administration).
57
42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(7) (2006) (defining these agencies as “Federal
agenc[ies] that makes direct loans secured by improved real estate or a mobile
home”). See FEMA, supra note 31, at 26 (entities include Federal Housing
Administration, Small Business Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs,
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture).
58
42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2006) (lender mandate); 42 U.S.C. § 4104a (2006)
(notice requirements). See FEMA, supra note 31, at 2-4 (the only lenders and
services excluded are those “who are not federally regulated and that do not sell
loans to . . . Fannie Mae . . . Freddie Mac,” or other government-sponsored
entities.).
59
FEMA literature often uses the term “special flood hazard area” but “Highrisk flood areas” and “special flood hazard areas” are synonymous. Compare U.S.
Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 14, at 14 with FEMA, supra note 31, at
GLS 9.
This is also called the 100-year flood plain. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2010)
(defining “100-year flood” as “the flood having a one percent chance of being
equaled or exceeded in any given year”); FEMA, supra note 31, at GLS 9. But
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All mapped areas with lower than 1% chance per year of flooding are in
low or moderate-risk zones;60 yet such zones historically lead to about 25
percent of NFIP claims.61 Since relatively few individuals purchase
insurance if they reside outside a high-risk zone, such policies constitute
such a significant portion of NFIP claims suggests that the 1% benchmark
is problematic.62
The lender mandate does not apply to properties outside of highrisk flood zones. The requirement also does not apply to properties located
in non-participating communities since individuals in those areas are not
eligible to purchase flood insurance.63 Under the most recent changes to the
such terminology can mislead individuals into thinking that a flood will only occur
once in a hundred years and is downplayed (or eliminated) in public education
information. See Pasterick, supra note 1, at 130 (“The term ‘100-year flood’ is
problematic for the NFIP. It is a term of convenience intended to convey
probability but has had the adverse effect of giving floodplain residents, who tend
to interpret it in chronological terms, a false sense of security.”).
FEMA has attempted to help people understand the risk assessments by
anchoring this to a more readily understood marker: the 30-year mortgage. Thus,
its public education website explains that high-risk “equates to a 26% chance of
flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage.” Nat’l Flood Ins. Program,
FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE NFIP, (last visited Aug. 25, 2011,
4:17 PM), http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/.
60
Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE
NFIP, (last visited Aug. 25, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://www.floodsmart.gov/floo
dsmart.
61
FEMA, supra note 31, at 5.
62
This estimate may be too low. See Burby, supra note 38, at 177 (stating that
“most flood losses in the United States stem from less frequent flood events” and
citing studies suggesting a range of 66% to 83% of losses arising from areas
outside the one-hundred-year flood zone). The Association of State Floodplain
Managers has recommended that a five-hundred-year flood plain be used as the
better benchmark for levees. ASSOCIATION OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS,
NATIONAL FLOOD POLICY CHALLENGES: LEVEES: THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 3-5
(2007), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/ASFPM_Levee_Policy_Challe
nges_White_Paper.pdf. See also Burby, supra note 38, at 177 (discussing proposal
by Association of State Floodplain Managers).
63
FEMA, supra note 31, at 5. In the case of a non-participating community, “a
lender is still required to inspect any flood maps to determine flood hazard risk and
provide notice of such risk.” Id. at 2. See 42 U.S.C. 4106(b) (2006) (requiring
regulations on notice). Prior to 1977, regulated lending was prohibited in
communities that did not participate. The change was implemented by statute.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-128 § 703(a), 91
Stat. 1144. See also FEMA, supra note 31, app. at 1-3.
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NFIP in 2004, lender–mandated insurance must remain in force over the
life of the loan64 and must be monitored by loan servicers for loans sold to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.65 Various specific rules have been enacted to
facilitated compliance.66 For example, if the loan requires an escrow—for
example, for real property taxes or homeowner’s insurance — flood
insurance premiums are also required to be escrowed.67
FEMA has no statutory authority to enforce this lender mandate;68
instead, each agency with direct oversight over the covered lender is to
enforce the requirement.69 A 2006 study done by RAND estimated national
compliance with the mandate at 75-80 percent, but with significant
variation across regions.70 Given the recent turmoil in the lending and
housing market, including problems with administrative agency oversight
and complicated securitization structures, it seems fair to wonder about the
extent to which these lender flood insurance mandates have been working
in recent years.71 For high-risk properties not covered by the lender
64

FEMA, supra note 31, at 5.
Id. at 25.
66
See generally id. at 23-60.
67
42 U.S.C. § 4012a(d) (2006). See FEMA, supra note 31, at 39 (discussing
requirement).
68
FEMA, supra note 31, at vii. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a (2006).
69
See supra note 56 (citing regulatory provisions and listing these agencies);
FEMA, supra note 31, at 59-60 (Civil penalties may be assessed. “As of November
30, 2006, a total of 119 banks had been assessed nearly $1.3 million in penalties,
for various violations of the 1994 Reform Act.” Regulators may also impose other
sanctions including “unsatisfactory bank ratings, memoranda of understanding,
and, ultimately, cease and desist orders.” Private individuals, including borrowers,
have no cause of action against lenders who have failed to enforce the mandate.).
70
DIXON ET AL., supra note 49. See Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules
Rather Than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK
UNCERTAINTY 101, 107 (2006) (discussing evidence that suggesting “that some
banks, which were expected to enforce the requirements that individuals in highhazard areas purchase flood coverage, looked the other way.”); Scales, supra note
6, at 14-15 (discussing RAND study and other scholarship on takeup rates). The
failure of lenders independently to require flood insurance is a mystery,
particularly given their insistence on general casualty insurance. See also Scales,
supra note 6, at 17-19 (discussing possible theories for lender behavior with
respect to flood insurance).
71
See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Without Loan Giants, 30-Year Mortgage
May Fade Away, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2
011/03/04/business/04housing.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Without%20Loan%20giants
,%2030-year%20mortgage%20may%20may%20fade%20away&st+cse (discussing
65
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mandate, the same RAND study estimated approximately a 50% take-up
rate.72
In addition to the lender mandate, the NFIP has only one additional
means of applying legal pressure on an individual’s decision to purchase
coverage. Under the current NFIP, individuals may receive government
assistance after a disaster even if they were eligible for, but failed, to
purchase flood insurance, but a condition of the assistance is that the
individual purchase flood insurance in the future. Failure to purchase
insurance then can be used to withhold assistance if flood loss help again
becomes necessary.73 Whether this penalty is actively enforced is another
question,74 particularly in the immediate aftermath of high-impact events.75
The NFIP has no ability to deny coverage if individuals are eligible
to purchase the insurance.76 As a result of repetitive losses, the GAO
possible demise of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac and resulting changes to the
housing market).
72
DIXON ET AL., supra note 49, at xvi.
73
42 U.S.C. § 5154(b); see also FEMA, supra note 31, at 7 (discussing
requirement); Pasterick, supra note 31, at 153 (discussing history of this
requirement and noting it “has its greatest potential impact on grant recipients, who
are generally in lower-income categories than those receiving loans and thus less
likely to be able to afford insurance. Whether the threat of denial of future federal
assistance will have the intended effect of promoting insurance purchase among
this segment of the population remains to be seen.”).
74
See Scales, supra note 6, at 13 (“[T]he NFIP’s enforcement mechanisms are
limited and not credibly invoked.”).
75
See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 292-93 n.82 (predicting “that public
sympathy and interest-group pressure would make enforcement of that restrictive
very difficult”).
76
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 1. Contra Scales,
supra note 6, at 33-34 (stating the NFIP does however, rigidly deny claims filed
more than 60 days after a loss, even though the difficulties involved in a flood
make filing the Paperwork difficult
perhaps especially for less sophisticated
individuals). But see 16 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006) (establishing these systems); 42
U.S.C. § 4028 (stating the NFIP is not available in certain zones designated as with
the Coastal Barrier Resources System); Emergency Management and Assistance
44 C.F.R. §§ 71.1, 71.3 (2010) (implementing regulations); Pasterick, supra note
31, at 146-47 (discussing history of legislation); id. at 146 (stating the Legislation
applies primarily to zones within barrier islands); id. at 146 (stating communities
may have some areas within such zones and others outside, and “[c]onsistent
enforcement . . . is difficult . . . [and] the NFIP must depend on the vigilance of
insurance agents to distinguish which areas of a community are eligible for
coverage and which are not.”) (alteration in the original); id. at 146-47 (“A review
conducted in 1992 by the General Accounting [sic] Office (GAO) found not only
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estimates one percent of policies “account for 25 to 30 percent of claims.”77
The dollar amounts associated with repetitive loss claims are, of course,
only part of the true cost of such claims since frequently such properties are
built in environmentally fragile locations.78
Although the NFIP covers a relatively low number of individuals,
the 2005 hurricane season’s demands on the NFIP were staggering and
overwhelmed the NFIP. FEMA had to invoke its authority to borrow funds
from the U.S. Treasury and seek additional appropriations.79 As of August
2010, FEMA’s debt stood at $18.8 billion;80 it remains unlikely that the
program will be able to repay this amount.81 The billions in payouts made
under the NFIP are still small, however, in comparison to the total cost to
the government of the disaster.82
C. COVERAGE LIMITS, FLOOD MAPS, AND RATES
The maximum coverage currently available under the NFIP is
$100,000 for personal property and $250,000 for residential real estate.83
The premium rate structure varies with coverage, deductible, and, most
importantly, the risks associated with the property to be insured.84 The
highest sample premium ($5,903) listed on FEMA’s website is for a coastal
area, high-risk residence and contents insured for the full available
coverage with a $2,000 deductible.85 Individuals may purchase coverage
that significant new development continued to occur in certain CBRS units after
the law was enacted, but also that NFIP coverage was written on 9 percent of the
residences in the units sampled.”).
77
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 1.
78
See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1508-10 (discussing the “value of
healthy wetlands”).
79
42 U.S.C. §§ 4016, 4017(b)(1), (b)(3), 4127; see Burby, supra note 38, at
177 (discussing past history of operating losses and use of this authority);
Pasterick, supra note 31, at 138-39 (discussing the same).
80
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5, 14.
81
Id. at 5.
82
See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 876-77 (“[T]otal government
expenditures could eventually exceed $200 billion.”).
83
42 U.S.C. §§ 4013-4015 (statutory authorization for setting various
coverage terms and rates); see also Residential Coverage Policy Rates,
FLOODSMART.GOV (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www/floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/r
esidential_coverage/policy-rates.jsp.
84
See Emergency Management and Assistance, 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 (2010)
(coverage, rates & deductibles).
85
See Residential Coverage Policy Rates, supra note 83.
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only for residences and their contents.86 Thus, cars are not covered,87 but
there is no limit to the number of residences for which an individual may
purchase flood insurance.88 Special restrictions do apply to basements and
lower-level crawlspaces.89 Further, “flood” under the NFIP generally does
not cover subsidence90 (which, incidentally, leaves a gap in coverage
availability since private insurers also generally exclude subsidence91).
Although individuals under-purchase flood insurance, possibly
because of perceptions that the rates are too high,92 in fact even the full risk
rates charged are not actuarially sound.93 FEMA is charged with
maintaining flood risk maps,94 but such mapping is difficult given the
contingencies that must be modeled and the costs involved in generating
accurate assessments. Maps cannot remain static since flood risks will
change over time both through natural occurrences and manmade
development. Many FEMA maps are badly in need of updating and also
often fail to take into account important risks.95
In addition to any scientific or budgetary difficulties surrounding
the creation of accurate flood maps, after updates, if FEMA changes maps,

86

See 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 App. A (2)-(3) (stating that renters insurance is
available as well as condo insurance).
87
Residential Coverage: What’s Covered, FLOODSMART.GOV, http://www.floo
dsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/residential_coverage/whats_covered.jsp (last visited
Aug. 25, 2011).
88
Residential Coverage: Policy Rates, supra note 83 (“Single-family
dwellings that are primary residences and insured to the maximum amount of
insurance available under the program or no less than 80% of the replacement cost
at the time of may qualify for replacement cost claim settlement. All other
buildings and contents will be adjusted based on their Actual Cash Value
(depreciated cost).”).
89
Residential Coverage: What’s Covered, supra note 87.
90
Contra 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 App. A(1) § II(A) (Coverage is, however, available
for “subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or similar body of water as a
result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding
anticipated cyclical levels that result in a flood . . . .”).
91
See Scales, supra note 6, at 35.
92
See infra Part III.B.
93
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5-6.
94
42 U.S.C. §§ 4101(a), (e)-(i) (2006) (requiring establishment and
publication of information about flood risk zones); see also 44 C.F.R. § 64.3
(description of flood insurance maps); 44 C.F.R. pt. 65 (special hazard mapping).
95
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 7; see also
Pasterick, supra note 31, at 144-46 (describing problem of erosion in general).
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FEMA will often be viewed as the proverbial bearer of bad news.96 As
discussed above, rate increases or more stringent floodplain management
requirements may have political repercussions,97 and FEMA has generally
adopted the administrative practice of grandfathering in current
policyholders to the prior rate.98 In addition to administratively crafted
grandfathering rules, subsidized rates are required by statute to apply to
policyholders who own “structures that were built before floodplain
management regulations were established.”99 These structures date to the
origination of the NFIP, and even forty-plus years later, nearly 25 percent
of NFIP policies receive these subsidized rates.100 These properties also
“experience as much as five times more flood damage than compliant new
structures that are charged full-risk rates.”101
D. OUTSOURCING AND THE NFIP
The federal government sets the flood insurance terms and bears
all of the risks associated with the program, marketing, sales, yet claims
adjustments are increasingly handled by private insurers through the “Write
Your Own” (WYO) Program.102 Under the program, for example, a
policyholder could buy flood insurance from Allstate although the actual
product is only available through the NFIP.103
Utilization of private insurance companies to participate in the
flood insurance program may have been intended to help market the
96

NFIP statute and regulations require consultation with local officials and the
regulations provide various procedures for appealing flood elevation and other
flood map determinations. 42 U.S.C. § 4107; 44 C.F.R. pt.66 (consultation with
local officials); 44 C.F.R. pt. 67 (flood elevation determination appeals); 44 C.F.R.
pt. 68 (administrative hearing procedures); 44 C.F.R. pt. 70 (procedures for map
correction); 44 C.F.R. pt. 72 (procedures and fees for processing map changes).
97
See supra Part II.A.
98
See supra Part II.A.
99
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 6; see 42 U.S.C. §
4015.
100
Id. at 5-6; see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 132-34 (describing
subsidized rates applicable to pre-flood-insurance-rate-map structures); Scales,
supra note 6, at 16 (“As of this writing, 38 years have passed, and approximately
28% [in 2006] of NFIP policies remain subsidized. This in fact reflects substantial
progress, as the subsidization rate was originally 70%.”) (alteration in the original).
101
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5-6.
102
42 U.S.C. § 4081; 44 C.F.R. § 62.23; see Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 96
(describing WYO program); Scales, supra note 6, at 14 (describing the same).
103
Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 96.
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program and provide better information to individuals regarding their
financial alternatives.104 WYO policies have increased dramatically as a
percentage of flood insurance purchases.105 By September 2008, ninety
WYO insurance companies administered almost ninety-seven percent of
approximately 5.6 million policies in force.106 By comparison, in 1986,
forty-eight WYO companies handled just under half of all policies.107
While WYO policies may be a high percentage of the total outstanding
policies, it is not clear whether the WYO has indeed helped increase total
participation since participation in the NFIP remains low.108
In creating the WYO program, the federal government may also
have been seeking to lower its administrative costs.109 But if so, the
program is flawed. The WYO companies are paid a flat rate and are not
required to account for actual costs incurred.110 The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) studied the difference between the fee
received and actual costs for six WYO insurers from 2005 through 2007
and found “that the payments exceeded actual expenses by $327.1 million,
or 16.5 percent of total payments made.”111 The GAO has also determined
that WYO insurers “did not strategically market the product” in spite of a

104

See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (explaining that
WYO was supposed to be a win-win allowing the NFIP to benefit from marketing
by private insurance); Scales, supra note 6, at 14 (“The WYO program seemed an
ideal way to remedy the NFIP’s persistent failure to sell many flood policies.”).
105
Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 97.
106
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-455, FLOOD
INSURANCE: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF THE WYO
PROGRAM 3 (2009) (Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate), available at http://www.gao.g
ov/new.items/d09455.pdf.
107
Id. at 3; see also Abramovsky , supra note 18, at 97.
108
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (“Despite this
potentially synergistic effort between the NFIP and private companies, take-up
rates for flood insurance have historically been low.”); Scales, supra note 6, at 1415 (discussing participation rates and stating that “the inception of the WYO
program had a very modest impact on flood insurance participation”).
109
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 3-4.
110
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 83 (“More than
thirty percent of each dollar paid for flood insurance coverage goes to private
insurers . . . . Over the period of 1968 to 2005, these private insurers received over
$7.4 billion (excluding the loss adjustment expenses for which we do not have
data) in fees.”); Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 97.
111
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 9.
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bonus structure that was added to the standard flat-rate compensation
system.112
In addition to the problems that arise in having WYO insurers
market both their own policies and government policies, WYO will also act
as the adjusters for both their private policies and the government policies
in the aftermath of a disaster.113 Thus, the same insurer will be deciding
whether to categorize damage as flood damage (covered by the NFIP) or as
wind damage (covered by private insurance).114 In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, press accounts reported that the WYO companies
boosted flood claims in order to minimize wind damage payouts.115
III. NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS
Currently, there is no private market in basic flood insurance as the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has preempted the field. Even if
path dependence did not all but dictate continued government intervention,
the development of a large market in unsubsidized, private flood insurance

112

Id. (commenting that the bonus structure is not aligned with the NFIP goals
of “increasing penetration in low-risk flood zones and among homeowners in all
zones that do not have mortgages from federally regulated lenders”).
113
See Scales, supra note 6, at 33-34 (describing “disappointing” quality of
help by adjusters in completing NFIP claims, which must be filed within sixty days
of the loss).
114
See Gene Taylor, Federal Insurance Reform after Katrina, 77 MISS. L.J.
783, 786-87 (2008) (describing conflict and explaining that exacerbating the
problem, at the instigation of the WYO companies, the NFIP implemented an
expedited claims procedure after Katrina which allowed WYO companies to issue
flood insurance checks “without apportioning the amount of wind and flood
damage to structures with losses from both perils”). It also, however, became more
difficult to obtain windstorm coverage in the aftermath of Katrina. Id. at 789-90.
(Congressman Taylor did introduce legislation that would expand the NFIP to
include windstorm.) See also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at
41-43 (describing the “wind-water controversy” and the Katrina-related lawsuits);
Scales, supra note 6, at 24-29 (describing Katrina cases, including insurance
companies’ interpretation of contract provisions yielding non-coverage for losses
partially caused by flood and partially by wind).
115
See id. at 787-88 nn.14-15 (discussing press accounts in the Biloxi Sun
Herald and Times Picayune); see also Scales, supra note 6, at 36-37 (describing an
insurer’s “unusually attractive opportunity to recharacterize wind losses as flood
losses as it is the very entity tasked with investigating flood claims for the
government.”).
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is in doubt.116 A private insurer would have to navigate multiple obstacles
in setting a price that would be both actuarially sound and profitable 117
That price would almost certainly be viewed as too expensive by many
individuals,118 including those who would be most in need of assistance
following a flood.119 The first section of this Part reviews those pricing
obstacles, including the extent to which universal coverage could alleviate
those pressures. In addition, the section discusses the concern that universal
coverage could increase moral hazard problems, including negative
environmental externalities. The second section of this Part focuses on the
consumer side of flood insurance and explores the puzzling reality that,
even at subsidized rates, many individuals fail to plan for flood loss by
purchasing insurance.
A. PROVIDER PERILS
Three well-known obstacles complicate the provision of flood
insurance: correlation, adverse selection, and moral hazard. Universal
116

See MOSS, supra note 19, at 262 (describing failed private flood insurance
experiments of the 1890s and 1920s); Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 857
(arguing that “major disasters . . . require significant federal involvement for
response and recovery”).
117
See Boardman, supra note 19, at 828 (“The primary problem for flood
insurance is cost, not calculation.”); Scales, supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that
flood insurance “suffers from unusual demand- and supply-side constraints that
make it a relatively difficult market for insurers, and they have responded
rationally by avoiding it”).
118
See infra Part III.B for a discussion of possible explanations rooted in
cognitive psychology; see also Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 239 (explaining
that flood loss risks are “underestimated systematically by homeowners in hazardprone areas” and that residents will perceive “actuarially ‘fair’ coverage” as
“overpriced, and will remain uninsured”).
119
See Debra Lyn Bassett, Place, Disasters, and Disability, in LAW AND
RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 51, 64-69 (Robin Paul Malloy
ed., 2009) (discussing rural poverty, including the “vulnerability of the rural
disabled”); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1473 (“Too often, those who suffer
most are the poorest members of society.”); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at
317 (“Inner-city property owners, including businesses and homeowners, selfinsure far more than their counterparts in affluent areas, in part because of
availability problems.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, Still Up on the Roof: Race, Victimology,
and the Response to Hurricane Katrina, in HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA’S
UNNATURAL DISASTER 183, 184-87 (Jeremy I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker, eds.,
2009).
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coverage should provide some relief as to the first and essentially sidestep
the second. Moral hazard is more complicated, and expanded coverage
would likely trigger concern that such coverage increases moral hazard
problems, including environmental impacts.
1. Correlation
Flood losses are typically highly correlated.120 That is, they
generally occur simultaneously for a large swath of individuals. Thus, even
if it is scientifically well established that a particular area suffers from a 1
in 100 chance of a flood in any particular year,121 if this year happens to be
the year, all of the losses will occur at once. An insurance company may
not yet have established sufficient reserves through receipt of premiums to
cover the losses.122 Insurance companies operating within more limited
geographic areas could face an even more concentrated correlation
problem.123
In order to deal with a correlation problem, a commercial insurance
company would have to charge front-loaded premiums to create a large
reserve in case the low probability event occurred early in the life of the
120

See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 843 (explaining that flood risks are
“difficult risks” because they are resistant to diversification and are highly
correlated).
121
Complete statistical accuracy is, in fact, unlikely given the state of current
flood maps. See supra Part II.C. Such ambiguity would likely further increase the
premium. See Howard Kunreuther et al., Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71, 72 (2003) (describing survey data revealing that
ambiguity in either probability of a loss or amount of loss results in “recommended
premiums” that are “considerably higher”); Scales, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing
ambiguity premium).
122
For-profit insurers will create insurance pools only if the contingencies are
statistically predictable with respect to the pool as a whole but occur randomly
with respect to any one contributor. The larger the pool of insureds, the more likely
it is that the actuarial predictions will be sound and provide an adequate basis for
calculating the premiums needed to cover the promised payouts and also yield a
profit to the insurance company. See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 842-43
(describing insurance pools).
123
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 65; Scales, supra note 6,
11 & n.30 (while cross-subsidization is possible, insurance companies oppose
cross-subsidies whether between geographically distinct subsidiaries or between
types of insurance (e.g., auto subsidizing casualty)); see Scales, supra note 6, at 11
(even national insurance companies generally operate through separate subsidiary
companies organized along state lines or even smaller geographic regions).
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risk pool. For example, if a commercial insurance company sought to
create a pool for a flood plain subject to a 1 in 500 chance of a flood in any
particular year, the premiums to establish the reserve would have to be high
even during the early years of the contract in case the current year
happened to be the year in which such a flood occurred.124 Not only would
individuals be unlikely to want to buy insurance requiring high up-front
payments, they would also have such a low probability of receiving any
payout during their lifetime that they would have a difficult time perceiving
any benefit from the coverage.125 Self-insurance would be the general
choice.126
Federal, universal coverage does not, of course, change the pattern
of flood loss. It does, however, allow for greater diversification across
geographic regions and access to non-program resources in particularly
turbulent years. Even with a national program, flood losses can overtake
capacity. This is essentially what happened to the NFIP during the 2005
hurricane season.127 The NFIP met its obligations through its access to
other resources — namely, its borrowing authority.128
2. Adverse Selection
In addition to the need to price for correlation, an insurance
company issuing a hypothetical flood loss policy would also have to price
for a significant adverse selection problem. Adverse selection occurs when
too many of the individuals who purchase coverage do so with certain or

124

With thanks to David Cay Johnston for this example. See Scales, supra
note 6, at 11 (explaining that correlation “induces greater variability in losses,
leading to significantly higher premiums” if an insurance company is even willing
to underwrite such a risk).
125
See infra Part III.B, for a fuller discussion of consumer choices regarding
flood preparation; Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 845 (explaining that “having
no claim” is often viewed as “purchasing a product with little value,
notwithstanding that the person received security against loss”).
126
Proposals to subsidize self-insurance have also been made. For example,
Congress has proposed the creation of catastrophe savings devices — similar to
health savings devices. See Christine L. Agnew, Come Hell and High Water: Can
the Tax Code Solve the Post-Katrina Insurance Crisis?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 701, 738-43 (2007), for a critique of such an approach.
127
See supra Part II.C.
128
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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near-certain knowledge that they will be filing an insurance claim.129 For
example, individuals will be more likely to purchase flood insurance if they
have knowledge that the risk of flood loss is already at the doorstep (or
roof, as the case may be).130 Generally, the problem of adverse selection is
one of information asymmetry.131 With respect to health and life insurance,
this information asymmetry is fairly easy to conceptualize: the insurance
company will not be privy to the private aches and pains of the insured and
may under-price premiums as a result.132 In the case of floods, individuals
would have particularized knowledge about the likelihood of flooding at a
residence, and such knowledge would contribute to a classic adverse
selection problem.
Adverse selection is a common reason advanced for the failure of a
private flood insurance market to develop.133 Universal or mandatory
coverage is the classic solution to adverse selection.134 If everyone is in the
insurance pool, it removes the question of whether some are in the pool
because they have inside information about personal risk. The information
on flood risk developed through the NFIP, however, complicates the
adverse selection picture. As discussed in Part II, part of the NFIP’s
mission is to assess flood risk and make those assessments available to the
public. Thus, individuals can go to a FEMA website to look at flood risk
maps.135 Many of these maps are, as discussed in Part II, incomplete,
difficult to decipher, or out of date, but, presumably, some will be
influenced to purchase flood insurance as a result. Further, the lender
129

See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 19, at 822 (“Adverse selection typically
occurs when insurers cannot distinguish between higher and lower risk
policyholders . . . .”); see also Kaplow, supra note 10, at 543.
130
A vivid example of such delayed response occurred during a flood in
Chesterfield, Missouri, in 1993, when business property owners purchased flood
insurance in response to a flood crest moving down the Missouri River. At the
time, only a five-day waiting period was in place. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note
4, at 1493 (describing the event). Currently, a thirty-day waiting period applies. 42
U.S.C. § 4013(c) (2004); 44 C.F.R. § 61.11(c) (2010).
131
See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 543.
132
Id. at 545.
133
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 135 (noting that private
insurers argued that adverse selection required creation of the NFIP).
134
See MOSS, supra note 19, at 50 (explaining that the ability of government to
compel “broad participation” is “[p]erhaps the most widely recognized justification
for public risk management”); Baker, supra note 20, at 380.
135
Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE
NFIP, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2011, 4:17
PM).
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mandate applies only to high-risk property. Thus, the proportion of floodprone properties among all the properties covered by the NFIP is likely
high.136 This result is not, however, readily ascribed to a classic adverse
selection problem given that general flood risk information is primarily
controlled and distributed by the government-insurer and is then used to
enforce the lender mandate.137
Private insurers would also have access to information about
general flood risk and would, presumably, act in their own self-interest
with two possible scenarios emerging. The first scenario assumes that
demand is strongest among those with high-risk property and that as a
result the insurance companies would have to charge higher premiums so
as to account for high-risk property. Higher premiums could drive out
lower-risk properties, necessitating premium increases, driving more lowerrisk properties out — i.e., the replication of an adverse selection death
spiral.138 This cycle could prevent formation of a robust, private flood
insurance option.139 A second, arguably more plausible, possibility is that
insurance companies would use their superior ability to assess risk to limit
coverage only to those at lower risk of suffering damage in what has
become known as a reverse information asymmetry problem.140 As a result,
higher-risk property would not be covered at all — a situation that would
be incompatible with a goal of providing a stable flood loss safety net,
136

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5.
See Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggerman, Catastrophic Risks and
First-party Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 27 (2008) (under adverse selection
information asymmetry “insurers must be unable to identify high-risk buyers”).
138
See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 544; Scales, supra note 6, at 9 (suggesting
that adverse selection “death spirals” occurring in the flood area is a possibility
with “unique plausibility”). Cf. Faure & Bruggerman, supra note 137, at 26-27
(classic adverse selection “is not a serious problem” with respect to catastrophic
losses); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (refuting the long-held notion that adverse
selection within insurance markets will inevitably lead to a collapse).
139
Baker, supra note 20, at 378 (pointing out that this cycle illustrates that
both insurer-side and insured-side adverse selection are at work).
140
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 135 (describing that in
the hurricane context, insurance companies may have the informational advantage
“if insurance companies spend a lot of resources estimating the risk (which they do
today)” and explaining that “[r]esearch . . . reveals that insurers might want to
exploit this reverse information asymmetry, which results in low-risk individuals
being optimally covered, while high-risk individuals are not”); see Baker, supra
note 20, at 378.
137
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though one that could lead to post-flood government intervention, at least
as to dramatic flood events.141
3. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is the term used for the notion that individuals will
engage in cost-increasing behavior if they are able to shift some of the cost
away from themselves.142 Since moral hazard is a potential side-effect of
cost-shifting, moral hazard is a possible consequence of any opportunity for
cost-shifting — whether insurance, post-disaster assistance, or even
casualty loss tax deductions. While universal coverage helps solve the
adverse selection problem, concerns about moral hazard could loom larger
because of the increased opportunities for cost-shifting that would come
with universal coverage.
An important assumption underlying the moral hazard concept is
that an individual has a consistent cost tolerance with respect to a particular
risk. If part of the cost has been shifted to another party, the benefitted
individual will rationally engage in less careful behavior up until the point
that the expected, unshifted costs reach that individual’s tolerance
threshold.143 For example, a person with auto insurance would drive
incrementally more recklessly than someone without insurance and, in
theory, would set the level of additional recklessness so that any resulting
damage would be adequately compensated by the policy and would not
result in unanticipated, irreparable damage to person or property.144
Insurers use various mechanisms to limit moral hazard, but the two
most common monetary methods are co-pays and deductibles.145 These
141

See infra Part III.B.
KENNETH BLACK, JR., & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE & HEALTH
INSURANCE 11 (13th ed. 2000).
143
See Baker, supra note 21, at 270.
144
See id. at 276-78 (explaining that an assumption underlying the economics
of moral hazard is that “money compensates for loss” when in fact “money cannot
restore the sense of security lost when a storm destroys a home . . . or, indeed,
much of what is important in life”).
145
See Boardman, supra note 19, at 841 (noting that “moral hazard is always
tempered by the extent to which the policyholder remains on the risk, through
deductibles, caps, and the uncertainty of a compliant insurer”); Johnson et al.,
supra note 11, at 232 (“The most common mechanism for controlling moral hazard
is a deductible . . . .”); KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 99
(discussing NFIP deductibles and stating that “the majority of homeowners prefer a
lower deductible”). The NFIP does use deductibles, but since the rates are not
142

28

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

devices are intended to shift just enough pain back to the individuals so that
they are more reluctant to engage in the cost-increasing behavior. Even
though co-pays and deductibles are usually quite small relative to the costs
that are covered by the insurance policy, out-of-pocket costs are fixed,
certain losses that individuals may be particularly prone to shun.146 Indeed,
setting co-pays too high may increase rather than decrease moral hazard by
over-deterring individuals from seeking benefits. For example, if an
individual puts off medical care to avoid a co-payment, the cost of the later
treatment may be much higher.147
In addition to using the pain of out-of-pocket costs to control for
moral hazard loss, insurers may also monitor the behavior of insured
individuals and thereby require a particular level of care.148 Direct
observation of the day-to-day behavior of individuals can be costly, but for
many types of coverage, insurance companies have devised methods for
indirect monitoring, including reliance on monitoring devices (e.g., fire
alarms) or third parties (e.g., doctors).149 The NFIP requires community
adherence to floodplain regulations to increase care and lower the costs of
flood loss.150 Premium rebates or adjustments could be used as monetary
rewards for easily measured good behavior — e.g., an absence of claims on
the policy.151
In the case of flood loss compensation for individuals, the primary
moral hazard concerns arise with respect to how individuals store their
personal possessions, how individuals construct and maintain their homes,
actuarially sound, these deductibles may not have the desired effect. The NFIP also
limits payouts to the value of the damaged property instead of allowing for
payment tied to replacement cost, unless the damage is to a primary residence and
its contents. See also supra Part II.C.
146
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 33-34 (2008) (discussing
loss aversion). See also infra Part III.B (discussing how consumer cognitive
perceptions affect flood loss coverage).
147
ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL
RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY (2011).
148
Baker, supra note 21, at 280-81.
149
Id.
150
See supra Part II.A.
151
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238; Baker, supra note 21, at
270 (discussing that for some types of moral hazard, observational monitoring is
more critical — for example, if the insurance reduces “the incentive to minimize
the cost of recovering from a loss,” e.g., the “malingering aspect of the disability
insurance temptation problem”).
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and where individuals choose to live. Coverage expansion would trigger
concerns about exponentially increased moral hazard costs, particularly
environmental costs associated with increased development. Expansion of
social safety net coverage for individual homeowners and renters could,
however, have less of an effect on moral hazard costs than may appear
upon first consideration because the assumptions underlying moral hazard
analysis are less likely to hold true as to social safety net coverage for
primary residences. 152
In his work excavating the historical and theoretical landscape of
moral hazard, Professor Tom Baker outlined several assumptions behind
classic moral hazard analysis.153 The realities of flood loss suggest that
several of these assumptions do not hold true, particularly as to an
individual’s primary residence. Moral hazard analysis assumes that “money
compensates for loss.”154 While loss of a vacation home may come close to
being compensable by money, the loss of a primary home and its contents
is far less likely to satisfy this condition.155
Another assumption underlying moral hazard is that “people with
insurance have control over themselves and their property.”156 Of course,
individuals have some choice over where to live, but, for many individuals,
such choices will be constrained by many factors, including financial and
social. Further, in the case of flood loss, any particular individual is likely
to be far removed from decisions involving flood plain regulation and

152

See Baker, supra note 21, at 240 (“By ‘proving’ that helping people has
harmful consequences, the economics of moral hazard justify the abandonment of
legal rules and social policies that try to help the less fortunate.”); Kunreuther &
Pauly, supra note 70, at 108 (“If consumers generally ignore both loss probabilities
and potential government assistance in deciding whether or not to buy insurance
and how much insurance to purchase, . . . [p]ublic intervention based on our
concern for fellow citizens can be straightforward: provide as much assistance as
our conscience dictates to fill in the observed gaps in coverage . . . If such choices
represent outcomes that are incomplete or inefficient according to the ‘selfish’
expected utility model, it is irrelevant because people are not using this model of
choice anyway.”). But see Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 10, at 104 (describing
the “perverse incentive effects” of post-disaster relief as “severely exacerbating
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in locational decisions”).
153
Baker, supra note 21, at 276.
154
Id.
155
See id. at 276-78 (“[Money cannot restore the sense of security lost when a
storm destroys a home . . . or, indeed, much of what is important in life.”).
156
Id. at 276.
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development.157 Expansion of flood insurance to all primary residences
would potentially affect the care taken by residential developers and
landlords,158 but such effects could be handled directly rather than being
used as a reason for denying social benefits to more vulnerable
individuals.159
Moral hazard analysis depends also on individuals being “rational
loss minimizers.”160 As will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section, there is reason to believe that a great many individuals fail to act
rationally with respect to flood loss. If individuals have difficulty
understanding and planning for flood risk, they may also have trouble
engaging in the calculated, care reducing behavior assumed by moral
hazard analysis. Of course, some individuals will strategically engage in
less careful behavior. For example, under the NFIP, the extent of repetitive
loss, particularly for second homes,161 as well as the concentration of
coverage in high-risk areas could suggest a moral hazard problem.162 But
the concentration of policies in high-risk areas could also be attributable in
part to the lender mandate163 or to adverse selection.164
The moral hazard effects of flood insurance expansion also depend
on the extent to which post-disaster relief already stands in for universal
coverage.165 Post-disaster relief operates to shift risk and thus raises moral
157

See id. at 279 (“If the people exposed to the insurance incentive are not in
control of the behavior that matters, then reducing the insurance incentive will
impose a cost on those people while providing little benefit . . . .”).
158
The problem of business flood loss coverage will be addressed in a
subsequent article.
159
See Baker, supra note 21, at 240 (“[C]onventional economic accounts of
moral hazard exaggerate the incentive effects of real-world insurance and, at the
same time, underestimate the social benefits of insurance.”).
160
Id. at 276.
161
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (The CBO
“found that many subsidized properties in coastal areas (23 percent from their
sample of 10,000 properties) were second homes, vacation homes, or rentals.”).
162
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 93-94 (A study
undertaken by Professors Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan of the Florida market
revealed that five counties in Florida accounted for two-thirds of the flood policies
in Florida; these counties were coastal counties whereas the five counties with the
lowest number of policies were located well inland.).
163
See supra Part II.B.
164
See supra Part III.A.2.
165
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 152 (“The prevailing public impression is
that federal disaster assistance is generally equivalent to the financial protection
provided by hazard insurance. In reality this is not the case.”).
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hazard concerns similar to those of ex ante coverage.166 Post-disaster relief
for large flood events is virtually guaranteed,167 and even for smaller scale
events, various tax provisions operate to shift some of the risk.168 As with
flood insurance coverage, the moral hazard story for post-disaster
assistance also depends, however, on assumptions that may not hold true
for flood loss. For example, the patchwork nature169 of available postdisaster relief may make being a “rational loss minimizer” even more
difficult.170
Given the history of flood loss in the United States, there seems
little doubt that more care should be taken in land use and development.171
At the same time, however, it is less clear the extent to which classic moral
hazard analysis satisfactorily explains the problem, particularly if the focus
is on individual homeowners and renters. Even if flood loss protection does
not fit neatly into a classic moral hazard frame, the problem of unwise,
environmentally harmful development remains. The inability of individuals
to plan carefully for flood loss suggests that steps for greater care,
including not only mitigation but prohibitions, must be express and be
backed by strong incentives or even mandates. Expansion of social safety
net coverage could provide an opportunity to craft such incentives and to

166

See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 281 (“[E]xpectation of federal
relief has almost certainly increased the willingness of some individuals and
businesses to locate or remain in disaster prone areas.”).
167
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (“[T]he driving
force in the provision of government assistance, is the occurrence of large-scale
losses.”).
168
See infra Part V.
169
See infra Part III.B (discussion of problems associated with post-disaster
relief).
170
Baker, supra note 21, at 276; see also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN,
supra note 6, at 122 (Empirical work on post-disaster relief suggests that
“individuals or communities have not based their protective decisions in advance
of a disaster by focusing on the expectation of government assistance.” Professors
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan cite studies suggesting that “most homeowners in
earthquake- and hurricane-prone areas did not expect to receive aid from the
federal government following a disaster” and that “local governments that received
disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses from future disasters than
those who did not.” Professors Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan conclude “this
behavior seems counterintuitive, and the reasons for it are not fully understood.”).
171
See generally Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4; KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra
note 7.
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enlist homeowners and renters in reducing harm caused by developers and
other real property businesses, such as landlords.172
B. DEMAND AND ITS DISCONTENTS
The central demand puzzle is why so many homeowners and
renters fail to purchase or under-purchase flood insurance, even though it is
a bargain. Examples of this puzzle can be gleaned from news accounts of
recent flooding. In June 2011, the Souris River rose and caused massive
flooding in Minot, North Dakota.173 The river had previously seemed
nonthreatening after numerous public works initiatives had reduced flood
risk.174 In 2000, the federal government had moved the flood risk
assessment level outside the high risk category, which meant that lenders
no longer had to enforce the mandate to purchase flood insurance.175
Although residents remained eligible to participate in flood insurance and
were counseled by federal officials to maintain their policies, a large
number dropped coverage.176 At the time of the flooding, an estimated one
in ten had flood insurance.177 In 2011, only 476 residents had flood
insurance policies; just one year earlier, 959 residents had flood
insurance.178 The combination of public works projects, lowered risk
assessment, removal of the mandate, and financial pressures inexorably led
individuals to stop worrying about floods.179 As one resident put it, “I
didn’t have any concerns. . . . It was not going to happen to me. I was in
complete denial.”180
172

See MOSS, supra note 19, at 50-51 (“[G]overnment enjoys a considerable
advantage over private insurers when it comes to monitoring and controlling moral
hazard directly.”).
173
A.G. Sulzberger, They Dropped Their Flood Insurance, Then the ‘Mouse’
Roared, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, at A13.
174
Id. (“[T]he once flood-prone river—known locally as the Mouse, after its
French name—had seemingly been tamed by public works projects that reshaped
the channel, raised the banks and controlled the flow of water . . . .”).
175
Id.; see supra Part II.B (discussing lender mandate).
176
See Sulzberger, supra note 171.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. (“[A]nother problem facing residents of Minot is a consequence not of
failing to control the river but of decades of doing so successfully. . . . ‘Some
citizens have been lulled into a false sense of security because we have had such
good results,’ said . . . the City Council president.”).
180
Id. (statement by a real estate agent married to a firefighter).
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This response to the possibility of flood loss is not unusual. Even
though the NFIP provides flood insurance at low rates,181 many individuals
still do not purchase it.182 The study of financial preparedness, including the
problem of underinsurance,183 has increasingly become intertwined with
cognitive considerations such as optimism bias, loss aversion, and timeinconsistent preferences.184 This section briefly reviews some of the
potential contributions of this research to the under-purchase of flood
insurance.

181

See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (“A rational, risk-neutral consumer
would purchase coverage at an actuarially fair price that is equivalent to the
expected loss. . . . In practice, the story is apparently not that simple.”).
182
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (noting that “coverage is
underpurchased by consumers, even when it is heavily subsidized”); Kunreuther &
Pauly, supra note 70, at 103 (“The NFIP . . . provides highly subsidized rates for
existing homes so that any risk-averse individual who made the appropriate
calculations of the expected benefits and costs of purchasing such insurance should
have wanted coverage. In the Louisiana parishes affected by Katrina the
percentage of homeowners with flood insurance ranged from 57.7 percent . . . to
7.3 percent. . . .”).
183
Underinsurance is a problem for virtually all potentially financially
devastating events — for example, death, disability, and casualty. See
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that thirty-eight
percent of “owner-occupied homes with severe wind damage” in the 2005
hurricanes did not have insurance against wind loss); Levmore & Logue, supra
note 4, at 273-74 (discussing problem of underinsurance for life insurance after the
attacks of 9/11); Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 953, 972-73 (2005) (describing fire
underinsurance in California).
184
See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 101-56 (discussing
cognitive glitches and financial decisions); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at
282-83 (stating that “simple underinsurance” may result from “myopia,
overoptimism, bad planning, or passivity.”); Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral
Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325, 336-40 (2011)
(discussing the rational investor versus the real investor); Edward J. McCaffery &
Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL
PUBLIC FINANCE 3,13 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006)
(discussing application of “time-inconsistency models” to savings decisions);
Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 153, 154-68 (Ronald J. Daniels et al., eds.,
2006) (discussing inference bias, forecast bias, procrastination, status quo bias, and
empathy gaps); Scales, supra note 6, at 9-10 (explaining individuals’ tendencies to
respond differently to risks that they view as remote).
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Individuals appear to have difficulty conceptualizing
probabilities.185 For low probability events that carry large costs,
individuals often fail to take minimal, economically rational steps —
purchasing flood insurance, for example. On the other hand, many
individuals over-pay for insurance for events that have more salience —
e.g., warranties for small electronics186 or flight insurance following acts of
or warnings about terrorism.187 Using familiarity as a shortcut for
understanding a given probability may work relatively well in a variety of
situations188 but is problematic for flood events.189 Even individuals
residing in a relatively hazardous area may never have personally
experienced a flood event.190
185

KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 121 (discussing studies
suggesting that people cannot “distinguish between probabilities that ranged from
1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1 million” and that individuals also “did not respond to
insurance premiums as a signal of risk”); Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 845
(discussing lack of demand for coverage of difficult risks as relating to whether the
individual has “past experience with it or know someone else who has endured it”);
Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225-26 (explaining that “consumers may have
distorted perceptions of the size or probability of the risks they face.”). See also
supra Part III.A.3 (discussing assumption of accurate risk assessment underlying
moral hazard analysis).
186
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 78-80 (discussing extended
warranties on small devices and concluding “the extended warranty is a product
that simply should not exist” given various market assumptions).
187
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 226-31 (discussing “distorted beliefs
concerning the probability and size of some potential losses” following from vivid
and dramatic news events, including terrorism). See also KUNREUTHER & MICHELKERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing study finding that “local governments
that received disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses from future
disasters than those who did not”).
188
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 24-26 (discussing cluster of related
mental shortcuts tied to familiarity, including the availability heuristic,
accessibility and salience).
189
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106-07 (discussing how
“[r]ather than using the expected utility model, many residents in hazard prone
areas appear to follow a sequential model of choice” and “[f]or these individuals
only after the occurrence of a disaster does this event assume sufficient salience”).
For example, the purchase of NFIP policies increased dramatically following the
2005 hurricane season. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 87
(750,000 more policies at end of 2007 than in 2005).
190
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 105 (characterizing a “hazardprone area” as one where annual probability of damage “is within the range of 1 in
50 to 1 in 500. So, while the financial losses should such an event occur can be
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Individuals may also be overly optimistic when faced with
probabilistic information.191 Thus, even assuming individuals spend the
time needed to understand flood risk,192 such information may still not be
enough to overcome an optimistic feeling that the event will not actually
happen. As discussed in Part II and also alluded to in the anecdote
beginning this section, public works projects may further contribute to a
false sense of security.193 Individuals who initially purchase a policy may
later cancel because of difficulty in perceiving the benefits of a policy that
has not produced a cash transfer to the insured.194 Flood insurance coverage
may seem superfluous to an individual who has paid for the coverage for
many years but who has yet to file a claim.195 Individuals already feeling
budget constraints will be more prone to seeing the coverage as a luxury
rather than necessity.196 Structuring insurance covering low probability
significant, the great majority of people will not have observed an event close at
hand recently.”).
191
See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 32-33 (discussing
“[u]nrealistic optimism” with respect to statistical risks “to life and health”); Lin,
supra note 184, at 340 (“Despite facts to the contrary, individuals generally have
an overabundance of confidence in their own abilities and an overabundance of
optimism in their futures.”).
192
As discussed supra even expert agencies have difficulty creating and
maintaining accurate flood risk maps. See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at
105 (“[M]any potential victims of disaster perceive the costs of getting information
about the hazard and costs of protection to be so high relative to the expected
benefits that they do not even consider purchasing insurance.”) (citation omitted).
193
See generally supra Part II.A (discussing the unintended consequences
public works projects may have). See also Sulzberger, supra note 173 (“Some
residents said they had misinterpreted these revised flood estimates to mean that
they were no longer at risk. Others said they had just used the lower odds as an
opportunity to save some money.”).
194
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 231-35 (discussing framing effects and
the relative attractiveness of rebates over deductibles). See also THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 36-37 (discussing framing effects and “choice
architects”).
195
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 124 (“People often
purchase flood insurance only after suffering damage in a flood, but many cancel
their policies when several consecutive years pass with no flood.”); Kunreuther &
Pauly, supra note 70, at 107 (stating that there is “empirical evidence that many
homeowners who initially purchase insurance are likely to cancel policies if they
have not made a claim over the course of the next few years”); Scales, supra note
6, at 31 n.108 (“[U]nrealized insurance risks still have substantial value.”).
196
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 105-06 (“[R]eluctance to invest in
protection voluntarily is compounded by budget constraints. For some
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events so that it pays an annual rebate to individuals who have not filed a
claim may help increase policy retention.197
Even if individuals understand that buying insurance would be
economically wise,198 they may decide to wait until tomorrow to make the
purchase given the pain of parting with money today.199 Unfortunately,
individuals tend to keep moving that “tomorrow” forward in time until it
becomes too late.200 Possible contributors to the procrastination
phenomenon include an aversion to parting with cash in exchange for
uncertain benefits201 and a bias toward maintaining one’s current
position.202
homeowners with relatively low incomes, disaster insurance is considered a
discretionary expense. . . . In contrast to the expected utility model where the
demand for insurance depends on the premium relative to the expected loss,
demand appears to depend only on the premium for a given amount of coverage.”).
197
Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 233-35 (describing experiment suggesting
that disability insurance structured to provide rebates would be more attractive than
standard disability insurance). See also BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 145, at 6265 (describing how making transfers of small amounts of food supplies increased
participation in vaccination program — a program that required multiple
treatments and would yield protection benefits that would occur in the future and
be difficult to perceive).
198
The difficulty individuals have in understanding probabilities and coverage
benefits will reinforce the desire to procrastinate. See BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra
note 147, at 154 (“[T]he [procrastination] problem is made even harder when the
insurance is against a catastrophic event: The payout would take place . . . in a
particularly unpleasant future that no one really wants to think about.”); Meyer,
supra note 184, at 164 (“Decisions to invest in protection against low-probability
events are particularly susceptible to procrastination . . . .”).
199
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (explaining that
“some homeowners with relatively low incomes” will perceive disaster insurance
as a “discretionary expense that should be incurred only if residual funds are
available after taking care of what individuals or families consider to be the
necessities of life”).
200
BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 147, at 65 (“Our natural inclination is to
postpone small costs, so that they are borne not by our today self but by our
tomorrow self instead.”); see also Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save
More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112
J. POL. ECON. S164, S167-68 (2004) (discussing the concepts of self-control and
procrastination).
201
See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 33-34 (describing loss
aversion); Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 200, at S169-70 (describing loss aversion
on savings behavior).
202
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 34-35 (discussing status quo bias).
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Pre-commitment devices may solve some types of procrastination
problems.203 The tax system already yields examples of such devices.
Congress codified204 an administrative position205 through which employers
may enroll employees in section 401(k) deferred compensation plan by
default; employees who do not want to participate must then complete an
opt-out procedure. Although employees may fairly easily free themselves
from their bindings, inertia will likely keep most from doing so and will
thereby reduce future regrets over poor planning.206 In addition to this
example of a congressionally crafted technique, numerous individuals save
through the tax system by selecting or sticking with tax withholding rates

203

See McCaffery & Slemrod, supra note 184, at 13 (describing advantages of
“self-commitment devices that limit future choices, like Ulysses did when he
bound himself to the mast as his ship passed the Sirens’ sweet song.”). The extent
to which government should act paternalistically to remedy cognitive flaws is
strongly debated. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 4-11; see
generally Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC
FINANCE 355 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006); Jonathan Klick
& Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive
Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
204
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 902, 120 Stat. 780,
1033. See also Automatic Contribution Arrangements, 74 Fed. Reg. 8200, 8200-02
(Feb. 24, 2009); Notice 2009-65, 2009-39 I.R.B. 413 (Sept. 28, 2009) (sample plan
amendments for adding § 401(k)(13) automatic enrollment features); see generally
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH 329 (Jan. 17, 2007).
205
Rev. Rul. 2000-8, 2000-1 C.B. 617, amplifying & superseding Rev. Rul.
98-30, 1998-1 C.B. 1273.
206
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 107-09; James J. Choi et al.,
Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC
FINANCE 304, 339 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006) (discussing
evidence that employees make savings decisions passively and arguing that
“employers should choose their plan defaults carefully, since these defaults will
strongly influence the retirement preparation of their employees”). See also STAFF
OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 51-52 (June 26, 2008). (“The theory is
that to the extent that these employees are not saving for retirement due to inertia
(simple failure to take initiative), that same failure to take initiative may prevent
them from electing out of the contributions” and will thereby assist “employees
who can and want to save for retirement.”).
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that yield significant, lump sum refunds.207 Even though saving through
withholding seems to make little economic sense because of the foregone
interest, the technique helps individuals resist the temptation to spend the
money elsewhere while providing an easy, virtually painless path to
amassing a usefully large sum.208
In the case of disaster insurance, devices for dealing with lack of
preparation may need to be stronger given the difficulties associated with
processing flood loss probabilities.209 The costs of failure to take mitigation
steps may make a disaster more costly,210 yet the more costly the more
likely it is that aftermath aid will be provided. As discussed in the previous
section, adverse selection also presents a problem against which mandates
provide significant protection. The adverse selection problem could be

207

Fennell, supra note 26, at 148 (“About three-fourths of U.S. taxpayers have
more income tax than necessary withheld . . . or make excess estimated payments. .
. .”) (internal citation omitted).
208
STUART RUTHERFORD, THE POOR AND THEIR MONEY 1-7 (2009)
(discussing need and ways poor amass “usefully large lump sums”). See also
Fennell, supra note 26, at 148-52 (exploring explanations for over-withholding
preference, including its use as a pre-commitment device). The allure of lump
sums may inspire other techniques designed to combat under-saving. Recently, for
example, some U.S. credit unions are attempting to correct savings myopia by
adding a lottery hook. See Melissa Schettini Kearney et al., Making Savers
Winners: An Overview of Prize-linked Savings Products 14-20 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16433) (2010), available at
www.nber.org/papers/w16433 (discussing U.S. market potential and current
offerings); Anne Stuhldreher, Credit Unions Launch a Savings Lottery, and
Everyone Hits the Jackpot, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2010, at B4 (discussing savings
lotteries). Such lottery-linked accounts have been utilized internationally for years.
See Mauro F. Guillén & Adrian E. Tschoegl, Banking on Gambling: Banks and
Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts, 21 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 219, 225-29 (overview
of history, practice, and methods used in various countries); See generally Kearney
et al., supra note 208, at 7-14 (discussing use of programs used internationally).
209
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 103 (discussing evidence suggesting
that people’s beliefs about flood loss cause them to “have no incentive to invest in
protective measures voluntarily”).
210
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 262-63 (discussing
“natural disaster syndrome” as increased vulnerability caused by “cost-effective
loss-reduction measures” and reviewing “extensive evidence that residents in
hazard-prone areas do not undertake loss prevention measures voluntarily”).
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exacerbated by cognitive hurdles if flood loss is salient only for those most
at risk.211
Local, state, and federal officials attempting to plan for overoptimism and probability processing difficulty will themselves be subject
to the same types of cognitive challenges.212 Prior to a flood, government
actors may fail to take protective steps even though cost-benefit analysis
strongly supports action.213 Political pressures to limit spending and keep
taxes low may further dampen efforts to take precautionary measures.214
Yet, in the aftermath of a flood, especially a large-scale event, officials will

211

It is also possible, however, that the problem might be lessened if even
individuals facing the highest risk fail to take action because of various cognitive
hurdles. Further, if individuals only perceive flood loss as salient after an event
occurs, adverse selection may be lower because another event in the near future
may be less likely depending on community response. See KUNREUTHER &
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing study finding “that local
governments that received disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses
from future disasters than those who did not”).
212
See Meyer, supra note 184, at 173 (“[B]enevolent central planning” is
limited in “that it has legitimacy only to the degree that benevolent central
planning is free of the decision biases that it is meant to cure.”); Scales, supra note
6, at 12 (“Governments, like individuals, are subject to many of the cognitive
biases that constrain the development of private catastrophe insurance.”).
213
Burby, supra note 38, at 179 (providing three examples of how local
government (in)action in New Orleans revealed a lack of concern about flooding
hazards, including lobbying by the local government for levees built to resist a
one-hundred-year flood rather than a two-hundred-year flood in order to reduce the
local cost share); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 102 (“Public sector
agencies may also behave in ways that are inconsistent with optimal social policy
by not using the principles of benefit-cost analysis . . . as illustrated by the Corps
of Engineers decision not to strengthen the New Orleans levees.”); Meyer, supra
note 184, at 157 (discussing history of hurricanes in the greater New Orleans area
and noting that “ironically, this success [with Hurricane Camille]—combined with
the lack of storms in the years that followed—seemed to deflate rather than spur
interest in completing the [flood-control] project.”); Nunn, supra note 119, at 18690 (detailing information available to public officials regarding the vulnerability of
New Orleans).
214
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (discussing how
“given short-term reelection considerations, the representative is likely to vote for
measures that allocate taxpayers’ money elsewhere that yield more political
capital. . . . because they believe that their constituents are not worried about these
events occurring”).
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be required to do something215 and may reap political rewards for their
public acts of generosity.216 Reliance on ex post relief may carry with it
significant problems. Relief efforts will depend on the vividness of the
event—and, with respect to government assistance, may also depend on the
proximity of the event to an election.217 If the event is sufficiently large
scale, aid may be relatively plentiful.218 On the other hand, even if a flood
event is catastrophic in the life of a particular family, if the flood is an
isolated occurrence, that family may have little access to outside sources of
support.219 Even in cases of large-scale disasters where aftermath aid is
relatively plentiful, access to the aid may be difficult for individuals to
obtain because the path may not be clear having been put together in a
patchy, ad hoc fashion in a stressful context.220 Lower-income individuals
may suffer in particular. For example, an important post-disaster program
is the availability of low-interest loans from the Small Business
Administration for damaged property, including personal residences and
215

Id. at 262 (“The magnitude of the destruction following a catastrophe often
leads public sector agencies to provide disaster relief to victims even if the
government claimed it had no intention of doing so prior to the event.”). See also,
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 86-87 (1990) (discussing congressional “bias in favor of action over
inaction”).
216
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (“The fact that
politicians can benefit from their generous actions following a disaster raises basic
questions as to the capacity of elected representatives at the local, state, and federal
levels to induce people to adopt protection measures before the next disaster.”).
217
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 123 (describing
research showing that “disaster assistance is more prevalent in presidential election
years, all other things being equal”); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106
(“[T]he amount and terms of the disaster [relief] depend on random political
influences including the proximity of the disaster to the date of the next national
election.”).
218
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106 (“What is well understood is
that large-scale losses from disasters are a driving force with respect to the actual
provision of government relief (citation omitted) . . . .”).
219
See Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation:
A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 61-62 (2006) (discussing
horizontal inequity in comparing relief for large-scale disasters and that for
disasters affecting fewer individuals).
220
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106 (“[T]he combination of low
private insurance and haphazard public disaster relief may lead to inefficiency as
well as high levels of government spending.”).
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effects.221 Low-income individuals are often ineligible for these loans
because of the default risk.222
Costs may be higher with post-disaster assistance—in part because
the cost of administering and obtaining the aid may be more costly because
of lack of pre-planning and in part because the costs may be higher than if
adequate pre-disaster mitigation steps had occurred.223 In the aftermath of a
disaster, the government may overreact by enacting rules that are
inconsistent with other policy goals — tax changes, for example, that have
far larger effects than may have been intended.224 Of course, ex ante
provisions are unlikely to bring the need for aftermath aid down to zero.
Unanticipated problems may emerge and some coverage gaps may remain.

221

KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 19 (describing
program).
222
Id. at 19. See also BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 145, at 151-52
(discussing government intervention in international context and noting “[t]he
government intervenes only in cases of large-scale disasters, not when a buffalo
dies or someone is hit by a car. And even disaster relief is, in most cases, vastly
insufficient by the time it gets to the poor.”).
223
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 262 (noting that the
“combination of underinvestment in protection prior to the event leading to large
disaster losses, together with the general taxpayer financing some of the recovery,
can be critiqued on both efficiency and equity grounds”).
224
See Danshera Cords, Charitable Contributions for Disaster Relief:
Rationalizing Tax Consequences and Victim Benefits, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 427,
434 (2008) (concluding that “Congress should avoid post-disaster temporary tax
legislation as a means to aid disaster relief efforts”); Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra
note 219, at 53-54 (discussing Congressional overreaction and the “legislative
imperative” to act following a disaster and concluding that the results have “been
disappointing, and largely inconsistent with sound tax policy”).
Professors Ellen Aprill and Richard Schmalbeck, for example, have
recommended having Congress adopt joint resolutions declaring a disaster instead
of delegating to the executive branch the responsibility of designating federally
declared disasters because “Congress will likely always feel that it needs to act
when disaster strikes.” Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 95. They have also
recommended creation of a panel to identify categories of relief provisions—some
of which would be available widely and other that should rarely be used. Id. at 9799. Such “[g]uidelines . . . would establish presumptions, obligating a member of
Congress who proposes to disregard them to offer compelling explanations of why
it would be appropriate to do so.” Id.
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In addition, government officials, charities, and individuals will likely still
want to do something to show altruism and support.225
No simple solution exists to deal with the difficulties inherent in
flood loss and floodplain management. The approach proposed in this
Article is one that relies on having multiple pressure points for action and
needed adjustment with respect to flood loss.
IV. NATIONAL FLOOD LOSS SECURITY PROGRAM
The previous two parts outlined some of the reasons supporting the
case for continued government intervention in flood loss relief and for
structuring such intervention to be widely available and focused on limiting
ad hoc, post-disaster decisions. Much more could (and has) been written on
these issues. This section will, however, take as a working assumption that
the benefits of a broad, ex ante approach outweigh its costs and will turn to
discussing the potential benefits of structuring a national flood loss security
program using the powerful tools available through the tax system. This
Part also outlines one possible structure for such an approach.226 Part V
225

Cf. Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 277 (predicting that “public and
charitable relief will more likely be forthcoming if there is (or is perceived to be)
less than full private insurance”).
226
The mechanisms proposed in this Article are aimed directly at individuals
instead of being designed to have an effect on institutions potentially involved in
managing flood risk — e.g., insurance companies and charitable organizations
providing aftermath aid. Thus, for example, this Article does not include
discussion of possible subsidies for insurance companies to aid in the creation of a
commercial flood insurance market. See Agnew, supra note 124 (discussing
proposed legislation aimed at providing tax relief to insurance companies for
catastrophe reserves). Nor does it include discussion of some type of
“supercharged subsidy for charitable gifts”. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4,
at 308-09 (discussing such a proposal in the context of terrorism insurance).
The money to fund flood loss coverage could also be raised through a
consumption tax model. State sales taxes are examples of a consumption tax;
excise taxes on alcohol and cigarettes are federal examples of consumption taxes.
See JOEL SLEMROD AND JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 231-68 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing consumption taxes).
The rate of a consumption tax would, however, be much more difficult, if not
impossible, to tie to a particular individual’s flood risk. It would also be more
difficult to adjust consumption tax rates to take into account an individual’s ability
to pay. For example, imagine that a flood tax were imposed as a national sales tax;
to adjust for flood risk and ability to pay, at each point of sale, a questionnaire
regarding one’s income and location of principal residence would need to be
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discusses how current tax law on disaster relief should be adjusted so as to
harmonize with the creation of a broad flood loss security program.
A. LEVERS OF TAX SYSTEM POWER
Flood loss protection is highly complex and requires attention to
both social safety net concerns and concerns regarding unsafe or unwise
development and construction. Utilizing tax system components to
implement flood loss protection could provide multiple avenues for
addressing this complexity. Use of the tax system would facilitate
implementation of mandates and universal coverage, thus ensuring a
minimum level of coverage for all citizens. Universal coverage would also
help to alleviate adverse selection problems and to resolve the difficulty
individuals have in committing to flood loss prevention. Other tax system
components — refunds and rate adjustments, for example — could be
utilized to make the benefits of having coverage more salient and to
incentivize individuals to engage in mitigation efforts. The tax system
could also be structured so as to harmonize with and reinforce other floodcost reduction programs, including relocation programs.
The strength of the withholding mechanism would facilitate the
collection of premiums.227 Other tax return items — gross income, for
example — could be readily utilized to adjust premiums so as to take into
account an individual’s ability-to-pay. As was discussed in Part II,
premium collection is currently outsourced to private insurance businesses
with highly problematic results. The IRS, in contrast, has a strong record of
enforcement competence and general efficiency.228 Further, the IRS and
completed. While the process could be streamlined through technology — e.g., a
smart card — the administrative and compliance problems of using a sales tax for
such a purpose loom large.
A more realistic consumption tax approach would utilize a low-rate
consumption tax to support a supplemental general catastrophe fund for dealing
with unexpected costs. Such a fund could also provide a focal point for political
involvement in the aftermath of the disaster. See Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note
219, at 93.
227
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 226, at 181 (discussing how withholding
technique is a “major enforcement tool”). But see Richard L. Doernberg, The Case
Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1982) (discussing history of
withholding system and providing a critique of the system).
228
John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and The Federal Income Tax
System, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 162 (2003) (“Efficiency pressures are so
embedded in the organizational culture of the IRS that even strong external
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Treasury already have experience dealing with flood events as it must
enforce several tax rules relating to natural disasters.229
Of course, bringing in the IRS and Treasury will also raise new
concerns. Utilizing these governmental units to implement a social program
could further dilute their mission, particularly revenue collection under the
income tax system.230 The IRS and Treasury already play a significant role
in other social programs, such as retirement planning and health care. In
addition, the Internal Revenue Code contains numerous tax expenditures
and other indirect social programs, such as the earned income tax credit.
The detrimental effects of the addition of one more social program to be
administered in part by the IRS and Treasury is hard to know in advance.
Certainly, implementation of the proposed flood loss security program
would require expansion of the IRS budget, something that is politically
difficult even in less partisan times. On the other hand, if the goal is
universal coverage through a federal program, it is difficult to envision a
government agency or private organization better equipped to handle the
collection of premiums.
The IRS and Treasury would not be the only administrative
agencies tasked with overseeing the proposed program. Flood risk
assessment and oversight of community regulations would still belong to
the agency that currently handles those assessments — i.e., FEMA.231 In
addition, FEMA’s role would need to expand to include claims adjustment,
a function which is currently almost entirely outsourced to private
insurance companies through the WYO program.232 The proposed
program’s heavy reliance on administrative agencies raises concerns

pressures have limited ability to change them.”); John T. Scholz & B. Dan Wood,
Efficiency, Equity, and Politics: Democratic Controls Over the Tax Collector, 43
AMER. J. POL. SCI. 1166, 1184-85 (1999) (finding that “efficiency consistently
provides the dominant influence on audit allocation decisions”). Complaints about
the IRS being too driven by collection may, however, arise as they have in the past.
Scholz, supra at 164-65 (discussing efforts by Congress to discourage “unduly
zealous enforcement”).
229
See infra Part V.
230
For general discussion of IRS mission and history, see Alan H. Plumley &
C. Eugene Steuerle, Ultimate Objectives for the IRS: Balancing Revenue and
Service, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 311 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel
Slemrod, eds., 2004).
231
See supra Part II.C (discussing problems with current FEMA maps).
232
See supra Part II.D.
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regarding agency capture and other agency shortcomings.233 As discussed
in Part II, a case can already be made based on the history of the NFIP that
communities exert too much influence over the updating and enforcement
of new flood maps, and FEMA’s approach to Hurricane Katrina can be
cited as a textbook example of regulatory failure.234 While an in-depth
discussion of agency capture and other potential agency flaws is beyond the
scope of this Article, the proposed system arguably should not be any more
problematic than that under the current NFIP and may even be less
susceptible to such pressures.
Moving to a mandatory, universally applicable system may make
interest group formation more difficult.235 Under the NFIP, communities
opt in to the program, and the availability of flood insurance to individuals
depends on communities agreeing to participate in the NFIP. FEMA
appears to have as an internal goal a focus on individual access and
purchase of flood insurance.236 If that is the case, FEMA may be more
inclined to agree to community demands in order to facilitate that mission
since individual access is available only if the community qualifies as an
NFIP participant.237 If flood insurance purchase is mandatory for
individuals, access to coverage would not be held hostage by community
demands. The rates charged to individuals under the system proposed in
this Article would, however, be adjusted through community adherence to
regulations. Thus, pressure from communities on agencies would continue
to be a factor, but the issue of rate rather than access may be less likely to
233

See MUELLER, supra note 40, at 343-47 (discussing phenomenon of rentseeking through regulation).
234
See supra Parts II.A and C. See also Russell S. Sobel & Pater T Leeson,
Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Public Choice Analysis, 127
PUBLIC CHOICE 55 (2006).
235
See MUELLER, supra note 40, at 475 (“One of the most counterintuitive
predictions of Olson’s theory is that small interest groups are much more effective
at obtaining favors from government than large groups are. . . . In poor countries,
where the agricultural sector is large and the group of middle-class urban dwellers
is small, farmers receive small or even negative subsidies for their products . . .
[but if] farmers make up a tiny fraction of the total workforce, they often receive
giant subsidies.”).
236
See The Official Site of the National Flood Insurance Program,
FLOODSMART.GOV, www.floodsmart.gov.
237
See Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, Local Control of the
Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service,
13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 233, 236 (2003) (discussing the “goal-seeking nature of
bureaucracy”).
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induce capitulation to community pressures. (Of course, communities may
themselves be under greater pressure from their residents as a mandate may
mean that more individuals would take an interest in assuring community
compliance so as to receive the best premium rates possible.)
The involvement of the IRS and Treasury may act as a
counterweight to community pressure and provide monitoring of FEMA.238
Some scholarship suggests that the IRS and Treasury are less susceptible to
capture than other agencies because of the diverse range of interests in the
charge of these agencies.239 In addition, empirical research on IRS
enforcement patterns suggests that the IRS is more influenced by national
trends than by localized politics.240
238

See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 49-58 (2010) (exploring how “shared
responsibilities” among agencies “can either foster or frustrate” agency
independence).
239
Scholz, supra note 228, at 158-59 (“Of all of the specialized enforcement
agencies, the IRS is arguably the most sheltered from direct political influence at
all levels.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci
Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE
L.J. 1165, 1166-67 (1993) (“Tax institutions, because of their greater visibility and
more competitive nature, are less susceptible to interest group capture and possess
greater legitimacy under pluralist criteria than their direct expenditure
equivalents.”).
240
Howard & Nixon, supra note 237, at 233 (“Examining cross-sectional time
series data from 1960 until 1988, we found that the IRS shifts the number of audits
it conducts of businesses versus individuals in response to the prevailing median
ideology of the federal courts of appeals, and in response to the prevailing
ideological framework of the President and Congress.”); Scholz & Wood, supra
note 228, at 1185 (“Partisan responsiveness exerts a somewhat less consistent
influence on audit allocations. State-level partisanship consistently shifts audit
resources away from taxpayers with business income in Republican states, but the
results are less supportive of the partisanship hypothesis for nonbusiness taxpayers.
On the national level, both presidents and Congressional committees influence the
tradeoff between equity and efficiency, with presidential influence being
significant for more categories of taxpayers than committee influence.”); John T.
Scholz & Dan Wood, Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and Public
Administration, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 141, 160 (1998) (“Consistent with past
research on other agencies, the mix of IRS audits also responds to changes in the
presidency as well as changes in the leadership and ideology of members of
congressional oversight committees. On the other hand, the mix of corporate
versus individual audits does not respond to state-level variations in partisanship of
the state’s congressional delegation, governor, presidential vote, or legislature . . . .
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Given the recent series of congressional showdowns over deficits,
social programs, and taxes, enactment of such an expansion over the
current NFIP would face its own hurdles. During the last several years,
Congress has put off dealing with the shortcomings of the NFIP by
enacting short-term extensions of the program.241 Admittedly, the prospects
of a more complete overhaul of the program are relatively dim given the
current political climate. Of particular concern may be the mandatory
aspect of the proposed expansion,242 especially given the litigation
surrounding the mandate contained in the health care legislation.243
Discussion of the constitutionality of the health care mandate is beyond the
scope of this Article, but there is reason to think that the structure proposed
in this Article is less susceptible to such arguments.
The federal government already has a well-established commercial
interest in flood loss protection as evidenced by the NFIP, Army Corps of
Engineers flood mitigation projects, and the provision of aftermath
protection.244 The formation and presence of commercial special interest
groups should also be much lower than was the case with health insurance
given that private insurers have not underwritten flood insurance for
decades, although removal of the WYO payments may cause some
consternation.245 The collection of premiums would be somewhat similar to
that utilized for social security, a program whose constitutionality has been

The picture suggests that earlier reforms have succeeded in insulating field offices
from local influences.”).
241
See supra Part I.
242
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 114 (discussing the prospects of
flood insurance mandate and suggesting “Lower income people will have the
increases cushioned (though not taken away entirely) by subsidies, but the middle
class especially may object to being charged for insurance which they think they
do not need and will never use. How to assemble at least a minimal winning
coalition of citizens to make mandated coverage feasible is a crucial research
topic.”).
243
See Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich.
2010), aff’d 108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-5007 (6th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel Bondi vs.
Health & Human Services, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-724 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 2011 WL 3519178 (11th Cir. 2011).
244
See 42 U.S.C. § 4001-4002 (2006) (congressional findings regarding
economic burdens caused by flood loss). For discussion of the commerce clause as
it relates to the healthcare legislation, compare Thomas More Law Center 108
A.F.T.R. 2d 2011-5007 at 14-15, with Florida ex rel Bondi, 2011 WL 3519178 at
*24-38.
245
See supra Part II.D (discussion of WYO program).
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upheld.246 The premiums would be paid in substantial part as an exchange
for direct coverage rather than being a penalty related to a decision to selfinsure (which has been characterized by critics of the health care mandate
as a tax on doing nothing rather than an income or excise tax).247 The
vividness of recent flood events and the feelings of altruism triggered by
such events may also ease the path to enactment.248 Finally, it may be
possible to invest a portion of the collected revenues (in years of lower
flooding costs) to spur development of private catastrophe coverage — for
example, stimulation of the catastrophe bond market.249
246

See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (employer
portion). For an overview of the current state of the social security system, see
Patricia Dilley, Through the Doughnut Hole: Reimagining the Social Security
Contribution & Benefit Base Limit, 62 ADMIN. LAW REV. 367 (2010).
Although the proposed plan uses the term “premium,” the payments could also
be characterized as a form of income tax under an analysis applied to social
security as well as to the “shared responsibility payment” of the health care
legislation. See Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010) (responsibility payment is a
constitutional income tax); Edward Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, TAX
NOTES 755, 761-62 (Aug. 16, 2010) (the healthcare penalty is a constitutional
income tax and one tied to self-insurance). But see Steven J. Willis & Nakku
Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, TAX NOTES 169 (July 12,
2010) (arguing that penalty is an unconstitutional, unapportioned direct tax —
assuming it is a tax).
Individuals may feel less favorably towards taxes and penalties and more
favorably toward rewards, even if the two structures are economically identical.
Individuals also appear to prefer hidden taxes to obvious taxes. See George
Lowenstein et al., Statistical, Identifiable, and Iconic Victims, in BEHAVIORAL
PUBLIC FINANCE 32, 38-39 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds. 2006)
(discussing the appeal of hidden taxes). In the case of the health care legislation,
using a term that avoided the word “tax” was viewed as disingenuous and
backfired. Use of the term premium should be less problematic in the case of flood
loss protection given that it is paid in exchange for coverage.
247
See Willis & Chung, supra note 246, at 185 (“Congress could require
everyone to purchase flood insurance from the government and charge
appropriately for it.”). See also Kleinbard, supra note 246, at 759 (explaining that
“[T]he Supreme Court has rejected any invitation to distinguish between taxes
designed to influence behavior and taxes designed to raise revenue.”).
248
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 108 (“Concern for our fellow
citizens as well as our own needs should disaster strike home makes us want our
government to help out, and in a democracy the public sector responds.”).
249
With thanks to Yariv Brauner & Tom Lin for this suggestion. For
discussion of catastrophe bonds and other alternative risk transfer instruments, see
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While the costs and hurdles to enactment of universal flood loss
will remain largely unknown until such a program is put into place, the
costs to individuals and communities of continuing with the NFIP and the
ad hoc post-disaster relief are relatively well understood. While this Article
advocates a universal system, if such a system were politically impossible a
scaled-back version of the system proposed herein could still be a
significant improvement over the current approach to flood loss.
B. PROGRAM OUTLINE
Payment into the proposed flood loss security program would be
mandatory for individuals,250 and premium collection would be handled as
much as possible through withholding, with adjustments as necessary
through an individual’s annual income tax return. Calculating the
withholding rate could be simplified by making various default
assumptions, which could be then be adjusted through worksheets
completed with the annual income tax return.251 Preferably, the default
withholding rates should be set so that is more likely that individual
adjustments lead to a refund rather than to the requirement of additional

KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 174-90; see also Scales, supra
note 6, at 46.
250
As discussed supra Part IV.B, for individuals at low risk, the tax could be
made an opt-out program if universal coverage were too politically difficult to
enact. Supra note 24. Using an opt-out regime rather than opt-in would allow for
the strategic use of the status quo bias, as has been allowed for 401(k) plans. See
supra Part III.B. Such opting out could come at the price of losing certain other tax
benefits, such as the casualty loss deduction. See infra Part V.C.
251
Complicated details relating to filing status—e.g., married filing jointly—
would have to be worked out, and that level of detail is beyond the scope of this
project. Working out those details may, however, be smoothed by similarities to
other withholding programs. For example, the flood security tax system would
share similarities with the current system for withholding regular income taxes and
the requirement for estimated payments. See Doernberg, supra note 227, at 595
(discussing history of withholding system and providing a critique of the system).
Self-employed individuals are also required to remit self-employment tax with
their tax form each year. See Patricia Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper:
Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65, n.6 (2000). For a
discussion of the conceptual flaws surrounding the self-employment tax, see
Patricia Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper: Reflections on the Self-Employment
Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65 (2000).
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payments.252 The premium rate would depend on the flood risk loss, the
amount of coverage purchased, and ability to pay.
The flood risk assessment would be tied to the location of the
principal residence.253 Second homes would not be covered, which should
help curb repetitive loss problems and is also in keeping with an approach
focused on provision of a safety net.254 Thus, it will be critical to define
principal residence carefully.255 The tax code already uses this term in other
contexts,256 and the same basic approach as contained in those sections
could be utilized. Thus, an individual’s principal residence would depend
on various factors, including place of employment, length of abode, and
residence of family members. Ownership would not be required,257 though
coverage would then, of course, be limited to possessions. Some
individuals may have difficulty pointing to a principal residence — either
252

See supra Part III.B (discussion of individual preferences for tax refunds).
A rate that varies with location raises the question whether the Uniformity
Clause would present an obstacle to enactment of such a program. The Uniformity
Clause is contained in Article I, section 8, which provides “The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” See
Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 78-84 (discussing the uniformity clause);
Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax
Legislation Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REV. 563, 588-601 (1989). This Article’s
proposals should pass muster under the Ptasynski case. United States v. Ptasynski,
462 U.S. 74 (1983). In that case, Congress imposed an excise tax on crude oil that
varied according to three tiers and that also exempted “Alaskan oil,” which was
defined in terms of a well’s proximity to the Arctic Circle or Alaska-Aleutian
Range and Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Id. at 77-78. The Court explained in dictum,
“[h]ad Congress described this class of oil in nongeographic terms, there would be
no question as to the Act’s constitutionality.” Id. at 86. See Zelenak, supra at 59194 (explaining significance of this dictum and arguing that Supreme Court is likely
to apply it in future cases). The Court upheld the exemption even though it was
framed in geographic terms because “Congress has exercised its considered
judgment with respect to an enormously complex problem.” Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at
86.
254
As will be discussed in greater detail infra, coverage could also be designed
so as to limit repetitive claims with respect to the same structure. See infra notes
277-79 and accompanying text.
255
A procedure for changing the primary residence would have to be put in
place as well.
256
I.R.C. §§ 121, 123, 1033(h) (2006).
257
The regulations promulgated under Code section 123 have a similar
provision. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(c) (as amended in 1980).
253
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because they have two or more regular residences or because they have no
residence at all. Regulations issued under an unrelated provision provide
that taxpayers with more than one residence are generally treated as having
their primary residence as the place where they spend the most time.258 In
the case of flood coverage, in limited circumstances,259 it may make sense
to allow taxpayers to designate a principal residence.260
Once the principal residence has been identified, the flood risk
associated with the principal residence would have to be determined. This
determination clearly presents an administrative burden, but it is one that is
already present even if the current system takes a less visible approach
through the WYO program261 and the lender mandate.262 Risk rate brackets
would be created, and these brackets could be narrowly or loosely tailored.
One possibility is to mimic the current approach under the NFIP and use
broad designations. For example, three brackets — high risk, moderate
risk, and low risk — could be used as an initial matter. The high-risk
category would apply to homes in one- hundred year flood plains or greater
risk, which corresponds to the current high-risk designation in the NFIP.263
The moderate risk category could apply to homes facing a five- hundred
year flood plain risk or greater (but less than the one- hundred year flood
risk).264 All other homes would be low risk.
As discussed in Part II, flood risk assessments have not been
completed (or are badly in need of updating) for many communities.
Individuals with principal residences in such areas would still need to be
assigned to a risk category. Default assignment to the high-risk category
could maximize the possibility that flood risk assessment would be
completed since the individual would have an incentive to pursue
completion of the assessment. It could also forestall complaints about being

258

Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b) (as amended in 2002).
For example, designation could be freely allowed for high-risk residences
but subject to much greater scrutiny if the designation relates to a home in a lowerrisk area.
260
It would be possible for each spouse in a marriage to have a separate
principal residence if, for example, each spouse has a different home for purposes
of the “away from home” requirement of section 162. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006).
Care would be required to keep such an allowance from becoming a means to
circumvent the principal residence requirement.
261
See supra Part II.D.
262
See supra Part I.B.
263
See supra note 59 (discussion of term).
264
See supra note 62 (describing recommendation for 500-year flood plain).
259
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moved from moderate-risk to high-risk.265 At the same time, individuals
may view an assignment to such a category would undoubtedly be viewed
as punitive by many individuals; thus, it may be politically prudent to set
the default for unmapped areas to moderate risk.
Use of risk rate brackets could function as an incentive for
individuals to lower their risk rate by engaging in less risky behavior (or by
influencing their communities to meet guidelines that would also move the
flood plain risk). In theory, if individuals have a choice of moving to a
high-risk or moderate-risk primary residence, all other things being equal,
they should choose the moderate-risk home to lower the taxes. The
brackets could be used in other ways to minimize costly behavior. For
example, an individual who experiences a flood loss and receives a
payment under the program could automatically be moved into a higher
risk category until the individual shows proof of taking adequate
mitigation266 or relocation to a less risky principal residence.
Rebates could be used to reward individuals who engage in hazard
mitigation or have multiple years without a claim. As discussed in Part III,
individuals appear to prefer to have taxes over-withheld so as to receive the
lump-sum tax rebate payment,267 and individuals may also prefer insurance
rebates (coupled with higher base insurance rates) to deductibles.268
Because flood loss is relatively unlikely even for individuals residing in
high-risk zones,269 interim rewards through refunds may help ease the
psychic difficulty of contributing to a system that in most years may be
perceived as not providing a benefit.270 With a national, mandatory
program, individuals may be more likely to understand the probability of
flood loss because flood losses, if looked at using a national perspective,
may appear more salient.271

265

See supra Part II.C (discussing how FEMA has adopted a grandfathering
approach in response to such complaints).
266
Of course, mitigation devices are themselves not without risk. See supra
Part II.A. See also Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1486-89 (discussing the
inadequacies of “engineered flood control”).
267
Fennell, supra note 26, at 148-52.
268
Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238.
269
See supra Part III.B.
270
See supra Part III.B.
271
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 352 (“[W]hen one
expands the lens to include a state or country or the global community,
catastrophic risks have a much higher likelihood of occurring.”).
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Community involvement in flood mitigation would remain a part
of the proposal as mitigation does reduce flood losses (within limits).272
Homes in nonparticipating communities could automatically be treated as
being in a high-risk area, while communities that receive high mitigation
ratings could trigger rate reductions for their residents. Thus, the
Community Rating System, described in Part II, would remain an
important feature of the flood loss landscape.
Risk would not be the only item to affecting rate, and adjustments
would also be made for coverage and income. In order for the program to
function as a social safety net, minimum coverage levels as well as
maximum coverage levels would need to be set. The minimum coverage
level should be tied to local cost of living measures. The maximum
coverage limits under the current NFIP appear generally adequate.273
These limits are $100,000 for personal property and $250,000 for
residential real estate.274 The coverage would apply per residence, so a
married couple sharing the same principal residence would have the same
coverage limits as a single individual residing alone in one principal
residence. Above the minimum coverage level, individuals would be
required to demonstrate actual loss rather than receiving the replacement
value amount.275 A side effect of the proposed flood security plan may be a
decrease in the aftermath relief provided by private sources and through
special legislation.276 Thus, minimum coverage should include payments
for temporary living expense grants.
272

See supra Part II.A. See also Burby, supra note 38, at 182 (“The number of
NFIP insurance claims per capita for compensation of flood damages and the per
capita dollar amount of payments made to settle claims were highest in states that
did not require responsible behavior—neither building code enforcement nor
comprehensive plans—from their local governments. . . .”).
273
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 83 (describing study
of years 2000-2005 suggesting that “almost three-quarters were still below the
$250,000 maximum coverage limit. One reason for this large percentage is that
many homes had property values below this limit.”).
274
See supra Part II.C. This coverage will not, of course, provide a full
recovery for many residences. Individuals with residences worth in excess of the
maximum coverage would be left to seek excess coverage in the private market, to
the extent available. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 41 (noting
that in Katrina some homes covered by flood insurance still suffered large
uninsured losses because of the $250,000 NFIP cap and failure to obtain “excess
coverage from private carriers”). Such a result is, however, consistent with the
safety-net focus of the proposed program.
275
See supra note 75.
276
See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4.
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One possibility for further tamping down repetitive loss would be
to have structural coverage run with the property rather than with the
individual277 and limit the recovery per property to a particular number of
times, through a declining coverage regime, or through a combination of
the two. For example, maximum structural coverage could be reduced in
half to $125,000 for a second occurrence, halved again for a third
occurrence, with coverage disappearing entirely for a fourth occurrence.278
Such a system would add some further complication to the collection
system, and notations would also need to be added to deeds so that
purchasers would not be caught unawares. The threat of coverage removal
would also have to be credible.279 Coupling coverage reductions with
relocation grants may be advisable as may be providing some type of reset
mechanism in the event of community changes.
The amount of tax owed would also be adjusted for income level
— with “income” tied to gross income rather than to “wages”.280 Taxexempt interest should be added back in for a more accurate snapshot of an
individual’s ability to pay.281
Because adjusting for income levels would further complicate the
proposed withholding system, it may be advisable to have fairly broad
categories and then create credits for the poorest individuals. For example,
the withholding rate could remain unchanged from $1 to $250,000, from
$250,000 to $999,999, and finally from $1 million and up.282 Lower income

277

With thanks to Marty McMahon for this suggestion. See also Scales, supra
note 6, at 20 n. 70 (noting that “insurance does not ‘run with the land’” in
discussing lender mandate since “mortgage obligations have a life of their own”).
278
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 264-65 (“In areas
that have suffered multiple catastrophes—say, three or more—nature may be
telling us something: that these locations are naturally much more likely to be
damaged than others.”).
279
See Kydland & Prescott, supra note 45, at 477 (“But the rational agent
knows that, if he and others build houses there, the government will take the
necessary flood-control measures.”).
280
The definition of “wage” may be quite complex. I.R.C. § 3401 (2006).
281
A similar rule applies to the taxation of Social Security benefits. I.R.C. §
86(b)(2)(B) (2006). See Goldin v. Baker, 809 F.2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1987)
(upholding constitutionality of § 86(b)(2)(B)).
282
By comparison, the rate brackets in the general income tax system are more
compressed and the highest rate bracket begins at a fairly low level. See Martin J.
McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993
(2004) (discussing distribution of income tax system brackets).
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individuals could then receive credits to further assist them in participating
in the system.
Adjusting the premium for wealth rather than for gross income
would arguably provide a more accurate picture of an individual’s ability to
pay the tax, particularly since the coverage would be for a wealth loss, but
measuring wealth would be far more difficult than measuring income given
that there is no annually assessed U.S. wealth tax.283 Coverage levels may,
in any case, be a rough proxy for wealth. That is, wealthier individuals may
be more likely to seek to cover the maximum amount of property damage,
and the rate can be increased for larger coverage amounts. As will be
discussed in the next Part, coverage limitations should be enforced directly
but also indirectly through, for example, limitations on the casualty loss
deduction.
V. CHANGES TO THE CODE
Various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code provide
additional risk-shifting from individuals to the government (and then out to
other citizens).284 This section outlines the current tax treatment of: noninsurance benefits received from government or private actors; insurance
proceeds for property loss and for temporary assistance; and losses not
reimbursed by insurance, government, or other private actors.285 As to each
283

For a discussion of wealth taxes, see Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal
Taxes Aare Subject to the Rule of Apportionment under the Constitution?, 11 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 839 (2009); David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive
Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000).
284
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 19-20 (explaining
that federal tax policy on catastrophe losses “affect the risk mitigation incentives of
property owners and insurers’ ability to finance catastrophe losses”); MOSS, supra
note 19 (describing various ways governments intervene in regulating risk).
285
The discussion in the Article centers on those Code provisions aimed most
directly at individuals and their personal property losses, but Congress has in the
past enacted and may again enact other special relief rules in the event of a
disaster, including provisions aimed at business losses. See generally, James
Edward Maule, Tax Incentives for Economically Distressed Areas, in BNA TAX
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO no.597 (2007). Congress may enact business-related
provisions—e.g., enhanced expensing or net operating loss treatment. State and
local governments’ ability to issue bonds may be increased and restrictions on
certain credits, such as the low income housing credit, may be lifted. See I.R.C. §§
1400L-1400Q (2006). Further, charities and charitable deductions may receive
favorable treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 1400L-1400Q. Penalties on retirement account
withdrawals may be lifted and deadlines extended for various tax items. See I.R.C.
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group, this section also discusses changes that may be recommended so as
to harmonize these provisions with the proposed flood loss security
program.286 Such harmonization is achieved through favorable tax
treatment for benefits received under the proposed program and supporting
mitigation grant programs while placing some limits the tax benefits to be
obtained for non-program assistance and strongly limiting the deductibility
of uncompensated flood losses.
A. NON-INSURANCE ASSISTANCE
In the immediate aftermath of a flood, government agencies,
charitable organizations, commercial businesses and individuals frequently
provide temporary aid to the victims. This aid is likely to include fresh
water, meals, hygiene supplies, clothing, transportation, and shelter.287
From a traditional, economic approach to defining income, such items are
arguably taxable increases to the recipients. Not surprisingly given the
circumstances in which these transfers occur, the value of temporary aid for
disaster victims is generally excluded from taxable income, though until
about ten years ago, the path for exclusion depended in large part on
Service rulings288 and was sometimes arguably inconsistent with the
Internal Revenue Code.289
§§ 1400L-1400Q. See also Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219 (providing
overview of relief enacted in response to 2005 hurricane season and attacks of
September 11, 2001); Lipman, supra note 183, at 976-1018 (describing Code
sections aimed at disaster relief).
286
Even in the absence of enactment of the proposed expansion of flood
insurance, these tax sections could be better aligned with the goals of the NFIP and
other flood-related programs. See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6,
at 20 (“[C]urrent tax policy with respect to uninsured disaster losses has received
little attention to date, as it creates disincentives for efficient disaster risk
management.”).
287
Disaster relief grants made to businesses are not addressed in this Article.
For background on such grants, see Notice 2003-18, 2003-1 C.B. 699 (grants to
businesses affected by World Trade Center attacks not excludable as gifts or as
general welfare payments).
288
For example, under these older authorities, if temporary assistance came
from government, it would be treated as a nontaxable, general welfare distribution.
Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840; Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17,18. Not all
governmental transfers are excluded from gross income. For example,
unemployment is included because it is substitute for wages. I.R.C. § 85 (2006).
See also Rev. Rul. 85-29 (Alaska dividend payments are income); J. MARTIN
BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME (9th ed. 2010), at
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225-26 (discussing general welfare rulings). In some cases, use of the general
welfare exclusion was technically problematic. For example, in the aftermath of a
fire caused by the National Park Service, the Service had difficulty determining
whether relief payments that were also a settlement of any claims against the
federal government could qualify under the general welfare exclusion and whether
a distinction should be drawn between insured and uninsured individuals. See infra
Part V.B.1 (discussing Code section 123 which provides a limited exclusion for
payments under insurance contracts for temporary living expense assistance). The
Chief Counsel’s office recommended not taxing any of the payments even though
it could not fully support this administrative position under then-current law. I.R.S.
CCA 200114044; I.R.S. CCA 200114045. A limited exception was made for
amounts “received for luxuries or for living expenses of an individual who has
abandoned efforts to re-occupy a dwelling comparable to the one whose occupancy
or use was denied by the fire.” I.R.S. CCA 200114045.
Individuals would be able to exclude assistance from a charitable
organization or another individual as gifts, so long as the transfer proceeded out of
charitable impulses and without the imposition of quid pro quo conditions. See
I.R.C. § 102(a) (2006); Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
289
In particular, a revenue ruling permitting employees to exclude disaster
relief from employers was particularly problematic because it took the position that
such transfers were not income because “[t]he objective of the corporation is to try
to place the employees in the same economic position, or as near to it as possible,
which they had before the casualty.” Rev. Rul. 131, 1953-2 C.B. 112, 113 (1953),
made obsolete by I.R.C. § 102(c) & I.R.C. § 139. The ruling did not, however,
allow the employees to increase basis in damaged property. Id. at 113-14. The
revenue ruling was issued prior to the Supreme Court’s determination that income
consisted of “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion.” Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426,
431 (1955). But how casualty events should be treated even given an expansive
definition of income remains a matter of debate. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal
Deductions—A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.D.C.L. 1, 37-40 (2002) (arguing that casualty and theft loss deductions should not
be treated as departures from economic income and should not be treated as tax
expenditures by the Joint Committee on Taxation). See also Boris I. Bittker,
Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L.
& ECON. 193, 198 (1973) (arguing that an insistence that there is only one way to
view casualty losses in terms of an income definition is “sheer dogmatism”).
More problematic for the validity of the ruling was the 1986 enactment of
a rule prohibiting an exclusion from gross income for “any amount transferred by
or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee.” I.R.C. § 102(c) (2006);
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2110 § 122(b) (1986). See
also Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (“[T]he payments made by the employer
described in Rev. Rul. 131 do not qualify as gifts under § 102 and are not excluded
from the employees’ gross income under the general welfare exclusion.”).
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In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress amended the
Internal Revenue Code290 to codify partially the Service’s administrative
positions with respect to non-insurance disaster transfers without
supplanting the exclusion for governmental general welfare transfers.291
Currently, the Code provides an exclusion from gross income for a
“qualified disaster relief payment”292 (relief payment) and a “qualified
disaster mitigation payment”293 (mitigation payment). Relief payments are
tied to the immediate aftermath of a disaster while mitigation payments are
grants to be used for improvements that will lessen the extent of future
losses.294 With respect to either type of payment, the Code provides that if
an excludible payment is received, the individual may not use the excluded
funds to take a further deduction or credit.295 In other words, taxpayers may
not obtain two tax benefits for the same dollars.
1. Qualified Disaster Relief Payments
In order to be excluded from income as a qualified disaster relief
payment, the payment must be for “reasonable and necessary personal,
family, living, or funeral expenses” or “reasonable and necessary expenses
Legislation enacted in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, clarifies that payments
made in connection with certain types of disasters are not gross income, regardless
of source of payment (other than insurance payments). I.R.C. § 139. See also
Cords, supra note 224, at 442 (discussing difficulty of excluding payments from
employer to victim-employee “because they did not easily fit within the definition
of a gift”).
290
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134 § 111,
115 Stat. 2427, 2432 (2001).
291
Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (explaining that § 139(b)(4) “codifies
(but does not supplant) the administrative general welfare exclusion”).
292
I.R.C. § 139(b) (2006).
293
I.R.C. § 139(g).
294
See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, JCS- 1-07, at 6 Report JCS-1-07
(explaining that mitigation payments are “grant[ed] to mitigate potential damage
from future hazards” whereas relief payments ally to “certain amounts received by
individuals as a result of a disaster that has occurred”); see 42 U.S.C. §
4011(b)(4)(listing mitigation programs and including properties covered by such
programs in the NFIP); 44 C.F.R. Parts 78-80 (flood mitigation assistance &
grants; property acquisition & relocation for open space).
295
I.R.C. § 139(h) (“[N]o deduction or credit shall be allowed . . . for, or by
reason of, any expenditure to the extent of the amount excluded under [section
139] with respect to such expenditure.”).
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incurred for the repair or rehabilitation of a personal residence or repair or
replacement of its contents.”296 FEMA temporary assistance grants would
be excludible under this authority.297 A qualifying relief payment does not,
however, include payments received under an insurance contract or
compensation for costs that have already been covered by an insurance
contract.298 Payments made under a flood insurance contract are, of course,
296

I.R.C. §§ 139(c)(1)-(2) (2006). In addition, non-governmental payment
must be made in connection with a qualified disaster, which includes a disaster
resulting from a “terroristic or military action” or a federally declared disaster.
These items “terroristic or military action” are in turn defined in Code § 692(c)(2)
and includes “any terroristic activity which a preponderance of the evidence
indicates was directed against the United States or any of its allies” and “any
military action involving the Armed Forces of the United States and resulting from
violence or aggression against the United States or any of its allies (or threat
thereof).” I.R.C. § 692(c)(2). Code section 692(c)(2) goes on to specify that
“’military action’ does not include training exercises.” Id. Code section 139 also
has provisions relating to common carrier disasters (e.g., airline crashes). See
I.R.C. §§ 139(b)(3), 139(c)(3).
A federally declared disaster “means any disaster subsequently determined by
the President of the United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.”
I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(C). The definition of “federally declared disaster” is in a Code
section whose primary effect (an increase in the standard deduction) only applies
to disasters occurring before January 1, 2010. Nevertheless, the definition itself
has not expired. In any case, prior to 2008, section 139 was tied instead to a
“Presidentially declared disaster,” which had virtually the same meaning as the
current “federally declared disaster.” Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax
Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, 3922 Division C, §
706(a)(2)(D)(iv) (2008). In order for a disaster to be considered presidentially
declared, the disaster, “with respect to the area in which the property is located,
resulted in a subsequent determination by the President that such area warrants
assistance by the Federal Government under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act.” I.R.C. § 1033(h)(3) (2006).
Payments from government sources, whether federal, state, or local, are
excluded if made “in connection with a qualified disaster in order to promote the
general welfare.” IRC 139(b)(4). With respect to governmental payments, qualified
disaster is defined more broadly to include “a disaster which is determined by an
applicable Federal, State, or local authority . . . to warrant assistance from the
Federal, State, or local government or agency or instrumentality thereof.” I.R.C. §
139(c)(4).
297
See Lipman, supra note 183, at 962-71.
298
Other than these restrictions related to insurance coverage, the statute does
not require that non-governmental payments must be from a particular source. For
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ultimately made by the federal government, but the statute does not contain
an exception for flood insurance in its requirement that the provision only
applies to payments “not otherwise compensated by insurance.” Since the
NFIP is generally treated as insurance for other purposes,299 and since the
Service has apparently not issued guidance on this issue,300 payouts under
the NFIP should be handled under the tax provisions relating to insurance
recoveries rather than under the exclusion for governmental disaster relief
payments.
For flood losses that occur outside the context of a federally
declared disaster, individuals would be able to exclude transfers from
individuals, charitable organizations, and government by arguing that these
transfers are gifts (if from individuals or charities) or are general welfare
transfers (if from government).301 Thus, the main difference between
treatment of flood losses occurring in federally declared disasters and other
flood losses is that transfers by employers and employer-operated
foundations would be subject to much greater scrutiny and would most
likely be taxable as a matter of positive law (whether the Service would
example, the Service has confirmed that transfers from employers to employees
may be excluded from income by the employees, so long as the requirements of the
Code are met. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (holding that even though
employer transfers to employees do not qualify as gifts or as excludible general
welfare, they may qualify for the section 139 exclusion if the other conditions are
met). See supra note 158 (discussing the problem of employer temporary
assistance payments).
299
See supra Part II.
300
In 2000, the National Park Service caused a fire that destroyed more than
200 residences in New Mexico. The Service’s Office of Chief Counsel issued
informal letters advising the exclusion of the FEMA payments made both to
provide relief for the disaster and to settle any claims an individual might have
against the federal government for the disaster. I.R.S. CCA 200114044; CCA
200114045. In addition, the Office of Chief Counsel further advised that FEMA
reimbursements for NFIP premiums were excludible to the extent the fire caused
taxpayers to need to purchase flood insurance as a result of the fire. I.R.S. CCA
200114046. The Chief Counsel’s Office provided little analysis to support its
“belie[f] that under the unique circumstances . . . the government’s reimbursements
of flood insurance premiums need not be treated as gain.” I.R.S. CCA 200114046.
In any case, none of the Chief Counsel Advice memoranda dealt with flood
insurance contract payments made to compensate for flood loss, and the letters also
pre-date Section 139’s exclusion for qualified relief payments.
301
See Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (discussing treatment of
government, charitable, and employer transfers in context of presidentially
declared disaster).
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pursue such transfers at the individual flood victim level is a different
matter).
The proposed flood loss security program with its mandate may
decrease the extent to which individuals receive aftermath aid from other
sources.302 Post-disaster assistance seems unlikely, however, to dwindle
altogether, and in the case of high-profile events is still likely to be
significant. This Article proposes that the exclusion for post-disaster
assistance should continue given the possibility of unexpected needs and
the administrative difficulty of enforcing an inclusion at a time of crisis.
The exclusion should, however, be made more generous so as to apply with
respect to any flood loss without the need for a federally declared disaster.
The current exclusion is allowed only to the extent amounts are not
already covered by insurance.303 As an enhancement to the social safety net
aspects of the proposed program and for administrative convenience, this
provision could be lifted to the extent of the minimum required coverage
for personal property.304 For example, if the minimum required coverage
for personal possessions were $15,000, individuals could receive a
matching amount from non-insurance sources income-tax free even if there
is some coverage duplication. It would, however, also be advisable to put a
cap on the amount that could be excluded if received from non-government
sources, especially employers. This cap could be set to match the personal
property coverage maximum and would be added to prevent the problem of
disguised compensation but also to avoid the possible creation of a shadow,
government-subsidized system for higher income individuals.305 Of course,
transfers from family and friends that exceed such a maximum amount
would still potentially be excluded from income under the general
provision for gifts.306

302

See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 280 (speculating that if private
insurance covers disaster losses “there is apt to be less sympathy and therefore a
lower probability of public or charitable relief”).
303
See supra Part IV.A.1.
304
This assumes that the proposed program is mandatory at all risk levels. See
supra Part IV.B. If the program is made opt-out for certain categories of risks, the
exclusion for non-insurance assistance should be largely disallowed as to those
who choose to opt-out. This disallowance could help discourage individuals from
opting out. The general gift provision of Code section 102 would still be available.
305
To the extent high-end private flood insurance is (or becomes) available,
payments under the contract would be governed by general provisions applicable
to insurance reimbursements. See infra Part V.B.
306
I.R.C. § 102 (2006).
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2. Qualified Disaster Mitigation Payments.
In addition to aftermath aid, Congress has instituted grant programs
aimed at lessening future flood damage.307 For example, homeowners may
apply for grants to elevate a home.308 In an informal memorandum, the
Service’s Office of the Chief Counsel advised that such payments were
taxable because they were for the mitigation of future disasters and thus
were not the type of relief payments excluded by either the Code or the
administrative general welfare exclusion.309 Congress acted in 2005 to
change this result and provided a retroactive exclusion for these types of
payments.310 In order to qualify for the statutory exclusion, however, the
payments may not be for the sale of the property.311 If the grant is in
substance the purchase of a property, then payments are not excluded and
would instead generate gain or loss according to the difference between the
payment and the individual’s tax investment (i.e., the individual’s adjusted
basis) in her property.312 Taxpayers would be able to defer recognition of
any resulting gain through purchase of qualifying replacement property,313

307

See I.R.S. CCA 200431012, 2004 WL 1701305 (IRC CCA) (describing
mitigation grants authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act and The National Flood Insurance Act); JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, JCS- 1-07.
NFIP flood insurance contract payments would not be excluded as
qualified disaster mitigation payments since the contract payments are
reimbursements for losses that have already occurred and are not made to lessen
future losses.
308
See supra note 292 (mitigation programs).
309
I.R.S. CCA 200431012 (advising that the mitigation payments were not
excludable under Code sections 102, 139, or 1033 or through administrative
practice regarding general welfare or government-created property rights).
310
I.R.C. § 139(g)(3) (2006); Public Law 109-7, § 1(a)(1) (2005). Any hazard
mitigation payment used with respect to property may not also increase the basis in
that property. I.R.C. § 139(g)(3); Pub. L. No. 109-7, 119 Stat. 21 § 1(a)(1) (2005).
Any hazard mitigation payment used with respect to property may not also
increase the basis in that property.
311
I.R.C. § 139(g)(2).
312
I.R.C. § 1001.
313
Code section 1033(k) provides that section 1033 is available for these types
of sales even though these programs are voluntary. I.R.C. § 1033(k). See infra Part
IV.B.2 (describing Code section 1033).
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but any loss would apparently be nondeductible if the payment related to a
residence or other personal-use property.314
The exclusion for hazard mitigation payments should remain in
place315 in order to continue to encourage steps that lessen the costs of
flood loss. Expansion of the benefits of such steps should also be explored.
For example, relocation programs that are the equivalent of a sale could
provide for a loss deduction, if any tax loss results.316
314

If the sale relates to a personal residence, the loss would be a nondeductible
personal loss under the Code. Individuals may deduct casualty and theft losses
even if the underlying asset is a personal-use asset, but any loss generated by the
type of sale described in Code section 139(g) would not qualify. The programs
described in Code section 139(g) are voluntary hazard mitigation programs, so
there is no involuntary taking. See CCA 200431012; Joint Committee Report,
JCA-1-07.
Code section 165(k) does allow taxpayers to take a casualty loss deduction if a
taxpayer is ordered by a governmental entity to demolish or relocate a residence
because it has been rendered unsafe as the result of a federally declared disaster
and the order to demolish occurs not later than the 120th day after the federal
disaster declaration. I.R.C. § 165(k) (2006). Section 165(k) would not apply with
respect to the voluntary hazard mitigation programs currently offered under the
Stafford Act and the Flood Insurance Act. In the absence of section 165(k), it is
less clear whether a government action such as an ordered demolition of an unsafe
building would qualify as a casualty event. See, e.g., Powers v. Commissioner, 36
T.C. 1191 (1961) (no casualty loss deduction allowed for impounding of car by
East Berlin authorities); Washington v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1990-386 (losses
arising out of a court-ordered eviction were not casualty losses). Compare I.R.C. §
280B (disallowing deduction for demolition costs). Eminent domain actions by
federal, state, or local government require, of course, payment of just
compensation. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fl. Dept. Environment’l
Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601-02 (2010) (general discussion of Takings Clause
of U.S. Constitution). Because of the compensation element, section 1033 rather
than section 165 would almost certainly be the applicable provision. Section 1033
is discussed infra Part V.B.2.
315
See supra Part IV.A.2.
316
This could be accomplished either by treating the loss as a casualty loss or
as an investment loss. If treated as a casualty loss, some of the current limitations
on deductibility could be relaxed, as has been done in the past for certain types of
casualty losses. See infra Part V.C. Because the sale would be of a personal
residence, any loss would be nondeductible under current law, so legislation would
also be required for such a loss to qualify as an investment loss. If treated as an
investment loss, the loss would be capital and subject to various timing constraints
on deductibility, which could also be relaxed. See I.R.C. §§ 1211(b), 1212(b)
(limiting capital loss deduction to amount of capital gains plus $3,000, with excess
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Such tax enhancements should, however, require that the
individual move to a low risk home and also require evidence that the home
had a prior history of flooding. Such tax enhancements should, however,
require that the individual move to a low risk home and also require
evidence that the home had a prior history of flooding. A more generous
tax treatment for sale-equivalent relocation may particularly be needed if
coverage of structural components is structured to decrease and eventually
disappear for repetitive loss to the same structure.317 Hazard mitigation
grants could also be used to support adjustments to the premium charged
individuals. In addition to direct grant programs, tax credit programs could
also be enacted to encourage home improvements that would decrease
flood loss.318
B. INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Current tax law divides casualty insurance payouts into two basic
categories: payments for temporary living expenses and payments for
property damage.
1. Temporary Assistance
A limited tax exclusion applies to insurance payments for
temporary living expenses.319 The Code exempts from tax insurance
carried forward). For individuals without capital gains, casualty loss treatment
would provide the lower tax result because casualty losses yield an offset against
ordinary income.
317
See supra Part IV.B.
318
Similar tax credit programs have been enacted with respect to energy
efficient improvements. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25D (2006). See also KUNREUTHER &
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 264 (suggesting tax incentives as a way “to
encourage residents to pursue mitigation measures is to provide tax incentives” and
describing success of an earthquake loss mitigation program established by the city
of Berkeley, California).
319
I.R.C. § 123 (2006). In the absence of Code section 123, such temporary
assistance transfers would be taxable. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(5) (insurance
payments for living expenses are includible in gross income except to the extent
provided for in Code section 123). First, payments for temporary assistance made
by an insurance company to an insured would never qualify as a tax-exempt gift
since such temporary assistance would occur by operation of the insurance contract
instead of out of charitable impulses. Second, since individuals have no deduction
for personal consumption, a non-statutory exclusion of the insurance proceeds for
such consumption would be problematic. I.R.C. § 262. At the same time, the
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reimbursements for “living expenses incurred during such period for
himself and members of his household resulting from the loss of use or
occupancy” if the individual’s principal residence is damaged by casualty
or if the individual is not able to enter his principal residence on
government orders because of the threat of a casualty.320 “Principal
residence” in this context “depends upon all the facts and circumstances in
each case,” and includes also rented residences.321 The exclusion applies
only to living expenses and not to payments made for loss of income or for
lost or damaged property.322 A federally declared disaster is not a
requirement, so this exclusion applies to any casualty event causing
displacement from the principal residence. A taxpayer may exclude the
insurance payment only to the extent the actual expenses incurred during
the displacement exceed the normal expenses that would have been
incurred but were avoided as a result of the casualty.323 As a result, the
exclusion applies only to duplicative and increased living expenses.324
dividing line between insurance premiums and pre-payments for services is not
always clear. For example, purchasers of AAA undoubtedly view roadside
assistance as services for which they have already made payments. Cf. Am. Auto.
Ass’n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 689 (1961); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm’r,
353 U.S. 180, 180 (1957) (membership dues included in income upon receipt).
Discussion of the line between prepayment for services and insurance is beyond
the scope of this Article.
320
I.R.C. § 123(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a).
321
Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(c). Omitted from this definition of “principal
residence” is a link to Code section 121, which provides an exclusion for gains
realized on the sale of a principal residence. In any case, the principal residence
definition in the section 123 regulations is consistent with, if not as nuanced as,
that contained in the section 121 regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b). See
supra Part IV.B (discussing principal residence concept).
322
Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(3).
323
Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(b)(1). The regulations also require that payments
must be traceable to reimbursement for living expenses under the insurance
contract. Thus, if an insured receives a payment on account of lost rental income
and uses it for duplicative living expenses, the payment will not be excluded under
this provision. The regulations contain ratios for determining the extent to which
an insurance reimbursement is for living expenses if there is blanket coverage
rather than identifiable living expense coverage. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(4).
324
For example, if a family spends $800 per month normally on food cooked
in the residence but is now forced to spend $1,200 on restaurant meals but spends
nothing on cooking food, only a maximum of $400 could be excluded for
increased food costs. All the living expenses are considered in the aggregate, so
this $400 increase might be offset by decreases elsewhere—for example, by a
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This limitation is not lifted even if the triggering event is a
federally declared disaster. In at least one instance, the Service’s Office of
Chief Counsel has, however, advised against implementing the limitation
and instead advised field agents to apply a blanket exclusion for all living
expense reimbursements other than those for “luxuries or for living
expenses of an individual who has abandoned efforts to re-occupy a
[comparable] dwelling.”325 The Chief Counsel Advice memorandum may
not be used as precedent and was given in response to a disaster triggered
by the actions of the National Park Service.326 Still, the memorandum
perhaps provides some indication of the relative zeal with which the
Service will audit those claiming exclusions for insurance coverage of
temporary living expenses — particularly if the displacement occurs in the
context of a large-scale disaster.
Coverage under the NFIP does not currently cover temporary
living expenses,327 but the proposed program would provide such coverage
and the current exclusion would thereby become applicable. The limitation
relating to the need for duplicative costs should be lifted with respect to
flood program payments for the same reasons that non-insurance amounts
should be excluded up to a certain point: to further safety net goals and to
reduce administrative complexity.328 An exception for luxuries, as
suggested in the Chief Counsel Advice described above, should not be
necessary because the amount of coverage for temporary living expenses
would be statutorily capped at an amount tied to meeting basic needs.
2. Property Loss Reimbursement
It may seem counterintuitive that a catastrophe could give rise to a
tax liability, but such is the case if reimbursements for property exceed the
taxpayer’s investment in the property. For example, if an individual
purchased a painting for $100,000 many years ago and receives $300,000
reduction in commuting costs. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(b)(4) Ex. 1. Professor Lipman
has noted that even though these provisions are strict on their face “in practice they
may have little application. Homeowner’s insurance coverage generally only
reimburses a homeowner for additional living expenses, which is defined
consistently with the exclusion provision.” Lipman, supra note 181, at 984-85.
325
I.R.S. TECH. ADV. MEM. 200114045 (Mar. 29, 2001).
326
Id.
327
See NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, National Flood Insurance Program
Summary of Coverage, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/residential_co
verage/whats_covered.jsp.
328
See supra Part V.A.1.
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in insurance proceeds for the painting, the individual would recognize
$200,000 of casualty gain. The Code permits taxpayers to elect to defer
paying taxes on such casualty gains by purchasing replacement property.329
The replacement property must be “similar or related in service or use” to
the original, destroyed property.330 The gain is deferred rather than
completely excluded by treating the taxpayer as though his investment in
the replacement property is carried over from the destroyed property.331
As discussed above, property purchased as part of a hazard
mitigation program is eligible for deferral of any gain on the sale.332 A
special rule also applies to principal residences that are “compulsorily or
involuntarily converted as a result of a Presidentially declared disaster”333:
taxpayers receive a full exclusion for insurance proceeds received for
unscheduled property without the need to purchase replacement property.334
The extent to which household contents are treated as unscheduled property
will depend on the particular insurance contract. In general, only assets of
relatively high value (e.g., jewelry, artwork) will be separately scheduled,
and all other household property will be treated as a single asset.335 The
329

I.R.C. § 1033 (2006).
I.R.C. §§ 1033(a)(1)-(2). See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 30.03[3]-[5] (3d ed. & 2010 cumulative supplement)
(discussing this requirement).
331
I.R.C. § 1033(b).
332
See supra Part V.A.2.
333
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1) (2006). The definition for principal residence is tied to
section 121 through a cross-reference, although a home may qualify even if rented
rather than owned. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(4). See supra Part IV.B.
Section 121, which provides a generous exclusion for gain on the sale of a
principal residence if various eligibility requirements are met, may also be
available. I.R.C. § 121(d)(5) (amount realized on involuntary conversion of
principal residence is reduced by amount of section 121 exclusion).
Because sales pursuant to a hazard mitigation program are not in response to a
federally declared disaster but are instead aimed at lessening future losses,
presumably Code section 1033(h)(1) does not apply to mitigation sales. A special
rule expanding the scope of qualifying replacement property also applies to trade,
business, or investment property converted as a result of a federally declared
disaster. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(2).
334
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006). See also Rev. Rul. 95-22, 1995-1 C.B.
145.
335
See Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145(containing example situation in
which general household furnishings were unscheduled while jewelry and sterling
silverware were separately scheduled). The IRS Chief Counsel has advised in an
informal memorandum that the exclusion will apply even to property not kept at
330
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principal residence (if owned) and any separately scheduled contents are
treated as a single asset for purposes of calculating gain and applying the
deferral provision.336 In addition, the replacement property may be anything
“which is similar or related in service or use to the residence so
converted”— or its contents.337
Thus, for example, consider a taxpayer whose rented residence and
its contents are destroyed in a federally declared disaster and who receives
$40,000 of insurance proceeds for unscheduled household items and
$10,000 for scheduled jewelry. All $40,000 of the proceeds received for the
unscheduled household items will be excluded from income even if no
replacement property is purchased.338 If the taxpayer originally purchased
the jewelry for $8,000, the $2,000 gain arising from the $10,000 insurance
payment can be deferred through purchase of $10,000 of replacement
property. The replacement property may be jewelry but it may also be any
household-related item — e.g., linens, dishes, furniture.339
These provisions should be expanded to cover all flood-related
reimbursement received under the proposed program. Coverage for
personal possessions would be treated as payment for unscheduled property
and thus any gain would be excluded from income. The exclusion for gain
resulting from reimbursement for unscheduled property is not, however, as
generous as it appears on its face. That is because it will be relatively rare
for a taxpayer to have a gain for typical, unscheduled household
furnishings, which generally go down in value after purchase. If insurance
the principal residence so long as the property was covered by the contract and was
lost in the federally declared disaster (e.g., property in a car). I.R.S. TECH. ADV.
MEM. 200114046 (Apr. 2, 2001).
336
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). Presumably the section 121
adjustment would apply to this aggregated asset, assuming the other qualifications
of section 121 are met. I.R.C. § 121(d)(5). The adjustment reduces the amount
realized from insurance by the amount excluded under section 121. Thus, for
example, if $700,000 is received under an insurance contract for a qualifying
principal residence by a couple filing a joint return, section 1033 is applied as
though only $200,000 of insurance proceeds were received. I.R.C. § 121(a)-(b),
(d)(5).
337
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii)(II). The time for purchasing the replacement
property is also increased from two to four years. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(B).
338
Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145 (no gain recognized “upon the receipt of
insurance proceeds for unscheduled contents destroyed in such a disaster,
regardless of the use to which the taxpayer puts those proceeds”).
339
See Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145 (“[A]ny type of replacement contents
(whether separately scheduled or unscheduled)” qualifies as replacement property
for separately scheduled contents).
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proceeds are insufficient to reimburse a taxpayer for his investment in the
property, the taxpayer will have a loss. For example, if a taxpayer
purchased an asset for $10,000 but receives only a $6,000 insurance
recovery, the taxpayer has $4,000 tax loss. Whether such a loss is or
should be deductible is considered below.
C. UNREIMBURSED LOSSES
Losses that arise from the disposition of personal-use assets are
generally nondeductible.340 Taxpayers may, however, take a limited
deduction if the loss is caused by a casualty event or theft and is not
compensated for by insurance or through some other means.341 The
calculation of the casualty loss deduction is complex and requires a series
of steps, each of which potentially serves to limit the size of a deduction.342
340

I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2006).
Whether an event constitutes a casualty event or theft loss is itself a
difficult issue to resolve. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 330, at ¶¶ 24.02-.03;
BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 288, at 530-33.
342
First, the amount of the loss is limited to the lesser of the taxpayer’s
investment in the asset or the decline in value of the asset. Treas. Reg. § 1.1657(b)(1). Thus, for example, if a taxpayer spent $10,000 for an asset but the asset
was worth only $7,000 when it was destroyed in a flood, the amount of the
potential casualty loss would be limited to $7,000. Second, the loss is reduced by
the extent to which an individual receives compensation for the loss (whether
through insurance or otherwise). I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d).
If the taxpayer received $6,000 in insurance proceeds, his potential casualty loss
deduction would be further reduced to $1,000.
Third, the Code disallows the first $100 of casualty loss stemming from a
casualty event or theft. In the case of the example, the taxpayer’s potential casualty
loss deduction would be reduced to $900. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1). This $100 amount
was temporarily raised to $500 during 2009. Tax Extenders and Alternative
Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, Division C, § 706(c), 122 Stat.
3921-3923.
Fourth, the sustained casualty losses for the year are aggregated and applied
first against the aggregate of any casualty gains for the year. I.R.C. §
165(h)(2)(A)(i). For example, if the taxpayer has a $400 gain resulting from an
unrelated theft, only $500 would remain as the net casualty loss. If the taxpayer
elects to defer the gain under section 1033, then the casualty gain is not included in
this netting calculation.
Finally, once the net casualty loss amount is determined, casualty losses are
only deductible to the extent they exceed 10% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii). Thus, if a taxpayer has a $500 potential casualty
341
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For example, losses are only deductible to the extent they exceed ten
percent of adjusted gross income; thus, only relatively large casualty losses
are deductible as a practical matter. In addition, because the casualty loss
deduction is an itemized deduction, the value of the deduction will increase
with higher rate brackets and also will not be available to those who use the
standard deduction rather than itemize.343 The ten-percent-of-adjustedgross-income threshold may, however, still place the deduction out of reach
for individuals with high taxable income. During 2008 and 2009,344
casualty losses caused by a federally declared disaster were less limited as
to amount345 and could also be used without the need to itemize.346
The deduction for casualty losses should be significantly limited, if
not eliminated, for flood losses.347 The deduction creates a shadow system
loss deduction, and the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income is $5,000 or more, no
casualty loss deduction will be permitted.
Even if an amount of net casualty loss remained over the 10% floor, the
taxpayer would only get the benefit of the deduction by electing to itemize his
deductions rather than taking the standard deduction. I.R.C. § 63(b)-(c) (2006). In
2011, the standard deduction for a taxpayer filing as single will be $5,800; for head
of household, $8,500; and for married filing joint, $11,600.
343
For example, at the margin, a $1,000 deduction is worth $350 to someone
in a 35% rate bracket but only $200 to someone in a 20% bracket.
344
I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(B)(i)(I); Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax
Relief Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, Division C, § 706122 Stat. 3921-3923. A similar
measure was also in place in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-73, § 402. See Aprill
& Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 59-60 (discussing temporary change to section
165 for 2005 hurricane season losses).
Legislative proposals have been made to extend or make permanent the
standard deduction increase for net disaster losses. See H.R. 5273, 111th Cong.
(2010); H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2010); and H.R. 4052, 111th Cong. (2009).
345
They were not limited by the ten-percent floor. I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(A)
(2006). Currently, a taxpayer who experiences casualty losses as the result of a
federally declared disaster may elect to deduct the casualty losses on the tax return
for the year preceding the disaster. I.R.C. § 165(i). See also supra note 314
(discussing § 165(k)). Personal casualty losses are not carried forward so if there is
not enough income to soak up the casualty loss, any tax benefit to be obtained from
the deduction would be lost. A taxpayer whose income fell as a result of the
federally declared disaster could use the election to move the deduction to a year in
which the taxpayer had income against which to offset the deduction.
346
The Code section did so by increasing the standard deduction. I.R.C. §
63(c)(2) (2006).
347
Sorting costs would need to be taken into account. See Levmore & Logue,
supra note 4, at 321-22 (discussing sorting costs that would result from

2011

MANAGING THE NEXT DELUGE

71

of government reimbursement for flood loss, but one that offers patchy,
difficult-to-understand coverage.348 Individuals may overestimate its
benefits, which may in turn contribute to less care with respect to purchase
decisions.349 For example, a relatively wealthy individual may purchase a
$400,000 beach house, purchase the maximum NFIP policy on the home,
and assume that the remaining $150,000 loss would be deductible should
the home be destroyed in a flood. But if the individual’s adjusted gross
income were $750,000, only approximately half of the $150,000 loss would
be deductible.350 As discussed in Part III, flood loss is difficult for
individuals to conceptualize, so the effect of this shadow system may be
relatively small. At the same time, individuals who itemize and who have
the ability to purchase that second vacation home may be particularly
tempted to believe that there is little personal downside to such a purchase
given the combination of the NFIP and the casualty loss deduction.
Eliminating the casualty loss deduction for flood-related costs
altogether would, however, likely be politically impractical. One possible
compromise would be to allow the loss deduction but only for flood losses
occurring at the principal residence and only for a limited dollar amount.
The deduction should be accessible even those who do not itemize, and the
ten-percent floor and other limitations should be lifted to provide greater
certainty about the amount to be deducted. For example, the deduction
could be limited to the loss in excess of the purchased coverage and up to
an additional $50,000 for personal property and $125,000 for structural
damage (these amounts are one-half the proposed coverage maximums).
If, however, eligible coverage has been phased out for a structure because
of repetitive claims, the loss deduction should be commensurately reduced.
Elimination of the casualty loss deduction as to second homes and to a
portion of the cost of more expensive homes would still be controversial,

government-sponsored crime insurance that did not cover terrorism). The same
casualty may trigger flood loss, windstorm loss, or possibly even fire loss. In many
cases, the presence of private insurance could simplify the inquiry. For example,
the Code could treat private insurance recoveries as being for losses other than
flood and assigning any residual loss as flood loss.
348
See Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and
Medical Expense Deductions and The Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums,
79 CAL. L.R. 1485 (1991). See also supra Part III.B (discussing difficulties
individuals face in processing flood loss probability and calculating assistance).
349
See Kaplow, supra note 10.
350
Ten percent of $750,000 is $75,000. The deductible amount would be
$74,900 -- $150,000 minus $100 minus $75,000.
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but the program goals of providing a social safety net while limiting
repetitive loss would be better served.
VI. CONCLUSION
Use of tax system components to implement social programs
should not be lightly undertaken. In the case of flood loss mitigation, the
government already plays a central function through both the NFIP and
various tax provisions already in place. Moving flood loss coverage under
the umbrella of the tax law could yield significant benefits, including
increased program efficiencies and better tools for balancing competing
land use goals. Most importantly, a national flood security system would be
a means of providing the least fortunate with a safety net when (not if) the
next unimaginable flood occurs.

A CONCURRENT MESS AND A CALL FOR CLARITY IN
FIRST-PARTY PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE
ANALYSIS
MARK M. BELL*
***
This article clearly and plainly describes the genesis and history of
the doctrine of "concurrent causation" and the development of anticoncurrent policy exclusions in first-party property insurance coverage
cases. After describing this unique history, the article argues that it is time
to create a new lexicon for "concurrent causation" issues and advocates for
a new deliberate, categorical approach for addressing "concurrent
causation" questions.

***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Insurance coverage questions for “all-risk” policies are
conceptually simple. If a peril is excluded, there is no coverage; if a peril is
not excluded, there is coverage.1 While this analysis seems conceptually
simple, it becomes complicated in practice when multiple perils combine to
cause a loss.
The complications are most acute when non-excluded, covered
perils combine or operate in conjunction with excluded, non-covered perils
to cause a loss. When covered and non-covered perils are connected to a
*

Attorney with Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, Nashville, Tennessee
practicing complex commercial litigation with a focus on insurance and
construction matters. I would like to thank one of the all-time property insurance
greats, James Costner, for numerous discussions and feedback related to property
insurance and concurrent causation. He has provided a lifetime worth of insights
and his desire to retire will leave a notable absence in the insurance world. I would
also like to thank David Rossmiller for thoughtful comments and feedback.
1

This central tenant of insurance, however, is slowly being eroded as well.
Mold exclusions are beginning to deny the result—mold—irrespective of what
caused the mold. Historically, insurers excluded perils, but it seems that insurers
are slowly beginning to exclude results. See J. Kent Holland Jr., Mold from a
Covered Concurrent Cause Still Excluded, IRMI.COM (Nov. 2010), http://www.i
rmi.com/expert/articles/2010/holland11-insurance-law-environmental.aspx.
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loss, it may be unclear from the policy whether the entire loss should be
covered, whether the entire loss should be excluded, or whether the loss
and resultant damages should be bifurcated to indemnify the insured for
losses caused by covered perils while denying indemnity for losses caused
by excluded perils.
Many courts and commentators refer to the process of multiple
covered and excluded perils combining to cause a loss as “concurrent
causation”.2 It goes without saying, but nevertheless needs to be said, that
the phrase “concurrent causation” presents a definitional problem. While
the common definition of “concurrent” implies a degree of temporal
simultaneity,3 courts and commentators have routinely used the term
“concurrent” to refer to sequential chains of events;4 independent, unrelated
events acting in conjunction;5 and even events that undoubtedly operated in
succession.6 These types of events patently contradict the term
“concurrent”; thereby turning “concurrent causation” into a definitional
misnomer.
In addition to these definitional inconsistencies, courts have
complicated the issues by developing a patchwork of interpretations of
concurrent causation and relevant anti-concurrent causation policy
exclusions.7 This resultant patchwork has operated to deprive policyholders
2

William Conant Brewer, Jr., Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts,
59 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (1961). As will be discussed infra, the term
“concurrent” has become imprecise, but it is used here as background. The term
“concurrent” can have two distinct meanings. Today, concurrent either describes
multi-cause losses operating or occurring at the same time or refers generically to a
web of events having some interrelation among them.
3
See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
383 (Joseph P. Pickett et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000) (“adj. Happening at the same time
as something else.”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 239
(Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 2001) (“adj. operating or occurring at the
same time.”); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 303 (Michael
Agnes et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001) (“occurring at the same time; existing together.”).
4
Churchill v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187 (W.D. Wash.
2002).
5
David P. Rossmiller, Katrina in the Fifth Dimension: Hurricane Katrina
Cases in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE:
CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 71, 77 (2008).
6
Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation “Riddles,” 43 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1, 4 (2007).
7
Douglas G. Houser, The Rise and Fall of Concurrent Causation:
Background and Current Trends Affecting Property Insurance Coverage, 44 FED.
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of their reasonable expectations and has prevented insurers from
maintaining contract certainty when drafting insurance policies.8
Analyzing this patchwork of interpretations has left one
commentator to explain, “[b]ecause causation as a theory or doctrine is so
elusive, inconsistent outcomes must be tolerated.”9 As stated by this
commentator, “[s]ometimes the different outcomes will turn on subtle
factual distinctions, but sometimes the different outcomes will be based on
an utterly irreconcilable view of policy text and principles of
interpretation.”10
This article argues that inconsistent outcomes need not be
tolerated, provides definitional clarification for the relevant elements of the
concurrent causation phenomenon, and proposes a revised analytical
framework to minimize the inconsistent outcomes. The article provides
both a history of concurrent causation and a history of anti-concurrent
policy exclusions. Using that history, the article proffers new definitions to
address multi-cause losses,11 and advocates for a more methodical,
categorical analysis for addressing “concurrent causation” questions.12
II. BACKGROUND OF CONCURRENT CAUSATION
Courts have struggled with the question raised in the introduction
on the best way to deal with losses caused by multiple perils. To address
the issue, courts have typically employed one of four approaches to
“concurrent” losses:13 the pro-policyholder approach, the pro-insurer
approach, the dominant-cause approach, and the apportionment approach.14
OF INS. & CORP. COUNSEL Q. 3, 3 (1993).
8

See Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting:
New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 387-88 n.8 and accompanying
text (1985).
9
ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 560 (4th ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
10
Id.
11
As discussed infra p. 21-22, this article advocates that the phrase concurrent
causation should be replaced with the more accurate term “multi-cause loss”.
12
A flow chart setting out the interpretive mechanism is attached as Appendix
A.
13
Peter Nash Swisher, Insurance Causation Issues: The Legacy of Bird v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 NEV. L.J. 351, 366-68 (2002).
14
Conventional scholarship does not typically refer to them by these names,
but the names provided herein more adequately and easily describe the relevant
categories. For the traditional names, see JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at
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Interestingly, and generating further confusion, courts routinely refer to
each approach as the “concurrent cause doctrine.”15
A. PRO-POLICYHOLDER APPROACH16
Under the pro-policyholder approach, if multiple perils combine to
create a loss, the full amount of the loss is covered, so long as part of the
loss was caused, even if insignificantly, by a covered cause of loss.17 This
approach has also been referred to by courts as the “concurrent causation”
doctrine or approach.18
The California Supreme Court in State Farm v. Partridge was one
of the first courts to adopt this approach for liability policies.19 The
560-61.
15
See e.g., Wallis v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 2 S.W.3d 300, 302-03 (Tex.
App. 1999) (applying the “concurrent cause doctrine” to the apportionment
approach: “Texas recognizes the doctrine of concurrent causes. This doctrine
provides that when, as in the instant case, covered and non-covered perils combine
to create a loss, the insured is entitled to recover only that portion of the damage
caused solely by the covered peril(s).”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d
883, 886 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (a third-party case applying the “concurrent cause
doctrine” to the dominant cause approach: “The Court also opined that insurer was
liable under ‘the concurrent cause doctrine’ which provides that coverage under a
liability policy is equally available to an insured whenever an insured risk
constitutes a concurrent proximate cause of the injury.”); Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (applying the “concurrent cause
doctrine” to the pro-policyholder approach); Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So.2d
1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (same result in first-party context); Phillips &
Coplin, infra note 87, at 33 (“A minority follows the doctrine of concurrent
causation where coverage is afforded as long as a covered cause of loss contributes
in a meaningful way to the insured’s damages.”). In this author’s opinion, the propolicyholder use is the most accurate explanation of the “concurrent causation
doctrine” because it was first and it spawned the anti-concurrent causation clauses
proliferating property insurance policies today. See infra Part IV.
16
Throughout this article, when the term “post-Partridge” is used, it is in
reference to the proliferation of the pro-policyholder approach.
17
For further discussion of the policy rationales supporting this approach, see
infra note 114 and accompanying text.
18
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tenn. 1991)
(“[T]he ‘concurrent causation doctrine’ . . . provides that coverage under a liability
policy is equally available to an insured whenever an insured risk constitutes a
concurrent proximate cause of the injury.”).
19
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973). For
further discussion, see infra Part III.B.
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California Court of Appeals attempted to also adopt this approach for
property policies in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams.20 In Adams,
the court held that if third-party negligence (a covered loss) contributes in
any respect to the loss, the entire loss is covered even if the efficient
proximate cause of the loss would be excluded.21 While Adams was later
overruled by the California Supreme Court, it demonstrates how courts
analyze cases under the pro-policyholder approach.
In arguing for the pro-policyholder approach, courts reason that
public policy militates in favor of the pro-policyholder approach.22 For
instance, because ambiguities in insurance contracts of adhesion are
generally interpreted strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured,
courts reason that when the loss is caused at least in part by a covered peril,
the exclusion should be interpreted against the insurer.23 Accordingly,
under the pro-policyholder approach, when non-excluded perils and
covered perils act in conjunction to cause the loss, the loss is covered.24
B. PRO-INSURER APPROACH
The pro-insurer approach applies the opposite view of the propolicyholder approach. Under the pro-insurer approach, if one of the causes
of loss is excluded, the entire loss is excluded. While no domestic
jurisdictions have entirely adopted this approach, British courts apply the
pro-insurer approach with some uniformity.25
20

170 Cal. App. 3d 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. This case was later expressly rejected by the California Supreme Court
in Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 711 (Cal. 1989).
22
Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 660-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
23
This is generally referred to as contra proferentem and applies in contracts
of adhesion. For large commercial entities creating and negotiating manuscript
policies, the same application may not apply. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 4.11[F] (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011) (“If the
[manuscript policy] is essentially drafted by the policyholder, a weak version of
contra proferentem should apply in reverse.”).
24
This can also be attributed, at least in part, to California’s Insurance Code,
which provides additional protections to policyholders. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530,
532 (West 2011).
25
See Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 972-73 (2010). Some may argue that
Lydick v. Insurance Co. of North America, 187 N.W.2d 602 (Neb. 1971) stands for
the proposition that Nebraska follows this approach, but that case, and more recent
cases in Nebraska indicate that the court was actually applying the dominant-cause
21
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The British case, Wayne Tank, provides the quintessential example
of this approach.26 The Wayne Tank factory suffered a fire caused by two
concurrent perils: “[F]ailure to install proper equipment (an excluded
cause) and employee negligence in leaving the factory unattended (a
covered cause).”27 The Wayne Tank court held that even if the employee
negligence was the predominant factor in the loss, the loss would still be
excluded because the failure to install the proper equipment concurrently
acted to cause the loss.28 Thus, the entire loss was excluded because at least
part of the loss was excluded.
It is unclear exactly why British courts have taken this approach,
but perhaps it can be explained, at least in part, by the history of insurance
in the United Kingdom and the remnants of a time when the insurer had
less influence and control over the policy-making process. The roots of
modern insurance date back to the United Kingdom and the shipping
industry.29 One of the first insurers, Lloyd’s of London, insured ships and
their cargo and provides a fundamental building block for insurance
interpretation in the United Kingdom.30
In these pre-modern transactions, the insurer was at an information
disadvantage to the shipper. The shipper had a better understanding of his
skills and the unique challenges presented by his specific cargo, and also
had significant control over his risks and potential losses. The insurer,
conversely, was often at the mercy of the shipper and had to rely on the
shipper providing truthful and accurate information to make its
underwriting determinations. Because of this information asymmetry in
favor of the shipper, Lloyd’s policies were often interpreted strictly against
the shipper.31 For instance, if the shipper issued a warranty and that
warranty was even partially breached, the entire loss was excluded.32
Accordingly, the British courts’ comparatively stern treatment of the
policyholder may be rooted in this specific anachronism.
In the United States today, unlike the United Kingdom hundreds of
years ago, insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and the justification
approach to the loss.
26
Id. at 973 (citing Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd. v. Empr’r’s Liab.
Assurance Co., Ltd., [1973] 3 W.L.R. 843 (Eng.)).
27
Id. at 973.
28
Id.
29
See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 560-61 (citing Shinrone Inc. v. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 570 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1978)).
30
Id. at 561.
31
Id. at 749-50.
32
Id.
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for strict interpretation of insurance policies against the insured no longer
remains an attractive option. Today, insurers have the negotiating leverage,
which is why United States’ jurisdictions read ambiguities broadly against
the insurer and read exclusions narrowly.33 For this reason, American
courts have been reluctant to follow the British, pro-insurer approach.
C. THE EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE RULE OR DOMINANT-CAUSE
APPROACH
The dominant-cause approach attempts to strike a balance between
the pro-policyholder and pro-insurer approaches and relies on equitable
principles of fairness and the parties’ reasonable expectations.34 Under this
approach, the court attempts to ascertain which cause, among the various
concurrent causes of loss—or which link in the chain of events—was the
most important, substantial, or responsible factor in the loss. This approach
is also commonly referred to as the efficient proximate cause approach.35
Shinrone Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America demonstrates how
courts apply the dominant-cause approach.36 Shinrone involved a coverage
dispute when cattle were killed during a storm with intense winds, damp
snow, muddy land, and extremely cold temperatures.37 The policy in
question provided coverage for death by windstorm, but excluded death
caused by “dampness of the atmosphere or extremes of temperature”.38 The
testimony in the case conflicted and experts concluded that the cattle died
due to a combination of factors including wind, cold temperatures, snow,
the size and age of the cattle, conditions of the land, and the lack of
adequate wind protection.39 Analyzing these factors, the jury determined
that the windstorm was the most important or “efficient proximate cause”
of the loss.40 The jury reasoned that “extreme temperature” could not be the
efficient proximate cause of the loss because without the wind, the cattle

33

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 491 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tenn.

1973).
34

See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 886-88 (1991).
Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 974-75 (2010).
36
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 561 (citing Shinrone Inc. v. Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 570 F.2d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1978)).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
35
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may have survived the extreme cold.41
The dominant cause approach has been adopted by the majority of
U.S. jurisdictions because many consider it intuitively fair: decisions
whether coverage should be afforded depend on which cause most
significantly contributed to the loss.
D. THE APPORTIONMENT APPROACH
The final available approach is the apportionment approach, which
Texas has adopted.42 Under the apportionment approach, the “insured must
attempt to segregate the loss caused by the covered peril from the loss
caused by the uncovered peril and secure a jury finding on the amount of
damage attributable to the different causes.”43 The approach follows
traditional tort apportionment doctrines. As is the case with comparative
negligence, there are two potential sub-approaches to the apportionment
approach: pure apportionment and modified comparative apportionment.44
Under a pure apportionment approach, the policyholder would
receive the apportioned percentage of the damages caused by the covered
losses. For instance, if 30% of the loss was caused by a covered peril, then
the insured would receive 30% of the total value of the loss—or 30% of the
policy limit if the limits were an issue.45
Under a modified apportionment approach, the policyholder would
receive the percentage of the loss so long as the efficient proximate cause
was a covered peril.46 Thus, if only 30% of the loss were caused by a
covered cause of loss, the insured would not receive any recovery since the
efficient proximate cause would have presumably been some other cause.
This approach inevitably leads to greater litigation and provides an
41

Id. This does impliedly reject the converse—that without the cold the wind
could not have killed the cattle—but the jury did not address that issue.
42
Wallis v. United Serv.s Auto Ass’n, 2 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App. 1999)
(requiring insured to carry burden of proof for what portion of loss is covered). For
an interesting discussion of Texas’s approach to anti-concurrent exclusions, see
Comment, Amber L. Altemose, The Anti-Concurrent Clause and its Impact on
Texas Residents after Hurricane Ike, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 201 (2010).
43
Id. (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.
1971)).
44
Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 977-78 (2010).
45
See Randall L. Smith & Fred A. Simpson, Causation in Insurance Law, 48
S. TEX. L. REV. 305, 322 (2006).
46
Id.
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incredibly complex method for analysis. Rare is the case when it is clear
the precise percent of the loss attributable to a particular peril. For this
reason, and others, courts are reluctant to adopt this approach.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPROACHES IN THE UNITED
STATES
In many ways, California is the grandfather of concurrent causation
jurisprudence.47 A trilogy of California Supreme Court cases has spawned
and inspired the jurisprudence throughout the country. Sabella v. Wisler,
State Farm v. Partridge, and Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty form
the California trilogy. While California would certainly like to disclaim
paternity status, the fact remains that other jurisdictions have followed
California’s lead on many concurrent causation issues.48
A. SABELLA V. WISLER (EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE/ DOMINANT
CAUSE APPROACH)
In much the same way that California is the grandfather of
concurrent causation analysis, Sabella v. Wisler is the grandfather of firstparty property coverage analysis.49 In Sabella, a home was damaged by
extensive settling, and the settling was caused by a leak in a sewer pipe.50
The leaking pipe saturated the fill material surrounding the foundation.51
The leak was caused by contractor negligence, and more specifically,
caused by the contractor inadequately compacting fill material and
improperly sealing the sewer pipe joints.52 Under the policy, settling was
excluded but contractor negligence was covered, and the court was faced
with the classic “concurrent causation” question.53 The court reviewed the
47

California has certainly tried—and justifiably so—to distance itself as the
genesis of concurrent causation. See Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient
Proximate Cause, the Katrina Disaster, Prosser’s Folly, and the Third
Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008)
(citing Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 903, 906 (Cal. 2005)).
See also Mark D. Wuerfel & Mark Koop, Efficient Proximate Causation in the
Context of Property Insurance Claims, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 400, 401 (1998)).
48
Lavitt, supra note 47, at 7.
49
377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963).
50
Id. at 892.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 890.
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causes of loss and held that the leaking pipe was the efficient proximate
cause of the loss because it set the other events in motion.54 The court
reasoned that because the efficient proximate cause of the loss was a
covered peril, the entire loss was covered.
B. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE V. PARTRIDGE
POLICYHOLDER/CONCURRENT CAUSATION APPROACH)

(PRO-

The second case in the trilogy is not a property-insurance case, but
a liability case.55 While it is plainly not a property case, it is included in this
discussion because of the confusion generated by the case.56
In Partridge, the insured was covered by separate automobile and
homeowner’s insurance policies.57 The homeowner’s policy provided a
much larger coverage amount but excluded losses “arising out of the use”
of an automobile.58 The facts in Partridge were unique: the insured had
filed a hair-trigger on a rifle allowing the rifle to be discharged at the
slightest touch of the trigger.59 The insured and some friends were offroading hunting jackrabbits when the insured hit a bump; causing the hairtrigger rifle to fire.60 The shot hit one of the passengers and caused
significant injuries.61 The trial court found that the insured had committed
two negligent acts: the negligent act of filing the hair trigger and the
negligent act of driving off-road.62 The homeowner’s policy covered
54

It is important to note the proximate causation issue here and how tort and
insurance proximate causation apply. Under tort theories, the loss was proximately
caused by the contractor’s negligence. This differs under the scope of insurance
law, where the goal is to determine the proximate cause of the loss, rather than
which culpable party proximately caused the injury.
55
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).
56
The confusion stems from the misapplication of third-party insurance
principles to first-party claims. This is not the only time this issue has confounded
courts. See, e.g., Ernest Martin, Jr. & Britton D. Douglas, The Montrose Case—A
Model Loss in Progress Rule Analysis, available at http://165.97.89.22/files/Uplo
ads/Documents/Attorney%20Publications/Montrose_Case_Progress_Rule_Analysi
s.pdf (describing the misapplication of the loss in progress rule to first-party
losses).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 125.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Martin & Douglas, supra note 56, at 127.
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general negligence but excluded damages arising out of the use of the
automobile.63
Faced with these multiple perils, the California Supreme Court was
again faced with a classic concurrent causation question. The court elected
not to follow the precedent in Sabella because “the ‘efficient cause’
language is not very helpful, for here both causes were independent of each
other: the filing of the trigger did not ‘cause’ the careless driving, nor vice
versa.”64 Recognizing Sabella’s inapplicability to the question at issue, the
court developed a new standard for liability losses independent of an
analysis of efficient causation. The court held that the fact that “coverage
under a liability insurance policy is equally available to an insured
whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause
of the injuries.”65 Thus, under Partridge, so long as a covered peril
substantially contributed to the loss, coverage would be afforded.
While the plain language of Partridge clearly limits the case to
third-party liability claims, courts began to extend the “concurrent
causation” approach to property insurance losses.66 For instance, in Safeco
v. Guyton, the Ninth Circuit analyzed concurrent causation questions after
Hurricane Kathleen using the pro-policyholder approach.67 The court found
that there were two concurrent causes of loss: (a) third-party negligence (a
covered loss) in maintaining flood control plans and (b) flood loss (an
excluded loss).68 The court held that because third-party negligence
contributed to the loss, the entire loss was covered, even though the loss
was unequivocally caused by flood.69
C. GARVEY V. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
Sixteen years, and a mountain of confusion later, the California
63

Id. at 126.
Id. at 130 n.10.
65
Partridge, 514 P.2d at 130 (emphasis added).
66
Douglas G. Houser & Christopher H. Kent, Concurrent Causation in FirstParty Insurance Claims: Consumers Cannot Afford Concurrent Causation, 21
TORT & INS. L.J. 573, 573 (1986).
67
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982).
68
Id. at 554. For a reincarnation of the Guyton case post-Hurricane Katrina,
see In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2007 WL 496856, at
*2 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2007) (holding that losses post-Katrina were not flood losses
within the meaning of the water exclusion but, rather, losses resulting from
negligence and the breach of the levies).
69
These cases were compiled in Houser & Kent, supra note 66, at 577-78.
64
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Supreme Court eventually revisited the pro-policyholder concurrent
causation approach developed in Partridge and rebuked the lower courts
for misapplying Partridge to property insurance coverage litigation.70
Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty involved facts eerily similar
to Sabella. In the late 1970s the Garveys noticed that an addition to their
house was beginning to separate from the main property.71 The Garveys
alleged that the contractor’s negligence was the proximate cause of the loss
and the loss should be covered.72 State Farm responded that settling was the
efficient proximate cause of the loss and that any negligence by the
contractor was negligible and should not affect coverage.73 Even though the
facts were entirely analogous to Sabella, the trial court relied on
Partridge—rather than Sabella—and held that the contractor’s negligence
was a contributing cause, but settling was the dominant cause.74 The court
held even though negligence was a minor cause and not the efficient
proximate cause, the policy should cover the loss because the policy
covered negligence.75
The California Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s application
of Partridge to property insurance questions.76 In first-party property
losses, a loss is not necessarily covered just because a covered peril
contributes to the loss. Rather, first-party insurance coverage questions
require the reviewing court to look at the facts of the case and determine
which among the various contributing perils is the “efficient proximate
cause” of the loss. The efficient proximate cause has been referred to as
“the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may
follow it, and operate more immediately in producing the disaster.”77
Under the efficient proximate cause analysis, if the predominant factor in
the loss is covered, the loss is covered even if excluded perils also
contribute to the loss. Similarly, if the predominant factor in the loss is
excluded, the loss is excluded even if covered perils contribute to the loss.

70

Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989).
Id. at 705.
72
Id. at 706.
73
Id. at 705-06.
74
Id. at 704.
75
Id.
76
Garvey, 70 P.2d at 713.
77
Id. at 707 (quoting Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963)
(quoting 6 COUCH ON INS. § 1463 (1930))).
71
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D. SPAWN OF THE TRILOGY AND RAMIFICATIONS
Before Garvey could clarify concurrent causation principles, the
insurance industry became fearful of the impending onslaught of claims
that could be brought as a result of the Partridge decision. As discussed
above, under some jurisdictions’ reading of the policies, if 99.9% of the
loss was excluded but 0.01% of the loss was covered, the entire loss could
be covered.78 Indeed, the insurance industry was justifiably concerned as a
broad reading of Partridge would prevent insurers from ever excluding
certain perils.
As a result of the insurance industry’s fears, the industry modified
its standard policies in the mid-1980s.79 The industry offered revamped
standard commercial general liability and commercial property policies, at
least in part, to address the concurrent causation decisions spawned by
courts applying Partridge to property policies.80 In order to avoid future
Partridge-like decisions, the insurance industry included a new exclusion
in its standard form contracts.81 Policies began excluding “loss or damage
caused directly or indirectly by any of the following [exclusions]. Such loss
or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that
contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.”82 This language
has been referred to generally as the “anti-concurrent” policy exclusion.83
IV. COURTS INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-CONCURRENT POLICY
EXCLUSIONS
Even though Garvey presumably would have corrected the
Partridge-progeny problems, the anti-concurrent causation exclusions have
been interpreted broader than even the insurance industry could have
initially imagined.84 The development of anti-concurrent causation
78

See supra Part III.C.
See Bragg, supra note 8, at 392.
80
Id. at 394.
81
See id.
82
See, e.g., Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins.
Co., 207 P.3d 839, 841 (Colo. App. 2008) (citing standard ISO policy language).
83
Again, there is a definitional problem here. The clauses are colloquially
referred to as anti-concurrent causation clauses, yet they refer to both simultaneous
and subsequent causes of loss. See supra Part II for further discussion.
84
Mark M. Bell, Christopher S. Dunn & James C. Costner, Confronting
Conventional Wisdom on Builders Risk: From Named Insured Status to
Concurrent Causation, 31-Fall CONSTRUCTION LAW 15, 20-21 (2011).
79
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exclusions has proved an especially powerful device for claims denials.85 In
dealing with anti-concurrent causation exclusions, courts have typically
followed one of three approaches: (1) the “freedom of contract” approach,
(2) the substantial factor approach, or (3) the Rossmiller/Blue-Pencil
approach.86
A. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT APPROACH
The freedom of contract approach is probably the most prevalent of
the approaches to anti-concurrent causation clauses.87 Although many
courts have followed this approach, one of the earliest adopters, and one of
the clearest analyses on point is found in Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas.
Co.88
Alf presented the classic chain-of-events concurrent causation
question.89 The parties agreed that the loss was caused when a pipe on the
Alfs’ property ruptured due to unusually low temperatures.90 Water then
escaped from the ruptured pipe and caused extensive flooding and soil
erosion.91
If Alf were decided prior to the 1980s-insurance policy revisions,
the policy would have clearly provided coverage. Utah follows the
dominant approach to concurrent causation issues, which seeks to find the
efficient proximate cause of the loss.92 Here, the parties agreed that the
efficient proximate cause of the loss was the ruptured pipe—just as in the
case of Sabella.93 Under the Dominant Cause analysis, which seeks to
determine the cause that set the others in motion, the policy would clearly
provide coverage.
85

Cases expanding on Partridge and applying Partridge to property insurance
questions are colloquially referred to herein as post-Partridge decisions.
86
No court has actually referred to its approaches by any of these names. But,
for clarification and categorization purposes, these names accurately reflect the
various approaches taken by U.S. jurisdictions.
87
See Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen, Concurrent Causation versus
Efficient Proximate Cause in First-Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis,
36 BRIEF 32, 35 (2007) (compiling cases throughout the United States).
88
850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993); see also Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768
P.2d 678 (Colo. 1989).
89
Alf, 850 P.2d at 1272.
90
Id. at 1273.
91
Id.
92
See supra Part II.
93
See supra Part III.A.
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Alf, however, was not decided under the pre-1980s insurance
policy revisions, and the Utah Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether an insurer could contractually avoid the efficient proximate
cause rule. The court held that the efficient proximate cause rule is not an
immutable rule of insurance in Utah, but rather, operates as a default rule
“only when the parties have not chosen freely to contract out of it.”94
The court held that the parties had chosen to contract around the
efficient proximate cause rule and that the parties were entitled to do so.95
The court reasoned that the anti-concurrent causation language in the
policy did not upset norms of reasonable expectations of insureds, and
therefore, the contractual modification was permissible.96
It is interesting to note that under this interpretation, insurers have
essentially turned the tables of Partridge on insureds. Courts used
Partridge as a shield to protect policyholders by granting coverage when
there was an argument that the policy should cover the loss.97 The freedom
of contract approach, conversely, denies coverage when there is an
argument that the policy should not cover the loss. This expansion goes far
above and beyond the intent of the insurers when they instituted anticoncurrent exclusions.98
Today, if the insurer can point to some event in the chain of events
that was excluded, the insurer can deny coverage in freedom-of-contractapproach jurisdictions like Utah.99 As currently applied, if the insured could
argue that 99% of the loss was caused by covered losses, but 1% of the
losses was excluded, then the entire loss will be excluded.100 Additionally,
the possibility exists that insurers can modify policies and begin excluding
Negligent Acts and Decisions, as an example, in all-risk policies, and
thereby effectively prevent coverage for all losses where the loss can be at
least partially attributed to someone’s negligence.
In addition to exceeding the insurance industry’s original intent in
authoring the exclusions, the expansive scope of the anti-concurrent
exclusions is also problematic when considering the nature of the insurance
industry. Most insurance policies are contracts of adhesion incapable of
94

Alf, 850 P.2d at 1277.
Id. at 1272.
96
Id. at 1278.
97
Houser & Kent, supra note 66, at 575-77.
98
See supra note 79-83 and accompanying text.
99
Davidson Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d
901 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
100
See Chattanooga Bank Assoc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 774
(E.D. Tenn. 2004).
95
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modification by individual policyholders. These disperse policyholders do
not possess the lobbying powers or the contractual capacity or influence to
cause ubiquitous changes across all policy lines of insurance, which is why
the policies remain as they are today. The insurance industry can
effectively modify the policy in response to negative precedent; whereas
the diverse policyholders do not possess similar power. Accordingly it
should be incumbent on either the courts or legislature to prevent overexpansive use of the anti-concurrent exclusions—especially when the
interpretations exceed the intended purpose of the exclusions.
B. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR APPROACH
Recognizing the various problems associated with the freedom-ofcontract approach, some courts have held that in order for anti-concurrent
exclusions to apply, the excluded loss must be a substantial factor or the
efficient proximate cause of the loss.101 There are four states that have
followed this approach and expressly rejected the freedom of contract
approach. California102 and North Dakota103 have done so by code and
Washington and West Virginia have done so by case law.104
The first case to reject the freedom-of-contract approach without
relying on insurance code regulations was Safeco Insurance Co. v.
Hirschmann.105 In Hirschmann, severe winds were followed by heavy rains
101

Phillips & Coplen, supra note 87, at 35 (compiling cases throughout the
United States).
102
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 532 (West 2005) (“An insurer is liable for a loss of
which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, although a peril not
contemplated by the contract may have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is
not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote cause.”).
103
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-01 (2010) (“An insurer is liable for a loss
proximately caused by a peril insured against even though a peril not contemplated
by the insurance contract may have been a remote cause of the loss. An insurer is
not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote cause. The
efficient proximate cause doctrine applies only if separate, distinct, and totally
unrelated causes contribute to the loss.”).
104
At the time of this writing, the Colorado Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to determine whether a loss is covered where 90% of the loss was
covered and 10% was excluded. Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v.
Northfield Ins. Co., 207 P.3d 839 (Colo. App. 2008), cert. granted, No. 08SC907,
2009 WL 1485804 (Colo. May 26, 2009).
105
773 P.2d 413 (Wash. 1989). For a recent example, see Sprague v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am., 241 P.3d 1276, 1278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“In analyzing
coverage, Washington follows the efficient proximate cause rule. Under this rule,

2011

A CONCURRENT MESS

89

and landslides.106 The Hirschmanns’ home was pushed from its foundation
and completely destroyed because of strong winds and water saturation of
the soil.107 According to one expert, the primary cause of the hillside’s
collapse was the heavy rainfall.108
Safeco denied coverage and conceded during the proceedings that
if the policy had been interpreted prior to the 1980 policy revisions, then
the loss would have been covered in Washington.109 Safeco argued that
even though Washington adheres to the dominant-cause approach, the post1980s policy revisions overcome the dominant-cause approach.110 Safeco
argued that it should be able to exclude coverage since at least part of the
loss was excluded.111
The court in Hirschmann rejected Safeco’s argument and held that
the efficient proximate cause rule represents an immutable principle of
Washington insurance law, and that the parties cannot contract around it.112
The court held that because the primary causes of the loss included the
covered perils of wind and rain, the entire loss was covered.113
Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. provides a thorough primer
on concurrent causation including a description of the resulting
disproportionate forfeiture if the efficient proximate cause rule is
ignored.114 In Murray, State Farm argued that its anti-concurrent clause
“operates to defeat the efficient proximate cause doctrine.”115 Further, State
Farm “argue[d] that if earth movement in any way contribute[d] to a loss,
regardless of the proximate cause, then under the lead-in [anti-concurrent]
clause the entire loss is excluded from coverage.”116
The court in Murray rejected State Farm’s contention and captured
the essence of potential problems associated with abandoning the efficient
the predominant cause of the loss determines coverage.”) (footnotes omitted); but
cf. City of Everett v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 823 P.2d 1112, 1115
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that insurance policies that use the phrase “arising
out of” do not warrant efficient proximate cause analysis).
106
Hirschmann, 773 P.2d at 413.
107
Id. at 414.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 413-14.
112
See Hirschmann, 773 P.2d at 415-16.
113
Id. at 417-18.
114
509 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1998).
115
Id. at 14.
116
Id. (emphasis added).
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proximate cause rule in the face of anti-concurrent causation clauses:
Indeed if we were to give full effect to the State Farm
policy language excluding coverage whenever an excluded
peril is a contributing or aggravating factor in the loss, we
would be giving insurance companies carte blanche to
deny coverage in nearly all cases.117
Applying these principles, the West Virginia court rejected a broad
reading of anti-concurrent clauses and held that the efficient proximate
cause rule cannot be modified to abandon the reasonable expectations of
the insured.118 The court held that the reasonable insurer expects to have
losses covered where the predominant cause of the loss is covered.119
One could certainly criticize the substantial factor approach
because it essentially ignores the 1980s revisions to insurance policies and
renders the anti-concurrent policy ineffective. As demonstrated by the
Washington and West Virginia cases, these courts essentially apply the
same analysis that they applied before the introduction of anti-concurrent
causation clauses. Opponents to the approach, including insurers in general,
argue that courts applying the substantial factor approach make anticoncurrent clauses superfluous and meaningless.
In this author’s opinion, the criticism is unproblematic. Insurers
introduced the anti-concurrent causation clauses to combat post-Partridge
expansion of concurrent causation. Michael E. Bragg, assistant counsel for
State Farm Insurance, wrote an article in the 1980s that discussed State
Farm’s specific attempts to draft policy language to avoid post-Partridge
concurrent causation interpretations.120
The difficulty of the industry’s task in combating
concurrent causation embraces two distinct but related
issues intertwined in the court decisions. First, the courts
are creating new “causes” of loss never contemplated by
property insurance policy drafters. Most important of these
causes are negligence and other human conduct. Such
117

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218
Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1456 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
118
Id. at 14-15.
119
Id.
120
Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting:
New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385 (1985).
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conduct may be active, passive, willful, negligent,
imprudent, untimely, or any other word which describes
how people act or fail to act. Second, the courts are telling
us that the proper causation standard is no longer to
attribute the loss to a single proximate cause, but rather to
grant coverage if any of the causes of the loss has not been
specifically excluded.121
As demonstrated by this influential article, anti-concurrent
causation clauses were not intended to impact the efficient proximate
causation standard employed by post-Sabella interpretations. The Sabella
analysis seems to offer a fair and reasonable interpretation from both the
insurer and policyholder perspectives. Insurers intended to prevent postPartridge interpretations where the loss was covered if the insured could
point to a single factor that contributed to the loss. While the case has not
yet arisen in any jurisdictions following the pro-policyholder approach, the
case can be made that the anti-concurrent exclusions would be effective in
those jurisdictions and would move those jurisdictions from a postPartridge analysis to a post-Sabella analysis.
Accordingly, by applying the substantial factor approach, as
Washington and West Virginia courts have, insurers are adequately
safeguarded against post-Partridge interpretations. Additionally, the
approach mitigates the potential for insurers to deny losses when the loss
was proximately caused by a covered cause.
C. THE ROSSMILLER/BLUE PENCIL APPROACH
The third approach that courts have used employs a much more
involved and detailed analysis of concurrent causation. It seems that
Corban v. USAA is the only court to have used this approach to date, but I
have included it as its own approach, because it is quite likely another court
will follow Mississippi’s lead. This approach has largely evolved from the
work of concurrent causation scholar/practitioner David Rossmiller.122
121

Id. at 389.
David P. Rossmiller, Katrina in the Fifth Dimension: Hurricane Katrina
Cases in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE:
CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 71, 86 (Matthew Bender ed., 2008)
[hereinafter “Rossmiller, Katrina”]; David P. Rossmiller, Interpretation and
Enforcement of Anti-Concurrent Policy Language in Hurricane Katrina Cases and
Beyond, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN
122
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Rossmiller published two influential articles in 2007 and 2008,
which cogently argue for a particular interpretation of “concurrent” when
used in relation to concurrent causation.123 Under Rossmiller’s view,
concurrent should either refer to perils (a) acting in coordination or (b)
acting in sequence.124 For instance, assume that a fire and earthquake both
operated to cause a loss: (a) acting in coordination would occur if the
earthquake worked in conjunction with the fire to cause the same damage;
(b) acting in sequence would occur if the fire resulted from the earthquake;
and (c) a non-concurrent result would occur if the fire merely occurred at
the same time as the earthquake but was not brought about by the
earthquake.125
According to Rossmiller, Hurricane Katrina did not actually
involve concurrent causes of loss “not because they came at different times,
but because each force acted separately to create unique damage”126 – as in
the third earthquake/fire example described above. Under Rossmiller’s
view, the fact that both wind and flood were “products of the same larger
phenomenon, a hurricane, is irrelevant.”127 The argument follows that
losses are concurrent only where multiple causes produce the same
damage, and losses are not concurrent when multiple causes result in
multiple losses.
While Rossmiller’s articles have been cited by other courts,128 the
first court to adopt his approach was the Mississippi Supreme Court. The
Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the concurrent causation question for
the first time in Corban v. USAA129 after several federal courts had
provided Erie-guesses as to how Mississippi would analyze concurrent
INSURANCE LAW 43, 65 (Matthew Bender ed., 2007) [hereinafter “Rossmiller,
Interpretation”].
123
See generally Rossmiller, Katrina, supra note 122; Rossmiller,
Interpretation, supra note 122.
124
See generally Rossmiller, Katrina, supra note 122; Rossmiller,
Interpretation, supra note 122.
125
The earthquake/fire analogy is used throughout this article. For references
to insurance/earthquakes, the reader should ignore any potential differing results
that would occur under an analysis of the New York Standard Fire Policy. For
purpose of the analogy, assume that neither New York’s nor any other state’s
standard fire policies apply.
126
Rossmiller, Interpretation, supra note 122, at 65.
127
Id.
128
Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins. Co., 207
P.3d 839, 842 (Colo. App. 2008).
129
Corban v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601 (Miss. 2009).
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causation questions.130
The Corbans owned a two-story home that was damaged—but not
destroyed—by Hurricane Katrina.131 USAA inspected the home and
determined that although the wind caused some damage to the roof and
second floor, the majority of damage to the first floor was caused by
flooding.132 Accordingly, USAA paid the portion of damages to the roof
and second floor related to the wind damage and denied coverage for the
first floor because of the anti-concurrent flood exclusion.133
In order to determine whether the denial was proper, the court in
Corban narrowly defined concurrent.134 Although there are numerous
definitions that the court could have used to define concurrent, Corban
used the following narrow definition: the “exclusion applies only in the
event that the perils [1] act in conjunction, [2] as an indivisible force, [3]
occurring at the same time, [4] to cause direct physical damage resulting in
loss.”135
Additionally, the court held that the provision “in any sequence”
irreconcilably conflicts with Mississippi law and is void and
unenforceable.136 By rejecting the “in any sequence language” in the anticoncurrent exclusion, the court also addressed questions brought up by
federal courts and held that “[a]n insurer cannot avoid its obligation to
indemnify the insured based upon an event which occurs subsequent to the
covered loss.”137
Under the narrow definition of concurrent, the insurer has the
130

For a fascinating history of the chronology of the federal courts Erie-guess
analogies, see Rossmiller, Katrina, supra note 122; see also Bell et al., supra note
84, at 21-23.
131
See Corban, 20 So. 3d at 605-06.
132
Id. at 606.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 614.
135
Id. (brackets added for clarity).
136
Id. at 615. The court presumably could have declared the entire exclusion
void as a result of this provision, but for reasons unexplained by the court, the
court seems to have severed this provision from the rest of the exclusion.
137
Corban, 20 So. 3d at 613. Indeed, USAA also rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
analogy when pressed during trial. According to USAA, “if an insured’s roof is
breached and rainwater comes in, damaging a carpet, USAA pays for rainwater
damage to the carpet . . . even if storm surge subsequently. . . destroy[s] the
carpet.” Id. at 610; for additional discussion on indemnification and subrogation,
see Jay S. Bybee, Profits in Subrogation: An Insurer’s Claim to be More than
Indemnified, 1979 BYU L. REV. 145 (1979).
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burden of proving that two perils operate in conjunction and that the perils
operated contemporaneously. In Corban, and likely the majority of Katrina
claims, the wind and the flood did not operate contemporaneously or in
conjunction because most experts estimate that the wind preceded the
flooding by up to four hours.
Corban also established the relevant burdens of proof for insurance
claims. Under an all risk policy, the insured has the burden to prove that a
loss occurred. After proving that a loss occurred, the burden shifts to the
insurer to prove an affirmative defense—for example, demonstrating that
the peril is excluded under the policy. In Corban, it was clear that a loss
occurred; therefore USAA had the burden of proving by a preponderance
of evidence that the damages were caused by the excluded peril of
flooding.138
I refer to this approach as the “blue pencil” approach because it
strikes a portion of the anti-concurrent exclusion, but does not invalidate
the entire clause. As stated previously, anti-concurrent exclusions
generally exclude losses caused concurrently and “in any sequence.”
Corban held that the “in any sequence” language was unenforceable, but
held that anti-concurrent clauses are enforceable. While this represents a
more policyholder-friendly approach than the courts that simply enforce
anti-concurrent causation clauses wholesale, it still leaves open the
possibility that anti-concurrent causation exclusions can exclude losses
where 99% of the loss is covered but 1% of the loss is excluded.
V. A CALL FOR CLARITY AND A REVISION OF THE TERMS OF
INTERPRETATION
As stated at the outset, and as evidenced by the approaches to
concurrent causation and anti-concurrent causation exclusions, the
nomenclature of concurrent causation has become so bastardized that the
concurrent and efficient proximate cause issues have become an
untraceable mess.
To correct this mess, courts and commentators should re-visit
concurrent causation to redefine the terms to more accurately reflect the
underlying policies and provide additional clarity. In addition to redefining
the relevant concurrent causation terms, courts, insurers, and policyholders,
should take a new approach to analyzing concurrent causation questions.

138

Corban, 20 So. 3d at 618-19.
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A. DEFINITIONAL CLARITY
There are two terms that proliferate “concurrent causation”
analyses and courts continuously apply these definitions inappropriately:
“concurrent causation” and “efficient proximate cause.”
As currently defined, these terms are inexact and create confusion
and result in inconsistent application. “Concurrent” is used (1) to refer to
any multi-factor causation analysis,139 (2) to refer to a particular type of
multi-factor causation analysis,140 and (3) as a method or approach to multicause losses.141 Similarly, “efficient proximate cause” is used (1) as a
method or approach to multi-cause losses,142 (2) as the “moving cause of
loss” when there is a chain-of-events preceding a loss,143 and (3) as the
“predominant” factor in non-chain-of-event losses when multiple perils
combine to cause a loss.144
Given the conflation of terms, it is time to redefine these terms to
allow greater accuracy and precision. Additionally, given the current
confusion generated by the term “concurrent”, courts, commentators, and
insurers should drop the term “concurrent” from the insurance lexicon.145
In order to provide clarity on “concurrent causation” questions, the
term concurrent causation must be addressed first. Although by definition
concurrent requires temporal proximity,146 the term has been eviscerated to
the point that concurrent no longer has any definitional meaning. To
demonstrate this point, Rossmiller, one of the most well-versed and
persuasive writers on the subject, argues that temporal proximity—the
essence of concurrence—is “irrelevant” to the question of whether a loss is
concurrent.147 If “concurrent” does not relate to temporal proximity, then
no concurrent causation analysis can truly be said to be necessarily related
to concurrence. Correspondingly, when courts attempt to define the term,
139
140

See, e.g., Bragg, supra note 120, at 285.
See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co, 770 P.2d 704, 709 (Cal.

1989).
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See supra Part II.
See, e.g., Lavitt, supra note 47, at 2.
143
See, e.g., Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963).
144
See, e.g., Shinrone, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 570 F.2d 715, 718-19 (8th
Cir. 1978).
145
Perhaps the word need not be dropped permanently, but certainly a long
hiatus would be beneficial to avoid the current conflation of terms currently
applied to “concurrent.”
146
See sources cited supra note 3.
147
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
142

96

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

they are unable to appropriately define concurrent while maintaining some
semblance of the term as defined by dictionaries or as originally intended
by courts and insurers.
For that reason, courts and commentators should avoid using the
term “concurrent” to refer to a loss caused by more than one cause. Instead,
courts and commentators should use “multi-cause” in its place. Either a
loss is caused by one cause, or the loss is caused by multi-causes. If the
loss is caused by one cause, the analysis is simple and the court determines
whether that loss is covered. If, however, the loss is caused by multicauses, then courts should engage a new approach to the multi-cause loss
analysis.
This presents a simple remedy to an unnecessarily complicated
problem. There is no reason that multi-cause losses should be referred to
as concurrent, but that is what has been done for years. If there were some
reason to use the term concurrent, I would refrain from suggesting a
replacement. However, there is absolutely no reason whatsoever to refer to
a loss caused by multiple causes as a “concurrent” loss.
Second, the term efficient proximate cause has been used in so
many different ways that there is confusion about its definition as well. As
originally envisioned, efficient proximate cause related to chain-of-event
questions.148 Originally, courts would attempt to determine the efficient
proximate cause to decide which event set the other events in motion.149
Thus, the precise definition for efficient proximate cause is the cause that
sets the others in motion and relates expressly to chain-of-event losses.
This is the only place where the term efficient proximate cause should be
used.
Over time, courts and commentators began to use efficient
proximate cause more loosely and applied the term to non-chain-of-event
multi-cause losses. Efficient proximate started being defined as the
“predominant factor” in a loss and has been used to refer to the dominantcause approach.150 This has generated confusion because courts now
attempt to look for the “moving” cause of loss even when there is not a
chain-of-events preceding the loss. For non-chain-of-event losses, however,
there is no “moving” cause of loss and courts must look to the predominant
or substantial cause of the loss.
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Lavitt, supra note 47.
Vintila v. Drassen, 52 S.W.3d 28, 41-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
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Elizabeth L. Perry, Why Fear the Fungus? Why Toxic Mold is and is not
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B. NEW ANALYSIS FOR MULTI-CAUSE LOSSES
Rather than having courts attempt to analyze insurance policies in a
vacuum, I would propose that courts and commentators address concurrent
causation issues using a more methodical, categorical approach.
In insurance coverage, categorization is often essential to
understanding the issues. Indeed, the proliferation of confusion concerning
multi-cause losses can be traced to deficiencies in categorization. For
instance, the post-Partridge proliferation largely occurred because courts
failed to appropriately categorize the losses. Different concerns arise in
property and liability disputes and courts should treat the disputes
differently.151 In the post-Partridge era, courts failed to properly distinguish
property from liability cases and inappropriately applied liability standards
to property cases.
To avoid these types of categorical problems, this article advocates
a more methodical approach and recommends that courts engage in an
analysis using a number of discreet, step-by-step questions. The discreet
questions would encourage courts to appropriately categorize the loss and
subsequently apply the proper means of analysis to that particular category
of loss. This approach would more uniformly address multi-cause losses
and would lead to improved consistency and efficiency throughout
jurisdictions, would avoid inequitable results, and would lead to greater
contract certainty.152
When addressing insurance coverage questions, the key concern is
causation and whether the peril causing the loss is covered or excluded.
The approach advocated in this article presents a more direct-line, causal,
approach to causation questions than the piecemeal approach currently
employed by the courts.
Obviously the threshold question in a coverage dispute concerns
the determination of what specific peril or perils contributed to the loss.
When losses only involve one peril, the analysis is straightforward: was the
peril covered or excluded? Conversely, when losses involve multiple
151

Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989)
(“Liability and corresponding coverage under a third-party insurance policy must
be carefully distinguished from the coverage analysis applied in a first-party
property contract. Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned
with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability.”) (citing Michael
E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for
Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 386 (1985)).
152
As with most insurance questions, these issues are often best addressed by
a flowchart and I have attached the flowchart to the appendix for review.
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causes, the analysis becomes far more complicated. Accordingly, once the
stakeholders recognize that the loss involves multiple causes, it would
behoove the courts to address a series of questions before opining on the
resulting coverage question: (1) did the causes operate in an unbroken
chain of events or did the causes operate independently?; (2) if the losses
operated independently, did they act simultaneously or sequentially?; (2a)
if the losses were simultaneous, were the various causes independently
sufficient or independently insufficient to cause the loss?; (2b) if the losses
were sequential, what cause and resultant loss came first and did the second
cause exacerbate the preceding loss?153
1. Did the Causes Operate in an Unbroken Chain or did the
Causes Operate Independently?
Different analyses are required when dealing with losses caused by
an unbroken chain-of-events and losses caused by independent perils. For
unbroken chains-of-events, courts typically try to determine what was the
“moving” cause of the loss, or stated in other terms, “if the immediate
cause of the loss was dependent on other forces or events, then the trier of
fact [is] required to engage in a process of selection to determine the
‘efficient’ cause of the loss.”154
If there is a chain-of-events, the court should look to the “efficient
proximate cause of the loss.” In typical chain-of-event scenarios, the event
that sets the others in motion is well established and easily ascertainable.
For instance, in a relatively recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, the
parties unequivocally agreed on the efficient proximate cause of the loss
stemming from an unbroken chain of events.155 In Terminal Freezers, the
policyholder had built a commercial freezer facility.156 Eventually, the
policyholder discovered that ice was accumulating in the ceilings and
walls.157 The parties unanimously agreed that the ice was caused due to an
unbroken chain-of-events.158 During construction, the contractor had
153

See flowchart attached to appendix for clarity on the steps.
Lavitt, supra note 47, at 9 (citing Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood, 55 U.S.
351, 366-67 (1852)). California has certainly tried—and justifiably so—to distance
itself as the genesis of concurrent causation. Id. at 7.
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See Terminal Freezers Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins., No. 08-35623, No. 08-35656,
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20321 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2009).
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Terminal Freezers Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins., No. C07-0090BHS, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48280, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2008).
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defectively installed a vapor barrier, the defective vapor barrier allowed
water vapor to enter the facility, the water vapor infiltrated ceiling tiles and
insulation, and the water vapor then froze in the ceiling tiles and insulation;
thereby destroying the interior of the facility and causing significant
damage.159 In Terminal Freezers, the immediate cause of the loss was water
vapor freezing; however, there was no doubt between the parties that the
real “cause”, or the “efficient” cause of the loss, was the defectively
installed vapor barrier: but-for the defectively installed vapor barrier, the
ice would not have accumulated in the building.160 Like Terminal Freezers,
most chain-of-event cases provide a relatively straightforward question that
is often capable of agreement between the parties.
Accordingly, for chain-of-event cases, the court should continue to
seek to determine the efficient proximate cause of the loss and determine
whether the efficient proximate cause is covered or excluded. If the cause is
covered, the entire loss should be covered; conversely if the efficient
proximate cause is excluded, then the entire loss should be excluded.
In non-chain-of-event cases, however, there is no “efficient
proximate cause” setting in motion an unbroken chain of events.
Accordingly, the efficient proximate cause analysis is inappropriate for
independent cause cases, which helps to explain why courts have had such
difficulty attempting to fit the efficient proximate cause framework into
independent causation analyses. Thus, courts should employ an entirely
different analysis when evaluating these types of losses. In these cases,
courts should determine whether the causes operated simultaneously or
sequentially.
2. Did the Causes in the Multi-Cause Loss operate
Simultaneously or Sequentially
Simultaneity is important in the insurance context. Modern
“concurrent
causation”—multi-cause—jurisprudence
arose
when
California addressed a loss where simultaneous causes operated to create
the loss.161
In this author’s view, perils operating simultaneously should be
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Id. at *4.
Terminal Freezers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48280 (the parties did dispute,
however, whether the resultant ice formations should be covered or excluded, but
the case is illustrative of how courts employ the chain-of-events analysis works).
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analyzed separately from independent perils operating sequentially.162 The
temporal differences raise independent questions. Just as in the case of
conflating chain-of-event and independent losses, when courts and
commentators begin classifying simultaneous and sequential losses
together, confusion results because the concerns and the issues in both
cases are separate and distinct.
a. Simultaneous Losses
For perils operating simultaneously, courts should first determine
whether the various perils were independently sufficient or independently
insufficient to cause the loss. By way of analogy, the quintessential
independent-simultaneous-multi-cause loss would present itself if an
earthquake (excluded peril) occurred at the exact same time as a fire
(covered peril). For this analogy, the two events are entirely unrelated, and
the property was completely destroyed as a result of the loss.
In this analogy, the court would determine whether a covered peril
was independently sufficient to cause the entire loss. If a covered peril is
sufficient to cause the entire loss, then the entire loss should be covered.
For example, in this analogy, if the fire could have caused the entire loss,
then the loss should be covered, even if the earthquake could also have
caused the entire loss.
If the covered peril was not sufficient to cause the entire loss, and
the excluded peril could have independently caused the loss, then the entire
loss should be excluded. Continuing the analogy, if the fire could not have
caused the entire loss, but the earthquake could have caused the entire loss,
then the entire loss should be excluded.
If, however, neither the fire nor the earthquake could have
independently caused the loss, then the court should determine which of the
two perils was the “predominant” cause of loss.163 If the court determines
that the fire is the predominant cause of loss, then the entire loss should be
162

It is important to note that once we are in step 2, sequential losses do not
refer to sequential unbroken chain-of-events. Rather, sequential refers solely to
independent perils occurring sequentially. For chain-of-event losses, courts should
continue applying the efficient proximate cause analysis as discussed supra Part
V.B.1.
163
It is important to note the definitional consistency that needs to be
employed in this category. This analysis should be referred to as seeking the
“predominant” cause of the loss. This should not be referred to as the “efficient
proximate cause” of the loss because that term is limited to chain-of-event
situations, which are not present in this example.
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covered. If however, the court determines that the earthquake is the
predominant cause of the loss, then the entire loss should be excluded.
The rationales for this approach relate to reasonableness and
notions of fairness. If one covered cause of loss was sufficient to cause the
entire loss, then the insurer should not benefit from the fortuitous
circumstance that an excluded loss operated at the same time. The insurer
underwrites the policy and intends to provide insurance for certain events.
Once that event is triggered, the insurer should not be able to benefit
because an additional cause occurred at the same time. The policyholder
pays a premium for particular coverages, and once those coverages are
triggered, the insurer is obligated to pay. Conversely, if an excluded peril
could have caused the entire loss, then the policyholder should not be able
to benefit when the property would have been completely destroyed and the
damages caused by the covered perils were less than the damages caused
by the excluded perils. Similarly, if neither peril could have independently
caused the loss, fairness dictates that the court should attempt to determine
which cause was the predominant cause of the loss. If the predominant
factor in the loss was excluded, the policyholder should not be able to
receive coverage when the bulk of the damage is caused by excluded
causes. By that same token, the insurer should not be able to avoid
coverage when covered losses predominate.
b. Sequential Losses
For independent causes occurring in sequence, the threshold
question should attempt to determine which cause and resultant loss came
first. The second question would ask whether the subsequent loss
exacerbated the damage or created new damage.
While some courts have ignored the sequence of losses,
fundamental notions of insurance dictate that the sequence is essential to
determine whether there should be coverage. As prudently stated by the
Mississippi Supreme Court:
No reasonable person can seriously dispute that if a loss
occurs, caused by either a covered peril (wind) or an
excluded peril (water), that particular loss is not changed
by any subsequent cause or event. Nor can the loss be
excluded after it has been suffered, as the right to be
indemnified for a loss caused by a covered peril attaches at
that point in time when the insured suffers deprivation of,
physical damage to, or destruction of the property insured.
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An insurer cannot avoid its obligation to indemnify the
insured based upon an event which occurs subsequent to
the covered loss.164
In Corban, the court addressed immutable principles of insurance
coverage. Covered losses do not become excluded merely because a
subsequent cause operates on the loss.165 Similarly, excluded losses do not
become covered merely because subsequent covered perils happen to
impact the loss. Thus, the key question should center on which peril came
first and whether that peril is covered or excluded: If the peril is covered,
the loss should be covered, and the reverse holds true as well.
After determining which loss came first, the court should
determine whether the subsequent peril exacerbated the loss or created new
damage. If the subsequent cause exacerbated the loss, then the exacerbated
damages should be categorized according to the prior loss. If, however, the
subsequent cause creates new damage, then the court should re-analyze
whether that cause is covered or excluded and provide coverage for the
new loss accordingly.
For example, if an earthquake (excluded) damaged a property and
two hours later a fire (covered) came and merely exacerbated the
earthquake damage, the entire loss would be excluded. If, however, the
earthquake damaged the foundation of the property causing distinct
damages, and the fire later damaged the roof and framing, then the fire
damage should not be excluded merely because an earthquake caused some
damage to the property.
The rationale for this approach relates to reasonableness and
doctrines of fairness. It should be an immutable doctrine of insurance
coverage that covered losses do not become uncovered merely because the
insurer has not had yet paid the claim.
By way of analogy, suppose a policyholder suffered a loss on the
1st of the month, and the insurer acknowledged the loss was covered and
payment should be made on the policy. No reasonable insurer would argue
that the covered loss on the 1st of the month becomes excluded simply
because the policyholder suffers a subsequent loss caused by an excluded
peril on the 31st of that month. Although that analogy seems absurd, that is
essentially the argument that insurers make during sequential multi-cause
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losses.166 These arguments should be rejected when an excluded peril
merely subsequently impacts the property and causes the same damage or
merely exacerbates the previous loss. Just as the argument is rejected for
losses occurring 30 days later, so too should they be rejected when
occurring 30 minutes later.
Similarly, the policyholder should not be able to receive an undue
benefit. By analogy, if an automobile is in an accident and the hood is
mangled and unfit for daily use, no reasonable policyholder would argue
that the policyholder should be able to recover for an unrelated key-scratch
on the same hood. The same analogy applies. The fact that a covered event
occurs after an excluded event should not morph the excluded loss into a
covered one.
The area for potential pushback in this approach concerns the
exacerbation/new loss distinction. If the subsequent loss significantly
exacerbates the loss, the stakeholders may have a claim that there should be
some offset. However, experience indicates that bifurcating losses is
extremely difficult, and apportionment is inexact and difficult to prove. The
problem only becomes more complicated in cases of total losses. Thus, for
clarity and policy consistency, a subsequent exacerbation of a previous loss
should not affect the prior loss determination.
In cases where the losses and subsequent causes can be clearly
bifurcated, the subsequent loss should be analyzed under general principles
of insurance interpretation.
Revisiting the earthquake-fire analogy, if an earthquake were to
damage the foundation and then an unrelated fire were to strike the
property, the damage from the earthquake would clearly be excluded since
it occurred first. If the earthquake caused the total loss of the property, then
the loss would be excluded, even if a subsequent unrelated fire struck the
location and would have assuredly burned the building to the ground. If the
earthquake did not cause a total loss of the property, and an unrelated fire
later struck the same property, then the court would look to the impact on
the property and the nature of the fire damage. If the fire damage
exacerbated structural problems caused by the earthquake, then the
resultant fire-structural damage would be excluded. Conversely, if the fire
damaged property was undamaged by the earthquake, then the policy
would cover the resultant unrelated fire damage.
166

The ISO policy exclusions exclude losses caused “in any sequence” by
excluded perils. Tim Ryles, Rethinking Concurrent Causation and the Flood
Exclusion: Further Comments on Katrina-Related Coverage Disputes, IRMI.COM,
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C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE REVISED APPROACH
As for my proposal calling for definitional clarity, most courts and
commentators would probably agree that the current definitional landmine
is unworkable and that it is time to revisit the terms relating to these issues.
While some may disagree with the terms used in this article, most
commentators will probably agree that the current lexicon is unworkable.
As for the approach this article takes with respect to jurisprudential
analysis, there are probably two main areas for attack: (1) the article
essentially adopts the dominant cause approach in most circumstances and
would result in a pro-policyholder jurisprudential shift and (2) the revised
approach could create additional confusion.
1. The Dominant-Cause or Efficient Proximate Cause Critique
In many ways, the approach advocated for in this article does adopt
some iterations of the dominant-cause approach. However, this
incorporation is intentional: (1) when insurers began inserting anticoncurrent causation clauses into insurance policies, the insurers were
trying to combat post-Partridge analyses to multi-cause losses; and (2)
policyholders do not possess the same negotiating leverage or coordination
of effort to institute the reasonable changes proffered in this article.
First, insurers sought to avoid situations where a minor covered
cause in a chain-of-events operated to cover the entire loss.167 By applying
the approach advocated in this article, the insurer is back in the prePartridge analysis of multi-cause losses. In the perfect world, there would
be much greater uniformity across jurisdictions, which would allow
insurers to be able to maintain some sense of contractual certainty. Insurers
would know ex ante how courts would address multi-cause losses, and
insurers and policyholders alike would have a better understanding of the
scope of insurance policies. In a recent conversation with one of the
nation’s premier property insurance coverage experts, James Costner
indicated that it is virtually impossible to maintain contract certainty in the
current state of multi-cause loss jurisprudence.168 Adopting the approach
advocated in this article would undoubtedly improve contract certainty.
Second, most policyholders—personal lines and small commercial
accounts—do not possess the power or capacity to unilaterally alter
167

Bragg, supra note 120.
Interview with James Costner, Former Senior Vice President, Property
Practice, Willis North America (Feb. 9, 2011).
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Insurance Services Office policies.169 While courts often discuss the
freedom to contract and reason that policyholders could have bargained to
avoid the “anti-concurrent exclusions,” these courts fail to acknowledge
that insurance contracts are pure contracts of adhesion, meaning that the
contracts are presented on a take-it-or leave it basis. Additionally, the
policyholder generally has no idea that anti-concurrent exclusions exist,
much less any clue as to how the policies will be interpreted. Accordingly,
the approach advocated in this article attempts to align doctrines of
reasonableness with policyholder expectations. It should be unconscionable
for a loss that is 99% covered to be excluded merely because 1% of the loss
was excluded.
The unconscionability extends even further when the potential for a
99%-covered loss is excluded under an “all risk” policy. Policyholders
understandably overestimate what is included in an “all risk” policy, but no
reasonable policyholder would expect the disproportionate forfeiture that
would result when a 99%-covered loss is excluded simply because a crafty
adjuster is able to find some small amount of the loss that is excluded.170
Also, if these types of exclusions are included, they should come with a
disclaimer specifically alerting the policyholder of the nature of the
potential exclusion.
Thus, while the approach advocated in this article does follow
some elements of the dominant-cause approach, it is a deliberate choice,
which more accurately reflects what should be the default position between
insurer and policyholder.
This approach also limits the dominant-cause approach analysis to
chain-of-event losses, and parts ways with the dominant-cause approach for
independently caused losses. As advocated in this article, independent
losses should be analyzed separately and distinctly from chain-of-event
losses.171 Accordingly, the approach advocated in this article, attempts to
provide a new method of analysis for independent losses.
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To be sure, large commercial entities can dictate terms of insurance and can
negotiate, draft, and use manuscript policies.
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The policies themselves can also be drafted to ensure that some portion of
the loss will be excluded. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Unity/Waterford-Fair
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2. Confusion About How to Approach the Analysis
Because this approach recommends a series of questions relating to
categorization, some may argue that the categorization itself could prove
more problematic than the original problem. For instance, questions may
arise as to how a court should determine whether causes harmonized to
create a clear chain-of-events or whether the causes operated
independently.
There certainly exists an element of discretion in this approach.
There will invariably be close cases in determining whether a loss was
caused by a chain-of-events or independent causes. Similarly, it may not
always be easy to determine whether causes operated simultaneously or
sequentially.
This approach addresses those concerns by making those close
calls fact issues. The fact-finder will determine whether the causes operated
sequentially or simultaneously. The approach is not designed to remove
fact finding from the calculus. Rather, the approach attempts to clearly
delineate fact questions from legal questions. Once the fact-finder
determines the relevant facts, the law is more easily applied.
Certainly, there will be results where parties disagree with courts’
conclusions respecting whether the losses were harmonious or independent.
However, the facts will be uniformly applied and will generate some
consistency in the muddled “concurrent causation” web. Further, the
approach will allow courts to look to other jurisdictions and clearly
understand how a court ruled and why the court ruled as it did.
Creating clear legal guidelines will allow parties to understand ex
ante the types of issues that will be addressed. Policyholders will have a
clearer understanding of perils that are covered and excluded and will not
have to play the concurrent-causation-roulette currently employed across
jurisdictions. Similarly, insurers will understand how courts interpret their
policies, which will create greater contract certainty and more accurate
underwriting determinations.
VI. CONCLUSION
“Current causation” has evolved into an unworkable mess. The
concurrent causation lexicon has become so muddled and amalgamated that
it is impossible to forecast how a court, insurer, or policyholder will
interpret “concurrent causation” questions. For these reasons, this article
concludes that the “concurrent causation” lexicon should be revised and
recommends that courts analyze multi-cause losses according to a
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formulaic, categorical approach. By applying more precise and accurate
language to multi-cause losses, courts and commentators will avoid
unnecessary confusion and potential conflation of terms; thereby assuring
contract certainty and ensuring that reasonable expectations are maintained.
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APPENDIX
How was Loss Caused
Single
Cause

Multiple
Causes
Determine how loss was
caused

Determine whether causes
were simultaneous or
sequential

Determine
independently
sufficient or
independently
Independently
Sufficient

Most important peril

Most important peril

Simultaneous

Determine whether
cause was covered

Entire loss
is covered

Excluded

Entire loss
is excluded

Sequent
Determine which
loss came first

If peril is covered
If peril is excluded

If all excluded

Determine most
important peril

Covered

Multiple
contributin

If covered

Sequence
or Chain of
events

Determine whether loss is
covered or excluded
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This article examines rate regulation in the property and casualty
insurance market in the United States. While rate regulation serves, in
particular, the purpose of promoting insurer solvency and preventing
oligopolistic pricing, it can also lead to market inefficiencies. The article
argues for rate deregulation as a superior alternative to the current
regulation model.
During the nineteenth century the property and casualty insurance
market was highly competitive, featuring periods of low losses and large
profits that attracted new market entrants. This competition caused
insurance companies to set rates that were inadequate, thus leading to
thousands of insolvencies. One method to solve the problem was the
compact, an agreement among insurers to have a manager set rates. This
solution often failed because members of the compact often cheated and
there was no way to make every insurer in the market join. By the end of
the nineteenth century several states had passed anti-compact law
prohibiting the practice.
States in the early twentieth century started passing rate regulation
laws in the fire insurance market. These laws subjected rate setting to state
control. These laws were prevalent in the fire insurance market by the
1940’s, but were not widespread in the casualty insurance market. With the
passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945, insurance regulation was
made the primary purview of the several states, with federal intervention
allowable only where states failed to legislate. Soon after, the AIC and
NAIC crafted model laws that became the basis for much state legislation.
While state laws started out with an emphasis on cooperative rate setting
by rate bureaus, gradually the laws were changed to facilitate independent
rate filing by insurers directly to state insurance regulators, thus
increasing rate competition. Today, the trend is toward less restrictive
systems of rate regulation in most property lines: gradually away from
“prior approval” towards “file and use,” “use and file,” “flex rating,”
“modified prior approval,” or no file systems.
The rationales for rate regulation include consumer protection, the
prevention of insurer insolvency and unfair pricing, and the promotion of
actuarial accuracy. The rationales against rate regulation are mainly that
cartel pricing and destructive competition are not a threat today, that the
market is the appropriate price setting mechanism in insurance markets,
deregulation promotes competition, and that rate deregulation would take
the politics out of rate setting.
Examining the structure of the American property and casualty
insurance market is necessary to determine how successful a policy of
deregulation will be. The U.S. property and casualty insurance market
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presents the structural features of a competitive market because it is
characterized by a large number of firms selling products with identical
features. Evaluation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for industry
concentration in conjunction with the Department of Justice’s Merger
Guidelines indicates that the property and casualty insurance market is not
concentrated. Furthermore, the trend toward an increase in the level of
market concentration is oftentimes the result of market competition since it
leads to low-cost, efficient firms replacing high-cost firms. The property
and casualty insurance market is also widely regarded as having low
barriers to entry for new firms. Thus the market does not have monopolistic
or oligopolistic characteristics that would justify rate regulation.
Nevertheless, purely competitive rate setting systems are seldom used
throughout the United States.
The European Union can provide a helpful case study in
considering rate setting deregulation because EU member states do not
have the right to regulate insurance prices, after the European Parliament
passed the third non-life insurance Directive in 1992. Previously, EU
member states exercised considerable rate setting power. The experience
has been a positive one. Competition increased, especially in heavily
regulated markets, and premium rates decreased. Market concentration,
however, did not decrease, though this could be attributed to an increase in
mergers and acquisitions. The number of insolvencies decreased as prices
were better aligned with costs.
Rate regulation in the United States may be adversely impacting insurer
profitably, as rate changes are impeded as market conditions change.
There is empirical evidence that property and casualty insurance
companies have experienced a lower rate of return than other industries.
These artificially low returns may have led to many insurers’ exits from the
market. In particular, with regard to some lines, over the 2000-2009
period, more insurers exited the market than entered it. Deregulation
would eliminate compliance costs and allow rate changes. Even if rate
deregulation lead to higher rates, in the long run this would be offset by
greater market availability and consumer choice. Rate regulation has the
tendency to force stricter underwriting that limits market availability.
Additionally, there is no evidence that rate regulation has eliminated the
possibility of insurer insolvency. It is more likely that allowing insurance
companies to set rates commensurate with their costs will enhance their
financial strength. Therefore policy makers should seriously consider
greater insurance rate deregulation.

***
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INTRODUCTION
The traditional justification for economic regulation is to protect
the public interest by correcting market failures and improving economic
efficiency and equity.1 In particular, with regard to insurance, regulation
aims to protect policyholders by ensuring the solvency of the insurance
companies. In light of the peculiar nature of an insurance contract, in which
the policyholder pays an upfront premium in exchange for the insurer’s
promise to pay in case a loss occurs, the need is clear to assure the financial
solidity of the insurance companies and their ability to pay possible future
claims.
In this context, by the first half of the twentieth century individual
states within the United States enacted rate regulatory laws to ensure that
rates were “adequate, not excessive and not unfairly discriminatory.” One
objective of rate regulation is to prevent insolvencies by avoiding a sort of
ruinous competition in which insurers, in order to strengthen their market
position, charge rates not sufficient to cover their costs. Another is to avoid
oligopolistic pricing.
This study will focus on the regulation of rates in the U.S. property
and casualty insurance market, highlighting the inefficiencies caused by the
system. The aim of the paper is to examine the advisability of replacing
rate regulation with rate deregulation. In this regard, although some states
have rating methods less restrictive than prior approval, like file and use,
use and file, flex rating and modified prior approval, it must be emphasized
that none of these methods fully rely on competition since the insurance
commissioner basically still retains the right to direct the insurers’ setting
of rates. The analysis supports the conclusion that rate deregulation should
be introduced.
Part I will provide the historical background of rate regulation,
discussing the developments from the nineteenth century, when rate
regulation was introduced in order to prevent insurers’ insolvencies, to the
more recent trend toward less restrictive rating laws.
Part II will set out the purposes of rate regulation to ensure, as
stated above, that insurance rates are “adequate, not excessive and not

1

STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-16 (1982); SCOTT E.
HARRINGTON, INSURANCE DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15 (2000); 2
ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 11
(1988).
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unfairly discriminatory.” Further, the arguments adduced for and against
rate regulation will be presented.
Part III will make the case for rate deregulation. In particular, the
analysis will consider the U.S. property and casualty insurance market
structure, the performance of the industry, market growth, market entries
and exits and the effects of rate regulation on insurance availability. The
analysis also considers the experience of the European Union, where state
supervisory authorities have been prevented from exerting control over
insurance premiums prices.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RATE REGULATION
A. PRIVATE CONTROLS OVER INSURANCE RATES
ENACTMENT OF ANTI-COMPACT LAWS

AND

THE

During the nineteenth century, the property and casualty insurance
market was distinguished by a high level of competition. Indeed, since
historically the fire insurance business was highly cyclical, in periods when
losses were low and profits high new insurance companies entered the
market aiming to make large profits.2 Neither barriers to entry nor
significant economies of scale hindered the entrance into the market.3 The
strong competition in the market in the 1800’s led insurers to set
inadequate rates and thus, by 1877, around 3000 companies had become
insolvent.4
In response, in 1866 insurers instituted a national organization, the
National Board of Fire Underwriters, in order to “establish and maintain, as
far as practicable, a system of uniform rates of premium.”5 However, the
fact that, in profitable periods, insurance companies violated the
agreements concerning the rates established by the Board, made the Board

2

1 JON S. HANSON ET AL., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS, MONITORING COMPETITION: A MEANS OF REGULATING THE
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE BUSINESS 9 (1974); Spencer L. Kimball &
Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 547
(1958); Michael D. Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance
Rates, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 677 (1967).
3
Rose, supra note 2, at 677.
4
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 9; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 54748; Rose, supra note 2, at 677.
5
Rose, supra note 2, at 677 (quoting Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 548).
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ineffective in controlling rates.6 Nevertheless, after the fire losses that
occurred in Chicago and Boston respectively in 1871 and 1872, it appeared
inevitable that insurance companies had to cooperate in order to set
adequate rates.7 In 1877, the National Board of Fire Underwriters
abandoned its function of rate control – addressing itself only to fire
prevention and the maintenance of statistics – and in the 1880s, regional
associations of companies assumed the task of rate stabilization.8 Among
the techniques implemented by the regional associations in order to control
rates was the compact, an agreement according to which the compact
manager set the rates and usually enforced them in compliance with the
compact’s conditions.9
However, the problem any cartel faces is that each cartel member
has incentives to raise its profits by cheating the cartel: bringing down the
cartel’s price and increasing its output.10 In the same way, these regional
associations did not effectively stabilize insurance rates.11 Indeed, the
insurer members of the association did not always honor the agreements
made in good faith since they used to cut rates.12 Further, the agreements
were often undermined by insurers that were not members of the
association.13
Toward the end of the 1800’s, many states responded to the
insurers’ efforts to fix rates by passing anti-compact laws.14 The first anticompact laws were passed by Ohio and New Hampshire in 188515 and by
1912 twenty-three states had passed such type of legislation.16
6

HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 10-11; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at
548; Rose, supra note 2, at 677.
7
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 548.
8
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 11; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 549;
Kent H, Parker, Ratemaking in Fire Insurance, in PROPERTY AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE HANDBOOK 169, 170 (John D. Long & Davis W. Gregg eds., 1965);
Rose, supra note 2, at 677-78.
9
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 11; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 549.
The first compact was the St. Louis Compact, concluded in 1879.
10
LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 668
(2002); DAVID A. BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 495
(2002); see generally D. K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 835-44
(1976).
11
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-13.
12
Id. at 12.
13
Id.
14
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 549; Rose, supra note 2, at 678.
15
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 14.
16
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 550.
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Nevertheless, the anti-compact laws were often evaded. In cases where the
law expressly prohibited agreements between insurance companies, like in
Ohio and Wisconsin, insurers concluded that agreements between agents
were not prohibited. So, the insurance companies relied on their agents to
fix rates.17 Elsewhere, where the law prohibited all agreements relating to
the establishment of rates, insurance companies formed “independent”
bureaus to make advisory rates.18
B. BEGINNING OF RATE REGULATION
During the first half of the twentieth century, states became aware
of the risks that ruinous competition posed to policyholders and began to
enact legislation to regulate fire insurance rates.19 The first rate regulatory
law, passed in Kansas in 1909, required fire insurers to file their rates and
their rating plans with the superintendent of insurance and prohibited rate
discrimination among insureds.20 It also required insurance companies to
give the insurance commissioner ten days’ notice in order to change rates
and authorized the commissioner to adjust rates that were excessive or
inadequate.21 In 1914, the German Alliance Insurance Company challenged
the Kansas law as unconstitutional.22 The company argued that insurance is
a private contract and that the state has no power to interfere by regulating
insurance rates; otherwise, such regulation would be a deprivation of the
insurer’s property without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.23 The Supreme Court rejected
the complaint, stating that insurance was affected with a public interest and,
for this reason, the insurance premium could be fixed by law.24
After the San Francisco fire of 1909, the New York legislature
conducted an investigation on fire insurance rating practices.25 To this end
a Joint Legislative Committee, known as the Merritt Committee, was
17

Rose, supra note 2, at 678.
Rose, supra note 2, at 678; Richard A. Wiley, Pups, Plants and Package
Policies – or the Insurance Antitrust Exemption Re-Examined, 6 VILL. L. REV.
281, 312-14 (1961).
19
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 551; Rose, supra note 2, at 679.
20
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 551; Rose, supra note 2, at 679.
21
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 551; Rose, supra note 2, at 679.
22
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 389 (1914).
23
Id. at 397.
24
Id. at 414-18. See also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71,
75 (1922) (holding that insurance is a business affected with a public interest).
25
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 17; Rose, supra note 2, at 679-80.
18
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established.26 The Committee did not view the results of the anti-compact
laws positively since they led to destructive competition and rate
discrimination.27 It instead recommended the passage of a statute providing
for the filing by rate bureaus of fire insurance rates with the Insurance
Department and subjecting those bureaus to the Insurance Department’s
control.28 In accordance with these recommendations, the New York
legislature enacted a law allowing fire insurers to fix rates in concert.29
Rate bureaus were authorized and had to set the rates; the rates had to be
filed with the insurance superintendent, who had to approve them before
they could be used.30
Afterwards other states, acknowledging the inefficiency of the anticompact laws, passed similar rate regulatory laws.31 States no longer relied
on competition as a means for rate-setting; instead, they authorized rating
bureaus to set fire insurance rates. Rate bureaus evolved from both the
public and the industry interest in rate setting; they were privately operated
except in Texas.32 Some states required companies “to become a member
of or subscriber to a rating organization.”33 Rates were, however, subject to
the public control by state insurance departments, which usually had to
approve them. By 1944, there were only three states with no public control
of rate-setting.34
Up to 1945 states did not regulate rates for the casualty insurance
industry to the same extent as in fire insurance.35 Except for workmen’s
compensation insurance, most regulation aimed at avoiding rate
discrimination.36 Further, only a small number of states required filing and
approval of automobile insurance rates.37 In general, rate competition was
prevalent in the casualty insurance market.38

26

HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 17; Rose, supra note 2, at 679-80.
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 17; Rose, supra note 2, at 679-80.
28
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 19; Rose, supra note 2, at 680.
29
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 19; Rose, supra note 2, at 680.
30
Rose, supra note 2, at 680.
31
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 19.
32
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 20; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 552;
Wiley, supra note 18, at 314.
33
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 20.
34
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 551.
35
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 20; Rose, supra note 2, at 682.
36
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 20-21; Rose, supra note 2, at 682.
37
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 21; Rose, supra note 2, at 682.
38
Rose, supra note 2, at 682.
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C. U.S. V. SOUTH-EASTERN UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION AND THE
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Until 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1868 holding in Paul v.
Virginia exempted rate-setting agreements from federal antitrust law.39 The
case involved an 1866 Virginia statute that prohibited insurers who were
not incorporated in Virginia and their local agents from doing business in
the state without first obtaining a license. The statute was challenged on the
ground, inter alia, that it conflicted with the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution,40 which gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States.”41 The Court,
upholding the Virginia statute, held that insurance was not commerce,
interstate or otherwise.42 From then on, insurance contracts were not
subject to federal antitrust law.43
In 1944, however, in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association,44 the Supreme Court reversed Paul v. Virginia. In that case,
198 member companies of the South-Eastern Underwriters Association and
twenty-seven individuals were indicted in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.45 The indictment alleged two conspiracies in
violation of the Sherman Act.46 The first was a conspiracy to restrain
interstate commerce by fixing insurance premiums.47 The second was a
conspiracy to monopolize trade and commerce in the fire insurance sector
and in allied lines in the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia.48 The District Court dismissed the
indictment and, relying on Paul v. Virginia, held that insurance was not
commerce and therefore price-fixing in the business of insurance did not
violate the Sherman Act.49 On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Sherman Act did apply to the fire insurance business since any business
conducted across state lines was “commerce among the several States.”50 In
39

Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
Id. at 177.
41
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42
Paul, 75 U.S. at 183.
43
Id.
44
U.S. v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 713 (N.D. Ga. 1943).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 713-15.
50
U.S. v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 538-41 (1944).
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that regard, the Court specified that all commercial activities conducted
across state lines fell within Congress’ regulatory power under the
Commerce Clause and no exception could be made for the business of
insurance.51
Following this decision, insurance companies and states lobbied
Congress to avoid federal regulation of the insurance sector.52 In particular,
states were afraid to lose their regulatory power and the power to tax
insurance companies.53 In 1945 Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson
Act to preserve the states’ control over insurance regulation.54 Congress
was concerned about the uncertainty that might ensue from a change in
regulatory authority and also believed that states could regulate insurance
better than the federal government, because of their relationship with the
insurance companies and their experience with regulating insurance.55
In the preamble McCarran-Ferguson states that “the continued
regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is
in the public interest.”56 To that end, Section 1012(b) of McCarranFerguson provides that no “Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair or supersede” any state law enacted in order to regulate
or tax the business of insurance.57 By virtue of this provision, state law
supplanted federal antitrust regulation of the insurance industry.
Conversely, the Act provides that the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts apply to “the business of insurance to the extent that
such business is not regulated by State law,”58 except for agreements or
acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.59 This aspect of the act was
considered a compromise between those in Congress who favored an
antitrust exemption and those who favored federal supervision of the
insurance industry.60 In this way the act permits states the opportunity to
continue to regulate insurance, while retaining the right for federal
intervention in case the states failed to intervene.61 As a consequence of

51

Id. at 553.
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 553-54.
53
Id. at 554.
54
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-1015 (West 2009).
55
Rose, supra note 2, at 694.
56
15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 (West 2009).
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Id. § 1012(b).
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McCarran-Ferguson most states enacted laws regulating insurance and, in
particular, rate-setting.62
D. THE NAIC-AIC MODEL RATE REGULATORY BILLS AND THE
SUBSEQUENT STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Section 1012(b) of McCarran-Ferguson encouraged the states to
regulate insurance in order to avoid federal intervention.63 Soon, uniform
legislation was introduced in the states under the auspices of the NAIC and
the All-Industry Committee (AIC).64 The AIC, representing nineteen
insurer associations, was formed to cooperate with the NAIC to develop
model legislation designed to reinforce state control of insurance in
accordance with section 1012(b).65 In 1946, two model laws, one for fire,
marine and inland marine insurance and the other for casualty and surety
insurance, were submitted to individual states for passage.66
The two model laws, which were similar in content, proposed
proscriptions on excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory rates and
advocated supervision of rate-setting among insurers.67 The bills provided
that in setting rates, consideration should be given, inter alia, to past and
prospective loss experience in the state and elsewhere.68 Further, insurers
had to file any rating plan and any modification to that plan with state
insurance commissioners.69 Under the model laws, such information would
become public after the filing became effective.70
The model laws also addressed rate-setting by insurers. Insurers
were allowed to benefit from the services of rating organizations or of
advisory organizations.71 Rating organizations made rates for their
members and subscribers, while advisory organizations assisted insurers
which filed their own rates or rating organizations in rate making by
62

Rose, supra note 2, at 696.
Id. (quoting Patrick A. McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance:
Moratorium under Public Law 15 Expired July 1, 34 A.B.A. J. 539, 540 (1948)).
64
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 555; Rose, supra note 2, at 696-97.
65
Rose, supra note 2, at 697.
66
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 555; Rose, supra note 2, at 698-99.
67
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 29-33 (reproducing the draft of the casualty
and surety insurance bill); Rose, supra note 2, at 699-701 (reproducing the draft of
the fire, marine and inland marine insurance bill).
68
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 30; Rose, supra note 2, at 699.
69
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 30; Rose, supra note 2, at 699.
70
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 30; Rose, supra note 2, at 699.
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HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 31-32; Rose, supra note 2, at 699-700.
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collecting and furnishing loss and expense data or by providing
recommendations concerning rates.72 Both rating organizations and
advisory organizations were subject to state requirements.73 Insurers could
file independent rates or those made by a licensed rating organization.
Insurers were also allowed to seek permission from commissioners to file
deviations from rates set by a rating organization.74 Lastly, under the socalled “deemer clause”, rate filings were considered approved unless
disapproved within fifteen days, or thirty days if the commissioner decided
to extend the period for approval.75
The model bills, which favored the interests of the rate bureaus,76
were introduced with amendments in some states.77 In particular, the
amendments concerned the deemer clause since states had different
interpretations about how rates should be filed with commissioners in order
to meet the state regulation requirement of section 1012(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.78 Some states, like California, Missouri and
Idaho, did not require rate filings for fire or casualty lines (although the
insurance commissioner had discretionary authority to request such filings),
while other states, like Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Wyoming, Ohio
and District of Columbia, provided that the rates once filed became
effective, subject to subsequent disapproval.79 The model laws assumed
that the requirements for reverse preemption found in section 1012(b) of
McCarran-Ferguson were met by the mere existence of state legislation.80
E. THE AFTERMATH OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE RATE REGULATORY
BILLS
With the enactment of state rate regulatory laws based on the
NAIC-AIC model bills, several controversies about competitive versus
cooperative rate making arose.81 Between 1947 and 1957 the rate bureaus

72

HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 31-32; Rose, supra note 2, at 700.
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74
HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 30-31; Rose, supra note 2, at 700.
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put up strong resistance to rate deviations.82 Insurers seeking to file
deviations experienced obstacles because the NAIC-AIC model laws
required commissioners to notify the rate bureaus before approving a rate
deviation.83 The rate bureaus could then testify in opposition to the
deviation.84 Further, since the deviation filing was valid for only one year,
insurers had to, at considerable cost, justify their request annually.85 This
led many insurers to resign from the bureaus in order to make independent
filings.86 For example, in 1954 the Insurance Company of North America
(INA) resigned from the New York Fire Insurance Rating Organization
(NYFIRO) and made independent rate filings for most dwelling classes
while remaining a subscriber for other dwelling classes and commercial
lines.87 The NYFIRO challenged the New York department’s approval,
arguing that INA could not independently file for some risks and subscribe
to the bureau for others and that INA violated NYFIRO’s property rights
by using bureau data in its filings.88 The New York Insurance Department
rejected the NYFIRO’s petition and authorized independent filing and the
right of partial subscribership.89
In 1955 the Pacific Fire Rate Bureau adopted a rule that companies
that made independent filings could no longer benefit from bureau
scheduled-rating services.90 The rule was challenged in several states since
insurers valued the scheduled-rating services and did not want to lose their
right to subscribe to them.91 The Arizona Supreme Court held the rule
invalid in 1958.92
The partial subscribership system that resulted permitted the setting
of more independent rates since insurance companies with sufficient loss
experience in certain lines of insurance could make independent filings.93
In doing so, insurers had to confront the attempts by the bureaus to
82
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intervene in the hearings and oppose the deviations as aggrieved parties,
subjecting insurers to delays and expenses.94 To remedy this situation,
insurance commissioners and courts95 ruled that rate bureaus could not
appear as aggrieved parties because they acted not to benefit the public but
rather to protect their own interests.96 In the process, a more flexible rate
setting system emerged that permitted price competition to a certain extent
through deviations from the bureau rates, aided by provisions in the NAICAIC model laws that did not make membership in rate bureaus mandatory,
allowing insurers to make independent filings.
F. REVISION OF THE RATING LAWS
The trend toward less regulated rates was also reflected in a study
conducted by the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee in 1958.
The Senate appointed the Subcommittee to conduct a study on insurance
and antitrust laws. The Subcommittee recommended denying rate bureaus
the status of aggrieved parties, eliminating the requirement of the annual
filings of deviations and, lastly, adopting file-and-use rating systems.97
Similar recommendations were also provided by the subcommittee
appointed by the NAIC Rates and Rating Organization Committee in 1960
in order to review the insurance state regulation system.98 The
subcommittee recommended that no rate bureau should have the status of
aggrieved party because the bureaus had no interest in decisions on rate
filings. Rate bureaus, according to the subcommittee, should have been
denied status to apply for a hearing on insurers’ independent filings and the
one-year limitation on deviation should have been eliminated. The
subcommittee also recommended continuing the deemer clause and the
right of partial subscribership to bureaus and to consolidate the fire and
casualty rating bills in order to permit the development of multi-line
package policies.99
In 1962 the NAIC approved amendments to the model rating laws,
adopting the recommendations of its subcommittee.100 In 1964 the NAIC
94
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Rates and Rating Organizations Committee appointed another
subcommittee to inquire into the rate regulation system.101 The
subcommittee found that competition had increased in the insurance market
since the 1940s.102 In particular, it noted that price competition had become
more widespread due to independent rate filings and decreased influence
by rate bureaus in setting rates.103 The Subcommittee recommended placing
more reliance on fair competition to set insurance prices104 and suggested
the suspension where possible of the prior approval system and its
replacement with no prior approval rate regulation.105 In states where local
market characteristics did not permit such a change, the subcommittee
recommended continuing the deemer provision to assure prompt responses
to rate filings.106
In a file and use system a rate filing becomes effective once the
rate is filed with the insurance commissioner. Soon, the insurance industry
embraced no prior rate approval and file and use provisions to permit
insurers to respond immediately to market changes.107 By 1985, 24 states
adopted such changes in their rating laws.108
California, for example, adopted a competitive rate setting system
that incorporated a no filing provision and abolished any requirement to
belong to a rate bureau.109 Under California law, rates could be used
immediately without having to be filed or approved by the commissioner.
Illinois, which had originally enacted a prior approval law, enacted an open
competition law in 1970.110 The open competition rating law was
distinguished by the lack of advance approval or disapproval by the
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regulator and the prohibition of any agreement to adhere to bureau rates.111
In August 1971112 the law was allowed to sunset and Illinois became the
only state without a rating law for property and casualty insurance.113
However, there has been no attempt at federal antitrust enforcement in
Illinois since the two largest personal lines insurers domiciled there, State
Farm and Allstate, make their rates independently.114 In June 1972 the state
enacted a law limited to regulating advisory organizations which were
defined to mean every person, other than an insurer, who compiles
insurance statistics, prepares insurance policies and underwriting rules,
makes surveys and insurance research and furnishes that material to
insurance companies.115 Insurers were prohibited from agreeing with each
other or the advisory organization to adhere to the use of any statistics,
policy forms or underwriting rules.116
G. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Between 1985 and 1988 several states adopted flex-rating systems,
seeking to establish caps on price increases.117 Indeed, especially in the area
of auto insurance, regulators started focusing on affordability of coverage
and suppression of rates despite increasing claim costs.118 In this
connection, an important regulatory development occurred in California on
November 8, 1988 with the passage of Proposition 103.119 Proposition 103
required a rollback of rates for automobile insurance to 20 percent below
the rates in effect on November 8, 1987120 unless the downturn in rates
would have led to the insolvency of the insurer.121 In addition, a prior
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approval system was introduced for most casualty insurance rates.
Beginning on November 8, 1989, property and casualty insurance rates in
California had to be approved by the commissioner prior to use.122 Finally,
Proposition 103 provided that personal automobile insurance rates must be
determined taking into account, in decreasing order of importance, the
insured’s driving safety record, the number of miles driven annually by the
insured, the number of years of driving experience of the insured and any
other rating factors that the commissioner specified had a substantial
relationship to the risk of loss.123 A mandatory 20 percent discount for good
drivers was also established.124 Thus, Proposition 103 replaced the open
competition system in force until then in California.
In 1994, in 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, the California
Supreme Court affirmed the Insurance Commissioner’s authority to adopt a
ratemaking formula implementing the rate rollback provision of
Proposition 103.125 The court held that the rate making formula was not
confiscatory since it did not preclude the setting of a just and reasonable
rate.126 According to the court, the rates set under the formula did not inflict
“deep financial hardship” on insurers and therefore did not prevent them
from operating successfully.127 Going forward, California’s system of rate
regulation mainly aimed to avoid excessive rates by determining maximum
rate levels.128
In 1980 the NAIC adopted model laws for less restrictive rating
systems introducing the “file and use” and “use and file” types of rate
regulation.129 In the 1990s, catastrophic losses increased the level of state
intervention in the pricing and underwriting of homeowners’ insurance.130
A tendency towards less restrictive rate regulation emerged with regard to
other property lines, in particular automobile insurance.131 Favorable loss
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trends led insurers to reduce their rates and consequently the need to use
regulation to suppress rates declined.132
Toward the end of the 1990s, many states passed laws deregulating
the price and policy forms of commercial insurance.133 Commercial
deregulation laws were enacted in 1998 in Arizona, Georgia, Illinois and
New Hampshire and in 1999 in Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Montana,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Indiana, Maine, Louisiana, Virginia and Rhode
Island.134 New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts have also adopted
similar legislation.135 These laws exempt insurance companies that sell
their products to large specialized commercial insurance buyers from rate
and policy form requirements.136 The hope was that if insurers did not have
to comply with state control, they would be able to diversify both their
rates and types of policies, thereby expanding the range of products they
could offer.137
Currently, there are six different types of rate regulation systems.138
Rate regulation varies from the most restrictive type, the prior approval
method, to the no-filing method, the least restrictive. The six systems are
the prior approval, file and use, use and file, flex rating, modified prior
approval, and no file methods.139 The prior approval system requires
insurers to file the rates and wait for the approval by the insurance
commissioner before using them. Approval is presumed if rates are not
denied within a specified number of days, in case there is a deemer clause.
In the file and use system, rates become effective immediately upon filing.
The insurance commissioner, however, may subsequently disapprove the
rates. A use and file system provides that rates must be filed with the
insurance commissioner within a specified period of time after their first
use. In the flex rating system insurers may increase or decrease rates within
a certain percentage range. Prior approval is required only if the rate
132
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change is larger than the specified percentage. The modified prior approval
system provides that rate revisions based only on a change in loss
experience are subject to file and use regulation. However, rate revisions
based on a change in expense ratio or rate classifications are subject to
prior approval. Lastly, under the no-filing system rates do not need to be
filed with or approved by the state insurance commissioner. The table in
Appendix 1 identifies the types of rate regulation systems according to
state.
Recent changes in state rating laws confirm the trend towards less
restrictive systems of rate regulation. As of April 2008 rates in
Massachusetts were determined according to what the insurance
commissioner at the time, Nonnie Burns, called “managed competition”.140
Previously Massachusetts had been the only state where the insurance
commissioner set rates for auto insurance. Now, insurance companies
submit their rates to the state insurance commissioner, who has power to
disapprove them if they are excessive or unfairly discriminatory.141 In May
2008 the Georgia legislature passed legislation142 permitting auto insurance
companies to set rates above the mandatory minimum limits without prior
approval from the insurance commissioner.143 Finally, in June 2008 the
New York legislature approved an auto insurance flex rating bill144 that
allows auto insurance companies to adjust their rates twice annually within
a 5 percent band without seeking prior regulatory approval.145
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II. RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST RATE REGULATION
A. PURPOSES OF RATE REGULATION
In the 1914 landmark case, German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the power of the states to regulate rates on
grounds that insurance is affected by the public interest.146 According to the
public interest theory and normative economic theory, insurance rate
regulation is intended to correct market failures that would otherwise cause
inefficiency and inequity in the insurance market and harm the interest of
the general public.147
In particular, rate regulation primarily aims to remedy two opposite
problems: one, the tendency of insurance companies to engage in
destructive competition and two, the formation of price cartels by insurance
companies that could set excessive rates.148 These aims were clearly
defined by the subcommittee appointed by the NAIC Rates and Rating
Organization Committee in 1960 to review the status of insurance rate
regulation.149 In a report dated November 28, 1960, the subcommittee
stated that rate regulation is intended to assure that insurance coverages
desired by the public are offered to the public by licensed insurers, that the
cost of these coverages is reasonable and not excessive, that insureds bear a
fair share of the cost of insurance and that insurers remain solvent to
protect their policyholders.150 In accordance with those objectives, states
seek to promote the public welfare by ensuring that premiums are
“adequate, not excessive and not unfairly discriminatory.” Although these
three rate standards are interpreted differently in the different states, they
have basic common features that the following analysis will describe.
The first aim of insurance rate regulation, to ensure adequate rates,
stems from past experience with unregulated rates and the consequent
destructive competition that led to several insurers’ insolvencies.151 One of
the principal aims of rate regulation is to maintain the solvency of
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insurance companies and to prevent rates from being set too low.152 The
importance of this goal results from the unique nature of the insurance
contract. An insurance contract, indeed, is an aleatory contract in which the
policyholder pays up-front premiums in exchange for the insurer’s promise
to indemnify in case a future loss occurs. This gives policyholders an
interest in the financial solidity of their insurance companies and in the
companies’ ability to pay future claims. Given the function of insurance in
satisfying society’s need for security, the financial solvency of insurance
companies is the principal purpose of insurance regulation.153 For this
reason, “the principle of solidity is pervasive” in insurance regulation.154
Rate regulation, like capital adequacy, is considered a means to ensure the
solidity of the insurance industry.155 The self-interest of insurance
companies in remaining solvent has not always been reckoned sufficient.156
Rate regulation, instead, is believed to assure insurers’ solvency by keeping
rates above a certain minimum level of adequacy so that adequate reserves
can be maintained.157
As for the second purpose of insurance rate regulation, the concern
for making rates not excessive was not one of the original reasons for
regulating prices. Initially, regulators and insurance companies were
concerned about ruinous competition that could threaten solvency.158 The
NAIC-AIC model laws introduced the “not excessive” standard due to the
drafters’ belief that cooperation among insurers in setting rates created a
need to prevent excessive rates.159
The “not excessive” standard seeks to make the cost of insurance
affordable.160 In the process, the standard promotes the availability of
insurance.161 At the same time, this standard may be in tension with the first
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standard, which requires insurance rates to be adequate in order to assure
the solvency of the insurance companies.162
Finally, rate insurance regulation seeks to avoid rates that unfairly
discriminate among insureds. This third goal reflects regulators’ concerns
about price discrimination among consumers when such discrimination is
not related to differences in the risks underwritten.163 Objectionable forms
of discrimination include: (i) unfair individual discrimination, such as
rebates, credits and misclassifications that favor one insured over another
when the risk underwritten is the same,164 (ii) unfair group rate
discrimination that usually involves rating plans that arbitrarily
differentiate among the insureds without taking into account their risk165
and (iii) unfair product discrimination that results in unreasonable
overpricing or under pricing of one product compared to another.166 In this
regard, insurance regulators aim to ensure that rates are fair for every class
of insured and that the classes are fair and nondiscriminatory.167 Therefore,
while the standard of “not excessive” rates seeks to accomplish
reasonableness between insurance companies and policyholders, the
standard of “not unfairly discriminatory” rates seeks to accomplish
“equity” by ensuring that policyholders are not unfairly discriminated
against.168 In order to achieve this objective, fair classifications of
policyholders for premium calculation are necessary so that every insured
will bear the cost of his or her own insurance.169 It is difficult to make fair
classifications, however, since every risk is unique and theoretically could
be uniquely rated.170
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B. ARGUMENTS FOR RATE REGULATION
Having analyzed the goals of rate regulation, now the article turns
to the arguments in favor of state regulation of insurance rates.
According to the traditional rationale for regulation of insurance
rates, states can protect policyholders by controlling rates.171 The argument
is based on the fact that policyholders and insurance companies do not deal
at arm’s length and that insurance companies are likely to overcharge
policyholders in the absence of rate regulation.172 When competition results
in a variety of rates, some argue that policyholders do not benefit from that
variety because they may not have the ability to compare the rates.173
Policyholders have difficulty in fully understanding the insurance contract
and in establishing a connection between the price and the quality of the
coverage. In these circumstances, rate regulation and standardization are
said to be appropriate.174 In an un-regulated system, some insurers may cut
rates by providing low-quality insurance products that policyholders might
not recognize as poor quality due to imperfect information about the
characteristics of the coverage offered and the financial solidity of the
insurer.175 Rate regulation would counteract deception by insurers and
assist consumers in comparing different insurance policies.176
Rate regulation also helps to prevent ruinous price competition
with a subsequent increase in insurers’ insolvencies.177 Advocates for rate
regulation argue that insurance companies will respond to the danger of
destructive competition, by conspiring to set rates.178 This raises concerns
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about anti-competitive conduct and the converse danger of excessive
rates.179
Predatory pricing concerns are another reason to favor of rate
regulation. The concern is that rate deregulation might induce stronger
insurers to use their greater financial resources to temporarily cut rates to
increase their market share and force weaker insurers out of the insurance
market.180
Rate regulation is also urged in the interest of actuarial accuracy,
because regulators must rely on wide loss experience in setting rates that
even larger insurance companies may lack.181 Moreover, unregulated rates
might lead to underwriting restrictions because some insurers might decide
to write only low-risk insureds in order to minimize their costs and charge
lower premiums.182 Insurers that continued to write higher-risk insureds
would bear a greater proportion of such risks and be forced to increase their
rates in order to cover possible losses.183 This would create problems of
insurance affordability and has the potential to result in insolvency of the
higher-risk insurers.184
C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RATE REGULATION
This article will now examine the arguments in favor of
deregulating rates. The principal rationale for insurance rate regulation is
that it is needed to correct market failures.185 Opponents of rate regulation,
however, argue that the insurance market is competitive186 since it is
characterized by a large number of firms doing business with a low level of
concentration and selling similar products.187 They agree that there are
modest barriers to entry and that profits are not excessive compared with
179
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other industries.188 Thus, they conclude there is no evidence of market
failure that may justify insurance rate regulation.189
Further, with regard to the two opposite concerns that, in the
absence of rate regulation, insurers would engage in destructive
competition or form cartels that would lead to excessive rates,190
proponents of rate deregulation note that these concerns are outdated.191
The concept of destructive competition dates back to the nineteenth
century192 and is no longer well founded since more recently there has been
no evidence of dangerous price cutting; rather prices in insurance markets
reflect expected claim costs and reasonable profits for insurance
companies.193 Those who favor deregulated rates stress that insurance
companies, like all other enterprises, aim to conduct a financially
successful business and to avoid charging rates that are too low to cover
their costs.194 Under this view, rate deregulation is not likely to cause
ruinous competition because, even assuming that a big insurer reduces its
rates in order to eliminate possible competitors, in the long run it will have
to raise its rates to cover its costs.195 In that event, new competitors,
attracted by the possibility of making profit, will enter the market.196
The cartel pricing concern originated from the initial bureau ratemaking activities and the regulatory restrictions on deviations from the
bureau rates in the 1950s and early 1960s.197 Effective cartel pricing is now
unlikely given the large number of insurers, ease of entry into the market
and the decreased influence by rate bureaus in setting rates.198
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Advocates of rate deregulation maintain that the free market is just
as appropriate for the insurance sector as it is for other businesses.199
Although insurance regulation is considered important to ensure the
protection of policyholders, proponents of deregulation agree that state
control of the insurance market impedes competition.200 In this connection,
rate regulation may lead to both inadequate and excessive rates.201 In the
latter case, rate regulation might cause levels of premiums so high that even
the most inefficient insurance companies would make profits.202 Regulators
should not intervene in rate setting and insurance companies should be
permitted to make rates so that policyholders can benefit from lower-cost
insurance.203
Further, advocates point out that determining a proper rate is not
feasible since rate setting is “not an inevitably accurate and scientific
calculation.”204 They observe that rate-setting is a subjective activity and
because there can be more than one reasonable decision in making rates,
there is no reason to regard a commissioner’s decision as the most
reasonable.205 Indeed, the setting of rates by competently managed
insurance companies is arguably as reasonable as the setting of rates by the
commissioners.206 It is also emphasized that a rate proper for one insurer
might not be proper for another one.207
In addition, proponents argue that unregulated rates will avoid
commission wars.208 When price uniformity prevails, insurers are more
likely to have to pay agents higher commissions in order to obtain
business.209 Conversely, they say, the problem of commission wars can be
overcome when rates are deregulated since insurers can obtain business by
competing on the price of the products offered.210 Another disadvantage is
that restrictions on price competition limit product differentiation because
199
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comparable rates must be charged for comparable products in order to
implement a uniform pricing system.211 Moreover, rate regulation requires
even more resources and efforts by the insurance departments in order to
examine insurance rates. Deregulation of rates would permit regulators to
fully devote themselves to other more important supervisory activities such
as solvency supervision.212
Another reason advanced in favor of rate deregulation is that it
would take politics out of rate-setting.213 Rate regulation often involves
political pressure on insurance commissioners by insurers demanding rate
increases and consumers that look unfavorably on those increases.214 In
particular, advocates of rate deregulation observe that the political pressure
by policyholders may lead to inadequate rates since regulators will be
influenced to approve rate increases that “may be either too little and/or too
late.”215 Ironically, even though rate regulation is aimed at avoiding
inadequate rates, it may actually lead to inadequate rates.216 This is
especially true in prior-approval systems, because of delays in obtaining
approval cost insurers, especially after taking inflation into account.217
Insurance companies react to inadequate rates by restricting underwriting
or by cancelling and refusing to renew insurance policies creating
subsequent possible problems of unavailable coverage.218 This result
undermines one of the purposes of insurance rate regulation, to promote
insurance availability. Consequently, reduced rate regulation will give
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insurers the flexibility to adjust rates, ensure adequate rates and make
insurance available.219
Finally, advocates of deregulation note that the prior approval
system can cause rates to remain at a higher level than appropriate.220 Due
to the time necessary to approve a new rate, a cost decline does not
automatically translate into a lower rate.221 Moreover, insurers may not
apply for lower rates based on improvement in their underwriting
experience if they expect to have difficulty in later obtaining a needed
increase.222
III. THE EFFECTS OF OPEN COMPETITION
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE MARKET
The economic justification for rate regulation is that it protects the
public interest by avoiding inefficiency that would otherwise result from
monopolistic or oligopolistic conduct. Under this logic, in order to assess
whether the property and casualty industry is likely to achieve benefits
from rate deregulation, market structure and easy of entry should be
examined.223 The principal characteristic of monopoly is the presence of a
single seller of a product for which there are no alternatives.224 However,
economists have demonstrated that oligopoly power may also exist if there
are few sellers and they act in concert.225 Entry by competitors is the main
limitation on monopoly power in a market economy.226
The U.S. property and casualty insurance market has the structural
characteristics of a competitive market.227 The market is characterized by a
large number of firms operating with low levels of concentration and
selling products with identical features.228 The competitive structure of the
market is apparent from the fact that in 2009 there were 2,737 property and
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casualty insurance companies operating in the United States.229 This
number has increased since 1971, when there were 1,206 companies
operating in the U.S. property and casualty insurance market.230
That said, the presence of a large number of insurers offering
basically the same product is not by itself indicative of competition since a
small number of companies could write a majority of the premiums and by
virtue of their market share be able to fix prices.231 It is necessary,
therefore, to consider the relative market share of insurance companies in
order to determine whether the market is competitive. The following table
presents the 2009 nationwide market share of the top twenty-five U.S.
property and casualty insurance groups. The market share of different
corporate groups as a whole is a more accurate indicator than market share
of their individual insurance subsidiaries. While individual subsidiaries are
separate legal entities, they are not economically independent and are
subject to the group’s management decisions.
Table 1 – Property and Casualty Insurance Industry 2009 Market
Share Nationwide by Group
GROUP
NAME

DIRECT
PREMIUMS
WRITTEN

MARKET
SHARE
percent

CUMULATIVE
MARKET
SHARE
percent

1 State Farm Grp

51,063,110,761

10.50

10.50

2 Zurich Ins Grp

28,979,691,684

5.96

16.46

3 Allstate Ins Grp

26,153,440,231

5.38

21.84

4 American Intl Grp

26,140,201,178

5.38

27.22

5 Liberty Mut Grp

24,772,894,328

5.10

32.32

6 Travelers Grp

21,409,548,242

4.40

36.72

7 Berkshire Hathaway Grp

16,054,658,656

3.30

40.02

8 Nationwide Corp Grp

15,405,561,636

3.17

43.19

9 Progressive Grp

14,200,294,349

2.92

46.11

10 Hartford Fire & Cas Grp

10,473,026,375

2.15

48.26

11 United Serv Automobile Ass’n Grp

10,439,501,509

2.15

50.41

229
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12 Chubb & Son Ins Grp

9,419,255,363

1.94

52.35

13 Cna Ins Grp

8,131,205,861

1.67

54.02

14 Ace Ltd Grp

7,780,534,083

1.60

55.62

15 Allianz Ins Grp

5,764,589,841

1.19

56.81

16 American Family Ins Grp

5,681,564,588

1.17

57.98

17 Auto Owners Grp

4,451,729,312

0.92

58.90

18 Erie Ins Grp

3,860,839,234

0.79

59.69

19 Assurant Inc Grp

3,735,278,486

0.77

60.46

20 American Financial Grp

3,565,868,308

0.73

61.19

21 Wr Berkley Corp Grp

3,255,838,299

0.67

61.86

22 Fm Global Grp

3,199,857,312

0.66

62.52

23 Qbe Ins Grp

3,128,630,118

0.64

63.16

24 Cincinnati Fin Grp

3,071,344,125

0.63

63.79

25 Metropolitan Grp

2,984,332,558

0.61

64.40

Source: NAIC, 2009 Market Share Reports for the Top 25
Property/Casualty Insurers Over 25 Years 39 (2010), reprinted with
permission. The NAIC does not endorse any analysis or conclusions based
on use of its data.
Although table 1 suggests that the market is concentrated since
twenty-five insurance groups control 64.40 percent of the market, with
State Farm Group controlling a market share of 10.50 percent,232 evaluation
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) leads to a different conclusion.
The HHI is a commonly used measure of industry concentration and is
calculated by summing the squares of the market share percentage of all
companies in the market. For example, if a market had only one seller, its
market share would be 100 percent and its HHI would be 10,000. If a
market had five sellers, each with an equal 20 percent of the market, the
HHI would be 2000. The HHI tends to zero when a market consists of a
large number of firms of relatively equal size. Increases in the value of the
HHI indicate higher concentration in the market, either due to a decrease in
the number of firms or an increase in the disparity in size between these
firms. Although there is no precise point at which the HHI indicates market
concentration sufficient to restrict competition, the Department of Justice
232

See James Barrese, Gene Lai & Nicos Scordis, Ownership Concentration
and Governance in the U.S. Insurance Industry, 30 J. INS. ISSUES 1 (2007).
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has developed Merger Guidelines under which an HHI of less than 1000
means the market is not concentrated, an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800
points means the market is moderately concentrated and an HHI over 1,800
points means the market is concentrated.233 According to the ISO, the HHI
for the property and casualty insurance market in 2009 was 351 points.234
This indicates that the market was not concentrated. Further, the trend
toward an increase in the level of market concentration indicates a decline
in high-cost companies in favor of more efficient and lower-cost
companies.235 Therefore, higher market concentration may be the result of
increased market competition and a subsequent improvement in
policyholders’ welfare.236
With respect to possible barriers to entry, it is generally
acknowledged that insurers can easily enter the property and casualty
insurance market.237 The ability of new insurers to enter into the business
assures efficiency and competition. When there are excessive profits in the
market, new firms are induced to enter and the quantity of products offered
is increased. Consequently, excess profits decrease until reaching a price
level where zero excess profits exist. In this way a competitive market is
achieved. The following table shows, inter alia, the number of entries in
the markets for commercial property and casualty insurance products from
2004 to 2009.
Table 2 – 2009 Commercial Lines Data – Nationwide

LINE OF
BUSINESS

PREMIUM
S
WRITTEN

MARK
ET
SHARE
S
FOUR
LARGE
ST
GROU
PS

Commerci
al
Auto
Liability

18,988,326
,402

28.55
percent

233

HHI
BASED
ON
PREMI
UM

320

NUMB
ER
OF
SELLE
RS
(GROU
PS)

105

NUMB
ER
OF
ENTRI
ES
LAST
5
YEAR
S

30

RETU
RN
ON
NET
WORT
H
10YEAR
MEAN

NUMB
ER
OF
EXITS
LAST
5
YEAR
S

MARK
ET
GROW
TH
LAST 3
YEARS

MARK
ET
GROW
TH
LAST
10
YEARS

29

-13.97
percent

7.43
25.05 percen
percent
t

U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines § 1.51 (1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publ
ic/guidelines/hmg.htm.
234
THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2011, supra note 229, at 47.
235
Joskow, supra note 187, at 382.
236
Id.
237
HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 16; Joskow, supra note 187, at 388-91;
Joskow & McLaughlin, supra note 108, 379.

140
Commerci
al
Auto
Physical
Commerci
al
Auto
Total
Commerci
al
Multiple
Peril

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

24

-20.16
percent

13.36
-4.67 percen
percent
t

25

-15.50
percent

8.49
16.56 percen
percent
t

25

27

-5.82
percent

99

33

33

5.11
percent

499

84

28

43

-1.31
percent

35.08
percent

495

76

25

32

-12.81
percent

5,449,184,
963

69.45
percent

1,594

8

1

1

-11.43
percent

1,922,896,
601

89.54
percent

2,985

9

5

5

-45.91
percent

10,817,257
,976

24.28
percent

288

98

27

25

-7.42
percent

Other
Liability
Workers
Compensa
tion

47,489,981
,386

33.13
percent

451

88

23

21

-13.41
percent

41,287,350
,051

33.34
percent

395

110

39

31

-20.98
percent

Products
Liability

2,895,299,
149

30.42
percent

404

66

19

16

-28.72
percent

5,792,918,
385

25.21
percent

24,781,244
,787

27.77
percent

34,034,902
,544

27.80
percent

338

104

Fire

12,861,192
,843

38.65
percent

554

Allied
Lines

11,249,248
,316

38.47
percent

Inland
Marine

13,434,863
,829

Mortgage
Guaranty
Financial
Guaranty
Medical
Profession
al
Liability

266

297

119

115

32

33

8.03
50.34 percen
percent
t
19.77
138.66 percen
percent
t
-3.92
186.42 percen
percent
t
19.07
61.49 percen
percent
t
-33.39
46.31 percen
percent
t*
-15.44
22.40 percen
percent
t*
7.40
67.72 percen
percent
t
4.66
82.38 percen
percent
t
6.35
19.64 percen
percent
t
0.43
47.40 percen
percent
t*

* Denotes Return on Net Worth for 2009 data year only.
Source: NAIC, 2009 Competition Database Report 10 (2010), reprinted
with permission. The NAIC does not endorse any analysis or conclusions
based on use of its data.
In particular, it can be seen that the number of insurance groups
with affiliated insurers which have entered the markets for commercial
property and casualty insurance products between 2004 and 2009 is
substantial. For example, thirty-nine insurers entered the workers
compensation market, thirty entered the commercial auto insurance market,
twenty-seven entered the medical professional liability market and twenty-
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five entered the commercial multiple peril market. This, along with the fact
that the level of concentration in the U.S. property and casualty insurance
market is low, leads to the conclusion that insurance companies are unable
to charge excessive prices by attempting to act in concert since, in the
absence of substantial barriers to entry, new insurers will prevent existing
companies from fixing prices.
As this shows, the U.S. property and casualty insurance market is
competitive because it is characterized by a large number of insurance
companies operating with low concentration levels. Prof. Paul Joskow
called the insurance market one of the markets that conform more closely
to the ideal model of perfect competition.238 The insurance market,
therefore, does not present characteristics of a monopoly or an oligopoly
that may justify rate regulation.
In recognition of the wisdom of rate deregulation, there has been a
gradual movement away from prior-approval systems toward less
restrictive systems such as: file and use, use and file, flex rating, modified
prior approval and, in particular, no file systems.239 Further, the NAIC File
and Use Model Act introduced a presumption in favor of the existence of a
competitive market unless the commissioner, after a hearing, determines
that the market is not competitive.240 The Model Act also established a
standard which provides that a rate in a competitive market is not
excessive.241
Nevertheless, prior-approval laws are still enforced in many
states.242 For example, prior approval systems are used in Mississippi with
regard to all insurance lines, in California with regard to all lines except
title insurance, in Alabama for medical malpractice, property and inland
marine, workers’ compensation and personal lines, in Alaska with regard to
medical malpractice, workers’ compensation and assigned risk rates, in
Connecticut with regard to medical malpractice (for rate increases of 7.5

238
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240
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VERSION) § 4 (NAIC 2010) [hereinafter FILE AND USE MODEL LAW] (providing
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performance, market conduct, the consumers’ practical opportunities to acquire
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competing insurers).
241
See, e.g., FILE AND USE MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 5(A)(1)(a).
242
See Appendix 1.
239

142

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

percent or more over the last rates filed) and title insurance.243 It is also
worth mentioning that, except for the no-file systems, all the other systems
mentioned above retain some form of regulatory control over insurance
rates. Although rating laws in the different states vary to some extent,
insurance commissioners retain the right to disapprove rates in file and use
and use and file systems, while in flex rating and in modified prior
approval systems insurers may be required to obtain prior approval from a
commissioner if an increase is larger than the percentage rate established or
the rate revision is based on a change in expense ratio or rate
classifications.244 With a few rare exceptions, purely competitive rating
models are not used in the United States. No-file systems are limited to just
a few lines in some states.245 This stands in contrast with the fact that the
competitive structure of the property and casualty insurance market in the
U.S. does not justify the regulation of rates.
B. THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE WITH REGARD TO REGULATION OF
INSURANCE TARIFFS
European Member States’ regulators do not have the right to
regulate insurance prices. It is worthwhile, therefore, to analyze the EU
experience in order to draw possible conclusions that could be valuable in
considering rate deregulation.
Insurance regulation in Europe aims to create an integrated
insurance market so that insurers can better diversify their risks and attain
more economies of scale, while allowing policyholders to benefit from
increased competition and a wider choice of insurance products.
To this end, the EU legislature has attempted to remove regulatory
barriers between Member States by introducing the principles of freedom
of establishment and freedom to provide services.246 In order to foster
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The third non-life Council Directive 92/49/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 228) and the
third life Council Directive 92/96/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 360) established a single
system for the authorization and financial supervision of insurance companies by
the Member State in which an insurer has its head office (the home Member State).
The authorization issued by the home Member State allows an insurance company
to conduct its business in the other European Member States, either by opening
agencies or branches (freedom of establishment) or by offering services on a
temporary basis (freedom to provide services). In general, the principle of freedom
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competition in the single insurance market, the third non-life insurance
Directive prevented insurance supervisory authorities from regulating
insurance premium prices and policy conditions.247
Previously, most EU Member States had exercised considerable
control over premiums by setting minimum or maximum prices or fixing
price scales for some lines of insurance or even for all insurance lines.248 In
the Italian insurance market, for example, before the enactment of the
“third generation” of Directives the principles of “authorization of
admission” and of “control on tariffs” were well established in the
industry.249 Before deregulation, potential competition in the European
insurance market was impeded by regulated tariffs that hampered insurance
companies from competing on price.250
With the removal of national control over insurance tariffs, new
insurance products can be introduced into the market without prior
regulatory approval. In this way, insurers’ efficiency increased and
consumers benefited from lower prices.251 Article 29 of the third non-life
insurance Directive of 1992 provides that Member States cannot maintain
or introduce systems of prior notification or approval of insurers’ proposed
increases in premium rates except as a part of general systems aimed at
controlling prices.252 Insurance companies in Europe are now free to set
their rates without any state interference and to write insurance contracts on
any terms they agree to with their policyholders. Efforts by Member States
to control insurance prices have been censured by the European
Commission. In 2000 the Italian government, due to the effects of motor
insurance prices on inflation, imposed a one-year ban on any increase in
premiums for certain policyholders whose rates were calculated on the

of establishment and freedom to provide services are set out, respectively, in article
49 and article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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24012007.pdf.
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250
European Commission, supra note 248, at 36.
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basis of accidents.253 Additionally, the Italian government imposed a oneyear freezing on all new policies that were calculated on the same basis.254
The European Commission censured the measure.255 According to the
Commission, the price freeze was incompatible with the freedom to market
insurance products within the European Union under the third non-life
insurance Directive and was neither part of a general price-control system
nor was it justified by the public interest.256
There is a legitimate concern that deregulation will obstruct setting
accurate rates in the short run because insurers may not have sufficient loss
experience on which to rely.257 The European Union addressed this
problem within the framework of the insurance Block Exemption
Regulations. The first Block Exemption Regulation, Regulation 3932/92,
was adopted by the Commission in 1992.258 When this Regulation expired
on March 31, 2003, the Commission replaced it with Regulation
358/2003.259 Afterwards, when also this second Regulation expired, on
March 31, 2010, the Commission adopted a new insurance block
exemption Regulation, Regulation 267/2010.260 The first Block Exemption
Regulation was introduced following the Verband der Sachversicherer
case, in which the European Court of Justice rejected arguments that full
competition would cause more insurers’ insolvencies and that, since
cooperation between insurance companies was necessary to avoid such a
risk, the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (formerly Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the
European Community)261 should be limited.262 Article 101(1) of the Treaty
253
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See Commission Regulation 3932/92, art. 1, 1992 O.J. (L 398) 9 (EC).
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See Commission Regulation 267/2010 2010, art. 2, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 5
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prohibits, inter alia, agreements between undertakings that prevent, restrict
or distort competition within the EU common market by fixing prices and
other trading conditions either directly or indirectly prices.263
The Commission, recognizing the importance of cooperation
among insurance companies to produce pool data concerning the
calculation of the average cost of covering a specified risk in the past, the
frequency and the size of past insurance claims, exempted the joint
compilation and distribution of calculations and studies from the
application of article 101(1) of the Treaty.264 The Commission also
exempted other agreements in the insurance sector concerning the setting
up and operation of industry (re)insurance pools for the common coverage
of certain risks in the form of co-(re)insurance.265
two articles are substantially the same. See Commission Regulation 267/2010, art.
1, fn. 2, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 1 (EU). Article 101(1) prohibits “all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.” See Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101(1), Mar.
30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83), 88. As an exception to this rule, Article 101(3)
provides that the provisions contained in Article 101(1) may be declared
inapplicable in case of agreements “which contribut[e] to improving the production
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit[s]”, and which do not
impose restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these
objectives and do not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned. See
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
101(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83), 88-89.
262
See Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v. Comm’n of the
European Communities, 1987 E.C.R. 405.
263
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 101(1), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 88.
264
See Commission Regulation 267/2010, art. 2, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 5 (EU).
According to paragraph 9 of the Preamble, access to past statistical data is essential
in order to facilitate the pricing of risks and therefore the Commission considered
cooperation in this area necessary. This can in turn facilitate market entry and
benefit consumers. It is specified, however, that agreements on commercial
premiums are not exempted. See also Commission Regulation 267/2010, pmbl. ¶
9, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 2 (EU).
265
See Commission Regulation 267/2010, art. 5, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 6 (EU).
Commission Regulation 267/2010 did not renew the exemption granted by the
previous Block Exemption Regulation for agreements on standard policy
conditions and security devices. In particular, according to paragraph 3 of the
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Unlike the old system where regulated tariffs prevented price
competition, liberalization following the third non-life insurance Directive
led to increased competition, particularly in formerly heavily-regulated
markets such as Italy, Germany, Belgium and Portugal.266 After price
controls were abolished, premium rates decreased.267 In particular, in
countries such as Germany, Austria and Spain that used to have minimum
premium regulation, price competition increased considerably.268 In
Germany, due to discounts and price reductions, premium income from
motor insurance decreased from DEM 44 billion in 1995 to DEM 39 billion
in 1998.269 On the other hand, in countries such as Italy, Portugal and
Greece, deregulation led to tariff increases in the motor liability sector in
order to cover actual claim costs.270 Deregulation permitted insurance
companies in those countries to reach a balance between the risks
underwritten and the premiums charged to cover potential losses.
Previously, in those countries premiums had been artificially low in order
to prevent inflationary pressure.271
The experience in countries like the United Kingdom and France,
countries that had not regulated insurance prices and contractual terms
before the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive confirms the benefits of rate
deregulation.272 In the United Kingdom, for example, market concentration
has decreased as an immediate effect of deregulation. In 1981, the fifteen
largest insurers operating in that country underwrote almost 80 percent of
Preamble, the new Regulation does not grant an exemption for the establishment of
standard policy conditions and the testing and acceptance of security devices
because the Commission’s review of the functioning of Regulation 358/2003
revealed that it was no longer necessary to include such agreements in a sector
specific block exemption regulation. The Commission considered more appropriate
that they be subject to self-assessment. See also Commission Regulation 267/2010,
pmbl. ¶ 3, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 1 (EU).
266
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d/163-parte-i.html.
267
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268
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272
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www.agcm.it/trasp-statistiche/doc_download/164-parte-ii.html (also stating that
more recently the concentration ratios has increased due to insurance companies’
reorganizations that have occurred recently).

2011

INSURANCE RATES REGULATION

147

the total premiums while in 1994, they underwrote about 65 percent of the
total premiums.273 Moreover, as a consequence of market liberalization,
even more foreign insurance companies set up business in the United
Kingdom.274
Following the deregulation of insurance prices and conditions,
concentration, however, did not decrease. After deregulation in 1992, the
largest insurers consolidated their positions in their national markets.
Between 1990 and 1998 the combined market share of European
multinational insurers (Allianz, Axa, Cgu, Generali, Royal & Sun Alliance,
Winterthur and Zurich) in the six largest national markets (United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain) increased from 18
to 39 percent.275 In France in 1990, the combined market share of the five
biggest insurance companies was about 40 percent, while in the second half
of the nineties their market share increased to 57 percent.276 The same trend
appeared in Italy. In 1990, the top five insurers controlled almost half of the
Italian market, while in 1999 they had a market share of 60 percent.277 In
Germany, the top five insurers had a market share of almost 32 percent in
1990 and 40 percent in 1999.278 In the United Kingdom, the top five
insurers controlled 32 percent of the market in 1994 and 55 percent in
1999.279
It is difficult to know whether deregulation accounts for that higher
concentration. More likely, the reduction in the number of insurers in the
European market resulted from the increasing number of mergers and
acquisitions at the end of the 1990s.280 For example, higher concentration
ratios in Italy were due to the fact that Generali bought out INA in 1999,
while in Germany they ensued from Generali’s acquisition of AMB and
AXA’s takeover of Albingia.281 Thus, it is unlikely that the increase in
concentration ratios of the non-life European market resulted from
deregulation. A case history of the motor insurance industry in Italy
273
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following deregulation is also illustrative. The Italian auto insurance sector,
which had been highly regulated by the government, was considerably
affected by the change introduced by the third non-life Directive.282 The
same trend seen in the general European non-life insurance market
appeared in the Italian auto insurance market. Between 1982 and 1991, the
number of insurance companies grew from 97 to 113, but then dropped to
80 between 1991 and 2000.283 The peak of the reduction occurred in the
period after 1994, when the number of insurers declined from 105 to 80.284
Entries in the market rose in the second half of the 1980s and decreased in
the 1990s.285 Conversely, the number of exits from the market decreased in
the second half of the 1980s and increased in the 1990s.286 The net entry in
the market between 1994 and 2002 was -28.287 The combined market share
of the top 20 insurers also increased from 63.63 percent in 1982 to 79.87
percent in 2000.288 From this, one might infer that deregulation in the
Italian auto insurance market had a negative effect on competition.
However, in a study conducted in 2001, the Italian Antitrust Authority
concluded that net exits from the market were not due to deregulation
because only some of the insurance companies that exited the market had
financial problems.289 Rather, the exits occurred because insurance
companies were acquired by other companies and some insurers voluntarily
ceased trading.290 The number of insurers’ insolvencies decreased with the
deregulation of insurance tariffs. In 1993-1994 around ten companies were
insolvent, but in 1995 that number dropped to six.291 The reduction in the
number of insurers’ insolvencies might be a result of the fact that insurers
were free to set the price of premiums at an adequate level to cover their
costs. Indeed, one adverse effect of rate regulation is to weaken the
relationship between premiums and expected loss costs;292 deregulation, on
the contrary, permits a better alignment of prices with costs.293 Premiums
rates went up and down until the first half of 1990s, while after tariffs
282

See Turchetti & Daraio, supra note 249, at 202.
Id. at 203-04.
284
Id. at 204.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 205.
287
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, supra note 272, at 35.
288
Id. at 26.
289
Id. at 36.
290
Id. at 36-37.
291
Id. at 36.
292
Cummins, supra note 147, at 12; see Tennyson, supra note 177, at 14.
293
See Cummins, supra note 147, at 2, 11.
283
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deregulation they tended to increase.294 Among the causes adduced to
explain rates increase are (1) the rise in the average cost of compensation
for damage that changed from € 1,923 to € 3,830 between 1994 and 2001;
(2) the increase in cost of repairs; (3) the frequency of fraud and the
considerable frequency of cervical spine lesions reported in around 66
percent of the claims.295 Moreover, an efficiency analysis of forty-five
Italian insurers in the motor insurance sector showed that the cost
efficiency and the total productivity of these companies increased between
1982 and 2000, particularly in the second half of the 1990s after adoption
of the third non-life Directive.296
Motor insurance aside, the other non-life lines in Italy experienced
a decrease in rates from 1993 to 1996.297 This trend toward lower rates was
common throughout Europe as a consequence of increased competition.298
For example, in Germany in 1997, strong competition among insurance
companies resulted in falling rates.299
As for more general European insurance rate trends, total
premiums for the overall countries represented by the European insurance
and reinsurance federation (CEA)300 grew in real terms by 1.2 percent in
2007, compared to an annual increase of 6.5 percent in the two previous
years.301 The slowdown in the rate of total premium increase was due to
294

Turchetti & Daraio, supra note 249, at 205.
Id. at 207-08.
296
Id. at 217.
297
5 SWISS RE, Sigma, Upheaval in Insurance Markets – Results Still Good
Despite Increased Competition, Forecast for the Biggest non-Life Markets in 1998
and 1999, at 19 (1998), media.swissre.com/documents/1b477a804659d8e893f8df
4ba16c05ab-17 Aug 1998_Upheaval in insurance.pdf.
298
Id. at 4.
299
Id. at 14.
300
The CEA (Comité Européen des Assurances) is the European insurance and
reinsurance federation; its members are the national insurance associations in 32
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and
United Kingdom). The statistical data presented in the text refer to the abovementioned 32 countries beside Lithuania. COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES,
http://www.cea.eu/.
301
2008 CEA Statistics, supra note 280, at 11. This part of the article
considers 2007 data since 2008 and 2009 insurance premium data are affected by
the impact of the financial crisis. Due to the financial crisis, gross written
premiums declined by 6% in 2008. See CEA Statistics No. 37: European Insurance
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strong competition between insurance companies in the non-life sector.302
In the non-life sector premium growth in 2007 slowed down to 0.4 percent
in real terms.303 In Western Europe, eight out of fifteen markets
experienced a decrease in premium volumes.304 For example, in Germany
and in the United Kingdom, which are the two largest European non-life
markets, premium volume fell respectively 1.4 percent and 0.7 percent
respectively.305 The link between the general slowdown in total European
non-life premiums and lower insurance rates could also be seen in the
motor vehicle insurance line, which is the biggest line of non-life insurance
in Europe, accounting for 31 percent of total premiums in 2007.306 Motor
insurance premiums declined by 0.4 percent in real terms in 2007 and by 2
percent in 2006.307 This reduction was caused by lower rates due to strong
competition between insurance companies.308
Thus, deregulation and the establishment of a single insurance
market in Europe had positive effects by intensifying competition among

in Figures, COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES 9 (Oct., 2009),
http://www.cea.eu/upl oads/Modules/Publications/eif-2009.pdf [hereinafter 2009
CEA Statistics]. In 2009 the European insurance industry weathered the crisis
better as to premium growth and total European premiums increased by 2.9%. See
CEA Statistics No. 42: European Insurance in Figures, COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES
ASSURANCES 10 (Nov., 2010), http://www.cea.eu/uploads/Modules/Publicatio
ns/1290503264_european-nsurance-in-figures.pdf
[hereinafter
2010
CEA
Statistics].
302
2008 CEA Statistics, supra note 302, at 11.
303
Id. at 14.
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
See id. at 15. See also 2009 CEA Statistics, supra note 301, at 14 (showing
a decline in European motor insurance premiums in 2008 due to insurers’ efforts to
improve the value for money of products sold, the strong competition in the market
and the decline in new car sales because of the economic crisis); 2010 CEA
Statistics, supra note 301, at 15 (showing a decline in European motor insurance
premiums in 2009 mainly due to the competitiveness of the market and the
economic crisis); Retail Insurance Market Study, EUROPE ECONOMICS 100, 104-05
(Nov. 26, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/motor/201
00302rim_en.pdf (stating that Europe has the largest motor insurance market in the
world, with almost € 119 billion motor insurance premiums in the EU27 in 2008)
[hereinafter Retail Insurance Market Study].
307
2008 CEA Statistics, supra note 280, at 15.
308
Id.
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insurers.309 Insurance companies were able to adjust their rates following
deregulation, and there were not substantial rate increases.310
C. THE CASE FOR RATE DEREGULATION
The concern that deregulation could lead to monopolistic or
oligopolistic pricing is controverted by the fact that the U.S. insurance
market is competitive and does not require regulation of insurance rates.311
Table 2 above, for example, shows no evidence of excessive profits by
insurers.
Indeed, rate regulation in the U.S. may result in artificially low
returns. According to an ISO analysis, the profitability of property and
casualty insurers measured under generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP)312 is lower than other industries.313 The return on net worth of both
large property and casualty insurance companies and the entire property
and casualty insurance industry for the period 1983 to 2009 was lower than
the return on net worth for the Fortune 500 combined companies except in
1986 and in 1987.314 Other industries also had higher rates of return
compared to the property and casualty insurance industry over that period.

309

See Retail Insurance Market Study, supra note 306, at xxi, 89-90
(analyzing the European motor insurance market).
310
See Id.
311
See supra pp. 134-39.
312
The data reported in the annual statement filed by insurance companies
with state Insurance Departments and the Internal Revenue Service are on a
statutory accounting principles (SAP) basis, that tends to be more conservative
than GAAP. Therefore, in order to make comparisons with other industries it is
appropriate to consider the adjustment of the insurers’ profitability on a GAAP
basis. See THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2011, supra note 229, at 39.
313
THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2011, supra note 229, at 39.
314
See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK
2009 33 (2009); THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2011, supra note 229, at 39.
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Table 3 – 2000-2009 Annual Rate of Return: Net Income After Taxes
as a Percent of Equity
Property and Casualty Insurance

Selected Other Industries

Year

Statutory
Accounting

GAAP
Accounting

Commercial
banks

Electric and
gas utilities

Fortune 500
combined
industrials
and service

2000

6.2 percent

5.9 percent

16.7 percent

11.8 percent

14.6 percent

2001

-2.0 percent

-1.2 percent

14.0 percent

10.5 percent

10.4 percent

2002

3.0 percent

2.1 percent

17.3 percent

7.9 percent

10.2 percent

2003

8.3 percent

8.8 percent

14.9 percent

10.5 percent

12.6 percent

2004

9.7 percent

9.4 percent

15.5 percent

10.5 percent

13.9 percent

2005

10.9 percent

9.6 percent

16.0 percent

10.0 percent

14.9 percent

2006

14.2 percent

12.7 percent

15.0 percent

11.0 percent

15.4 percent

2007

12.0 percent

10.9 percent

11.0 percent

11.0 percent

15.2 percent

2008

0.8 percent

0.1 percent

3.0 percent

13.0 percent

13.1 percent

2009

6.2 percent

4.7 percent

4.0 percent

9.0 percent

10.5 percent

Source: INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT
BOOK 2011 39 (2011), reprinted with permission. (Source: SNL Financial
LC; ISO; Fortune).
Calculating, from data in Table 3, the average rate of return on a
GAAP basis for the property casualty insurance industry and the average
rate of return for the Fortune 500 combined companies for the period 20002009, the return on average for the property and casualty insurers was 6.3
percent and 13.08 percent for the Fortune 500 combined companies.
Table 2 also raises questions about insurers’ low profitability.315
Although the market growth for commercial lines over the 2000-2009
period indicated that new insurers had incentives to enter the business,316
nevertheless many insurers exited the market.317 For example, 29 insurers
exited the commercial auto liability market, 31 exited the workers’
315

See supra Table 2.
It is more appropriate to consider the market growth over the period 20002009 than just over the period 2007-2009 since 2007-2009 data may be affected by
the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. As to the data for commercial property and
casualty insurance before the financial crisis, see infra Appendix 2.
317
See supra Table 2.
316
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compensation market, 32 left the market for inland marine and 43 exited
the allied lines market.318 The fact that those insurers exited the market may
suggest that they did not consider the market profitable enough to remain in
business.319
It is difficult to establish for certain a direct causal link between
this data and insurance rate regulation. At a minimum, rate regulation could
be one of the causes depressing insurers’ profitability.320
Rate regulation may affect insurers’ profitability since it may limit
insurers’ ability to adjust their rates according to changes in market
conditions. Insurers might need to raise rates when investment income dips
or premiums are too low to absorb losses. Yet in prior approval systems
insurers may experience delays or denials in getting approval for rate
increases. There could also be political pressure on insurance
commissioners to keep rates low.321 A commissioner might grant approval
for a rate increase lower than that requested by the insurer, either to attain
the rate increase over a longer period of time or not at all. This can have
adverse effects on insurance companies. Similar concerns surround file and
use, use and file, flex rating and modified prior approval systems. With
regard to the first two systems, the commissioner retains the right to
disapprove the rates filed, while, with regard to the flex rating and modified
prior approval system, both require prior approval if the rate change is
larger than the specified percentage rate, or if the rate revision is based on a
change in expense ratio or rate classifications. Because of the time and
expense to meet the rate-filing requirements, insurance companies may
have less-than-optimal opportunity to adjust their rates to changes in the

318

See id.
In particular, with regard to commercial multiple peril insurance, inland
marine and allied lines, more insurers exited the market than entered it (a net loss
of 2 in the commercial multiple peril market, of 7 in the inland marine market and
of 15 in the market for allied lines). See supra Table 2.
320
See Cummins et al., supra note 215, at 42-44 (demonstrating by statistical
regression analysis that insurance regulation led to significantly lower prices in the
majority of states that were regulated during the sample period 1980-1996);
Cummins & Harrington, supra note 215, at 60 (showing by multiple regression
analysis that in competitive rating states loss ratios are significantly lower and
average prices significantly higher); Scott E. Harrington, A Note on the Impact of
Auto Insurance Rate Regulation, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 166, 169 (1987) (finding
that auto insurance rate regulation increased average loss ratios during the sample
period 1976-1981).
321
See supra p. 135.
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market.322 While deregulating might result in higher rate volatility, it would
permit insurance companies to set appropriate rates in response to changes
in market conditions.
Deregulation would also allow insurers to eliminate the costs of
complying with rate regulation and prior approval systems. Under the
NAIC Property and Casualty Model Law, an insurer has to file with the
insurance commissioners “every manual, minimum premium, class rate,
rating schedule or rating plan and every other rating rule, and every
modification of any of the foregoing which it proposes to use.”323 Further,
insurers have to submit or incorporate by reference “all supplementary
rating and supporting information to be used in support of or in conjunction
with a rate,” such as the insurers’ interpretation of statistical data on which
they relied, the experience of other insurance companies, and any other
relevant information.324 The commissioner, after reviewing the insurer’s
filing, may require that “the insurer’s rates be based upon the insurer’s own
loss, special assessment and expense information,” where the insurer’s loss
is not actuarially credible, the insurer “may use or supplement its
experience with information filed with the commissioner by an advisory
organization or statistical agent.”325 For insurers using the services of an
advisory organization, the commissioner may require them to provide “a
description of the rationale for such use, including its own information and
method of utilization of the advisory organization’s information.”326
Rate filings, therefore, are a drain on insurers’ time and resources.
The process to approve rates can be invasive, lengthy, inaccurate and
disputed.327 Further, a commissioner’s analysis of whether the rates are
“excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory” requires a considerable
outlay of effort and resources by insurance department staff in order to
consider past and prospective loss experience and expenses.328 The same is
322

HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 33.
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY MODEL RATING LAW (PRIOR APPROVAL
VERSION) § 5(A)(1) (2009) [hereinafter PRIOR APPROVAL MODEL LAW]; FILE AND
USE MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 6(A)(1).
324
PRIOR APPROVAL MODEL LAW, supra note 323, at § 5(A)(2); FILE AND USE
MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 6(A)(2).
325
Prior Approval Model Law, supra note 323, at § 5(A)(4); FILE AND USE
MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 6(A)(4).
326
Prior Approval Model Law, supra note 323, at § 5(A)(5); FILE AND USE
MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 6(A)(5).
327
HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 31.
328
Prior Approval Model Law, supra note 323, at § 4(B); FILE AND USE
MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 5(A)(4).
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true for a commissioner’s determination of whether there is competition in
the market.329 Rate deregulation could allow insurance departments to fully
devote themselves to other more important supervisory activities such as
solvency supervision.330
In addition, the effect of rate regulation on the availability of
insurance can be seen by analyzing the residual market. Generally, a
declining residual market means that insurance is relatively more available
in the voluntary market, and vice versa. Thus, it is of concern that residual
market shares increase along with the degree of rate regulation. Table 4
compares the size of the voluntary market and the residual market by state
for private passenger car insurance for the year 2008.
Table 4 – Private Passenger Cars Insured in the Voluntary and
Residual Market, 2008

Voluntary
Market

Residual
Market

Total

Residual market
as a percentage
of total

3,384,021

6

3,384,027

< 0.001 percent

Alaska

437,274

122

437,396

0.028 percent

Arizona

4,130,900

20

4,130,920

< 0.001 percent

Arkansas

2,069,310

0

2,069,310

< 0.001 percent

California

24,127,758

5,941

24,133,699

0.025 percent

Colorado

3,667,061

0

3,667,061

< 0.001 percent

Connecticut

2,442,996

487

2,443,483

0.020 percent

608,459

25

608,484

0.004 percent

State
Alabama

Delaware
D.C.

221,678

457

222,135

0.206 percent

Florida

11,288,408

6

11,288,414

< 0.001 percent

Georgia

6,789,526

3

6,789,529

< 0.001 percent

Hawaii

796,742

5,188

801,930

0.647 percent

Idaho

1,068,562

38

1,068,600

0.004 percent

Illinois

7,936,919

1,153

7,938,072

0.015 percent

Indiana

4,578,960

6

4,578,966

< 0.001 percent

Iowa

2,398,138

9

2,398,147

< 0.001 percent

329
330

FILE AND USE MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 4, 8.
See supra p. 135.
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Kansas

2,349,365

1,327

2,350,692

0.056 percent

Kentucky

3,013,470

64

3,013,534

0.002 percent

Louisiana

2,834,988

7

2,834,995

< 0.001 percent

Maine

1,022,278

28

1,022,306

0.003 percent

Maryland

3,792,401

73,328

3,865,729

1.897 percent

Massachusetts

3,955,971

112,891

4,068,862

2.775 percent

Michigan

6,164,846

1,297

6,166,143

0.021 percent

Minnesota

3,746,861

5

3,746,866

< 0.001 percent

Mississippi

2,076,581

76

2,076,657

0.004 percent

Missouri

4,195,783

41

4,195,824

0.001 percent

Montana

775,934

230

776,164

0.030 percent

Nebraska

1,501,473

4

1,501,477

< 0.001 percent

Nevada
New
Hampshire

1,793,132

23

1,793,155

0.001 percent

904,727

710

905,437

0.078 percent

New Jersey

5,290,260

15,048

5,305,308

0.284 percent

New Mexico

1,455,016

24

1,455,040

0.002 percent

New York
North
Carolina

9,233,103

92,283

9,325,386

0.990 percent

5,607,617

1,442,470

7,050,087

20.460 percent

592,814

4

592,818

0.001 percent

Ohio

8,029,756

0

8,029,756

< 0.001 percent

Oklahoma

2,719,636

52

2,719,688

0.002 percent

Oregon

2,724,683

9

2,724,692

< 0.001 percent

Pennsylvania

8,483,438

19,151

8,502,589

0.225 percent

Rhode Island
South
Carolina

663,890

9,335

673,225

1.387 percent

3,294,512

1

3,294,513

< 0.001 percent

South Dakota

681,839

0

681,839

< 0.001 percent

4,187,461

24

4,187,485

0.001 percent

Texas

Data
not available

Data
not available

Data
not available

Data
not available

Utah

1,808,234

2

1,808,236

< 0.001 percent

Vermont

474,881

450

475,331

0.095 percent

Virginia

6,023,910

1,460

6,025,370

0.024 percent

Washington

4,513,296

0

4,513,296

< 0.001 percent

North Dakota

Tennessee
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West Virginia

1,305,657

39

1,305,696

0.003 percent

Wisconsin

3,674,130

0

3,674,130

< 0.001 percent

Wyoming

503,741

1

503,742

< 0.001 percent

185,342,396

1,783,845

187,126,241

0.953 percent

Nationwide

Source: INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT
BOOK 2011 71-72 (2011), reprinted with permission. (Source: Automobile
Insurance Plans Service Office).
Of the states with a higher residual market share relative to the total
private passenger cars insured in 2008, North Carolina (20.460 percent),
Massachusetts (2.775 percent), and New York (0.990 percent) had strict
rate regulation systems for automobile insurance.331 North Carolina and
New York had prior-approval rating laws with regard to auto-insurance,332
while in Massachusetts until April 2008 auto insurance rates were set by
the commissioner.333 Conversely, some of the states with a lower residual
market share were states with less restrictive rating systems like file and
use or use and file: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa,
Minnesota, Nebraska (less than 0.001 percent), Delaware (0.004 percent),
Idaho (0.004 percent), Illinois (0.015 percent).334
This suggests that rate regulation may have negative effects on
insurance availability. Rate suppression, especially, may force insurers to
tighten underwriting, forcing consumers to turn to the residual markets for
coverage.335 Understandably, insurers will not underwrite higher risk
consumers if rates are too low to cover their possible costs. In the worst
331

But see the cases of Maryland and Rhode Island having a quite high
residual market share (1.897 percent and 1.387 percent respectively) even though
they adopt less restrictive rating systems: file-and-use the former and flex-rating
the latter.
332
See NAIC, Auto Insurance Database Report 2005/2006 231, (2008)
[hereinafter Auto Insurance Database Report]. In June 2008 the New York
legislature approved flex-rating legislation for auto insurance providing that,
subject to some conditions, overall average rate level increases or decreases of 5
percent above or below the previously filed rates may take effect without obtaining
prior regulatory approval.
333
See supra pp. 126-27.
334
With regard to the rating systems for auto insurance adopted in the states,
see Auto Insurance Database Report, supra note 332, at 231.
335
Residual market mechanisms are statutory arrangements that permit to
provide insurance to people considered ineligible for coverage in the voluntary
market.
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case rate suppression could cause insurers who cannot offset low rates with
decreased costs to exit the market.336 Consider, for example, the number of
insurers who exited California following the introduction of Proposition
103337 and Massachusetts, New Jersey and South Carolina because of strict
rate regulation in the auto insurance market.338 In particular, New Jersey,
before 2003, had had a highly regulated automobile insurance market that
prompted over 20 insurers to exit over a period of 10 years.339 After the
state enacted reforms in 2003 increasing competition in the market,340 the
number of insurance companies changed from 17 to 39, the availability of
insurance increased, and insurance prices fell for most policyholders.341
The same occurred in South Carolina where a less restrictive rating law
was passed in 1999. Afterwards, the number of insurers offering
automobile insurance almost doubled and the residual market share and
rate levels fell.342
Deregulation of rates, therefore, would avoid problems with the
availability of insurance by allowing insurers to charge an appropriate price
to cover their costs and earn a reasonable profit. Although deregulation
might lead to higher rates, the benefits of rate suppression are not worth the
cost of restricted availability. While rate suppression may make insurance
affordable in the short run, in the long run it will cause insurers to exit from
the market with consequent problems for consumers and the social welfare.
Instead, rate deregulation will result in appropriate prices for insurance
336

Harrington, supra note 118, at 189.
Editorial, California Smashup, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1988, at A22
(discussing the exit of forty insurance companies from California due to the
enforcement of Proposition 103 rate rollback).
338
Harrington, supra note 118, at 189.
339
Tennyson, supra note 179, at 16.
340
The Auto Insurance Reform Act approved in June 2003 (P.L. 2003, c. 89),
introduced inter alia (i) the phase-out and final elimination of the “take-allcomers” provisions of the Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1990 (P.L.
1990, c. 8); (ii) amendments to the prior approval rate filing provision to establish
a time-line for regulatory action; (iii) changes in the expedited rate filing procedure
by raising the ceiling for rate increases; (iv) provisions that simplify the procedures
to be used by insurers to withdraw from selling a particular type of insurance or to
withdraw from the state; (v) measures to combat insurance fraud and provide for
consumer protection and education. Further, the 2003 Act also amended the New
Jersey’s excess profits law, according to which insurers were prohibited from
earning more than 6 percent in profits from the sales of auto insurance policies
over a three-year period. The Act extended that period from three to seven years.
341
Tenyson, supra note 179, at 16.
342
HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 22; Tenyson, supra note 179, at 16.
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because insurance companies in a competitive market will supply products
in the long run at prices equaling their average costs plus a reasonable
profit.
Rate deregulation will also lead to more consumer choices because,
by increasing the range of prices that insurers can charge, the range of
products offered to policyholders should increase as well. Rate regulation
limits consumer choice since, to implement a uniform price system,
comparable rates must be charged for comparable products. Any effects on
the ability of consumers to compare insurance rates can be addressed by
increasing disclosure and enhancing regulation of insurance advertising and
marketing.343 In addition, standard policy conditions may also facilitate
consumers in comparing insurance policies offered by different insurers.344
This way, policyholders may acquire the knowledge they need to properly
compare rates and make informed decisions, taking into account the price,
the quality of the policy and the insurer’s financial strength. Comparison
shopping can be enhanced by the on-line availability of insurance
quotations345 and help of independent agents and brokers in assisting
policyholders with price comparisons.346
One of the main objectives of rate regulation is to prevent
insurance insolvencies that could result from ruinous competition. In the
long term a competitive market should reach equilibrium where insurers
charge premiums that equal their average costs. Insurance companies like
all other enterprises strive to conduct a financially successful business so
that they are most unlikely to charge rates not sufficient to cover incurred
losses and expenses.
Even if that is not always the case, rate regulation has not avoided
insurers’ insolvencies. In the United States, around 340 property and

343

HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 26.
Id. at 44-45.
345
See, e.g., the Massachusetts Division of Insurance’s website on auto
insurance premium comparison, http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=ocatermina
l&L=4&L0=Home&L1=Consumer&L2=Insurance&L3=Automobile+Insurance&s
id=Eoca&b=terminalcontent&f=doi_AutorateCompare_autoratecompare&csid=Eo
ca. The website gives information on how to contact insurance companies and
agents directly for quotes and allows consumers to compare premiums for new
private passenger auto insurance across companies for seven policy examples by
showing the range of prices and discounts they may qualify for.
346
HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 26-27.
344
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casualty insurance companies became insolvent from 1986 to 2006.347
Furthermore, there have been relatively fewer insolvencies in states with
less restrictive rating laws than in those that highly regulate rates.348 Of 79
insolvent insurance companies subject to rate regulation in the period 1946
to 1959, 26 were based in Texas, a state which used to have rate uniformity
enforced by law.349 California and Missouri that did not then regulate rates
at all had only 3 insolvencies each.350 Similar considerations can be
inferred from the data concerning the number of insolvencies in the Italian
auto insurance market for the period immediately following deregulation of
tariffs.351 Rate deregulation, therefore, is consistent with a financially
healthy insurance industry. It permits flexibility in the price of insurance
and allows insurers to charge appropriate rates in connection with possible
market changes and, ultimately, to set rates more aligned with costs,
thereby enhancing insurers’ financial strength.
CONCLUSION
Rate regulation seems to be based more on an historical tradition
than on solid economic arguments. Although deregulation might seem bold
in the current financial crisis, it is important to distinguish between the
need for rate regulation and the desirability of more effective solvency
regulation. Solvency concerns can be addressed by focusing on insurers’
reserves and increasing the monitoring of the financial conditions of
insurers. For these reasons rate freedom should replace regulation of rates.

347

American Academy of Actuaries, Risk Focused Surveillance Framework
14 (2006), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_catf_aaa_risk_focus
ed_surveillance.doc.
348
CRANE, supra note 189, at 95.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
See supra p. 148.
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Appendix 1
Rate Filing Methods
FILING
METHOD

STATE
Alabama

file and use

LINES
commercial lines, title
medical malpractice,

prior approval
personal lines, property and inland
marine, casualty and surety,
workers' compensation
Alaska

prior approval
flex rating on rate
changes

medical malpractice, title
workers’ compensation,
assigned risk rates
all property and casualty lines
except workers’ compensation,
medical malpractice, assigned risk

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

file and use
rate changes

all property and casualty lines
except workers' compensation,
medical malpractice, assigned risk

file and use

workers' compensation, title

use and file

other property and casualty lines

file and use
(competitive market);
prior approval
(non-competitive market)

personal lines and small
commercial risks

no filing

large commercial risks

prior approval

workers' compensation

prior approval

all property and casualty lines

file and use

Title

prior approval

workers’ compensation loss cost
filing by a rating organization;
auto assigned risk

file and use

all other property and casualty lines,
except exempt commercial
policyholders, title

no file; must maintain
documentation

exempt commercial policyholders
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file and use

commercial lines (exception), personal
lines

prior approval

medical malpractice (for rate increasing
7.5 percent or more over last rates filed),
title
all lines except title

Delaware

file and use

District of
Columbia

file and use
prior approval

Florida

file and use or
use and file

all lines
workers’ compensation and medical
malpractice
all lines except title and workers'
compensation

prior approval

workers’ compensation

rate set by the Commissioner

title

Georgia

prior approval
file and use
no file

personal private passenger auto
other property and casualty lines
large commercial risks

Hawaii

prior approval

property and casualty lines

Idaho

prior approval

workers’ compensation, title

use and file

other property and casualty lines

use and file

private passenger auto,
taxicabs,motorcycles,
homeowners,allied lines, dwelling fire,
liquor liability, workers’ compensation

file and use

medical malpractice, group inland
marine

file and use

property and casualty lines

modified file and use

workers’ compensation

prior approval

workers’ compensation, other
property and casualty lines,
title

use and file

homeowners, private passenger
auto

prior approval

workers’ compensation

file and use

personal and commercial lines

no file

large commercial insured, medical
malpractice

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

2011
Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine *

Maryland

INSURANCE RATES REGULATION
use and file (competitive
market); prior approval (noncompetitive market);
prior approval of any rates which
when combined with any rating
factors effectively change pre-tax
premium of any particular policy
by more than +/- 25 percent in any
12-month period of time

personal lines, auto guaranty,
credit, medical malpractice,
workers' compensation

no file

other commercial lines

file and use

title

prior approval

all property and casualty lines

no file

workers’ compensation (competitive
market)

modified file and use

property and casualty lines, title

no filing

large commercial risks

prior approval

workers’ compensation

file and use

lines designated by the commissioner
as competitive

prior approval

property and casualty lines, title

163

Massachusetts

file and use or set by the commissioner motor vehicle (filing method based on
finding of existence of competitive
market by commissioner)
file and use
all other lines

Michigan

file and use

auto, homeowners,
workers' compensation,
inland marine, title

prior approval

property excluding auto and
homeowners

file and use

all lines except workers’
compensation

prior approval

workers' compensation

Mississippi

prior approval

property and casualty lines

Missouri

informational filing only

commercial property and casualty
lines

use and file

other property and casualty lines,
workers' compensation

Minnesota
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Montana

file and use

property and casualty lines, title

Nebraska

file and use

personal lines, workers’ compensation,
most commercial lines,
crop, professional liability, excess and
large deductible workers’ compensation

prior approval

medical professional liability, title

prior approval

all personal lines, medical professional
liability rates, except surety

prior approval

workers’ compensation loss costs and
assigned risk rates

file and use

workers’ compensation loss cost
multipliers and supplementary rate
information
title

Nevada

file and use
New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

file and use (competitive market);
prior approval (non-competitive
market)
use and file

personal lines (competitive market)

prior approval

commercial lines (non-competitive
market)

no filing
use and file

ocean marine, aircraft, financial
guaranty, boiler and machinery
title

prior approval

workers’ compensation

no filing required

ocean marine, aircraft, financial
guaranty, boiler and machinery

use and file

commercial lines

prior approval

other property and casualty lines,
workers’ compensation, title

prior approval

property and casualty lines (noncompetitive markets, reverse competitive
and residual markets), workers’
compensation
property and casualty lines ( competitive
markets except workers’ compensation
and medical professional liability)
title

no file
commissioner-set rates

commercial lines (competitive market),
workers’ compensation
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prior approval

workers’ compensation, title,
medical malpractice, personal and
commercial lines

flex rating

auto

file and use

other property and casualty lines

prior approval

personal auto, homeowners

modified file and use

commercial property and casualty
lines

file and use

workers’ compensation, title

North Dakota

prior approval

all lines except workers’ compensation
and aircraft

Ohio

file and use

all other lines

file and use (competitive market)
prior approval (non-competitive
market)
file and use

commercial casualty

North Carolina

Oklahoma

use and file

flex rating

property and casualty lines (competitive
market)
property and casualty lines (noncompetitive market), medical
malpractice
commercial casualty

prior approval

workers’ compensation, title

file and use

other property and casualty lines

prior approval

property and casualty lines

exempt from filing

large commercial risks

file and use

small commercial risks

file and use

casualty, property, title

prior approval

workers’ compensation

file and use
Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

medical malpractice

no file

large commercial risks

flex rating

casualty insurance, fire and marine

prior approval

all lines

prior approval or file and use

commercial auto rate changes of
7 percent or less
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South Dakota

Tennessee

no file

large commercial risks

file and use

all lines except title

prior approval

title

prior approval

personal lines, workers
compensation

Vol. 18.1

use and file
commercial lines, workers compensation
loss cost multipliers
Texas

Utah

Vermont

file and use
file and use

title
all lines

commissioner sets rates

title

use and file

property and casualty lines

file and use

title, workers’ compensation

prior approval

workers’ compensation, auto (assigned
risk), property and casualty lines ( noncompetitive market)
property and casualty lines (except
claims made and assigned risk), title
and other types of workers’
compensation (voluntary market)
residual market for workers’
compensation and automobile; home
protection, credit property, credit
involuntary unemployment

use and file

Virginia

prior approval

no file

large commercial risks, title

file and use (competitive market)

general liability, homeowners, fire,
miscellaneous property and casualty,
boiler and machinery, surety, credit,
inland marine, farm owners’, mortgage
guaranty
commercial multi-peril;
professional liability and legal services
property and casualty lines identified
by commissioner after hearing

60 days prior filing requirement for
non-competitive lines

2011
Washington

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

INSURANCE RATES REGULATION
prior approval

use and file

property and casualty (except
commercial lines),
medical malpractice,
workers' compensation
commercial lines

file and use

title

prior approval
file and use

other property and casualy lines,
excluding workers’ compensation
commercial lines

use and file

property and casualty, title

prior approval

workers’ compensation

prior approval

title, medical malpractice

no filing (competitive market);
prior approval
(non-competitive market)

property and casualty

167

SOURCE: NAIC, 2 COMPENDIUM OF STATE LAWS ON INSURANCE TOPICS,
HEALTH/LIFE/PROPERTY/CASUALTY II-PA-10-1–II-PA-10-20 (2010),
reprinted with permission. The NAIC does not endorse any analysis or
conclusions based on use of its data; NAIC, 2 COMPENDIUM OF STATE
LAWS ON INSURANCE TOPICS, HEALTH/LIFE/PROPERTY/CASUALTY II-PA10-9 (2008), reprinted with permission. The NAIC does not endorse any
analysis or conclusions based on use of its data.
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Appendix 2
2007 Commercial Lines Data – Countrywide

LINE OF
BUSINESS

Commerci
al
Auto
Liability
Commerci
al
Auto
Physical
Commerci
al
Auto
Total
Commerci
al
Multiple
Peril

PREMIU
MS
WRITTE
N

MARKE
T
SHARES
FOUR
LARGES
T
GROUPS

HHI
BASED
ON
PREMI
UM

NUMBE
R
OF
SELLER
S
(GROUP
S)

NUM
BER
OF
ENTR
IES
LAST
5
YEAR
S

NUMB
ER
OF
EXITS
LAST 5
YEARS

MARK
ET
GROW
TH
LAST 3
YEARS

MARK
ET
GRO
WTH
LAST
10
YEAR
S

35

3.50
percent

62.76
percen
t

6.45
perce
nt

29

6.44
percent

34.54
percen
t

11.72
perce
nt

33

4.24
percent

54.73
percen
t

7.39
perce
nt

68.36
percen
t
152.40
percen
t
242.60
percen
t
111.90
percen
t
87.39
percen
t
126.30
percen
t
71.94
percen
t

7.00
perce
nt
17.39
perce
nt
8.41
perce
nt
18.46
perce
nt
6.15
perce
nt
5.28
perce
nt
6.76
perce
nt

22,071,57
7,526

27.64
percent

7,255,767
,155

24.45
percent

29,327,34
4,681

25.89
percent

36,138,79
9,711

26.75
percent

327.8

105

36

34

4.52
percent

Fire

12,235,77
5,465

38.74
percent

579.2

95

32

29

26.33
percent

Allied
Lines

11,399,11
0,261

42.38
percent

621.6

85

29

37

48.72
percent

Inland
Marine
Medical
Malpracti
ce

15,408,76
3,035

33.44
percent

450

78

25

30

21.02
percent

11,684,42
5,721

25.27
percent

289.9

99

41

25

4.24
percent

Other
Liability
Workers
Compensa
tion

54,845,52
8,333

38.39
percent

627.9

88

36

25

1.28
percent

52,247,49
8,240

34.20
percent

425.5

104

35

37

5.77
percent

308.6

260

281.5

103

114

109

28

24

27

RETU
RN
ON
NET
WOR
TH
10YEAR
MEA
N

SOURCE: NAIC, 2007 Commercial Lines Competition Database Report 13
(2008), reprinted with permission. The NAIC does not endorse any analysis
or conclusions based on use of its data.

ERISA: REMEDIES, PREEMPTION AND THE
NEED FOR MORE STATE REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT
JILLIAN REDDING, ESQ.*
***
This article explores the current state of ERISA law and its effects
concerning good faith, fiduciary breaches, and the remedies available
under ERISA. Recent case law provides that the duty of good faith applies
in an ERISA context; however, any breaches result in recovery to the
employee benefit plan and not usually to the injured victim. According to
case law, ERISA precludes state remedies, even laws specific to insurance.
In part one, this paper provides an overview of ERISA and why state
remedies or more state oversight are necessary to protect beneficiaries.
Section two discusses the legislative background of ERISA. Section three
discusses several cases that illustrate ERISA’s lack of appropriate
remedies for fiduciary breaches. Section four provides a case study of
Unum Provident, a disability insurer that made such egregious breaches
that it was required to have long-term, strict oversight by the state
departments of insurance. The last section compares several theories by
other authors on how to improve ERISA’s remedies, along with this
author’s argument that the most appropriate and efficient way to remedy
breaches is to require strict oversight by the state departments of
insurance, which has proved to be most successful in the Unum Provident
case.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, a health care bill that expands health care to a greater
portion of Americans and prohibits insurers from rejecting applicants based
on, among other things, pre-existing conditions.1 This law was passed in
*

LLM., Insurance Law, University of Connecticut School of Law, May 2010;
J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, January 2010; B.A., University of
Massachusetts, June 2006. Sincere thanks to Professor Kochenburger for his
mentoring for this article. I owe a debt of gratitude to Jared Cantor for repeatedly
reading this article and for listening to me talk about insurance law when no one
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part because of the severe ongoing crises in healthcare. In 2009 alone, the
U.S. is estimated to have spent 17.3% of the gross domestic product on
healthcare.2 This notable day will go down in history along with days that
other great social welfare bills were passed, such as Social Security and
Medicare. One glaring oversight, however, is that the bill fails to correct an
erroneous interpretation by the courts that has been ongoing for decades:
the remedies available under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA).3
This paper concerns ERISA, the statutory remedies available to
participants and beneficiaries, and a way to protect insureds from egregious
insurer behavior. ERISA law governs the benefit plans offered by
employers, such as pension and healthcare plans (called “welfare benefit
plans”). The Supreme Court has held that the remedies specifically
enumerated in section 502 of ERISA are the exclusive remedies available
to participants and beneficiaries in any claims relating to ERISA, and has
interpreted the “other appropriate equitable relief” provision to preclude
make-whole relief, such as money damages, for serious fiduciary breaches.
The Supreme Court interprets ERISA’s remedies section narrowly instead
of following the true intent of ERISA: protecting the benefits of
participants and beneficiaries of such plans balanced against the need to
encourage employers to offer such plans. Most courts have decided that, in
the competing interests of protecting the participants versus less regulation
for employers, Congress intended for less regulation to encourage
employers to offer plans. This results in less protection for breaches of
fiduciary duties. In doing so, the courts reject that any state tort claims may

else found it interesting, and for being a fantastic fiancée. I am also grateful to my
family and friends for their unending support, especially my parents, Lorraine and
Lawrence Redding, and my grandparents, Bill and Sandy Watson.
1

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
2
NHE Fact Sheet, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, NATIONAL
HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS FOR 2009-2010, http://www.cms.
gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHE_Fact_Sheet.asp (last visited May 16,
2010); see also Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending, The Kaiser Family
Foundation Report on Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending (March 2009),
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf (estimating that the
U.S. spent 17.6% of GDP on healthcare) (last visited May 10, 2010).
3
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)).

2011

ERISA: REMEDIES, PREEMPTION

171

apply to breaches of fiduciary duties in employee benefit health plans, such
as insurance unfair trade practices, bad faith, or negligence.4
Section two of this paper discusses the history and Congressional
intent in passing ERISA. Section three illustrates the problems of ERISA’s
lack of remedies for beneficiaries by summarizing major case law, legal
articles, and investigative journalism by the popular show Good Morning
America. Section four is a case study of a major disability insurer, Unum
Group,5 and the litigation and ultimate regulatory oversight due to
egregious bad faith on the part of the company. Section five argues for
more regulatory oversight for ERISA insurers, which has proved successful
in the Unum example and arguably changed the company into a possible
model of the industry.
Ultimately, this paper supports the viewpoints of several writers,
namely that trust law supports consequential relief in certain instances and
state insurance unfair practices statutes should be saved from preemption
under the savings clause, including its remedies, as Congress expressly
stated that such insurance laws must apply to employee benefit plans.6
However, as Congress and the courts are unlikely to change, it is up to the
regulators – the state departments of insurance – to effect this protection of
4

It is of note that penalties for violations of such claims are what keep
insurance companies in check: a fear of large monetary penalties by the courts.
This check is completely lacking in the ERISA context because of ERISA’s
conflict preemption in section 514, which requires ERISA’s regulations to
“supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan.” See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2007).
5
Unum Group is the parent company of Unum Life Insurance Company, the
Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, Provident Life and Accident Insurance
Company, Provident Life and Casualty Insurance Company, and First Unum Life
Insurance Company.
6
See Donald Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption,
Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105,
115 (2001); John H. Langbein, Trust Law As Regulatory Law: The
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1340-41 (2007); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means
by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and
Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1338, 1362 (2003); Charlotte Johnson,
Justice Ginsburg’s Fiduciary Loophole: A Viable Achilles’ Heel to HMOs’
Impenetrable ERISA Shield, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1591 (2006); Susan Harthill,
A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole”
Relief is Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 722-24
(2008).
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its citizens from bad faith practices by ERISA insurers. The purpose of this
paper is to encourage the state departments of insurance to promulgate,
enact, and enforce regulations for practices and procedures for ERISA
insurers to follow, as they did for Unum in the Regulatory Settlement
Agreements. The regulations should focus on the duties of good faith and
fair dealing that insurers owe insureds, but is currently lacking in the
ERISA landscape.
II. THE HISTORY OF ERISA
ERISA was passed in 1974 with the intent to protect “millions of
employees and their dependents” in their retirement benefits, as stated in
the Congressional findings and declaration of policy.7 This law established
a regulatory and guaranty system designed to ensure that employees
received the retirement benefits promised. However, some note that the
health insurance provisions were hastily added last minute.8
ERISA was a reaction to the previously enacted Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA), which sought to provide some
federal oversight of retirement benefits.9 WPPDA failed to provide the
necessary mechanisms to adequately protect employee retirement benefits,
as it lacked a method to control administration of the plans or a way to
remedy abuses in plan administration, and retired workers lost anticipated
benefits promised by employers.10 Recognizing this failure, the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare appointed a subcommittee to
investigate the problem, concluded that WPPDA lacked the necessary
substantive regulatory controls, and suggested a that new “comprehensive
and reticulated statute” be enacted to correctly regulate the pension
industry.11 This new regulation was to protect against, as one writer termed

7

29 U.S.C. § 1001; ERISA § 2.
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 130 (2d ed. Aspen Publishers
2008).
9
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997,
repealed by ERISA § 111(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1974).
10
Bogan, supra note 6. Notably, the WPPDA preserved state remedies to
supplement its regulation. See Act of Mar. 20, 1962, Pub L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat.
35 (repealed 1974); Bogan, supra note 6.
11
Bogan, supra note 6, at 115-16 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 4, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4841, and 1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 1974 at 590 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
8
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it, default risk and administration risk.12 Default risk pertains to the danger
that an employer may dishonor the promised pension, and applies mainly to
defined benefit pension plans.13 Administration risk is the danger that the
fiduciary (person responsible for managing and investing plan assets and/or
paying claims) may abuse his or her authority by performing
inappropriately, misusing plan assets, or improperly refusing to pay
promised benefits.14 The health care and disability insurance issue concerns
this latter risk because it is where the least protection is provided to
claimants.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In passing ERISA, Congress noted that there was a lack of
transparency to employees and adequate safeguards concerning plan
operation, thus “it is desirable in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of
commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with
respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans.”15
Congress was very specific in its intentions when passing ERISA and
intended “to alleviate certain problems which tend to discourage the
maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans”; further “provide
reasonable protection for the interests of participants and beneficiaries of
financially distressed multiemployer pension plans”16 and “encourage the
maintenance and growth of single-employer defined benefit pension
plans.”17 This encouragement illustrates Congress’ intent to provide a
uniform framework of regulation for employee benefit plans to lessen the
burden of compliance on employers and entice them to offer such plans.18
Congress also sought to protect the plan participants’ interests by
“providing . . . appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to Federal
courts.”19

“Legislative History”]; H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4642, and in 2 Legislative History at 2351)).
12
Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1323.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
16
Id. §§ 1001a(c)(2)-(3).
17
Id. § 1001b(c)(2).
18
See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).
19
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
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B. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND PREEMPTION
ERISA is frustrating to insureds and claimants attempting to utilize
state insurance bad faith laws because of its strict preemption laws, which
provide an easy out for plan fiduciaries: removal to federal court, thereby
preempting all state laws. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal laws may
preempt or take precedence over state laws by express provision,
implication, or when there is a conflict between federal and state law.20
ERISA has three main provisions that control the preemption of state laws.
The first, the “preemption clause”, in section 514(a), states:
“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) [the “savings clause”] of this
section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”21 The next provision, “the
savings clause”, in section 514(b)(2)(A) provides: “[e]xcept as provided in
subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”22 The last clause, called the
“deemer clause”, in section 514(b)(2)(B), has been held only to apply to
self-insured plans, and states:
Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company,
or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.23

20

See U.S. CONST. art IV; N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995) (stating the supremacy of
federal laws over state laws due to the Supremacy Clause, and its effect on
ERISA).
21
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1987) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a)).
22
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).
23
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)). In FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S.
52, 61 (1990), the Court held that the deemer clause exempts self-funded ERISA
plans from state laws that “regulate insurance” within the meaning of the savings
clause.
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To put it more clearly, the preemption clause holds that all state
insurance laws that apply an ERISA plan are preempted because they
“relate” to an ERISA plan. “Relates to” has been an issue much discussed
in case law, and in 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court applied a narrower
reading than before in determining what exactly “relates to” means.24 In
essence, the Court held that if the state law references or targets an ERISA
plan, or has a connection to or directly affects the ERISA plan, it is
preempted.25 However, the savings clause will “save” state laws that
specifically pertain to insurance, banking, or securities, and those laws will
still apply to ERISA plans. An example of this is when an employer
purchases insurance for group coverage of its employees under a plan, thus
uses an insurer, and the plan is subject to state regulation because the
employer is using direct insurance and there is an insurance contract.
Under the deemer clause, self-funded plans are not subject to state
insurance laws. A plan is self-funded when the employer completely funds
the plan, or creates a trust for the employee health plans and deposits
money for the claims into the trust. It is not considered insurance because
there is no actual insurance contract that is transacted by the employer with
regards to the plan, and the state law cannot regulate it via its power to
regulate insurance contracts.26 Common sense dictates that, due to
numerous state insurance regulation laws which are expensive to comply
with, employers are more likely to avoid the costs of complying with the
insurance state regulations by creating a trust.
When presenting the bills for ERISA, the preemption provisions
were described as a “reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to
regulate the field of employee benefit plans as ERISA’s crowning
achievement” by Representative Dent.27 Another politician, Senator
Harrison Williams, provided that this provision “and its narrow exceptions,
are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating
24

See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at
656-57.
25
Id.
26
See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 64-65 (stating that “[o]ur interpretation of the
deemer clause makes clear that if a plan in insured, a State may regulate it
indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer’s insurance contracts; if
the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it”). The Court also noted that it
realized it was making a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, thus
“leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter is not.” Id. at 62
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)).
27
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 482 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (citing 120 Cong.
Rec. 29197 (1974)).
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the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of
employee benefit plans. “This principle is intended to apply in its broadest
sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality
thereof, which have the force or effect of law.”28 The result: this legislation
effectively deregulated employee health and disability benefits by allowing
employee benefit plans to largely be exempt from state insurance
regulation. While the insurance forms must still be approved by the state
department of insurance and the insurer must abide by the funding
requirements, the insurer is completely exempt from state unfair insurance
practices statutes.
C. REMEDIES UNDER ERISA
Section 502 provides the civil enforcement language for suits
brought against plan fiduciaries. It allows participants and beneficiaries to
bring suit to: (1) recover benefits due under the plan; (2) enforce his or her
rights under the terms of the plan; (3) clarify his or her rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan; or (4) to enjoin fiduciaries from acts or
practices that violate ERISA.29 It also allows for “appropriate relief”, which
includes language from section 1109, which gives the court discretion to
order “such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate” for fiduciary breaches.30 It also allows the Secretary of Health
to assess and collect civil penalties for certain violations.31 This section
applies to both employee insurance benefit plans and trusts. Section 502,
which carves out jurisdiction for federal district courts in ERISA-related
claims, also allows for concurrent jurisdiction (i.e., plaintiff can bring the
suit in either state or federal court) to recover plan benefits, enforce benefit
rights, or clarify future benefits.32 However, a cause of action will always
be subject to removal to federal court.
There is a lack of state remedies and compensatory remedies
afforded to plan participants and beneficiaries when an administrator
violates the fiduciary duties. As noted above, section 502(a) establishes the
remedies a participant or beneficiary may seek when a violation of
fiduciary obligation under ERISA occurs, and the remedies are largely
remedial in nature. Notably, courts have held that no remedies are available
28

Id. (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 29933 (1974)).
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
30
Id. (referencing 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)).
31
Id.
32
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), (e).
29
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to plan participants or beneficiaries unless it is enumerated in this section,
because “Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for actions by
ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of
a claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of action for claims
within the scope of § 502(a) would pose an obstacle to the purposes and
objectives of Congress.”33 There is no ability to bring a bad faith claim
against a plan or its fiduciary or be awarded punitive damages.34 This
leaves plan participants and beneficiaries in the untenable condition of
fighting with the plan’s administrators over benefits, with little to no
recourse from the courts, especially if the plan language affords the
administrator with discretionary authority to interpret the plan, raising the
level of review by a court to arbitrary and capricious.35
In short, if a plaintiff brings suit because of a mishandled benefit
claim and suffers health damages due to the denied treatment, all he may
receive from the court is (1) an injunction to stop the insurer from
wrongfully denying benefits in the future and (2) “other equitable relief.”36
The courts have interpreted the “equitable remedy” to mean that the
plaintiff must receive the benefit that was wrongfully denied. However, this
does not allow the plaintiff to receive any damages for his suffering, the
delay, or for the consequential further treatment required from the wrongful
benefit refusal. As one writer states, “The courts have . . . interpreted
ERISA’s ‘equitable relief’ provision to prevent an insured from obtaining
‘make-whole relief.’ Make-whole relief includes expenses that an insured
may have incurred due to the wrongful denial of benefits, such as physical
harm or suffering.”37 The Court’s interpretation of “other equitable relief”
defies insurance principles. Under traditional insurance law, plaintiffs are
usually entitled to damages for insurer breaches under the notion that the
insurance contract is one of adhesion, the insured is not sophisticated and is
unable to negotiate in any way with the insurer, and to oppose insurer
33

See Aetna Health Ins. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004); Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 481 U.S. at 52.
34
Davila, 542 U.S. at 214; Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52-53; Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985).
35
Discretionary authority in plan documents was highlighted and basically
approved by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101 (1989).
36
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
37
Elizabeth Khoury, HMO Liability After Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila: Are
Patients’ Rights At Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1631 (2006) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
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opportunism.38 Courts utilize contract law, essentially the principles of
reasonable expectations and unjust enrichment, to remedy plaintiffs.
D. ERISA, TRUST LAW, AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
An administrator of an employee benefit plan or trust is considered
a fiduciary and manages the assets within the plan or trust for the claims of
the participants or beneficiaries. ERISA states the fiduciary duties owed by
those who have control over the assets, management and administration of
a plan in ERISA sections 404 and 405. First, fiduciaries have the duty of
loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries, and must always discharge his
or her duties solely in the interest of those participants and beneficiaries.39
Next, the fiduciary must act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use . . . .”40 Further, the
fiduciary must reasonably divest the investment of assets and follow the
terms of the ERISA plan, unless it violates ERISA.41
The duties of loyalty and prudence have the most teeth, as they
require the fiduciary to solely act for the participants in a prudent manner –
thus the fiduciary must “deal fairly and honestly with beneficiaries”.42
Congress based ERISA plan administrators’ fiduciary obligations on trust
law.43 This “fiduciary law of plan administration governs claims
administration as well as the administration of plan assets.”44
38

See C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W. 2d 169 (Iowa
1975). Opportunism is described as the insurer’s ability to refuse to pay claims
after the insured has faithfully paid all premiums, and it is too late for the insured
to switch insurers. See supra note 10.
39
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2006).
40
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
41
Id. §§ 1104(a)(1)(C)-(D).
42
Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (citing GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, p.
218-19 (rev. 2d ed. 1992); 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170, at 311-12 (4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959)).
43
Varity, 516 U.S. at 506; see also Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law,
supra note 6, at 1316 (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 115 (1989)); John A. Pereira, A Fiduciary’s Right to Contribution or
Indemnity Under ERISA, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 507, 518 (1996) (citing S. REP.
NO. 93-127, at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4869).
44
Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1326.
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ERISA subjects the administrators of the plan to a modified and
constricted version of the “core substantive rules of trust fiduciary law”.45
The plan administrator or fiduciary is expected to primarily focus on
ensuring that the benefit recipient's expectations are fulfilled; they should
not be primarily focused on protecting the plan’s assets.46 ERISA allows a
fiduciary to be personally liable for a breach of duties, responsibilities, or
obligations.47 ERISA provides that the fiduciary must “make good to such
plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore
to such plan any profits of such fiduciary” made through the use of plan
assets.48 Importantly, the statute gives the court discretion to order “such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate” for
fiduciary breaches.49
Under traditional trust law, the trustee is the guardian of the trust’s
assets.50 Trust law recognizes the need to preserve the assets in the trust to
satisfy future and present claims, and requires the trustee to “take an
impartial account of the interests of all beneficiaries.”51 When a trustee is
given discretion as to his exercise of power, the court may only intercede
when there is an abuse of that discretion.52 Further, one treatise suggests
that a court may remove a trustee’s power of discretion when there is a
reason to believe that he will not act fairly, such as by showing that the
trustee has already acted in bad faith.53 Another source indicates that the
45

Id. at 1326 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (2006), § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)).
Pereira, supra note 43, at 518 (citing Pompano v. Michael Schiavone &
Sons, 680 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that fiduciary’s duty is to insure the
honest administration of financially sounds plans); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 21-22
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4659-60 (noting that it is not the
fiduciary’s duty to primarily focus on the protection of assets)).
47
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 176 (1957).
51
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1957)).
52
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1957).
53
Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1647 (2010) (“If the trustee’s
failure to pay a reasonable amount [to the beneficiary of the trust] is due to a
failure to exercise [the trustee's] discretion honestly and fairly, the court may well
fix the amount [to be paid] itself. On the other hand, if the trustee's failure to
provide reasonably for the beneficiary is due to a mistake as to the trustee's duties
or powers, and there is no reason to believe the trustee will not fairly exercise the
discretion once the court has determined the extent of the trustee's duties and
powers, the court ordinarily will not fix the amount but will instead direct the
46
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court may intercede when the trustee acts “beyond the bounds of
reasonable judgment.”54 Yet another treatise states that, after a trustee has
abused his discretion, the court may decide “for the trustee how he should
act, either by stating the exact result it desires to achieve, or by fixing some
limits on the trustee's action and giving him leeway within those limits.”55
Further, when there is a conflict, trust law allows a court to scrutinize
conflicted discretionary acts.56
Notably, trust law allows make-whole relief, including
consequential relief, for acts of “negligence or misconduct in the making or
retaining of investments.”57 The make-whole standard under trust law
restores the victim to the position he would have been in had no breach
occurred, and includes an award of monetary damages.58
Appearing to neglect the trust law precedent, the U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted “other appropriate equitable relief” to be similar to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and declared that ERISA

trustee to make reasonable provision for the beneficiary's support.”) (citing 3 A.
SCOTT, W. FRATCHER, & M. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 18.2.1, at
1348-49 (5th ed. 2007)) (footnotes omitted).
54
Id. at 1648 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. i, at 406
(1957)).
55
Id. at 1648 (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560, at 223 (2d rev. ed. 1980)).
56
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2008) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107, cmt. f (1957) (discretionary acts of
trustee with settlor-approved conflict subject to “careful scrutiny”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107, illus. 1 (1957) (conflict is “a factor to be considered
by the court in determining later whether” there has been an “abuse of discretion”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 187, cmt. d (1957); 3 A. SCOTT, W.
FRATCHER & M. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 18.2, at 1342-43 (5th
ed. 2007) (hereinafter SCOTT) (same). See also, e.g., BOGERT § 543, at 264 (rev. 2d
ed. 1992) (settlor approval simply permits conflicted individual to act as a trustee);
BOGERT § 543(U), at 422-31 (same); SCOTT § 17.2.11, at 1136-39 (same)).
57
Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1337
(quoting BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862 at 38-39 (rev. 2d ed.
1995)).
58
Id. at 1335 (quoting 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988)); Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002) (citing RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 160, cmt. a (1936); GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION §
1.4, at 17, § 3.7, at 262 (1978)).
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precludes “awards for compensatory or punitive damages.”59 The Court
reasoned that such relief must be limited to the scope of appropriate relief
typically available in equity.60 However, in an amicus brief submitted by
the Solicitor General, the argument was made that “equitable relief”
included damages claims, because traditionally money damages were
available in equity courts against trustees for breaches of fiduciary trust.61
Interestingly, even one of the drafters of ERISA disagrees with the Court’s
interpretation of “equitable relief”, stating that it is “preposterous to think
that the ERISA conferees or the ERISA Congress intended to repudiate the
law-equity fusion in an ERISA context, and yet would never say a word
about it.”62
III. PROBLEMS
COVERAGE

WITH

ERISA

AND

HEALTH

INSURANCE

The majority of courts interpret ERISA to preempt all state remedy
laws, both statutory and common law. These courts are incorrect for several
reasons: first, Congress’s original intent in passing ERISA; second, the
equitable principles of justice in the law; and third, principles of statutory
construction. All three reasons support interpreting ERISA to allow at least
some state law remedies, particularly those which apply specifically to
insurance companies, to apply to certain fiduciary claims in order to protect
plan participants and beneficiaries, and ensure that plan fiduciaries exercise
the utmost care and diligence in plan decisions, thereby always placing the
participants’ needs first.63
A. CASE LAW
Lack of fiduciary loyalty leads to the majority of lawsuits and is a
major problem in employee welfare benefit law. Plan fiduciaries must be
59

Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (citing United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992)).
60
Id. at 262-63.
61
Id. at 255-56.
62
Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1333 (citing
Letter from Michael S. Gordon to John Langbein (June 14, 2002)).
63
It is of note that these duties are what fiduciaries are supposed to be held to
and follow: the duty of loyalty (to discharge duties solely in the interest of
participants and beneficiaries, see 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (2006)) and the duty of
prudence (to act with the skill and diligence of a prudent person in that position);
26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(B) (2006)).
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held to a higher standard, and Congress intended for the courts to hold
fiduciaries to this higher standard by incorporating the fiduciaries’ duties in
section 404(a). Courts have, for the most part, failed to do so (and in some
circumstances, specifically excused those fiduciary duties as not applying
for HMOs – a real travesty of justice),64 and have failed in their
administration of justice, as it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to
leave participants – the very people sought to be protected – without
equitable redress for serious harms committed under ERISA plans.
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, the employeebeneficiary, Doris Russell, received her health insurance through an
employee benefit plan funded by her employer, Mass. Mutual.65 She
became disabled due to a back ailment and received benefits for about five
months, when the disability committee terminated her benefits based on an
orthopedic surgeon’s report. She requested an internal review and
submitted a report from her psychiatrist indicating that she suffered from a
psychosomatic disability, rather than an orthopedic illness. Her benefits
were reinstated about five months later, after an examination by another
psychiatrist.66
She claimed to have been injured from the improper refusal to pay
benefits because it forced her disabled husband to cash out his retirement
savings, which in turn aggravated the psychological condition that caused
her back ailment. Her complaint was based on both state law and on
ERISA.67 The case was removed to federal court, and the court granted
Mass. Mutual’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the state law
claims were pre-empted by ERISA and the claims for extra-contractual
damages and punitive damages were barred under ERISA.68 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the state law claims were preempted,
but held that she alleged a cause of action under ERISA, as taking 132 days
to process her claim violated a fiduciary’s obligation to process claims in

64

See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231-35 (2000) (holding that HMOs
are not meant to be fiduciaries and held to fiduciary duties under ERISA when
making mixed eligibility decisions for participants and beneficiaries; holding the
HMOs to such a standard would “in effect . . . be nothing less than elimination of
the for-profit HMO” as the court must allow the HMO to make decisions
influenced by financial incentives, even if it to the detriment of the participant or
beneficiary).
65
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 136 (1985).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 137.
68
Id.
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good faith and in a diligent manner.69 Thus, the appeals court reasoned, this
violation gave rise to a cause of action under § 409(a) that could be
asserted by a plan beneficiary pursuant to § 502(a)(2); and under § 409(a),
the court has discretion to award “such other equitable or remedial relief as
the court may deem appropriate.”70 The appeals court believed it had “wide
discretion as to the damages to be awarded”, including compensatory and
punitive damages.71 The Ninth Circuit held that punitive damages are
recoverable under § 409(a) if the fiduciary “acted with actual malice or
wanton indifference to the rights of a participant or beneficiary”, and the
court believed this result was supported by the text of § 409(a) and the
congressional purpose of providing broad remedies to prevent violations of
the Act.72
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under § 409, the remedy
of “such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate” is only available to the plan, not to an individual.73 The Court
decided that, since Congress’ focus was on protecting mismanagement of
pension plans, the intent was to exclude individual recovery to beneficiaries
for fiduciary breaches.74 The Court stated that a “fair contextual reading of
the statute makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen were primarily
concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that
would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual
beneficiary”, thus eliminating any hope for emotional compensatory
damages to the plaintiff, based on a whim of the Court.75 The Court
candidly and unabashedly wrote off the need to protect the beneficiaries’
interests in a single paragraph.76 Conclusively, the court held that plaintiffs
may not recover extra-contractual damages, stating it was “reluctant to
tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the
69

Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138.
71
Russell, 473 U.S. at 138.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 140.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 142.
76
Id. at 142-43 (the Court states: “It is of course true that the fiduciary
obligations of plan administrators are to serve the interest of participants and
beneficiaries and, specifically, to provide them with the benefits authorized by the
plan. But the principal statutory duties imposed on the trustees relate to the proper
management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the maintenance of
proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the avoidance of
conflicts of interest.”).
70

184

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

one in ERISA.”77 In a subsequent case, the Court noted that this plaintiff
had ultimately received all the benefits owed to her, albeit late. Her
additional claim for consequential damages was for the delay in processing
her claim, and ERISA, the Court concluded, “does not provide a remedy
for this type of injury.”78
In Pilot Life, Dedeaux, the plaintiff-employee, sustained back
injuries at work and brought a claim under his employer’s long-term
disability plan. The insurer, Pilot Life, processed disability claims and
determined who received disability benefits.79 Pilot Life initially approved
his benefits, and then cancelled them after two years, followed by a threeyear period of several benefit reinstatements and terminations by Pilot
Life.80 Dedeaux brought suit in federal court, citing tortuous breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud.81 He sought damages for
mental and emotional distress, along with punitive and exemplary damages,
totaling $750,000.82 All of his claims were under state tort law, and not
ERISA.83
The district court granted Pilot Life’s motion for summary
judgment, ruling that all of the claims were preempted under ERISA.84 The
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the law was saved under the savings
clause because it affected the “relationship between the insurer and the
insured,” thus placing it within the ‘business of insurance’ under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, and therefore qualifying as a law which regulates
insurance.85
The Supreme Court reversed. First, it noted that Dedeaux’s claims
clearly ‘related to’ the ERISA plan were preempted under section 514(a).86
Second, the Court rejected that the Mississippi law of bad faith is saved by
the savings clause, because it is a general tort law that did not specifically

77

Russell, 473 U.S. at 147.
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., 552 U.S. 248, 254 (2008).
79
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43 (1987).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 43-44.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 44.
85
Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2391 (1985)).
86
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48.
78
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apply to insurance companies, and thus did not regulate insurance.87 The
Court distinguished this case from Metropolitan Life Ins., stating:
Unlike the mandated-benefits law at issue in Metropolitan
Life, the Mississippi common law of bad faith does not
effect a spreading of policyholder risk. The state common
law of bad faith may be said to concern “the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured.” The
connection to the insurer-insured relationship is attenuated
at best, however. In contrast to the mandated-benefits law
in Metropolitan Life, the common law of bad faith does
not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer
and the insured; it declares only that, whatever terms have
been agreed upon in the insurance contract, a breach of
that contract may in certain circumstances allow the
policyholder to obtain punitive damages. The state
common law of bad faith is therefore no more “integral” to
the insurer-insured relationship than any State's general
contract law is integral to a contract made in that State.
Finally, as we have just noted, Mississippi's law of bad
faith, even if associated with the insurance industry, has
developed from general principles of tort and contract law
available in any Mississippi breach of contract case.88
The Court held that in order to be saved under the savings clause the state
law must specifically regulate insurance.
In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the employer, Varity Corporation, owned
a subsidiary, Massey-Ferguson (“MF”), which employed the plaintiffs and
provided a self-funded employee welfare plan.89 Varity determined that
87

Id. at 50 (“A common-sense view of the word ‘regulates’ would lead to the
conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an impact
on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry.
Even though the Mississippi Supreme Court has identified its law of bad faith with
the insurance industry, the roots of this law are firmly planted in the general
principles of Mississippi tort and contract law. Any breach of contract, and not
merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive damages
under Mississippi law.”).
88
Id. at 50-51.
89
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 492 (1996). (Note that under the
ERISA deemer clause, a self-funded plan is exempt from compliance with state
insurance regulations and statutes.)
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several MF divisions were losing too much money, and concocted a plan to
place all of the unstable divisions and debt, and the employees, into another
subsidiary, Massey Combines (MC”).90 The makers of the plan
acknowledged the possibility that MC would fail, but saw that outcome as a
victory because it would eliminate the unstable divisions and the debt
transferred to MC.91 If Varity did not form the separately incorporated
subsidiary, then Varity itself would have to pay for the debt and the ERISA
plan benefits for the unstable divisions.92 Instead of terminating the plan,
which would have likely resulted in the employees leaving to find new
employment (and “voluntarily release[ing] Massey-Ferguson from its
obligation to provide them benefits”), Varity essentially made MC the new
employer and switched the employees to a new plan that was funded by
MC.93 However, the employees had to elect to switch employers and thus
to switch plans. To persuade them, Varity held a meeting and presented the
plan, passed out documents which represented that the benefits would
remain the same and were safe, but noted that employment conditions in
the future depended on MC’s success.94 Unfortunately, all the employees
agreed to Varity’s plan, and Varity also took the liberty of assigning the
benefit obligations to 4,000 retired workers to MC.95
The lower court found that MC was insolvent from its very first
day. It ended its first year with an $88 million loss and its second year in
receivership, thus terminating the employees’ non-pension benefits.96 The
Supreme Court held that Varity was a fiduciary of the plan, as it was both
the employer and administrator of the plan and was acting in a fiduciary
capacity during the meeting with employees.97 The specific context of the
events supported that Varity was exercising discretionary authority on the
plan’s management or administration when it made the benefit
representations to the employees.98 The main message represented to the
employees at the meeting, by designated fiduciaries in the plan documents,
was that transferring to MC would not undermine their benefits. This
constituted conveying benefit information to participants.99 Such
90

Id. at 492-93.
See id. at 493.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 493-94.
94
Id. at 494, 500-01.
95
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 494.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 498.
98
Id. at 498-99.
99
Id. at 502-03.
91
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information is specifically required under ERISA to allow participants the
ability to make an informed choice about continued participation in a new
benefit plan.100 The district court concluded that since the fiduciaries knew
that there was a high likelihood that the employees’ plans were not safe and
would not remain the same, their statements were materially misleading.101
The Supreme Court held that knowingly deceiving plan participants and
beneficiaries violates the duty of loyalty: “lying is inconsistent with the
duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a)(1) of
ERISA.”102 The Court further noted that trust law requires trustees to deal
“fairly and honestly with beneficiaries.”103
In determining the relief warranted under ERISA, the Court held
that individual relief was appropriate under section 502(a)(3), which
provides that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may bring suit “(A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the
terms of the plan.”104 The Court stated that individual relief is authorized
under ERISA section 502(l) for violations of section 502(a)(5), and that
section 502(a)(3) is identical to 502(a)(5), except that it allows suit to be
brought by the Secretary of Labor.105 Further, the legislative history
supported a broad reading of section 502 to permit broad remedies for
redressing or preventing violations of ERISA.106 The Court further noted
that it would be “hard to imagine why Congress would want to immunize
breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured

100

Id. at 502, 505 (citing ERISA §§ 102, 104(b)(1), 105(a)). The Court
rejected that these statements were made as the employer in a plan sponsor (thus in
a manner similar to amending a plan, which is not a fiduciary act) because the
statements were about the future of benefits, which is something that plan
administrators regularly communicate to participants and beneficiaries. Id. at 505.
101
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 505.
102
Id. (quoting Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698
F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983)).
103
Id. (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 218-19 (2d. ed. 1993); 2A AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170,
at 311-12 (4th ed. 1987)).
104
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006).
105
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510.
106
Id. at 512 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838).
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beneficiaries a remedy.”107 Therefore, individual relief is allowed under
ERISA for fiduciary breaches.
In Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Insurance, arguably one of the
most108 egregious abuses of fiduciary conduct, the plaintiff obtained health
insurance through her employer, AT&T, and her children and husband
were beneficiaries of the policy.109 Her husband had a drinking problem
and was admitted to a hospital for alcohol detoxification and medical
evaluation. The hospital notified Greenspring, the review provider who,
under the plan, must pre-approve treatment. Greenspring refused to
approve the treatment even though the insurance policy specifically entitled
the insured and beneficiaries to “at least one thirty-day inpatient
rehabilitation program per year.”110 Greenspring approved only a five-day
stay, and he was discharged after five days, “with a diagnosis of alcohol
dependence, alcohol withdrawal symptoms [and] elevated liver
function.”111 Twenty-five days later, he resumed drinking and admitted
himself to another hospital. Despite the terms of the insurance plan,
Greenspring approved only an eight-day stay.112 After being discharged, he
consumed a large amount of alcohol, cocaine, prescription drugs, and
attempted to commit suicide. After a commitment hearing, the court clinic
requested Greenspring’s approval for a thirty-day treatment at a private
hospital, which it declined. Mr. Clarke was committed to Southeastern
Correctional Center at Bridgewater for his detoxification and rehabilitation,
where he received “little in the way of therapy or treatment” and was
forcibly raped by a fellow inmate.113 Upon release, he resumed drinking
and committed suicide.114
Mrs. Andrews-Clarke brought suit against Travelers and
Greenspring, claiming Clarke’s death was the direct and foreseeable result
of the improper refusal of Travelers and its agent Greenspring to authorize
appropriate medical and psychiatric treatment during Clarke's repeated
hospitalizations for alcoholism in 1994. Her claims included breach of
contract, medical malpractice, wrongful death, loss of parental and spousal
107

Id. at 513.
Although certainly not the most egregious. See infra Part IV.
109
Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 50 (D. Mass.
1997).
110
Id. at 50-51.
111
Id. at 51.
112
Id.
113
Id.
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Id. at 52.
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consortium, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
specific violations of the Massachusetts consumer protection laws.115
The district court spoke on the importance of breach of contract
claims, noting that such causes of action “pre-date [the] Magna Carta” and
“[are] the very bedrock of our notion of individual autonomy and property
rights”, arguing that “[o]ur entire capitalist structure depends on it.”116
Clearly regretting what it understood the law to be, the court granted
Travelers’ motion to dismiss, effectively “slam[ming] the courthouse doors
in [Andrews-Clarke’s] face and leav[ing] her without any remedy.”117 The
court noted that it was just another example of “the glaring need for
Congress to amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of the
modern health care system” because ERISA had “evolved into a shield of
immunity that protects health insurers, utilization review providers, and
other managed care entities from potential liability for the consequences of
their wrongful denial of health benefits.”118 The judge acknowledged that
the plaintiff’s claims would be cognizable if not controlled by ERISA. The
federal judge concluded in a candid statement:
Employee health benefit plans lack security because of the
de facto immunity that the law now confers upon insurers
and utilization review providers associated with such
plans. Unfortunately, to date, “ERISA [has proven an
excellent example of the classic observation that it is a
115
116

Andrews-Clark, 984 F. Supp. at 52.
Id. at 52-53 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 1.4-1.6 (2d ed.

1990)).
117

Id. at 53.
Id. (citing Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995)
(“One consequence of ERISA preemption, therefore, is that plan beneficiaries or
participants bringing certain types of state actions - such as wrongful death - may
be left without a meaningful remedy.”); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965
F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The result ERISA compels us to reach means
the [Plaintiff has] no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious
mistake.”); Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419, 424 (D.
Mass. 1997) (Gorton, J.) (“An unfortunate consequence of ERISA preemption is,
therefore, that plan beneficiaries or participants who bring certain kinds of state
actions, e.g., wrongful death, may be left without a meaningful remedy. . . . Sadly,
the case at bar compels a like result. Plaintiff's state common law claims are
preempted by the broadly sweeping arm of ERISA. Plaintiff is left without any
meaningful remedy even if he were to establish that [the insurer] wrongfully
refused to provide the [bone marrow transplant] his wife urgently sought.”), aff'd,
127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997)).
118
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great deal more difficult for Congress to correct flawed
statutes than it is to enact them in the first place . . .
because interests coalesce around the advantageous aspects
of the status quo. Although the alleged conduct [of
wrongfully denying benefits that were clearly due to the
beneficiary, resulting in his death] of Travelers and
Greenspring in this case is extraordinarily troubling, even
more disturbing to this Court is the failure of Congress to
amend a statute that, due to the changing realities of the
modern health care system, has gone conspicuously awry
from its original intent.
Does anyone care? Do you?119
This judge brings to the forefront the serious concerns implicit in ERISA
law – the lack of equitable relief allowed to injured beneficiaries in these
circumstances.
In Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, there were two separate cases of
egregious HMO behavior, consolidated because the preemption issues were
the same for both.120 Juan Davila, covered under his employer’s benefit
plan, was prescribed Vioxx for arthritis pain by his treating doctor.121
Aetna, the plan administrator that reviews requests for coverage and pays
providers, declined the prescription and advised that it would only cover
Naprosyn; Davila ingested the Naprosyn and suffered a severe reaction that
required hospitalization and extensive treatment.122 Ruby Calad, also
covered under an ERISA plan, underwent surgery and her doctor
recommended an extended hospital stay to prevent post-surgery
complications.123 Her plan administrator’s discharge nurse, a CIGNA
employee, concluded that Calad did not need the extended stay and advised
CIGNA to deny coverage, which it did.124 Forced to return home too early,
she suffered post-surgery complications and required hospitalization.125
119

Id. at 64-65 (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Catherine L. Fist, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?: A
Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 99 (1996)).
120
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004).
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Id. at 205.
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Both plaintiffs sued the plan administrators, alleging violations of a
Texas bad-faith insurance statute.126 The district court held that ERISA
preempted the claims, and, as the plaintiffs refused to amend their
complaints to allege ERISA claims, dismissed the complaints with
prejudice.127 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs’ claims were
cognizable actions under ERISA’s “[section] 502(a)(1)(B), which provides
a cause of action for the recovery of wrongfully denied benefits, and
[section] 502(a)(2), which allows suit against a plan fiduciary for breaches
of fiduciary duty to the plan.”128 But because the decisions were mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions by HMOs, they were not fiduciary in
nature, and no relief was available under section 502(a)(1).129
The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs only complained about
the denials of coverage promised under the terms of the plan, and that they
were fully capable of, upon denial, paying for the treatment themselves and
then seeking reimbursement through a section 502(a)(1)(B) action, or
through a preliminary injunction.130 The Court held that essentially the
claims were for the wrongful denial of benefits, which was a claim
available under section 502, and that when a state law cause of action
duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy,
it conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy
exclusive and therefore is preempted.131 The Court rejected plaintiffs’
argument that its claim was saved under the savings clause, which
specifically regulates insurance, instead holding that because, as held in
Pilot Life Ins. Co., Congress set out a comprehensive remedial scheme in
ERISA, and “[t]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were
126

Davila, 542 U.S. at 205 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 88.001 (West

2011)).
127

Id.
Id. at 206.
129
Id. (citing Pegram v. Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000)).
130
Id. at 211. Clearly the Court (as it was a unanimous decision) did not
understand the position the plaintiffs were in and were unable to empathize or
sympathize: what person can afford to pay for a hospital visit on his own, without
insurance? How is this a reasonable suggestion? I cannot imagine the brazenness in
even suggesting that the plaintiff take on this responsibility, when his insurance
should be covering it, and failed to do so out of severe negligence. And the Court
appears to support such an act, or to shield the fiduciary, when justice and
Congressional intent clearly foresee a different outcome.
131
Id. at 208-09, 213-14.
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free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in
ERISA.”132
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence is enlightening; she stated that she
joined the “rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court
revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”133 She
noted that the Court’s interpretations of preemption and the “equitable
relief” clause under section 502(a)(3) had left a “regulatory vacuum”
because “virtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few
federal substitutes are provided.”134 She went on to give specific examples
of situations in which fiduciary breaches have left the beneficiary in a
deficient position due to an inability to receive ‘make-whole’ relief under
ERISA.135 Thus, we are left with a bad taste of ‘justice’ under ERISA: that
some members of the Court recognize that it is misinterpreting or
incorrectly applying ERISA, leaving plaintiffs harmed yet with little or no
relief.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, the plaintiff was diagnosed
with a “severe dilated cardiomyopathy, a heart condition”, and she applied
for long term disability under her employer’s employee welfare benefit
plan.136 MetLife, the insurance provider on the plan, approved her for the
initial 24 months of benefits, concluding that she could not perform the
material duties of her job.137 MetLife directed her to a law firm which
would help her apply for Social Security disability benefits, and “an
132

Davila, 542 U.S. at 217 (alteration in original) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133
Id. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
134
Id. (quoting DeFilice, 346 F.3d at 456-57 (Becker, J., concurring)).
135
Id. at 222-23 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148
(1985) (“[T]he Court stated, in dicta: [T]here is a stark absence - in [ERISA] itself
and in its legislative history - of any reference to an intention to authorize the
recovery of extracontractual damages for consequential injuries.”) (second and
third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mertens v. Hewitt
Assoc.’s, 508 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1993) (“[T]he Court held that [section] 502(a)(3)'s
term ‘equitable relief’ . . . refer[s] to those categories of relief that were typically
available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not
compensatory damages).”) (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221
(2002) (“the Court ruled that, as [section] 502(a)(3), by its terms, only allows for
equitable relief, the provision excludes “the imposition of personal liability ... for a
contractual obligation to pay money.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136
Metro. Life Ins. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008).
137
Id.
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Administrative Law Judge found that her illness prevented her not only
from performing her own job but also from performing any jobs [for which
she could qualify] existing in significant numbers in the national
economy,” thus meeting the standard for Social Security benefits.138 She
was granted permanent disability benefits, the majority of which went to
MetLife and the rest of which went to the lawyers.139 MetLife subsequently
denied her benefits beyond the 24-month mark, determining that she was
“capable of performing full time sedentary work,” applying a standard
similar to the one used by the administrative judge, who had found her
incapable of such work.140
She brought suit for judicial review of this denial of benefits, and
the district court granted MetLife’s motion for judgment because the plan
granted the plan administrator discretionary authority in deciding
benefits.141 The Sixth Circuit set aside the denial of benefits because of:
(1) the conflict of interest [arising from MetLife’s
authority to determine whether it was obligated to pay
benefits to an employee]; (2) MetLife's failure to reconcile
its own conclusion that Glenn could work in other jobs
with the Social Security Administration's conclusion that
she could not; (3) MetLife's focus upon one treating
physician report suggesting that Glenn could work in other
jobs at the expense of other, more detailed treating
physician reports indicating that she could not; (4)
MetLife's failure to provide all of the treating physician
reports to its own hired experts; and (5) MetLife's failure
to take account of evidence indicating that stress
aggravated Glenn's condition.142
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a plan
administrator both evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits on
claims, it creates a conflict of interest that a court may review for abuse of
discretion in denying benefits, because “every dollar provided in benefits is
a dollar spent by ... the employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a dollar in

138

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2346-47.
140
Id. at 2347.
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Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006).
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[the employer's] pocket.”143 A troubling example appears when “[t]he
employer's fiduciary interest may counsel in favor of granting a borderline
claim while its immediate financial interest counsels to the contrary”, and
“the employer has an interest . . . conflicting with that of the
beneficiaries.”144 Here, the Court affirmed the lower court’s review of the
benefit denial, and in doing so, took a step forward in beneficiary
protection.
B. GOOD MORNING AMERICA INVESTIGATES UNFAIR CLAIMS
PRACTICES IN DISABILITY INSURANCE
In 2008, Good Morning America, a daily news program aired by
ABC, broke several investigative news stories about disability insurers and
unfair claims practices. In April, the story of Susan Kristoff displayed to
the world the dishonest practices and lengths one insurer was willing to go
to avoid paying her disability claim. She was diagnosed with Stage IV
metastic breast cancer and had several doctors’ accounts confirming that
she was disabled.145 The contract with Cigna, the disability insurer,
provided that she be paid 60% of pre-disability income upon disability.146
But Cigna denied her claims, and she spent two years attempting to furnish
the “additional information” constantly requested by Cigna as “necessary”
to further review her claim.147 Finally, she hired a lawyer and wrote to
Good Morning America about her plight. Good Morning America
contacted Cigna to attempt to resolve the issue.148 In response, Cigna sent a
143

Id. at 2348 (quoting Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134,
144 (3d Cir. 1987)).
144
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. at 115 (1989) (citing that Restatement comment); cf. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 319 (8th ed. 2004) (A conflict of interest is “[a] real or seeming
incompatibility between one's private interests and one’s public or fiduciary
duties.”)).
145
See Chris Cuomo & Gerry Wagschal, Denied: Fighting for Insurance
Coverage, ABC NEWS (Jun. 27, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id52
57491&page=1; Brent Adams, Every Bad Faith Insurance Victim Cannot Have
Good Morning America As Their Lawyer, INJURYBOARD BLOG FAYETTEVILLE,
N.C. (Feb. 1, 2009 9:20 PM), http://fayetteville.injuryboard.com/miscellaneous/e
very-badfaith-insurance-victim-cannot-have.aspx?googleid=256444.
146
Adams, supra note 145.
147
Cuomo & Wagschal, supra note 145; Adams, supra note 145.
148
Cuomo & Wagschal, supra note 145; Adams, supra note 145.
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canned statement to Good Morning America and promptly approved
Kristoff’s claim, denying that it was because of the show’s involvement.149
Another story published online in 2009 described Charles Tucker’s
fight with Standard Insurance over disability benefits. Tucker, a 48 yearold accountant, suffered from a severe and debilitating form of multiple
sclerosis.150 He had been paying for long-term disability insurance
coverage, but when he became too sick to work, he stopped working and
filed a claim. He received constant notices requesting more information and
for months could not receive a final determination from the insurer.151
Eleven doctors examined Tucker, and all concluded that he had MS.
However, the insurer’s doctor, without examining Tucker or contacting him
about the inquiry, determined that there was insufficient evidence for such
a conclusion. Tucker hired an attorney and contacted Good Morning
America. The show’s anchor contacted the insurer and spoke with a
spokeswoman for the company, Susan Pisano, also a lobbyist for
America’s Health Insurance Plans. The next day, Standard Insurance
approved Tucker’s claim, but denied that it was because of Good Morning
America’s investigation.152
One personal injury attorney blogged about this seeming epidemic
of disability claims denials, arguing that disability claimants are in the
worst position to fight denials.153 He stated what should be obvious: “The
disabled person is the least likely to be able to afford an attorney [because]
a major source of income has been taken away.”154 Perhaps his assertion is
correct, that most insurers are betting on the fact that denials will not be
appealed due to lack of money, or fear that the insurer will insist that a
fraud is being committed, or lack of understanding of the denial-appeal
system.155 If this is true, then the argument for strict regulatory oversight
becomes absolutely necessary, as this will ensure that such claimants will
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Cuomo & Wagschal, supra note 145; Adams, supra note 145.
See Chris Cuomo & Gerry Wagschal, ‘GMA’ Gets Answers: Man with MS
Fights for Long-Term Disability Insurance, ABC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2009),
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See Frank J. Dito Jr, Good Morning America Airs Report about Disability
Insurance, NEW YORK INJURY LAW BLOG (Nov. 19, 2009), http://nyinjuryla
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not only have fair reviews of their claims but have recourse and knowledge
of the appropriate recourse.
C. VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESOLVE ERISA’S REMEDIES
PROBLEM
Several authors write of different approaches for allowing extracontractual relief under ERISA. Three authors argue that compensatory
(i.e., money) damages are appropriate under ERISA’s “other appropriate
equitable relief” clause in section 502, because such relief is allowed in
trust law.156 Another argues that plaintiffs use RICO claims to receive
appropriate relief.157 Yet another approach argues that state insurance
unfair practices statues must be saved from preemption, as section
514(b)(2)(B) expressly enforces state insurance laws, while section 502
only generally provides remedies and does not expressly preempt insurance
laws.158
1. Trust Law As A Basis For Additional Remedies To
Beneficiaries
In a poignant review of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Aetna
v. Davila, Charlotte Johnson advocates that the Court has not enforced
ERISA as it was intended by Congress, and has effectively, but
inadvertently, “painted itself into a corner by restrictively interpreting
ERISA to preclude compensatory relief to victims of HMO patient
treatment decisions.”159 She argues that, as ERISA was enacted before the
surge of HMOs, Congress could not have anticipated ERISA’s effect and
regulation of HMO liability.160 The Court has time and again decided that,
under ERISA, injured participants and beneficiaries may only receive
traditional equitable relief, i.e., injunction or restitution, and not
compensatory relief, e.g., money damages; thus, the Court has provided a
shield for HMOs against plan participant claims.161
156

Johnson, supra note 6, at 1589; Harthill, supra note 6, at 722; Langbein,
Trust Law As Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1340-41; Langbein, What ERISA
Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, 1338, 1362.
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Lalena J. Turchi, Health Insurance: Paying the Premium or Paying the
Price? – ERISA Preemption and RICO’s Recourse, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
526, 551-59 (2008).
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The only way of effectively getting around this shield was pointed
out by Justice Ginsburg in her Davila dissent: allow make-whole
compensatory relief under section 502(a)(3).162 The Court’s interpretation
of “appropriate equitable relief” is strange, in that it refuses to impose
personal liability on the defendant, as that would transfer the equitable
restitution to one of legal restitution.163 However, section 409 allows a
fiduciary to be personally liable for breaches, thus such personal liability is,
in fact, permitted and authorized under ERISA.164 Johnson also advocates
Justice Stevens’ position, that Congress intended ERISA to provide a broad
framework under which the courts may apply make-whole compensatory
relief, due to ERISA’s skeletal framework incorporating some facets of
trust law combined with Congressional intent to “protect the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans.”165 Further, monetary
(compensatory) damages are authorized under ERISA because, as shown in
Varity, section 502(a)(5) permits payment of civil penalties for fiduciary
breaches to participants and beneficiaries, and sections 502(a)(5) and
502(a)(3) are nearly identical.166 Further, Johnson argues that trust law
permits monetary equitable relief to individuals, yet the Court’s decision to
overlook this principle of trust law has resulted in fiduciary breaches, in the
HMO context, to not be a breach at all.167
Johnson concedes that the remedial scheme in ERISA is properly
fixed by Congress, not “creativity in the courts.”168 This article is
encouraging in its analysis of trust law, however, the concession that only
Congress can fix the problem is frustrating. Courts interpret laws, and if
they misinterpret the laws, Congress may react and amend the law.
Unfortunately, this does not always happen, and the health insurance
industry likely has a stronghold on many politicians that prevented such an
amendment from being passed.
Professor John Langbein argues that Congress only referenced trust
law as a regulatory structure, by using the tenets of loyalty and prudence,
but left ERISA skeletal in form to be refined by the judiciary.169 The Court
itself acknowledged that Congress intended the judiciary to look to settled
162

Id. at 1591.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).
164
See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006).
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Johnson, supra note 6, at 1612 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006); Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97, 502-03 (2006)).
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Id. at 1613 (citing Varity, 516 U.S. at 510).
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Id. at 1622-23.
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Id. at 1617.
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common law in shaping ERISA, thus creating a “federal common law of
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.”170 Langbein
illustrates several instances where the Court failed to correctly apply trust
law principles, such as in Russell by rejecting the plaintiff’s claim for delay
damages.171 Delay in making a distribution from a trust fund “has long been
understood to be a breach of trust.”172 In the Uniform Trust Code of 2000,
money damages for breaches of trust are included in the available
remedies.173 In Bogert’s treatise on trust law, breaching trustees “may be
directed by the court to pay damages to the beneficiary” and in cases of
negligence or misconduct, the beneficiary may have a claim “to recover
money damages from the trustee.”174 Thus, it seems clear that trust law, in
fact, does allow beneficiaries to recover compensatory and consequential
damages.
In drafting ERISA, Congress surpassed trust law verbiage and
further subjected the fiduciary to “such other equitable or remedial relief as
the court may deem appropriate,” on top of making the fiduciary liable to
the plaintiff for recovery of the loss incurred, profits made by the fiduciary
in the breach, and any gains made from the breach.175 This phrase is also
found in section 502(a)(3), and is more expansive than the trust law
standard, and it is the belief of several scholars that this language is meant
to provide compensatory and consequential relief, as Congress was simply
wording it in a way to address fairness.176 If the Court refuses to utilize
trust law principles, then perhaps the statutory construction should
persuade it that, because this phrase surpasses trust law verbiage, Congress
intended for fairness to govern, thus allowing additional recovery for
egregious breaches.
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2. Applying the Savings Clause with Force: State Unfair
Insurance Practices Statutes Should be Saved from
Preemption under the Pilot Life Rationale
In an article written before Davila, Professor Donald Bogan argues
that state unfair insurance practices laws should be saved from preemption
under the savings clause.177 These laws are specifically aimed at the
regulation of the insurance industry, fulfill the requirements in the savings
clause, and are saved from preemption under section 502 because of the
express language in section 514(b)(2)(B), authorizing and enforcing state
insurance laws to ERISA plans.178 In analyzing Pilot Life, he argues that
the Court only preempted the law at issue because it was a general bad faith
law that did not specifically regulate insurance, and as such was preempted
by the remedies in section 502.179 In this case the Court made a landmark
decision: that section 502 was intended by Congress as “the exclusive
vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants . . . asserting improper
processing of a claim for benefits.”180
Bogan points out that state unfair insurance practices statutes do
more than simply provide punitive damages remedies, they “establish and
define a standard of care owed by the insurer to the insured that attaches to
every insurance policy.”181 The Supreme Court has, in the past, declared
that state insurance laws affect an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and insured, and are saved from preemption.182 Bogan
177

Bogan, supra note 6, at 113-14.
Id. at 114.
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Id. at 124-25 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50
(1987)).
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Id. at 126 (citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)). In a subsequent decision by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, a claim under the Florida unfair insurance practices
statute for disability benefits was denied. It was denied for two reasons: while it
directly regulated insurance, it failed to meet all three prongs under the McCarran
Ferguson test, thus precluding it from regulating the “business of insurance.” The
court concluded that this plus the Pilot Life analysis forced preemption due to
section 502. Id. at 131-32 (citing Anschultz v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d
1467, 1468-69 (11th Cir. 1988)).
181
Id. at 133.
182
See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 743-44 (1985);
Bogan, supra note 6, at 134 (citing UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358,
374 (1999) (holding that a California notice-prejudice law, requiring the insurer to
establish prejudice before denying a claim filed late, was saved from preemption
because it served as an integral part of the policy relationship).
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asks: why are state insurance unfair practice statutes not also saved, when
they clearly affect every insurance contract and “effectively create
mandatory contract terms that require insurers to timely investigate and
settle claims, to notify insured employees of the benefits and coverage
contained in the insurance policies that are pertinent to a claim, and to
refrain from attempts to obtain fraudulent releases of claims from their
insureds?”183 He notes several lower courts, which have held that state
insurance bad faith remedies laws do regulate insurance and are thus saved
from preemption.184 Most of these cases, however, have subsequently been
overruled since his article was published.
Bogan further argues that, taking Supreme Court precedent of
saving insurance laws from preemption, those laws should be preempted
because of the express language in section 514(b)(2)(B), even when the
state remedies laws conflict with section 502, as the former expressly
exempted state laws that regulate insurance.185 The issue really boils down
to two competing sections of the same federal statute: one provision
expressly exempting certain state statutes from preemption, and one
provision providing general remedies.186 He asserts that statutory
construction principles mandate that the courts give effect to legislative
intent in such circumstances.187
The savings clause is unambiguous in its exemption of state
insurance laws. There is no support in the legislative history that the court
may pick and choose which insurance laws to apply, especially with
regards to state insurance remedies laws.188 However, looking at the
statement of Senator Williams on page 7 infra, it would appear that the
remedies in section 502 eliminate all other laws, except for the provided
“narrow exceptions” in ERISA. Bogan argues that the “narrow exceptions”
are the state insurance bad faith laws, and thus are saved from preemption
and section 502.189 Therefore, as the Court has saved other insurance laws
from preemption under the savings clause, it should also save state
183

Bogan, supra note 6, at 134.
Id. at 144-45. An example of the cases cited: Colligan v. UNUM Life Ins.
Co. of Am., No. 00-K-2512, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8103 (D. Colo. Apr. 23,
2001), overruled by Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 345 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.
2003).
185
Bogan, supra note 6, at 152.
186
Id. at 153.
187
Id. at 153-54.
188
Id. at 154 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 745-46
(1985)).
189
Id. at 154.
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insurance unfair practices statutes, as they were intended to be saved by
Congress because they integrally affect the insurer-insured insurance policy
relationship.
This is a different view on ERISA and does not entail rejecting any
statutory language. I support this reading of ERISA; however, the Court
has, as aptly described by Johnson, “painted itself into a corner” and likely
will not adopt this reading. The Court is unlikely to undertake a sweeping
change of heart and overrule twenty-plus years of precedent.190
3. Alternative Pleading: One Argument to Use RICO for
Fraudulent Claims Practices
In an article written by an employee benefits consultant, Lalena
Turchi empathizes with the strife many beneficiaries face with benefits
claims against fiduciaries.191 She is able to give a first-hand account of the
administrative inefficiencies inherent in the insurer-provider billing system
which leads to erroneous rejections, and the disheartening rejection due to a
decision that the treatment is not “medically necessary.”192 She argues that,
since the Court has rejected application of state insurance bad faith laws,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), found in
18 U.S.C. § 1961, should be used.193 It is of note that RICO claims allow
for treble damages against defendants.194
The Court allowed the plaintiffs-beneficiaries to assert a RICO
claim in Humana v. Forsyth, and permitted the treble damage provision to
190

Perhaps the Court only takes such drastic action once a millennium, such as
was necessary in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and such action is
not deemed as important for the health insurance industry and protection of plan
participants.
191
Turchi, supra note 157, at 526.
192
Id. at 527.
193
Id. at 551.
194
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c): “Any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, except that
no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in
the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The
exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against
any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case
the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction
becomes final.”
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apply in a suit against an insurer involved in a scheme where it received
discounts for hospital services but failed to pass those discounts on to the
plan beneficiaries. The plan agreement, which provided that the insurer
would pay 80% and the insured is responsible for the remaining 20%, was
not followed, as the insurer paid at a discount and forced the insured to pay
more than the agreed-upon 20%.195 The Court held that RICO
complemented the state statutory and common law claims for relief, and
therefore did not supersede, preclude or conflict with the state laws under
McCarran-Ferguson.196 The claims alleged violations of RICO through a
pattern of racketeering activity consisting of mail, wire, radio and
television fraud.197 The Court noted that RICO advances the state’s interest
in protecting against insurance fraud and does not frustrate state policy, and
insurers have relied on RICO when bringing fraud claims.198 However, this
insurer was not governed under ERISA.
Turchi finds support for RICO claims in ERISA plans in several
cases, such as Maio v. Aetna, where plan participants in an HMO brought
suit against the insurer for overpayment of insurance.199 While the court
dismissed for lack of standing, it stated that the plaintiffs would have had
standing if they had alleged that the health care received under the plan
“actually was compromised or diminished as a result of insurer’s
management decisions challenged in the complaint.”200 Accordingly, had
the proper allegations been made, a RICO claim apparently would have
been permissible. In another case, a plaintiff sued for a fraudulent insurance
telemarketing scheme when an insurer sold her a death and dismemberment
policy with limited value, and led her to believe it was a term life plan.201
The district court, granting a motion to dismiss in part, however, stated that
her loss of funds through premiums paid to the insurer was a cognizable
injury to property as required under RICO.202
In Klay v. Humana, Inc., a suit brought by physicians against
HMOs, the doctors alleged that the HMOs were engaged in a scheme to
underpay the physicians via a computer program that reimbursed the
195

Id. at 552 (citing Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 299-301 (1999)).
See 525 U.S. at 311.
197
Id. at 299 (citing RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961).
198
Humana, 525 U.S. at 299, 302.
199
Turchi, supra note 157, at 554 (citing Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472
(3d Cir. 2000)).
200
Id. (citing Maio, 221 F.3d at 472).
201
See McClain v. Coverdell & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 631, 634 (E.D. Mich.
2003).
202
Turchi, supra note 157, at 555 (citing McClain, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 637).
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physicians based on “financially expedient cost and actuarial data rather
than medical necessity.”203 The RICO claims included racketeering
activities through mail fraud, wire fraud, and extortion, as the HMOs
threatened that the physicians, if they refused to cooperate, would lose
patients, be blacklisted, and not be paid in full if they were not under
contract with the HMO.204 The Eleventh Circuit held that “it would be
unjust to allow corporation to engage in rampant and systemic wrongdoing,
and then allow them to avoid class actions because the consequences of
being held accountable for the misdeeds would be financially ruinous” in
response to the insurers’ argument that such a suit would devastate the
health care industry.205
Turchi argues that health plan participants suffer the same harm
and experience the same calculated wrongdoing when denied benefits as
the plaintiffs in the above mentioned cases, and RICO claims are the best
method to obtain adequate remedies.206 Her analysis states that, in allowing
a RICO claim, the Court will provide the much needed relief for ERISA
preemption when an insurer denies benefits and insured suffers injuries, as
it will force insurance companies to be more conservative in their benefit
denials when there is a possibility for treble damages for bad faith.207
This approach is optimistic and inventive. Unfortunately, it is
likely to be rejected by the Supreme Court, under the view that the
remedies provided in section 502 are the sole remedies available. It is not
an issue of federal versus state laws that can apply; the issue is that the
language in section 502 is narrowly construed by the Court, and such a
narrow interpretation will likely not allow a plaintiff to invoke RICO as the
“other appropriate equitable relief” allowed under section 502(a)(3). An
alternative to this is stricter regulatory oversight of insurers, specifically
ERISA insurers, which should have the same result – compliance with
insurance regulations and protection of beneficiaries.
IV. CASE STUDY: UNUM PROVIDENT
The Unum scandal has been immortalized as probably the most
egregious known scheme to defraud participants and commit fiduciary
203

Id. at 557 (citing Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005)).
204
Id.
205
Id. at 559 (citing Klay, 382 F.3d at 1274).
206
Id. at 560.
207
Id.

204

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

breaches. Unum is a disability insurer. It is made up of the parent company,
Unum Group, and several subsidiaries, including Unum Life Insurance
Company of America, the Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, Provident
Life and Accident Insurance Company, Provident Life and Casualty
Insurance Company, and First Unum Life Insurance Company. In 1997, the
parent company acquired the Paul Revere Company, a Massachusetts
corporation providing individual long-term disability insurance.208 In 1999,
the parent company became Unum as a result of a merger between Unum
Corporation and Provident Companies, Inc. When the companies were
merged, an oversight resulted in no streamlining of policies, practices or
procedures among the newly acquired groups.209 Thus, claims adjusters
were localized and followed whatever procedures had been in place before
the merger and had little oversight by the parent company.
A. THE LAWSUITS AND SCANDAL
An attorney at Unum realized that the company could gain
discretionary review of its plan decisions, i.e., its claim denials, by
incorporating Firestone language, which limits judicial review of benefit
denials to only abuse of discretion situations.210 An internal Unum
executive memorandum advocated the “enormous advantages that ERISA,
as interpreted by the courts, bestowed upon Unum” because of state law

208

MULTISTATE MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT, Rackeman,
Sawyer & Brewster, P.C., submitted to state departments of insurance at 2 (Apr.
14, 2008).
209
Telephone interview with senior management employee, Unum (July 1,
2010). The interviewee requested to remain anonymous.
210
Id. at 1321; see Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111,
115 (1989) (Stating: “Trust principles make a deferential standard of review
appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers. See Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959) (‘[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee
with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the
court except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion’). See also G.
Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 560, pp. 193-208 (2d rev. ed.
1980). A trustee may be given power to construe disputed or doubtful terms, and in
such circumstances the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable.
Id., § 559, at 169-71. Whether ‘the exercise of a power is permissive or mandatory
depends upon the terms of the trust.’ 3 W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 187, p. 14
(4th ed. 1988).”)
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preemption.211 Further, it advocated that such protection precludes jury
trials, compensatory or punitive damages, and provides relief only for the
amount of the benefit in question, which Unum would have had to pay
anyway, but not before the claimant pays a lot of money and time to force
such payment.212 The memorandum went on to state that twelve claims
situations were identified “where we settled for $7.8 million in the
aggregate. If these 12 cases had been covered by ERISA, our liability
would have been between zero and $0.5 million.”213 This memo illustrates
ERISA’s weaknesses and insurers’ ability to exploit those weaknesses
(loopholes which shield insurers from liability and penalties), to the
detriment of beneficiaries with claims.
J. Harold Chandler, the CEO of Unum until 2003, instituted costcontainment measures, whereby claims processors were pressured to deny
valid claims, especially during the last month of the quarter to meet
“projections” and “budget goals.”214 Several investigative reporting
television programs demonstrated these mechanisms through internal
Unum emails, which advised claims employees to deny claims in order to
meet desired goals.215 One Unum employee, a staff physician, admitted that
Unum instructed him to use language to support denials of disability claims
and denied him the ability to request additional medical testing to fully
determine a claimant’s disability.216
In Weiss v. First Unum Life Insurance Co., the beneficiary, Weiss,
sued First Unum under RICO, claiming that First Unum discontinued
payment of his disability benefits as part of its racketeering scheme
involving an intentional and illegal policy of rejecting expensive payouts to
disabled insureds.217 Weiss, an investment banker, had insurance through
his employer, which included long-term disability (“LTD”) insurance by
First Unum. He had a heart attack in 2001, which left him suffering
permanently with ventricular tachycardia and unable to work due to
lightheadedness, weakness, and shortness of breath.218 His claim for was
211

Id. at 1321 (citing Memorandum from Jeff McCall to IDC Management
Group & Glenn Felton, Provident Internal Memorandum, Re: ERISA (Oct. 2,
1995)).
212
See id.
213
Id. (citing Memorandum, supra note 211).
214
Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1318.
215
Id. at 1319.
216
Id. (citing McSharry v. Unum/Provident Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877
(E.D. Tenn. 2002)).
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Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 254, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2007).
218
Id. at 256.
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approved for short-term disability benefits, which resulted in seven months
of benefit payments.219 At the end of the maximum allowable short-term
disability benefits, Unum paid Weiss LTD benefits for another three
months, and then discontinued paying benefits.220 Weiss brought suit in
state court, and Unum removed to federal court and filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the state claims were preempted under ERISA.221
While the case was pending, Unum resumed payment of his LTD benefits,
retroactive to the prior termination date.222
Weiss added both federal and state RICO claims, arguing that his
claim was terminated because it exceeded $11,000 per month.223 In support
of this argument, he alleged that on October 3, 2001, defendants David
Gilbert, Paul Keenan, George DiDonna, Lucy-Baird Stoddard, Unum
employees, and others conspired at a roundtable meeting to terminate
Weiss’s benefits and devise a rationalization for doing so.224 Weiss claimed
that DiDonna, the insurer physician, did not receive or examine his hospital
records until the termination decision was reached, and tests that would
make clear the severity of his injury were purposely never ordered.225
Weiss sidestepped a simple state bad faith claim by arguing that his denial
is one instance in a pattern of fraudulent activity by First Unum aimed at
depriving its insureds with large disability payouts of their contractual
benefits.226
The District Court dismissed his RICO claims, believing that the
allowance of such a RICO claim would interfere with New Jersey’s
statutory regulation of insurers, and thus run afoul of the McCarranFerguson Act.227 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, using the
Humana analysis for ability to assert RICO claims.228 The court noted that
219

See id.
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Weiss, 482 F.3d at 257.
224
Id.
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Id.
226
Id.
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Id. at 255.
228
Id. at 256. The court expansively noted Humana v. Forsyth in its analysis,
stating: “In sum, the Humana analysis explored the specific interplay between
RICO and the state insurance scheme. As described above, the non-exclusive list
of factors the Court examined in Humana included the following: (1) the
availability of a private right of action under state statute; (2) the availability of a
common law right of action; (3) the possibility that other state laws provided
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the state insurance trade practices act (“ITPA”) allowed the insurance
commissioner to determine whether an insurer had engaged in an unfair or
deceptive practice, which includes unfair claims settlement practices.229 If a
violation was found, the commissioner may assess a $1,000 penalty for
each negligent act or violation, unless the insurer knew or should have
known the act was a violation - then the penalty is $5,000 per act or
violation.230 The commissioner was required to investigate upon receipt of
a consumer complaint of a violation of this act, and upon a finding of
violations, may order the insurer to pay restitution to the aggrieved party or
other equitable relief.231 The court also found there was a state common law
private right of action against insurers for wrongly withheld benefits, other
state laws allow claims, and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, which
provided treble damages available to redress such violations.232
The appeals court found that the claim alleged that First Unum
embarked on a fraudulent scheme to deny insureds their rightful benefits,
“clearly an unconscionable commercial practice in connection with the
performance of its obligations subsequent to the sale of merchandise, i.e.
payment of benefits.”233 Ultimately, the court held that Weiss could
appropriately bring a RICO claim against First Unum, and remanded the
case.234
In McCauley v. First Unum, the plaintiff’s disability insurance was
through his employer plan and First Unum was both the administrator and
payor of benefits.235 McCauley was diagnosed with advanced colon cancer
in April 1991 and underwent severe chemotherapy treatments to save his
life.236 Due to these treatments, he took several short-term disability leaves
grounds for suit; (4) the availability of punitive damages; (5) the fact that the
damages available (in the case of Nevada, punitive damages) could exceed the
amount recoverable under RICO, even taking into account RICO's treble damages
provision; (6) the absence of a position by the State as to any interest in any state
policy or their administrative regime; and (7) the fact that insurers have relied on
RICO to eradicate insurance fraud.” Id. at 261 (citing Humana, 525 U.S. at 31114).
229
Weiss, 462 F.3d. at 263 (citing N.J. STAT. § 17:29B-5 (2003)).
230
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. § 17:29B-7(a) (2003)).
231
Id. at 264 (citing N.J. STAT. § 17:29B-18 (2003)).
232
Id. at 264-67.
233
Id. at 266.
234
Id. at 269. Note here that the court completely failed to mention ERISA’s
preemption clauses and section 502, which limits the remedies available.
235
McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 2008).
236
Id. at 128-29.
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in 1991 under the group disability plan.237 Over the next three years, he
experienced health problems in connection with his cancer and took several
short-term disability leaves.238 In 1994, he notified his employer that his
health conditions were too traumatic and he could not continue to work.239
In May 1995, First Unum denied his claim.240 Upon McCauley’s
appeal and submission of additional information, First Unum again rejected
his claim in September 1995.241 McCauley attempted to rejoin the
workforce and accepted a General Counsel position, but his health
problems persisted.242 Because he found work, his former employer ceased
paying the disability plan premiums and advised him to convert the policy
and make future payments, which he did.243 On January 16, 1996, he
applied for long-term disability benefits under his conversion policy, as he
accepted that he simply could not work due to his severe health
problems.244 First Unum again denied his claim on the basis that the
employment with the former employer had terminated in 1994, and,
therefore, that he had exercised his conversion after the allowable period.245
McCauley brought suit for wrongful denial of benefits. He alleged
that certain procedural irregularities, such as missing documents from his
file and the incorrect assertion to McCauley that a medical doctor reviewed
his file (only a nurse reviewed it) which occurred in the handling of his
claim demonstrated that First Unum's conflict of interest had affected its
decision to deny him benefits.246 While both courts held that the insurer’s
first denial of benefits was proper, as McCauley’s physician’s letter did not
indicate total disability, the additional information submitted should have
resulted in coverage.247 This additional information was a memorandum
237

Id. at 129.
Id., noting, for instance, he had part of his liver removed because cancer
was found, and subsequently suffered a severe liver infection. He also underwent
surgery to repair a hernia. Id.
239
Id. The court noted his physical traumas, stating that, while the cancer
treatment was successful, it caused “chronic diarrhea, chronic and acute renal
impairment, incontinence, progressive vascular sclerosis, high cholesterol,
insomnia, depression, and incisional scarring and pain.” Id.
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238

2011

ERISA: REMEDIES, PREEMPTION

209

written by McCauley, with the advice and knowledge of his physician,
listing his medical issues as (1) chronic diarrhea, (2) chronic and acute
renal impairment, (3) progressive vascular sclerosis, (4) high cholesterol,
(5) insomnia, and (6) incisional scarring and pain, and stated:
[He] is only able to control bowel movements by carefully
timing his food ingestion and lists a number of ways in
which this limits his daily activities. Respecting his renal
impairment, the memorandum explains that McCauley has
chronic blood in the urine and pain in the kidney area and
that he forms a kidney stone every two weeks. As a result,
his physician recommends that he not sit for long periods
of time. Moreover, the memorandum states that during the
acute phase of his renal impairment, “it is impossible for
the patient to perform at any level.” As to his vascular
sclerosis, the memorandum explains that McCauley’s
vascular system was permanently damaged by the
chemotherapy treatments and that he suffers “severe
chronic headaches at the base of the skull, resulting in an
inability to focus eyesight and a lack of concentration.”
His insomnia is described as “chronic and recurring,”
resulting in a “general feeling of lethargy and malaise” and
leaving him with a “need to take naps during the day.” The
memorandum also states that McCauley “is in pain on an
almost constant basis” and takes Percocet, an opiate, to
manage that pain.248
A nurse, not a doctor, reviewed this additional evidence and rejected his
claim, because it was “‘not an official document from [an] attending
physician.’”249 However, the rejection letter stated that it had rejected the
claim because “‘these conditions were acknowledged by your physician on
the initial application and in his narrative letter of March 1995.’”250
The court granted First Unum’s motion for summary judgment,
stating that a de novo standard of review of the benefit denial was not
applicable because the plan had Firestone language (which granted the
insurer discretionary authority in benefit determinations, and a court may
248

Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 135.
250
Id. “First Unum never told McCauley that the absence of a physician's
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only review where there has been an arbitrary or capricious action).251 On
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, under the
Metropolitan Life v. Glenn standard, and found that the plan administrator
abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's second claim for long-term
disability benefits, because its reason for doing so was deceptive and
unreasonable.252
Several bad faith suits were brought against Unum, and in one case
(a non-ERISA case), a five million dollar punitive judgment was awarded
by the jury due to the egregious bad faith acts by Unum.253 A district court
in Massachusetts wrote that “an examination of cases involving First Unum
. . . reveals a disturbing pattern of erroneous and arbitrary benefits denials,
bad faith contract misinterpretations, and other unscrupulous tactics.”254
That court listed more than thirty cases in which First Unum’s denials were
found to be unlawful, including one decision in which the behavior was
“‘culpably abusive.’”255 A state insurance commissioner noted that Unum
looked “‘for every technical legal way to avoid paying a claim.’”256
Several insurance state commissioners enforced fines, to the tune of
millions of dollars, for the unfair and egregious claims practices of Unum
employees.257
B. THE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES STEP IN
On January 7, 2003, the Massachusetts Division of Insurance
conducted a market conduct examination of the Paul Revere Company’s
handling practices of individual disability insurance claims (“IDI”
251

Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 128, 133, 135 (“Following Glenn, a plan under which an
administrator both evaluates and pays benefits claims creates the kind of conflict of
interest that courts must take into account and weigh as a factor in determining
whether there was an abuse of discretion, but does not make de novo review
appropriate.” (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2348, 2348 (2008))).
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Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1319 (citing
Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082 (N.D. Cal.
2002), aff’d, 373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Ins. Co of Am., 321 F. Supp. 2d 226, 247
(D. Mass. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
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Id. at 247 n.20.
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Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1320 (citing Mike
Pare, $1 Million Fine Hits Unum, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 19,
2003, at C1).
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claims).258 In September 2003, a multistate targeted market conduct
examination was commenced by the Maine Bureau of Insurance, the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance, and the Tennessee Department of
Commerce and Insurance, concerning the claims practices of Unum,
Revere and Provident in both IDI and group LTC policies.259 Additionally,
the remaining forty-seven states plus the District of Colombia acted as
“participating states” in this 2003 exam.260 Contemporaneously with the
Multistate Examination, the Department of Labor conducted an
investigation of the companies (the “DOL Investigation”) pursuant to
Section 504 of ERISA.261
According to the exam report, the examination team requested the
companies to provide a comprehensive database including all claims closed
during 2002.262 Initially, 300 claim files randomly selected from IDI and
LTD claims closed during 2002, or for which benefit determinations were
appealed or litigated during 2002, or claims open as of year-end 2002 were
evaluated for the initial review.263 The initial review comprised 300 claims
(100 claims each for Unum, Revere and Provident).264 “The proportion of
selected IDI and LTD claims was based on the relative reported reserves
for each company as of December 31, 2002.”265 The team also commenced
a second, follow-up review in 2004, as the companies advised that they had
made several changes in claim administration implemented in 2003.266
The initial review actually consisted of 299 files instead of 300,
because the companies were unable to locate one of the claims files

258

2008 MULTISTATE MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT, supra note
208, at 3.
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Id. at 3-4.
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Unum Provident Regulatory Settlement Agreement, § A.3, MAINE.GOV
(Nov. 2004), http://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/unum/UNUM_Regulatory_Sett
lement_Agreement.htm.
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TARGETED MULTISTATE MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT,
MAINE.GOV (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/unum/Unu
m_Multistate_ExamReport.htm.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. In 2004, the team reviewed 75 claim files (25 each for Unum, Revere
and Provident) which were randomly selected from the Companies’ IDI and LTD
claims for which benefit determinations were first appealed during the period of
December 2003 through February 2004. Id.
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selected for review.267 This initial review concluded with four “general
areas of concern” for both the IDI and LTD claims handling. The four areas
were: (1) excessive reliance on in-house medical professionals; (2) an
unfair bias and inappropriate interpretation of medical reports to the
detriment of claimants based on the excessive reliance upon the in-house
medical professionals; (3) failure to evaluate the totality of the claimants’
medical conditions (benefits were denied due to the failure to “properly
evaluate cumulative effects” of multiple claimant conditions); and (4) the
inappropriate burden placed on claimants to justify eligibility for
benefits.268
After the follow up review in 2004, the team concluded that further
regulatory action was necessary, resulting in the Regulatory Settlement
Agreements (“RSA”), which provided a “Plan of Corrective Action” that
the companies implement in their claims handling procedures.269 The RSA
stated that a further review would be completed in 24 months to assess
implementation of the practice and procedures set forth in the RSA.270 The
RSA also provided for a $15 million penalty to be paid by the
companies.271
The RSA required the following changes in claims practices and
procedures to reduce any potential bias and promote claims handling
accuracy:
The engagement of experienced claim personnel at the
earliest possible stage of claim reviews;
Increased emphasis upon claim staff accountability for
compliance with the terms of insurance policies and
applicable law;
Increased involvement of higher levels of claim
management staff in each claim denial or claim
termination decision;
Creation of a separate compliance/accountability
function at the claim denial and claim termination
level;

267

Id.
TARGETED MULTISTATE MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT, supra
note 262.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
268

2011

ERISA: REMEDIES, PREEMPTION

213

Assurance that co-morbid conditions are properly
evaluated at every level of claim review;
Increased utilization of Independent Medical
Examinations;
Additional compliance training for all claim staff, with
emphasis upon the results of the multistate
examination, the Plan, and the NAIC Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Act; and
Additional training for group policyholder human
resources personnel so as to better facilitate the
process for LTD claims.272
With regards to the corporate governance, the companies were required to
address corporate control issues by implementing the following changes:
The Board of Directors of the Parent Company will be
expanded by three members, each of which will have
significant insurance industry or insurance regulatory
experience (two will have regulatory experience); each
candidate will be approved by the Lead States and by
the DOL;
The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors will be
expanded by one member; at least one of the new
members of the Board of Directors will be appointed
to the Audit Committee;
The Board of Directors will establish a new
Regulatory Compliance Committee, comprised of two
of the new members of the Board, and three existing
independent directors; the Regulatory Compliance
Committee will have responsibility for monitoring
compliance with the Plan and other compliance-related
oversight functions; and
The companies will create a Regulatory Compliance
Unit, which will report directly to the Regulatory
Compliance Committee; the Regulatory Compliance
Unit will monitor compliance with the Plan (including
the functions of the Claim Reassessment Unit) through
the performance of periodic audits, provide assistance
272
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to claimants to ease and facilitate the claim submission
process, and gather data for the Lead States’ ongoing
monitoring of compliance with the Plan.273
Further, the RSA and Plan required the Regulatory Compliance Committee,
the companies’ senior management, the lead regulators and the DOL to
meet on a quarterly basis to evaluate compliance with the Plan and RSA.274
In 2005, the RSA was amended to allow LTD and IDI claimants the
opportunity to have denied claims reassessed.275
The reassessment of claims was performed by the Claim
Reassessment Unit (“CRU”), a newly formed claims unit within the
companies.276 Its results were evaluated in another multistate market
conduct examination, conducted in 2007, to evaluate compliance by the
companies. More than 79,000 claimants elected to have their claims
reassessed, however, only 23,190 claimants correctly submitted the
required Reassessment Information Forms.277 Therefore, only 23,190
claims were actually reassessed by the companies, which is approximately
29% of the total requested reassessments.278
The examining team concluded that 41.7% of the claims (including
both IDI and LTD) reassessed were reversed in whole or part, resulting in
approximately $676.2 million in benefits paid to claimants, either
immediately or reserved for future payments.279 Forty-five percent of the
LTD reassessed claims were reversed in whole or part, resulting in
approximately $558.6 million of benefits paid or reserved for future
payment.280 Twenty-two percent of IDI reassessed claims were reversed in
whole or part, resulting in approximately $117.6 million in benefits paid or
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reserved for future payment.281 In total, it appears the companies paid more
than a billion dollars in benefits due to the reassessed claims.
The 2007 exam also evaluated the companies’ compliance with the
claims procedures required under the RSA. The team evaluated claims
reassessed by the CRU, both IDI and LTD, along with a sample of claims
assessed by other claims personnel.282 The team assessed 50 CRU IDI
claims, 100 CRU LTD claims, 50 Operations IDI claims, and 100
Operations LTD claims.283 According to the RSA, the error rate in claims
could not exceed 7% for each area assessed.284 The team concluded that the
companies were well below this error rate, and in some instances there
were zero errors.285 Therefore, according to the 2008 multistate market
conduct examination report, the companies are in complete compliance
with the RSA.
In 2007, California’s Department of Insurance (“CDI”) also
conducted an independent market conduct exam, releasing the report in
2008.286 The examiners evaluated the reassessed claims subject to the
separate California Settlement Agreement between Unum and CDI. One
hundred and ninety-one reassessed claims were reviewed, along with 30
post-CSA claims (closed between December 2005 and May 2006) and 60
post-CSA claims (closed between August 2006 and July 2007).287
The examiners found seven violations in evaluating the 191
reassessed claims (approximately 3% error).288 The violations included: (1)
five instances of failure to comply with the CSA’s definition of “total
disability” in denying claims and (2) two instances of failure to effectuate
281
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prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims where liability was
reasonably clear.289 In response, Unum voluntarily imposed a written
refresher training course for the CRU employees, emphasizing compliance,
and reassessed the noted claims.290
There were no violations found in the 90 post-CSA claims.291 The
report noted a 54% drop in consumer complaints against Unum after it
adopted the measures required in the regulatory settlement agreements.292
C. THE REST OF THE STORY: UNUM IS NOW A MODEL DISABILITY
INSURER AND TRIES TO AMELIORATE ITS BAD REPUTATION
I had the opportunity to speak with a senior management
employee at Unum. He acknowledged the egregious behavior which
occurred and resulted in the lawsuits and RSA, but was very clear about
Unum’s complete turnaround. He advised that it is a completely different
company under these new claims practices and procedures, as evidenced by
the most recent market conduct reports. The procedures implemented to
ensure compliance and fairness include an ethics hotline, where employees
are encouraged to report any wrongdoing in business practice and remain
anonymous, a notice to beneficiaries upon a denied claim of their right to
request an independent medical exam, a requirements for claims personnel
to contact attending physicians if there are questions or when clarification
is necessary, and a policy to give significant weight to social security
disability decisions and attending physician decisions.293
The departments of insurance view this outcome as a success. In a
2009 letter from the Maine, Massachusetts, Tennessee and New York
departments of Insurance to the editor of the Insurance Forum, the
commissioners and superintendents advocated that the “systemic
misconduct” that led to the multistate examinations was no longer present
at Unum, according to the latest exam reports.294 Mila Kaufman,
superintendent of the Maine Department Insurance declared that “this case .
. . is an example of effective state-based insurance regulation for insurance
289
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consumers. Regulators identified a problem and worked together to
effectively address it.”295 She went on to support Unum’s change, stating
“it is also an example of an insurer reforming its practices and becoming a
model for other insurers. The strong new processes and the resulting
change in corporate culture – measure by the very low rate and in some
cases a 0% error in claim determinations is remarkable.”296 This view was
also advocated by the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner, stating she
“is pleased” with Unum Group’s compliance and using the procedures to
“ensure its claimants are treated fairly going forward.”297
In my interview, the company seems to be frustrated with the lack
of knowledge of the RSA and changes in procedure. In my insurance
classes, when studying bad faith and ERISA law, we read about the Unum
cases but never read about the regulatory involvement; perhaps due to time
constraints. Unum is a great case study to show regulators working together
to reform an insurer into a fully compliant and better market actor. During
the RSA negotiations, Unum was advised that the standards provided in the
RSA would eventually be enforced nationally. Unfortunately, this is not
true, as is seen from the Good Morning America cases.298
V. MORE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT WILL ALLEVIATE
EGREGIOUS INSURER ACTIONS AND ENSURE COMPLIANCE
The kind of regulatory cooperation between states that occurred in
the Unum case is exactly what is needed at present to ensure beneficiaries
are protected from unscrupulous insurers. As discussed, ERISA fails to
provide the remedies to claimants when benefits are wrongly denied. As
the Supreme Court is unlikely to change its position on interpreting ERISA
and Congress is unlikely to amend ERISA, it is left to the state regulators to
295
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effect change and compliance. Per the savings clause, ERISA insurers are
still subject to compliance with state insurance laws. Thus, regulators must
strictly enforce the types of procedures required of Unum as to all ERISA
insurers, which will alleviate the need for money damages; as such
procedures and examinations will ensure compliance and result in
protection of beneficiaries. To this end, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) should assist in implementing this
change.
A. PURPOSE OF STATE DEPARTMENTS OF INSURANCE
Each state has a regulatory authority which oversees the insurance
industry transacting business in its state. They generally regulate insurer
activity and compliance with all state insurance laws and regulations, such
as licensing, policy form approval, rate approval, ensure adequate financial
conditions, receive consumer complaints and conduct market conduct
examinations to ensure compliance and fairness to consumers.299 These
departments exist primarily to ensure compliance with state laws and to
protect consumers. ERISA-insured plans are governed by these laws and
oversight by the state departments of insurance.
B. REGULATORY COOPERATION
BENEFICIARY PROTECTION

WILL

LEAD

TO

INCREASED

As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has held that ERISA
does not allow compensatory or consequential money damages beyond that
of the denied benefit. In Mass. Mutual v. Russell, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that an unreasonable delay in receipt of benefits does not warrant
consequential damages, or money damages, being paid to the beneficiary in
an individual capacity, as ERISA only envisioned the plan to receive such
damages.300 In Varity Corp., the Court held that an individual may recover

299

See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Ins., Purpose and Duties of the Connecticut
Insurance Department, CT.GOV, http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254384
(last visited July 4, 2010); State Insurance Regulation: History, Purpose and
Structure, NAIC, available at http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_s
tate_reg_brief.pdf (last visited July 4, 2010); Ind. Dep’t of Ins., Indiana
Department of Insurance, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/idoi/ (last visited July 4,
2010).
300
Russell, 473 U.S. at 144, 148.

2011

ERISA: REMEDIES, PREEMPTION

219

individually.301 In Pilot Life and Andrews-Clarke, the Court refused to
apply state bad faith statutes because they were not specific to the
insurance industry, no matter how egregious the misconduct by the
insurer.302 In Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, the Court refused to apply a state
insurance bad faith statute to the HMO, noting that although it was specific
to the insurance industry, an HMO’s mixed decision on treatment and
eligibility was not a fiduciary function, thus it could not be held liable for
any damage that occurred as a result.303 The Court instead suggested that
beneficiaries who were wrongly denied benefits pay for the services out of
their own pocket and then bring suit for enforcement.304 This statement by
the Court is completely out of touch with America and current economic
conditions. With unemployment at 10% and economic crisis abroad, what
average person, who relies on an employer-provided health plan, has the
wherewithal to single-handedly pay for medical services, which are
extremely expensive, out of their own pocket? As shown in the Good
Morning America cases, several of the beneficiaries who were denied
benefits were left with no income and often choose between paying the
mortgage, the utilities, or food for their family, never mind paying an
attorney to fight with the insurer over the denied benefits.305
As a result, there is only one authority left with the ability to
adequately regulate this industry and protect consumers: the state
departments of insurance. Not only is it their stated purpose as state
agencies, but it is sorely needed due to the lack of oversight elsewhere.
The Unum example demonstrates that regulators are able to cooperate and
work together to implement fair practices and procedures and oversee
compliance. The state departments of insurance simply need to enact the
same practices and procedures from the RSA in each state, and even on a
national level, to ensure beneficiaries everywhere are protected from
insurer opportunism.

301

See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2011); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510

(1996).
302

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987); Andrews-Clarke v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 55-56 (D. Mass. 1997).
303
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 212 (2004).
304
Id. at 211.
305
Cuomo & Wagschal, supra note 145.

220

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

VI. CONCLUSION
The current regime of insurer regulation in the ERISA context is in
danger of harming beneficiaries due to the lack of motivation by insurers to
be fair and to strictly comply with state claims practices laws. To combat
this inequity, I propose that the state departments of insurance intercede
and enforce strict regulatory oversight of such insurers, as was done in the
Unum situation. There, the state departments of insurance collaborated and
implemented practices and procedures for Unum to adopt and use in its
claims handling. As a result, Unum has drastically changed in its claims
practices and is arguable a model for the industry in terms of its customer
service of claimants. These practices and procedures are not nationally
enforced. If such practices and procedures were enforced, it would
admittedly serve as an added expense on insurers. However, these practices
and procedures would more effectively regulate this area, thereby leading
to fairness in claims handling, and ultimately protecting beneficiaries the
entire goal behind ERISA. If strict regulation is in force, then beneficiaries
would not need to resort to additional remedies, as the insurers would fear
large penalties from state department of insurance for noncompliance. This
fear, along with reputation damage, would keep ERISA insurers in line.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS, ACTUARIAL LITIGATION:
HOW STATISTICS CAN HELP RESOLVE
BIG CASES
KENNETH R. FEINBERG
Thank you very much. The Dean said I’m a skilled mediator. As
long as he didn’t say I’m a model mediator. A couple of months ago,
somebody introduced me as a model mediator, and a critic stood up and
said, “Model in Webster’s Dictionary; a small replica of the real thing.” I
want to thank the Dean for mentioning my book, What is Life Worth. Now
you may have trouble finding that book today in Barnes & Noble or on
Amazon.com. Don’t worry, my personal supply of my book is virtually
inexhaustible.
It’s a real pleasure for me to be here today. There was no way I was
turning down an opportunity to be here today and partake in a small part of
[this symposium]. It is true, as the Dean pointed out, that for various
reasons, which you can read in my book, I got involved in some of these
public law challenges over the last twenty-five years starting with Judge
Weinstein, Agent Orange, 9/11, Virginia Tech, the Pay Czar (which I think
is a very unfortunate characterization of my role, Pay Czar).
[L]et me make a few comments about all of these assignments.
First, these special funds that are set up, like the one I’m doing now, with
BP, are very, very rare and they should be very rare. I’m asked all the time
[whether these funds], like the 9/11 fund, the Agent Orange fund, the
Virginia Tech fund, [are] “an alternative to the conventional way of
resolving disputes, the wave of the future?” Absolutely not. They are not
the wave of the future, they should not be the wave of the future, and even
if you wanted them to be replicated, it won’t happen. I mean I do these
every six years when some tragedy befalls the country. There are
variations; you heard . . . others talking about bankruptcy and mass
settlements. Those are cousins to what I do. I’m engaged with a design and
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal Symposium, Actuarial Litigation: How
Statistics Can Help Resolve Big Cases, April 15, 2011, Hartford, CT.
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an implementation and an administration that’s very, very different from
those in terms of its lack of checks and balances, in terms of its delegation,
and in terms of its function.
What I do is really out of the box. It is a precedent to nothing and
this BP thing is a wonderful idea of why it’s a precedent for nothing.
Within thirty days after the deep-water explosion, the administration sits
down with BP; no statute, no judicial oversight, no regulation, [no]
administration, no checks and balances in the form of senate confirmation
or me or anybody like me, and they shake hands and BP announces to the
world, “We have decided to put up twenty billion dollars.” Now how many
times can you think of a company, or an admitted wrongdoer, who decides
that it’s in our interest and it’s in the public interest [to] fund twenty billion
dollars?
[After] 9/11, Congress passed a law to set up a special fund.
Congress didn’t appropriate one dollar for that fund. Congress just said,
“Whatever it costs, Feinberg, pay it out of petty cash from the US
Treasury.” No appropriation, pay whatever it takes to get the job done.
[With the] Agent Orange [fund], under the auspices of Judge Weinstein, . .
. eight chemical companies . . . decided to settle a class action . . . put up
one hundred eighty million dollars with interest, which over ten years will
grow to about two hundred fifty million dollars. That’s when interest
mattered . . . .
These programs – ask yourself a very practical question when you
think about these special programs. Who is funding these programs? Who
is going to fund them? If you don’t have a deep pocket willing to cut the
check; even if you had a deep pocket, as a philosophic matter, these
programs are so alien to the conventional way we resolve disputes that
even if you come up with some sort of law review article that’s going to
point out how these programs can be expanded and made more pervasive
along the legal spectrum; I don’t think you’ll get much support for it.
The conventional adversarial litigation system is so engrained in
the fabric of this country. It’s such a part of our history, our heritage; you
may nibble at the edges, but you’re not going to change that system. . . .
There is a problem with any profession. There’s a problem with the
adversary system, but when you talk about wholesale changes, here’s an
alternative way to do it. Unless that alternative way is grounded in history
as an alternative – and there are some examples, workers’ compensation,
the most obvious – unless you’re going to have a real historical basis for
making radical change, these programs that I’ve administered over the past
twenty-five years should be viewed as aberrations, as one-offs.
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Now people . . . may look at the way these programs are
administered and designed and you may say, “You know, we can take a
little of this and get a little of that.” That’s fine, but any idea that, “Well we
did it for BP, we did it for 9/11, let’s do it for asbestos, or let’s do it for
pharmaceuticals or let’s do it for chemicals,” it isn’t going to happen.
That’s why you really need . . . these people . . within the design mold of
mass aggregation and mass ligation, class actions; a discussion of that,
that’s where I think you’re going to likely see some change. That’s where
you may see some change, not what I do, which is really an aberration and
a sideshow.
Philosophically, you see, there are real problems with what I do.
Now take 9/11; the 9/11 Victim Compensation. . . . It was not a mistake.
The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund was absolutely the right thing to do
and I’ve been defending it since it was passed by Congress, signed by the
President and we implemented it. It was successful and it was the right
thing to do, but they’ll never do it again. They will never do it again, not
the way it was done in 2001 by Congress where it delegated to one person
the authority to design and administer a program that by statute gave
everybody a different amount of money in order to buy them out – to
attract them out of a tort system. And even though I’ll defend the 9/11
Program, it is a very, very close question. Philosophically, it raises
tremendous issues in a free society. There was no 9/11 Fund for the victims
of Katrina. You should have read some of the emails that I got when I was
administering that fund.
“Dear Mr. Feinberg, my son died in Oklahoma City, where’s my
check?” “Dear Mr. Feinberg, I don’t get it. My daughter died in the
basement of the World Trade Center in the original 1993 attacks committed
by the very same people, how come I’m not eligible by a check?” And it
didn’t end with terrorism. “Dear Mr. Feinberg, explain something to me.
Last year my wife saved three little girls from drowning in the Mississippi
River and then she drowned a heroine. Where’s my check?”
It’s very, very difficult to justify public money, yet tax payer
money one hundred percent to some people who are victims of life’s
misfortunate. Nobody else is getting a check, and even though I think it
could be justified with 9/11 and it was the right thing to do, it’s not by
trying to explain away differences among victims – I can’t do that. Maybe
you can, but from the perspective of the country, it was the right thing to
do, not from the perspective of the victims. The country wanted to do it.
The country wanted to show its community and cohesiveness with the
victims. Fine, from the country’s perspective, but very, very difficult issues
get raised. Then to delegate to one person – I mean I’m getting hammered
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now with BP and with the anniversary coming up next week – hammered.
One person is making these decisions.
Now there are differences obviously with all of these programs.
The problem in BP is the sheer volume paid. I’ve received, in nine months,
eight hundred thousand claims. You know, its human nature. BP announces
to the world, “Twenty billion. We’re going to make you whole.” Well, I’m
a dentist, are they going to make me whole? I’m a veterinarian, a
chiropractor, why shouldn’t I file a claim? Proximate cause, what is that?
That’s something taught maybe at Connecticut Law School, but what that
have to do with me? But for causation is what I’m interested in. But for the
skill and human nature being what it is, every financial ill-eye suffers
because of that bill. It’s in good faith and you’re not going to convince
people otherwise. So in nine months, we have distributed to two hundred
thousand people, four billion dollars. In nine months, and you still get
criticized.
So these programs raise important issues, philosophical, political,
etcetera. . . . How do you decide what a person ought to get paid, whether
it’s in tort or [when] Congress passes a law that says, “Pay Czar.” How do
you decide what a corporate official at CitiGroup should get paid? How do
you decide compensation? How do you decide it?
Now the first thing you find out is when you read the statutes or the
rules or the compact or the escrow agreement; that gives you some
guidance as to how you’re going to go about compensating. Notice that in
these cases, they largely involve death, physical injury. Pay Czar is
financial compensation outside the tort system and BP is largely – not
exclusively but largely – old fashioned economic loss: financial wage loss,
income loss arising out of the spill. [There’s] very, very little actuarial
work [involved], very little. First of all, you basically have an unlimited
budget in a lot of these, you see, so there’s no actuarial requirement in
terms of trying to allocate limited resources, thank goodness. One of the
biggest problems that I confront in my work is when Peter thinks I’m
nickel and diming him in order to pay Paul out of a limited fund, you see.
So the more money I have, the more I’m able to deflect arguments like that.
Most of the work in defining compensation depends on the statute
and the nature of the cohort of people you’re trying to help. In 9/11, the
overwhelming compensation went to death. We paid about three thousand
people something like six billion dollars. . . . Notwithstanding the title of
my book, What is Life Worth, I like the title because it sells books, but it is
a little bit of a misnomer . . . because we’re not placing value in 9/11 on the
moral integrity of any person. I’m doing what judges and juries do in
Connecticut every day. . . . What is the economic loss suffered by the
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victim? How old was he? How long would he have worked? What does the
census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics tell us about what a secretary
makes in the World Trade Center? Male or female? How many
dependents?
Put aside the administrative law problem of having one person do it
and delegate to one person, it is basically rather common, if you want to
know the truth. What I do in all of these assignments is not rocket science.
The people in this room could do exactly what I do, exactly. This is not
something where I have a magic bullet here. I do what judges and juries do
every day. In BP, but for the difficult problem, shall we say, of people not
paying their taxes so that it’s hard to prove the claim, it’s rather
straightforward. What did you earn before the spill? What did you earn
after the spill? How do you tie the difference to the spill?
I mean I’ve got claims from fifty states, from fifty states. “Mr.
Feinberg, we served the best shrimp scampi in Hartford. Now we can’t get
shrimp from the Gulf and we’ve lost ten percent of our clientele base.”
“Well proximate cause. . .” “What? What does that mean? Pay me. You’ve
got twenty billion dollars.”
One final point . . . . One thing that I’m not involved in, in any of
these cases, is insurance, contribution, subrogation – not on my watch.
Thank goodness. Here’s a claimant. Pay the claimant or don’t pay the
claimant. “Well, there are offsets from insurance.” . . . “There’s an
indemnity agreement that BP has with Transocean and with Halliburton.” I
don’t want to hear about it. That’s not what I’m not here for. I’m here to
pay the claimant and get a release. Corral the claims and pay the people.
Now if BP and Transocean have contributions, indemnity agreements,
offsets, insurance, it’s not my problem. My problem is to pay the claim.
Whatever else is going to happen is going to happen, but not on my watch.
Otherwise, I’m already bogged down with eight hundred thousand claims.
People want their money, you see. . . . there have been two hundred seventy
thousand claims filed since November 23rd, and about seventy percent of
them have been processed. Not all paid, but processed.
So that’s sort of what I’m doing, and why I thought . . . this [was]
the right crowd to [consider] the ramifications of what I do or what our
cousins do in the mass tort system and . . . aggregative statistics and
aggregative law.

A NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF ACTUARIAL
LITIGATION
ROBERT G. BONE*
***
This Article addresses the normative issues raised by the use of
statistical sampling to adjudicate large case aggregations. In its recent
decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court referred to
sampling pejoratively as “Trial by Formula.” This Article argues that the
pejorative label is undeserved. In fact, sampling can be justified in many
more situations than courts currently apply it, and society is paying a very
high price for limiting its use. I explored some of the normative issues in an
earlier publication, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a
World of Process Scarcity, and the current Article expands on my earlier
analysis in four respects. First, it analyzes the effect of sampling on
settlement and discusses in more detail the problem of frivolous and weak
filings. Sampling tends to reduce the likelihood of settlement and also
provides cover for undesirable lawsuits. However, while both of these
effects must be considered in any efficiency analysis, neither is likely to tip
the cost-benefit balance against the use of sampling in large enough case
aggregations. Second, this Article evaluates sampling in the context of an
outcome-oriented rights-based theory. In this connection, the most serious
problem is that sampling gives high value plaintiffs only an average
recovery. Statistical Adjudication discussed this topic as well, but the
current Article generalizes the analysis in a useful way. Third, the Article
offers some further thoughts about process-based participation and the
day-in-court right based on work that post-dates Statistical Adjudication.
Fourth, the Article explores another possible objection to sampling that
Statistical Adjudication did not address. This objection, which I call the
“methodological legitimacy objection,” is distinct from adverse effects on
outcome and limitations on individual participation. It rests ultimately on
the assumption that adjudication at its core involves reasoned deliberation
that engages the facts of particular cases. The problem with sampling from
this perspective is that it substitutes a formulaic method for fact-sensitive
reasoning. This Article shows that while the methodological legitimacy
objection has some intuitive appeal, it is very difficult to sustain in a
rigorous way.
***
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INTRODUCTION

Statistical methods pervade the law and litigation. Sometimes the
substantive law adopts an explicitly probabilistic standard suitable for
evaluation by statistical techniques. One example is the likelihood of
confusion requirement for trademark infringement, which calls on the court
to estimate the probability that an ordinary consumer will be confused.1
Sometimes the substantive law adopts a standard that, while not explicitly
probabilistic on its face, nevertheless authorizes statistical methods. An
example is the discrimination element of a disparate impact Title VII claim,
which sometimes involves a statistical analysis to determine the existence
and magnitude of differential effects.2 Indeed, constitutional civil rights
claims based on the Equal Protection Clause often depend on statistical
evidence insofar as liability turns on a comparison of the challenged
conduct to statistical features of a larger population.
Statistical methods are used even more frequently to generate
evidence to prove a claim. Sometimes a legal standard that is not inherently
linked to statistical properties of a phenomenon is nevertheless most easily
proved statistically. For example, liability might turn on acts of the
defendant reflected in written records too numerous to examine
individually. In such a case, the plaintiff might rely on a sample to draw
inferences about liability.3 For another example, statistical models are often
used to estimate damages in antitrust and other complex cases where losses

* G. Rollie White Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
A draft of this paper was presented to the Actuarial Litigation Conference at the
University of Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful to the conference
participants for useful comments and insights and to my anonymous peer reviewer
for excellent suggestions that improved the article.
1

See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1 et seq. (4th ed. 1996). Courts use a multi-factor test
to infer likelihood of confusion from factors such as the strength of the mark, the
similarity of the marks, and the proximity of the products, but any inference is
probabilistic and necessarily refers to statistical properties of the relevant consumer
population. See id. § 23:19.
2
See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 79-89 (3d ed. 2010).
3
See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.493 (4th ed. 2004).

2011

A NORMATIVE EVALUATION

229

must be measured relative to a counter-factual baseline that cannot be
easily reconstructed using non-statistical techniques.4
In fact, the law is bound up with statistical generalization at a very
deep level. Any general rule reflects statistical generalizations about a large
population of regulated phenomena, whether the generalization is done
through the use of formal methods or through informal guesses or even
rough political compromise. For example, the general rule that drivers must
not exceed fifty miles per hour on a stretch of roadway is based on
estimates of the average risk of harm at speeds in excess of fifty miles per
hour. Thus, when the speed limit is applied to an individual driver, the
driver’s liability is evaluated not by the risk that she actually created, but
rather by the average risk aggregated over all drivers in all possible
situations.
This brief account might lead one to conclude that statistical
methods fit litigation smoothly.5 But as we know, the use of statistics is
controversial. Perhaps the most controversial yet important application is
the use of sampling to adjudicate mass tort or other large-damage cases by
extrapolating from sample outcomes. Whether the extrapolation involves
simple averaging or more complex regression techniques, the result is the
same. Very often some cases receive outcomes that differ systematically
from the outcomes those cases would have received if they had been tried
individually.
Despite the problems, however, there are well-known cases in
which courts have used sampling to determine damages and sometimes
liability as well. In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,6 for example, the Ninth
Circuit approved the use of sampling to award compensatory damages in
9,541 consolidated cases.7 On the advice of a statistical expert, the district
judge randomly selected a sample of 137 cases and used the sample cases

4

Another example is calculating backpay for class members in an
employment discrimination case involving discriminatory hiring and promotion.
See Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258-63 (5th Cir. 1974). The
court must somehow imagine what would have happened to each class member
had there been no discrimination. This is such a complex polycentric problem that
there is no other feasible method to do it than to use statistical models.
5
In his paper Probability Sampling in Litigation and his presentation to the
Actuarial Litigation Conference, Professor Joseph Kadane gave more examples of
the use of statistics in litigation.
6
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
7
Id. at 782.
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to generate a total compensatory damage award for the entire group.8
Perhaps the most famous sampling case is Cimino v. Raymark Industries,
Inc.,9 in which Judge Parker, plagued by an onslaught of asbestos litigation,
employed sampling to determine individual damages in 2,298 consolidated
asbestos cases.10 He constructed a stratified sample of 160 cases, tried the
sample cases, and gave the sample mean to all the other cases in the
aggregation.11 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Judge Parker’s use
of sampling infringed the Seventh Amendment jury trial right and
impermissibly altered state substantive law in violation of Erie’s dictates.12
But this case still stands as a dramatic reminder of what might still be
possible in some circumstances.
Most recently, an en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
following Hilao, gave a favorable nod to the use of sampling to determine
back pay for class members in a massive and highly publicized Title VII
class action, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.13 The court did so over WalMart’s objection that Title VII gave it individualized defenses that could
only be adjudicated in individual suits.14 The Supreme Court reversed. The
Court objected to the sampling procedure—calling it “Trial by Formula”—
on the ground that sampling impaired Wal-Mart’s entitlement to “litigate
its statutory defenses to individual claims” and thus violated the Rules
Enabling Act.15 Even so, there is still room left for sampling in future cases.
It is not clear how far the Court’s objection extends, and in any event, its
Rules Enabling Act rationale does not apply to sampling that is
legislatively authorized.
8

See id. The district court did not simply apply the sample average. Instead, a
special master made damage recommendations for different injury subgroups by
relying on the results of discovery in the sample cases. Then a jury heard testimony
on the sampling procedure and special master’s recommendations with freedom to
reject, accept, or modify the results.
9
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
10
Id. at 653.
11
Id.
12
Cimino, 151 F.3d 297, 320-21.
13
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 625-28 (9th Cir. 2010); see
id. at 627 n.56 (noting that the invalid claim rate for the sample could be applied to
the entire aggregation). Any sampling would take place, however, only after the
plaintiffs succeeded in proving company-wide discrimination and thus prima facie
liability. See id. at 643.
14
See id. at 624-25.
15
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
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This Article, prepared for the Actuarial Litigation Conference held
at the University of Connecticut School of Law, addresses the normative
questions raised by these and other controversial uses of sampling.16 In
addressing these questions, it is important to distinguish between an
outcome quality metric and a process-based participation metric. An
outcome metric focuses on the quality of the judgments and settlements
that sampling produces. Evaluation of outcomes in turn depends on
whether one takes a utilitarian or a rights-based approach. The utilitarian
evaluates outcome quality in terms of aggregate social benefits and costs.
The rights-based proponent evaluates outcome quality in terms of how
effectively parties’ rights are enforced.
By contrast, a process-based evaluation ignores outcome effects
altogether and focuses instead on the intrinsic value of participation.
According to the United States Supreme Court, each individual has a due
process right to her own personal “day in court”; that is, her own
opportunity to control litigation that binds her.17 If this day-in-court right
guarantees individual participation in all cases, it poses a serious obstacle
to sampling, since sampling imposes outcomes on parties without giving
them an opportunity to litigate their own suits. However, the day-in-court
right is not absolute. The question then is what reasons for using sampling
justify limiting party participation opportunities consistent with a processbased approach.
I explored these normative questions in a previous article,
Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process
Scarcity (which I shall refer to as Statistical Adjudication for short).18 I
summarize the main points of that earlier article here and extend its
analysis in four respects. First, I analyze the effect of sampling on
settlement and discuss in more detail the problem of frivolous and weak
16

The Actuarial Litigation Conference was held on April 15, 2011, and it
focused on the use of sampling to litigate mass tort cases in the form of class
actions or large-scale, non-class aggregations. For another discussion of the
normative issues, see Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula”, TEX.
L. REV. (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i
d=1945514 (arguing that sampling better achieves equal treatment among litigants
and greater transparency of outcomes). See also Alexandra D. Lahav, Rough
Justice, 1, 30 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562677.
17
See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008).
18
Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993) [hereinafter Bone,
Statistical Adjudication].
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filings. I ignored settlement effects in Statistical Adjudication and only
touched on the frivolous suit problem. Both points deserve more extensive
treatment. Second, I expand in this Article on the implications of an
outcome-oriented rights-based theory for sampling. I discussed this topic in
Statistical Adjudication, but the following discussion generalizes that
analysis in a useful way. Third, I offer some further thoughts about
process-based participation and the day-in-court right based on my more
recent work.
The fourth extension deals with a possible objection to sampling
that I did not discuss in Statistical Adjudication. This objection is distinct
from adverse effects on outcome and limitations on individual
participation. Simply put, it insists that sampling is incompatible with what
adjudication is supposed to do. I believe that this objection rests ultimately
on an assumption that adjudication at its core involves reasoned
deliberation that engages the facts of particular cases. The problem with
sampling from this perspective is that it substitutes a formulaic method for
case-specific and fact-sensitive reasoning.
I shall refer to this objection as the “methodological legitimacy
objection” to highlight its focus on legitimacy and its assumption that
legitimacy has to do with the method of decision making rather than the
quality of outcomes or the degree of participation. In theory, the
methodological legitimacy objection retains whatever force it has even if
there is no reason to worry about externalities, party participation is
adequate, and litigation costs are reduced. In practice, however, it is likely
to operate, when it does, behind the scenes, as a factor influencing
decisions to reject sampling on other grounds. For example, the Wal-Mart
Court might have had something like this concern in mind when it went out
of its way to characterize sampling pejoratively as “Trial by Formula.”19
In any event, the methodological legitimacy objection has sufficient
plausibility and superficial appeal to warrant separate discussion even if it
is difficult to tell when it is being invoked. As we shall see, the objection is
very difficult to sustain in a rigorous way.
The body of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I frames the
problem more precisely. Part II focuses on outcome effects with special
attention to settlement and frivolous and weak lawsuits. Part III focuses on
process-based participation and adds some further thoughts on the day-incourt right. Finally, Part IV discusses the methodological legitimacy
objection. Throughout, I mean to consider applications of sampling to
19

See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
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determine damages, liability, or both. To be sure, there are special
problems with applying sampling to determine liability and much of what I
say fits damage sampling better than liability sampling. But liability
sampling has been done in the past and might be done more often in the
future if process scarcity becomes an even more pressing concern.20
II.

FRAMING THE PROBLEM MORE PRECISELY

Sampling runs the risk of distorting outcomes relative to individual
trials and substantive entitlements, deprives parties of participation
opportunities, and calls for a decision-making method that might be at odds
with the usual case-specific reasoned deliberation associated with
adjudication. On the positive side, sampling saves litigation resources,
helps to equalize litigating power across the party line, and improves real
recovery for plaintiffs trapped in a lengthy litigation queue. Parts II, III, and
IV explore the normative tradeoff.
Before doing so, however, it is important to clarify the precise
nature of sampling’s effect on outcome and the normative problem
sampling creates from an outcome quality perspective. Some commentators
claim that sampling produces more accurate outcomes than individual trials
in many situations.21 The truth, however, is not nearly as rosy as these
claims suggest.
To see why, let us compare the result from an individual trial of a
tort case with the result for the same case when it is part of a mass tort
aggregation subject to sampling. There is, of course, an error risk
associated with an individual trial. Suppose the same case is tried over and
over again. If the defendant is in fact liable and juries are reasonably
reliable, we would expect most, but not all, of the trials to end in plaintiff
verdicts. Moreover, the distribution of damage awards, with the incorrect
defendant verdicts counted as zero, should roughly resemble a bell-shaped
curve (i.e., a normal distribution) with a possible spike at zero. The mean of
this distribution will closely approximate the expected trial outcome, and
the mean of the distribution without the zero awards will closely

20

For more on sampling to determine liability elements, see Laurens Walker
& John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329 (1999).
21
See, e.g., Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44
STAN. L. REV. 815, 851 (1992).
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approximate true damages.22 In addition, the standard deviation of the
distribution – that is, the spread around the mean – measures the error risk
from an individual trial. Let us call this distribution the “individualized
error distribution,” or IED for short.
Now assume instead that the case is part of an aggregation of 1000
mass tort cases. Suppose 10% (100 cases) are sampled and tried and that
the average of the sample verdicts is calculated (with defendant verdicts
assigned a value of zero). Imagine that we repeat this process over and over
again. Each time we sample 100 cases randomly, try each of the 100 cases,
and calculate the sample average. Not all the samples will be the same, of
course, and the sample averages for the different rounds will vary a bit.
Nevertheless, if we graph all the sample averages for all the rounds, they
should form a bell-shaped (normal) distribution. Let us call the distribution
of sample averages the “sample average distribution,” or SAD for short.
The mean of SAD with the erroneous zero verdicts closely
approximates the average expected trial outcome for all the 1000 cases in
the aggregation, and the mean of SAD without the zero verdicts closely
approximates the average true damages for all cases. Moreover, according
to basic statistical theory, the standard deviation of SAD should be small
and it should get smaller as the sample size increases. In other words, the
sample averages cluster rather tightly about the mean and they cluster ever
more tightly with increasing sample size.23 This means that sampling gives
a very good estimate of damages for the average case. But it also means
that sampling gives a rather poor estimate of damages for those cases that
deviate substantially from the average.

22

For example, assume that the defendant caused $100,000 in damages and
that the case is tried 100 times. Suppose that there is a 10% risk of error in
determining liability, so 90 of the trials yield plaintiff verdicts and 10 yield
defendant verdicts. Also, suppose that of the 90 plaintiff verdicts, 25 are for
$50,000, 25 are for $150,000, and 40 are for $100,000. The mean of the entire
distribution, including the 10 defendant verdicts, each counted as zero, is $90,000,
which is the same as the expected trial verdict when the probability of error in
determining liability is 0.1 (i.e., likelihood of proving liability (0.9) x the expected
damage amount if liability is proved (100,000) = $90,000). Considering only the
distribution of the 90 plaintiff verdicts, the mean is $100,000, which is the true
damage amount for the case.
23
For a discussion of this and other statistical properties of the sample
average, see RICHARD J. LARSEN & MORRIS L. MARX, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2d ed.1986).
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To be more precise, if the cases in the aggregation do not vary
much in salient characteristics (i.e., the aggregation is strongly
homogenous), then all the cases closely resemble the average case and as a
result the sample average is a very good approximation for every case.
Moreover, if the error risk associated with an individual trial for each case
is high (i.e., the standard deviation of the IED is large enough), then an
individual trial does a relatively poor job of accurately determining case
outcomes. With sampling doing a good job and individual trials doing a
poor job, it is easy to see that sampling can produce a more accurate
outcome than an individual trial for each case.
This is what the proponents of sampling are keen to point out—
and it is a very important observation, one not clearly understood by judges
and lawyers. The problem, however, is that this happy result breaks down
when the aggregation is heterogeneous or the error risk associated with an
individual trial is relatively small, or both.24 Indeed, it does not take much
heterogeneity before the sample average gives an estimate that is inferior to
an individual trial for at least one case in the aggregation.25 Whether this is
a normative problem depends on one’s theory of adjudication. As Part II.B
explains, a utilitarian theory can accommodate a good deal of
heterogeneity, but a rights-based theory is less forgiving.
The degree of population heterogeneity and the magnitude of the
error risk for individual trials are both empirical questions, and there might
be reasons to believe that the former is small and the latter large for some
case aggregations. However, there are some, and perhaps many,
aggregations for which this will not hold true. Even worse, judges will
often find it difficult to determine which aggregations meet the

24

For a more detailed explanation and an example, see Bone, Statistical
Adjudication, supra note 18, at 577-87.
25
The intuition is easy to grasp. When we take a sample, we know that the
sample average is very likely to be close to the value of the average case for the
population as a whole. This follows directly from the statistical property of the
SAD mentioned in the text. Consider a case located at an extreme of the
distribution of cases in the aggregation. This case will have a value much higher,
or much lower, than the average case and thus the sample average. As long as
judges and juries do a reasonably good job of deciding cases accurately on average
and make only random errors that are not systematically skewed to one side, it
follows easily that an individual trial is likely to come closer to the true outcome
for the extreme case than the much lower (higher) sample average.
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homogeneity and error risk conditions and which do not.26 Assessing the
relevant variables requires specific information about how individual cases
vary over the aggregation and how much error individual trials create.27
This case-specific information is costly to obtain, and those costs are
precisely what sampling is meant to avoid.28
In sum, my point is that the mean of the IED (which is the
expected outcome from an individual trial) for at least some cases is likely
to differ from the mean of the SAD (which is the expected outcome in the
same case if sample averaging is used). The same is true, although in a bit
more complicated way, for more sophisticated regression techniques.29
These points distinguish the use of statistical methods to adjudicate
case aggregations from the more accepted uses of statistics in litigation
mentioned in the Introduction. Using sampling to extrapolate case
outcomes from sample cases is not expressly authorized by any substantive
law of which I am aware. Nor is it strictly necessary in the same strong way
that statistical models are necessary to construct the counterfactual world
for determining damages in complex antitrust cases. Calculating damages
in an individual tort suit is a much more straightforward process than
reconstructing what the market would have looked like without an illegal
antitrust conspiracy or unlawful attempt to monopolize.
It is important to be clear about this last point. Sometimes
advocates of sampling point to the impossibility of adjudicating individual
cases for an extremely large population, such as hundreds of thousands of
asbestos cases or the more than one million individual Title VII suits that
were aggregated in the Dukes v. Wal-Mart class action. This way of
26

This point raises an important question. What level of confidence in the
degree of homogeneity and the error risk in individual trials should be required
before sampling is justified? Suppose a judge is convinced that it is more likely
than not that the aggregation is sufficiently homogenous so that the sample average
will yield a more accurate result for each case than an individual trial. Should this
be enough, or should something less than preponderance suffice?
27
For example, some cases in a mass tort aggregation will be weaker on
liability elements than others (such as a smoker who has trouble proving specific
causation); some cases will have weaker evidence to support legal requirements for
obtaining damages, and some cases will have more serious injuries than others
(such as cancer versus benign abnormalities).
28
Stratified sampling can reduce these problems. However, one must still
know a good deal about the population of cases to form sufficiently homogenous
subgroups for a stratified sample.
29
See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 584-87.
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framing the argument has rhetorical force, but it is incorrect. The fact is
that individual litigation is not technically impossible.30 Simply set up a
queue and proceed. Matters are very different for the complex antitrust
case. Calculating damages in a way that bears any reasonable relationship
to those actually suffered is analytically impossible without using a
statistical model. But it is not analytically impossible to litigate each mass
tort or Title VII case individually. It might take hundreds of years to do it
(although these kinds of numbers are usually hyperbolic given the
inevitability of settlement), but in theory it can be done.
This is an important point because it highlights the respect in which
sampling can force plaintiffs who have superior litigating advantages, such
as better lawyers, better cases, or simply a better position in the litigation
queue, to forego those advantages and accept average outcomes
significantly less than the actual value of their cases. To be sure, some of
these advantages are a matter of luck and not properly the subject of a
moral claim. I shall discuss this point later when I examine the rights-based
arguments against sampling.31 For now, the important point is that the
normative issues must be squarely addressed in the sampling context; they
cannot be dodged simply by arguing that there is no other way to provide
relief to anyone. By contrast, in the antitrust case, no plaintiff can complain
that she would have done better without the statistical approach, because
the statistical approach is analytically essential to provide her with any
meaningful relief at all.
None of this means, of course, that there are no good reasons to use
statistical methods to adjudicate mass tort or other large-scale case
aggregations. For one thing, individual trials generate unacceptably high
costs in a world of scarce judicial resources.32 Moreover, separate trials
generate delay costs for plaintiffs late in the litigation queue and those costs
30

The pure epidemiological mass tort suit might be an exception. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 215-20
(using Vioxx as an example of an “epidemiological mass tort” in which individual
recovery is impossible because drug use leaves no trace of evidence to prove
individualized causation, even though epidemiological studies confirm a
correlation between use and injury). Professor Issacharoff argued at the Actuarial
Litigation Conference that the only hope for recovery in these cases is to aggregate
all the individual suits and use epidemiological statistics to generate an aggregate
damage award. For more on this example, see infra note 67.
31
See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
32
This is, of course, due in large part to very restrictive nonparty preclusion
rules. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 882-83 (2008).
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can substantially erode the real value of any recovery. This dim prospect
creates strong pressure to settle early and on terms favorable to the
defendant. Sampling removes this type of unfairness. In addition, statistical
methods facilitate aggregate litigation, which helps to equalize litigating
power across the party line and produce settlements and trial outcomes
closer to the substantive law ideal.33
These are very weighty reasons. The question, however, is whether
reasons like these can justify imposing on some parties statistically
generated outcomes that are likely to deviate systematically from their
substantive entitlements and from the results of individual trials. In
analyzing this question, one should distinguish between consensual and
nonconsensual use of sampling and between use to extrapolate final
judgments and use to facilitate voluntary settlements.34
This Article focuses on nonconsensual sampling used to impose
final judgments. This is the most controversial application because it is
supported neither by consent to sampling itself nor by consent to the
settlements that sampling facilitates. Thus, it is the most difficult to justify.
Moreover, it is also the most important application. It turns out that
justifying nonconsensual use is critical to justifying sampling more
generally because many of the uses that seem consensual are on closer
inspection less consensual than they first appear.
Let me explain this last point a bit more clearly. In large case
aggregations, individual plaintiffs are not likely to be the ones who give
consent. The attorney usually decides whether to agree to sampling and
whether to settle, and in a world of high agency costs typical of mass tort
aggregations, attorneys cannot always be trusted to represent the interests
33

Roughly, by aggregating separate claims into a single lawsuit, plaintiffs
achieve economies of scale and incentivize their attorney to invest more than she
would in an individual suit and at a level that is closer to what the defendant is
likely to invest.
34
Judges sometimes try a sample of cases from a large aggregation not to
impose final judgments, but rather to generate a common baseline of trial verdicts
from which parties can estimate the value of their own cases for settlement
purposes. Because parties use the sample verdicts as a common baseline, their
respective valuations are likely to converge, which makes settlement more likely.
Moreover, the randomness of the sample helps to reduce the variance of party
estimates, and the judge can reduce variance even further by increasing the sample
size (although this also increases costs). For a useful discussion of the benefits of
sampling to facilitate settlement in large case aggregations, see Alexandra D.
Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008).
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of plaintiffs faithfully.35 Given that lawyer-client incentives diverge, one
should question the extent to which party consent actually legitimates
sampling.
There is another reason to question consent in the sampling
context. Any consent is likely to be thin. To see why, start with the premise
that a party will agree to sampling whenever she expects a better outcome
from sampling than from an individual trial. It follows that if delay costs
are high enough with a long litigation queue so that the expected value of a
trial outcome in the plaintiff’s case is virtually zero, a plaintiff should be
willing to accept virtually any kind of sampling procedure. But then
consent is not meaningful because the plaintiff’s choices are radically
limited. Sampling might still be justified—and I shall argue in Parts II and
III that it is—but it must be justified without relying on consent.
Thus, it is critical to justify nonconsensual use of sampling. As the
basis for consent weakens, the need for an independent justification grows
stronger, and any independent justification of sampling must include
nonconsensual use. There are also other reasons to put nonconsensual use
center stage. Parties are not always able to settle even with the benefit of a
judicially created baseline, and the settlement process creates transaction
costs that could be avoided if the judge were simply to give all parties the
average or regression result. So there are efficiency advantages to coercive
imposition as well.
III.

AN OUTCOME-BASED ANALYSIS

Thus, the question is: When and why can courts use sampling to
generate final judgments that are imposed on parties without their consent?
The following discussion analyzes this question. It first summarizes the
likely effects of sampling on trial judgments and settlements, and then
reviews the normative arguments from utilitarian and rights-based
perspectives.

35

Both class actions and non-class aggregations are plagued by agency
problems. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and
Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50
DUKE L.J. 381, 464-65 (2000); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1377, 1390-91 (2000).
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A. LIKELY OUTCOME EFFECTS
1. Litigated Judgments
Statistical Adjudication made three main points about the effect of
sampling on litigated judgments.36 First, the sample average can deviate
from a trial judgment for at least one and possibly many cases in the
aggregation depending on the degree of heterogeneity. This is the same
point as the one developed in Part I above. Second, it is possible to reduce
this risk by adjusting the sampling procedure and using regression rather
than sample averaging, but these refinements require information about the
population of individual cases, which is costly to obtain. Third, sample
averaging distorts litigation investment incentives by introducing a new
source of free rider and externality problems.
As to the third point, the precise nature of the distortion depends on
four factors: (1) whether the sample cases receive the sample average or
their own trial verdicts; (2) whether the trial costs in the sample cases are
spread over all cases in the population or left for the parties in the sample
cases to bear; (3) the pattern of multiple representation of plaintiffs, and (4)
the severity of agency problems in a large case aggregation with
contingency fees.37 Some combinations of these factors skew litigation
investment incentives and results in the defendant’s favor.38 Other
combinations skew incentives and results in the plaintiffs’ favor. Statistical
Adjudication proposed ways to mitigate these adverse effects.39
In short, sampling can alter outcomes relative to litigated
judgments in individual trials, and can do so in ways that for some and
perhaps many cases deviate systematically from what the parties’
substantive entitlements require. But sampling also produces benefits for
many parties and for society at large by reducing cost, risk, and delay.
How one strikes the balance depends on whether one takes a utilitarian or a
rights-based perspective, as Section II.B below explains.

36

See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 576-94.
See id. at 587-94.
38
Assuming that the party who invests more is more likely to win.
39
Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 587-94.
37
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2. Settlements
The effect of sampling on settlement incentives is complicated. To
begin with, it depends on the sampling protocol and in particular on three
aspects: (1) whether the sampled cases are allowed to settle after they are
chosen for the sample; (2) whether the sample plaintiffs receive the sample
average or their own trial verdict; and (3) whether trial costs are averaged
and spread over all cases in the population or left for sample plaintiffs to
bear.
First, consider the question whether sample cases should be
allowed to settle. On the one hand, forcing trial without party consent
seems problematic. On the other hand, the point of sampling is to generate
trial outcomes from which to extrapolate, and allowing parties in the
sampled cases to settle makes it more difficult to achieve this goal. One
might simply add settlements to the sample mix, but doing so complicates
the task of extrapolation. Settlements are difficult to compare to trial
verdicts because settlements discount for likely trial success and are
influenced by relative bargaining power, which may or may not correlate
strongly with the relative litigating power that affects trial verdicts. To
make settlements comparable to trial verdicts, therefore, each settlement
must be adjusted to take account of these differences, which is bound to be
a complicated and imprecise task.40
Given these problems, one might be tempted to exclude
settlements, but doing so creates a different set of problems. The cases that
settle are not randomly selected, so excluding settlements will taint the
randomness of the remaining trial verdicts. Worse yet, it gives the
defendant an incentive to settle the strongest sample cases in order to

40

Suppose the plaintiff’s probability of success in proving liability at trial is p;
the likely damage award conditional on success is w, and the cost to the plaintiff
(defendant) of litigating through trial is CP (CD). Also assume that the plaintiff’s
relative bargaining power is , meaning that the plaintiff is likely to capture a
fraction of the settlement surplus equal to . The lowest amount the plaintiff will
accept in settlement is pw-CP, and the largest amount the defendant will offer is
pw+CD. Therefore, the settlement surplus is CP+CD and the likely settlement is: pwCP + (CP+CD). If this sample case went to trial and the plaintiff succeeded in
proving liability, we would expect a jury verdict close to w. If the cases in the
sample vary by w and p, it will be difficult to adjust a settlement of pw-CP +
(CP+CD) so that it is commensurable with verdicts of w in the sample cases that
go to trial.
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reduce the sample average and thus reduce total liability for all cases in the
larger population.
These problems might not be all that serious if a single attorney
represents the entire aggregation of plaintiffs and consults her own interest
in a fee when she makes the decision whether to settle. Under these
circumstances, the attorney has an incentive to counter the defendant’s
strategy by rejecting settlement offers in the cherry-picked cases. This is so
because an attorney who settles cherry-picked cases loses the fee she would
have earned with a larger sample average applied to the whole
aggregation.41
Let us assume that the sample cases do not settle, either because
settlement is barred or because the attorney rejects every settlement offer.
What are the parties likely to do before cases are sampled if they know
sampling will be used? Party incentives depend on the other two features of
the sampling protocol: whether sample plaintiffs receive the sample
average or their own trial verdict, and whether trial costs are averaged and
spread over all cases in the population or left for sample plaintiffs to bear.
These two elements create four possible scenarios:

Total Costs
Spread Over All
Cases
Each Sample
Case Bears Its
Own Costs

All Cases Receive
Sample Average

Sampled Plaintiffs
Receive Own Trial
Verdicts

SCENARIO I

SCENARIO II

SCENARIO III

SCENARIO IV

Scenario I is attractive on fairness grounds because it treats all
plaintiffs in the aggregation equally. But Scenario I might be difficult to
implement constitutionally if there are due process problems with denying
the parties in the sample cases the benefit of their own trial verdicts. This
pushes in the direction of Scenario II. Scenarios III and IV also have some
41

More precisely, the defendant would have to offer a premium that
compensates the attorney for the fee amount lost due to a lower sample average.
This is certainly possible but rather unlikely for large case aggregations. Of course,
aggregate attorney representation can exacerbate the problem of agency costs, but
that is a problem that exists without sampling as well.
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attractive features, but there is a strong fairness reason to distribute costs
equally over all cases since all plaintiffs in the aggregation benefit from the
sample plaintiffs’ litigation efforts, and this consideration weighs against
Scenarios III and IV. For this reason, the following discussion focuses on
Scenarios I and II.
In the Appendix, I present a simple settlement model and use it to
analyze the settlement effects of sampling under Scenario I and Scenario II,
comparing the results to the no-sampling baseline.42 In doing so, I consider
two different allocations of settlement power: one in which each plaintiff
controls the settlement decision in her own individual case, and one in
which all plaintiffs are represented on contingency by the same attorney
who controls the settlement decision and settles en-masse.
The most important result of this analysis is that the use of
sampling under Scenario I and Scenario II makes settlement impossible, or
at least more difficult, for many cases that could have settled without
sampling. It follows then that sampling is likely to reduce settlement
frequency. Moreover, this is true whether the individual plaintiff or the
attorney for the aggregation controls the settlement decision—although the
distribution and magnitude of the effects differ. The result for expected
settlement amounts is less surprising. High value claims settle for less than
they would without sampling. Low value claims normally settle for more.
The following provides a bit more discussion of these settlement
impacts, but the details are in the Appendix.
a.

Scenario I

The intuition behind the results for Scenario I is easy to grasp. In
the simple settlement model, parties can settle if and only if the defendant’s
expected loss from going to trial is greater than or equal to the plaintiff’s
expected gain. Expected loss and expected gain depend on each party’s
estimate of plaintiff’s likely success, the expected recovery if plaintiff
succeeds, and expected litigation costs through trial. When parties settle,
they bargain over how to apportion the savings in trial costs between them,
and when they have different estimates of likely success, they also bargain
over how to split the additional gains from trade.
42

The analysis uses the standard economic model of settlement under
asymmetric estimates of likelihood of success. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003) [hereinafter BONE,
CIVIL PROCEDURE].
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To see this clearly, suppose the plaintiff and the defendant make
different estimates of plaintiff’s likely success. Let p and p be plaintiff’s
and defendant’s estimates, respectively.43 Suppose the two parties agree on
w, the likely recovery if plaintiff succeeds, and on CP and CD, the plaintiff’s
and defendant’s costs, respectively, of litigating through trial. These latter
two assumptions are not entirely realistic, but they are useful for
simplifying the discussion and conveying the basic intuition.44
Given that both parties agree on w, the conventional settlement
model holds that settlement is feasible without sampling if and only if:
p w + CD

p w - CP

The settlement surplus that parties create by settling is the
difference between the left hand and right hand sides of this inequality,
which is p w + CD – (p w - CP) = (p - p )w + CP + CD. Another way to state
the feasibility condition is that the settlement surplus must be greater than
or equal to zero; in other words, there must be something for the parties to
bargain over:
(p - p )w + CP + CD

0

(1)

Scenario I sampling has two effects on Expression (1). First, it
gives all the plaintiffs in the aggregation the sample average for their
individual cases. When the aggregation encompasses claims with different
valuations, this effect reduces the value of w, the expected recovery
conditional on success, for above-average claims and increases it for
below-average claims. Second, sampling reduces total litigation costs (i.e.,
CP + CD), since only the sampled case are tried. Before the sample is
selected, there is a chance that any case could be chosen for the sample, so
43

Thus, p and p might refer to the likelihood of success in establishing
liability and proving damages, or they might refer only to the likelihood of success
in proving damages conditional on the plaintiff establishing liability without
sampling. The referent for the variables depends on whether sampling is used only
to determine damages or also to determine liability.
44
For example, in the typical case, the plaintiff is likely to be better informed
about the seriousness of her injuries (and thus about w) than the defendant. Also,
CP and CD might vary with case value. It is possible to modify the model to take
account of these factors, but doing so complicates the analysis. In a later footnote, I
make a few comments about how asymmetric estimates of w might affect the
results. See infra note 47.
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the parties in every case discount litigation costs by the fraction of cases to
be sampled. The impact of these two effects on the likelihood of settlement
depends on whether p > p or p < p .
First, consider the case where p > p . In this situation, all the
terms in Expression (1) are positive, which means that settlement is
feasible for all cases whether or not sampling is used. However, sampling
reduces the settlement surplus for above-average cases because w and CP +
CD both get smaller. For below-average cases, w increases with sampling
but CP + CD decreases. Therefore, the settlement surplus rises or falls
depending on which factor dominates.
Although settlement is feasible in all these cases, the likelihood
that parties will reach a settlement can be affected by the size of the
settlement surplus. As I explain in the Appendix, one theory holds that
parties have greater difficulty reaching a settlement when the settlement
surplus is smaller because there is a more limited range of allocations on
which the parties can agree. Another theory holds that parties have greater
difficulty reaching a settlement when the surplus is larger because they are
more likely to bargain hard when more is at stake. Therefore, the effect on
settlement depends on which theory of bargaining behavior holds true,
which might vary with the circumstances.45
Next consider the case where p < p . The results here are more
striking. If p < p , the difference p – p is always negative, so the (p –
p )w term in Expression (1) is always negative. Therefore, if w increases
enough with sampling (so the negative (p – p )w term gets sufficiently
larger in the negative direction) or if CP + CD decreases enough with
sampling (so the positive term gets sufficiently smaller), a case that has a
positive settlement surplus—and therefore could settle without sampling—
can have a negative settlement surplus with sampling and be impossible to
settle.46
45

I tend to think that hard bargaining kicks in only for very large settlement
surpluses. If I am correct, then we would expect a reduced surplus to make
settlement more difficult, unless the surplus is very large both before and after the
change.
46
The effects vary between above-average and below-average claims in the
aggregation. For above-average cases, w decreases with sampling. This means that
the negative term (p – p )w is smaller in the negative direction and thus has a
weaker impact in reducing the settlement surplus. Still, the magnitude of the
reduction in CP + CD, which depends on the fraction of cases sampled, can be so
large that Expression (1) turns from positive without sampling to negative with
sampling for above-average cases that are not too far out on the tail of the
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These effects obtain whether plaintiffs control their own
settlements or an attorney for the aggregation controls the settlement and
settles en masse. In the latter case, switching to sampling does not affect w
because aggregations settle anyway for average recovery per case
multiplied over all cases, which is exactly the same as the estimate under
sampling. However, sampling reduces expected litigation costs since only
sample cases are litigated, which reduces CP + CD.
The Appendix develops the analysis more rigorously and describes
the different effects that Scenario I sampling can have on the settlement
surplus for different types of cases and different sample sizes. The
conclusion is the same throughout. For the most likely aggregations,
Scenario I sampling rarely, if ever, converts a case that cannot settle into
one that can, but frequently converts cases that can settle into ones that
cannot.47
population distribution. In theory, it is also possible for sampling to turn some
cases that cannot settle without sampling into cases that can settle with sampling.
However, the Appendix shows that the conditions necessary for this to occur
should rarely hold as a practical matter. For below-average cases, w increases with
sampling. This means that the negative term gets larger in the negative direction
and has a stronger impact in reducing the settlement surplus. This result, combined
with the reduction in CP + CD, guarantees that many below-average cases that could
have settled without sampling become impossible to settle with sampling.
47
The results are slightly different if the parties have different estimates of w.
In the most extreme case, the plaintiff knows w, but the defendant knows only the
background distribution of w for all cases in the aggregation (i.e., what fraction are
high value and what fraction are low value). Under these circumstances, the
defendant must use the average value of w over all the cases; let’s denote the
average by v. Instead of (1), the settlement condition without sampling for this
situation is:
p v - p w + CP + CD 0
For above-average claims, w is greater than v, so it is possible that this
condition will not be satisfied when p > p and w–v is very large, in which case
settlement is impossible without sampling. (When p > p , the condition is always
satisfied for below-average claims, i.e. those for which v > w.) If Scenario I
sampling is used, however, all cases can settle because the plaintiff calculates
expected value based on v, the sample average, the same as the defendant does.
This means that for above average cases that are located very far out on the tail of
the distribution, i.e., where w–v is large enough, settlement can become feasible
with sampling when it is impossible without sampling. However, these should be
fairly rare occurrences because not many cases are likely to deviate sufficiently
from the mean to make this possible. Also, for a very high value claim, the
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b. Scenario II
Not much more need be said about Scenario II. It has the same
effect on CP + CD as Scenario I because litigation costs are shared equally
just as they are in Scenario I. But Scenario II sampling reduces the impact
on w. This is because sample plaintiffs get their own trial verdicts. All the
parties anticipate this possibility because all of them know there is a chance
their case will be chosen for the sample, and therefore they include the
possibility in their estimates of case value before a sample is chosen. This
means that sampling produces a smaller reduction in w for above-average
cases and a smaller increase in w for below-average cases. How much
smaller depends on the fraction of cases chosen for the sample: the larger
the fraction, the smaller the effect.
Nevertheless, Scenario II sampling has the same effect as Scenario
I on the two critical factors defining the settlement surplus: it reduces
(increases) w for high-value (low-value) claims, and it reduces total
litigation costs. This means that it has the same general impact on the
likelihood of settlement, except that the ranges of (p – p ) values
corresponding to the different effects vary to some extent from Scenario I.
The precise results are in the Appendix.
In sum, the use of sampling can significantly reduce the settlement
rate and thus increase litigation costs, all other things held equal. As the
following section explains, this effect is important because it reduces
sampling’s cost-saving benefits and to that extent weakens the efficiency
case for using it. Sampling also gives plaintiffs average recovery, which in
effect transfers wealth from high-end to low-end plaintiffs. While this
transfer must be justified under both utilitarian and rights-based theories, it
is much more problematic for a rights-based theory. The following
discussion explores these points.

settlement produced by sampling (which is based on v) departs markedly from the
plaintiff’s substantive entitlement, which can raise particularly serious fairness
concerns.
When p < p , the results are also similar to those for the symmetric
information case, although the relevant ranges of p – p are different. It is still
unlikely that sampling will enable settlement for above average claims, but it is
somewhat more likely than in the symmetric information case. Also, sampling
never enables settlement and sometimes scuttles settlement for below average
cases.
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B. AN OUTCOME-ORIENTED NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAMPLING IN
LIGHT OF ITS OUTCOME EFFECTS
1. Within a Utilitarian Metric
From a utilitarian perspective, the goal is to maximize aggregate
utility, or in the version of utilitarianism associated with law and
economics, the goal is to minimize social costs. The social costs of
procedure include expected error costs and expected process (or
administrative) costs. Thus, procedure aims on this view to minimize the
sum of expected error and process costs; i.e., to produce more accurate
outcomes but not at the price of excessively costly implementation.
More precisely, the social cost of erroneous outcomes is measured
in terms of the policies that the substantive law aims to achieve. An error
weakens deterrence and thus distorts primary incentives relative to the
substantive law ideal. Process costs include the costs of such things as
preparing and filing motions, litigating the issues, holding hearings, and
deliberating on a decision. From a law-and-economics perspective, a
procedure that reduces error risk might require such a large resource
investment that the additional process costs outweigh the marginal
reduction in error costs.48
In Statistical Adjudication, I discussed the efficiency case for
sampling.49 Extrapolating from the sample average makes a great deal of
sense on efficiency grounds. First, as long as aggregations are limited to
transactionally-related cases, the sample average should do a reasonably
good job of inducing efficient incentives. Agents shape their primary
conduct in light of expectations, and the sample average is just an
expectation measure. Second, insofar as sampling reduces the delay costs
that dilute the real value of a damages payment, it should enhance
deterrence. Third, using the sample average can reduce the variance

48

To complicate matters further, there are two types of error, false negatives
(for example, holding an innocent defendant liable) and false positives (for
example, exonerating a guilty defendant). See BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note
42, at 128-32 (explaining the importance of considering these two types of error).
If false negatives are more costly than false positives, a rule might reduce the error
risk overall and still increase expected error costs if it reduces the less costly type
of error and increases the more costly one.
49
See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 595-98.
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associated with the expected outcome and thus improve incentives for riskaverse defendants.50
On the other side of the coin, sampling adds costs of its own. First,
the sampling procedure must be implemented—the sampling protocol
designed, the cases actually sampled, and the results analyzed—and this
adds process costs. Nevertheless, these costs should be relatively small
compared to the litigation and trial costs that sampling saves. Second, by
speeding up recovery and attracting more lawsuits, sampling could lead to
over-deterrence in some cases. For example, the prospect of having to pay
claims sooner could create serious cash flow problems for defendants faced
with massive potential liability, and this in turn could force otherwise
viable and productive companies into bankruptcy. However, as I argued in
Statistical Adjudication, these concerns are better handled in ways other
than delaying the payment of valid claims.51 Third, sampling can skew
litigation incentives across the party line, and skewed incentives are likely
to lead to skewed outcomes. However, the asymmetric stakes in ordinary
litigation already produce a skewing effect, and the problems sampling
creates can be mitigated to some extent by choosing the right sampling
protocol. Moreover, the adverse effects might be offset somewhat if the
case aggregation made possible by sampling corrects for a litigating power
imbalance across the party line.52
I concluded in Statistical Adjudication that the litigation cost
savings and beneficial incentive effects make a powerful case for sampling
from an efficiency perspective. Moreover, in order to minimize the risk of
skewed litigation investment incentives, I recommended that courts use a
sampling procedure that gives all plaintiffs the sample average and spreads
litigation costs evenly over the aggregation. The following discussion
extends this analysis by considering effects on settlement and filing
incentives more carefully.53
50

This is so when the standard deviation of the distribution of possible sample
averages, i.e., the SAD, is less than the standard deviation of the distribution of
possible trial verdicts, i.e., the IED.
51
Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 596.
52
For a discussion of how aggregation reduces skewed litigation investment
incentives, see David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have
and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (2000); Note, Locating Investment
Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class Action, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2665 (2004).
53
I touched on the filing issue in Statistical Adjudication, but I gave it only
cursory attention. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 593-94.
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First consider settlement. Section A above showed that a switch
from individual litigation to sampling is likely to reduce the settlement rate
for cases in the aggregation. With a reduced settlement rate, some (perhaps
many) cases that would have settled instead incur additional litigation costs
and these costs reduce sampling’s cost-saving benefits. The magnitude of
this effect, however, is uncertain: it depends in part on when sampling
takes place and how much individual litigation precedes it. Sampling’s
adverse effect on settlement can increase costs substantially when the
parties must have ample opportunity to invest in litigation of their
individual suits between the time they become aware that sampling will
take place and the time that the court actually draws the sample. This presampling investment, after all, is a large part of what is saved by an early
settlement. The trial judge can control these costs to some extent by
managing the litigation to minimize pre-sampling expenditures and by
implementing the sampling protocol expeditiously.
Assuming, however, that there is sufficient opportunity before
sampling for parties to invest substantially, the adverse effect of sampling
on the settlement rate is likely to be significant and should be included in
an efficiency analysis.54 The total cost of scuttled settlements increases
with the size of the aggregation, so larger aggregations will generate higher
costs. Of course, the total cost savings from sampling increase as well.
Although it seems reasonable to suppose that cost savings will dominate
most of the time, it depends on the fraction of cases that would have settled
without sampling and the amount of extra investment those cases incur
with sampling.
Second consider frivolous and weak suits. Since only the sample
cases are tried, undesirable suits can receive the sample average simply by
hiding in the aggregation. One might try to deter this strategy by
entertaining summary judgment motions in individual suits before
sampling, but doing so would increase pre-sampling costs and magnify the
adverse settlement effects discussed in the previous paragraph. It is
important to bear in mind, however, that the problem of frivolous and weak

54

So too should the effect on settlement quality. The Appendix derives the
likely settlement amount assuming equal bargaining power. This should be
compared to the expected trial award in individual litigation, assuming that the
expected trial award is the proper baseline for assessing deterrence and
compensation gains.
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filings already exists in the absence of sampling.55 Large case aggregations
tend to settle en-masse and the attorney for the aggregation has an incentive
to include frivolous and weak cases in order to inflate the population size
and the ultimate settlement. In the end, it is unclear whether or how much
sampling exacerbates these already existing problems.56
Even if the problems are more serious with sampling, the use of a
sampling procedure makes possible new approaches to managing the risk.
For example, a judge might refuse to apply the sample average when the
sampling procedure yields a large enough fraction of zero or very small
sample verdicts. The idea is to deprive frivolous and weak suits of their
cover when the sample results signal a serious frivolous suit problem. This
approach wastes the process costs invested in sampling whenever the judge
refuses to extrapolate, but it could still make sense if it deterred enough
frivolous and weak suits. The important point is that sampling can open up
new ways to handle the frivolous suit problem.57
2. Within a Rights-Based Metric
The analysis is much more complicated and the conclusions more
qualified within a rights-based theory and this is one of the chief reasons
sampling is so controversial. In Statistical Adjudication, I examined two

55

See S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlement, 42 U. MEM. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1783792; Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort
Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 688 (1989).
56
The defendant who anticipates this strategy can try to counter it by offering
a smaller aggregate settlement or even refusing to settle outright. One might think
that this is an important difference from sampling, which does not give the
defendant this type of control. However, the defendant’s total liability with
sampling is not affected by frivolous and weak suits because the sample average
takes account of their presence. It is the meritorious plaintiffs who are hurt, since
they receive a sample average diluted by the presence of frivolous and weak suits
in the sample mix.
57
The literature on statistical techniques for sorting fraudulent from legitimate
insurance claims might provide useful insights. See generally Richard A. Derrig,
Insurance Fraud, 69 J. RISK & INS. 271 (2002) (providing an overview); Patrick L.
Brockett, Richard A. Derrig, Linda L. Golden, Arnold Levine & Mark Alpert,
Fraud Classification Using Principal Component Analysis of RIDITs, 69 J. RISK &
INS. 341 (2002) (proposing a statistical technique for sorting claims).
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versions of an outcome-oriented, rights-based theory.58 One version
assumes that legal rights are designed to enforce moral rights. In other
words, it looks through the legal right to focus on the moral right that the
legal right protects. The other version assumes that legal rights have force
as utility-checking rights independent of their underlying justifications.
Accordingly, it focuses on the positive legal right that the substantive law
creates.
The existence of substantive rights, whether moral or legal in
character, necessarily implies the existence of procedural rights. For
without procedural rights, substantive rights could be sacrificed on
utilitarian grounds—contrary to their status as rights—simply by denying
the socially costly procedures needed to enforce them.59
The core problem for sampling is the same no matter which version
of a rights-based theory one adopts. Sampling can produce outcomes for at
least some cases that systematically diverge from what moral or legal rights
guarantee. This divergence can be justified in a utilitarian theory by relying
on the social costs that sampling saves. But this type of justification is not
available in a rights-based theory, or at least not available in quite as
straightforward a way. A right is supposed to guarantee its holder the
treatment it specifies even when the social costs of doing so are high.
Thus, it would seem that sampling, by sacrificing substantive rights to
achieve social gains, is just what an outcome-based procedural right is
meant to prevent.
At first glance, this problem might seem intractable. However,
Statistical Adjudication explored several ways to address it. In general,
there are two possible approaches to addressing the problem. One approach
assumes that the use of sampling is a prima facie violation of procedural
rights, but that the violation is justified when sampling helps to prevent
seriously unfair results produced by high litigation costs and protracted
delay.60 The second approach denies that there is even a prima facie
violation. It argues that a proper understanding of the rights at stake shows
58

Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 605-17.
For an excellent discussion of this point, see RONALD DWORKIN, Principle,
Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 93-94 (1985).
60
In this approach, the statistical method used must treat all plaintiffs with
equal concern and respect and must aim for outcomes that take account of casespecific facts to the extent practically feasible under the circumstances. See Bone,
Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 615-17. The latter constraint might call
for a regression analysis in many situations.
59
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that they can make room for sampling, provided that the sampling
procedure is properly designed.61
More generally—and here I expand on my argument in Statistical
Adjudication to take account of subsequent work—any sensible conception
of outcome-based procedural rights must incorporate four factors that
together allow for the use of sampling in appropriate circumstances.62
First, a sampling procedure generates aggregate liability that closely
approximates what the defendant should pay under the substantive law, and
it does so regardless of how the total damages are distributed among
plaintiffs. The defendant might insist, as defendants do in these cases, that
it has a right to contest liability in each individual case, but there is no
obvious outcome-based justification for such a right as a normative matter.
After all, the defendant’s expected loss is the same in both situations. In
fact, its total liability is likely to be more accurately measured with
sampling.63
Second, it must matter in some way that a plaintiff who obtains a
recovery less than her substantive entitlement makes up for the shortfall
with the litigation costs that she saves through sampling. One might object
that each plaintiff has a right to the remedy that the substantive law
guarantees and that this substantive right does not deduct for litigation
costs. On this view, any shortfall in recovery would be a reason by itself to
condemn sampling on moral grounds. But this view cannot be correct. If it
were, severe delay costs would be irrelevant as well. It would be enough
that the plaintiff recovered a formal judgment in the right amount even if
she did so many decades after her injury.
The reason litigation cost savings matter is that the substantive
rights courts enforce are institutional rights and as such take account of the
salient features of the institutions in which they operate, including the
61

In Statistical Adjudication, I focus on the nature of the underlying
substantive right. I argue for a corrective justice theory of tort law that recognizes a
moral right to compensation only for expected loss. Since the sample average
measures expected loss, sampling gives each plaintiff exactly what corrective
justice requires. See id. at 605-15.
62
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1011, 1013-18 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights]; Robert
G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem With Contractarian Theories of
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 513-16 (2003) [hereinafter Bone,
Agreeing to Fair Process].
63
This follows from the statistical property that the sample average is very
close to the population average. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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courts that enforce them. Accordingly, they take account of the different
ways that rightholders obtain redress within the institution of adjudication,
including through the litigation costs they save. This point may seem fairly
obvious for legal rights, which after all are created with enforcement in
mind. But it is also true for moral rights, although in a less obvious way.
Courts do not enforce background moral rights directly; they enforce legal
rights that instantiate the moral rights institutionally. And those legal rights,
as institutional rights, take account of institutional context, including the
litigation costs the institution creates.64
The third factor goes to the nature of the procedural right itself.
Because outcome error is inevitable and because process costs must matter
to the amount of procedure any society provides, outcome-oriented
procedural rights are most sensibly defined not as rights to some predefined
set of specific procedures, but rather as rights to a fair and just distribution
of error risk across cases and litigants.65 Understood in this way, procedural
rights guarantee that each litigant is treated with equal concern and respect
in decisions about how error risk is distributed. This means that the overall
error risk can be distributed unequally as long as the reasons for doing so
accord equal concern and respect to each individual as a substantive-rightholder. Reasons sounding in social utility, standing alone, are too
impersonal to meet this condition. However, reasons that focus on how
collective gains benefit each individual personally can qualify.
The fourth factor shifts from the rights litigants possess to the
duties they owe one another. This is too complex a subject to provide a
detailed analysis here. Let me summarize briefly. The American system of
litigation is highly adversarial and parties are given broad freedom to
control their own lawsuits. These facts might lead one to conclude that the
only duties parties owe one another are duties to refrain from obviously
objectionable conduct, such as intentionally filing a frivolous suit or
imposing costs for the sole purpose of burdening one’s opponent. But a
closer examination of actual litigation procedure and practice shows that
64

This does not collapse moral rights theory into legal rights theory. In
contrast to legal rights, moral rights recognize that background moral principles
continue to exert independent force on courts. For example, a court has some
freedom to adopt a procedure that better implements a moral right even it also
distorts the corresponding legal right to some extent.
65
See, e.g., Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, supra note 62, at 1015-18;
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process, supra note 62, at 513-16. This is not the place to
parse the content of this right carefully.
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the duties of parties are more robust. Indeed, the fact that procedural rights
are institutional rights means that parties owe a general duty of fair regard
to one another that is tied to what makes adjudication as an institution work
fairly for all litigants.66
These four factors taken together can justify sampling on outcome
quality grounds in a range of circumstances. The defendant’s outcomeoriented rights are fully satisfied by a properly designed sampling
procedure. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ procedural rights are institutional and
as a result take account of institutional context, including the reality of high
litigation and delay costs. This opens the door to an argument that
procedural rights are satisfied for plaintiffs who end up at least as well off
net of litigation costs with sampling as without, a group that includes
plaintiffs with cases relatively close to the sample mean. As for those
plaintiffs with cases further out on the tail of the distribution, they have
procedural rights only to equal concern and respect. This means that they
are entitled not to specific procedures or a specific result, but rather to a
good reason for the outcome they must bear that respects them as
individual rightholders. Moreover, they also owe duties of fair regard to
others in the aggregation the same as everyone else.
Still, the fact that parties have procedural rights imposes
constraints on when sampling can be used. It is not enough, as it is for a
utilitarian approach, that sampling reduces net social costs compared to
individual litigation. In a rights-based theory, sampling must be a sensible
solution to the problem of high litigation costs and long litigation delays
and a solution that fits the fact that parties are rightholders.
For example, suppose cost and delay put some litigants at risk of
unfair outcomes due only to the (bad) luck of where they happen to end up
in the litigation queue. Because one’s place in the queue is a matter of luck
and no one can make a moral claim to benefit from this luck, it makes
sense to evaluate sampling not ex post, after queue position is set, but
rather ex ante, before any plaintiff knows where she is in the queue. From
an ex ante perspective, all the plaintiffs face an equal chance of filing late
and thus an equal chance of suffering unfair delay. Insofar as sampling
66

See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation:
Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577,
619, 623-24 (2011) [hereinafter Bone, The Puzzling Idea] (arguing that a duty of
fair regard is at work when Rule 19 and Rule 23(b)(1)(B) force some plaintiffs to
accept outcomes less than what their substantive entitlements guarantee so that
other plaintiffs receive minimally fair recovery).
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makes aggregation feasible, it responds to this unfairness for each and
every plaintiff. That it does so is a justification for its use that accords equal
concern and respect to each plaintiff as an individual rightholder.67
Thus, as long as sampling does not distort outcomes for high value
plaintiffs by too much,68 it can be justified as compatible with outcomeoriented procedural rights.
IV.

A PROCESS-ORIENTED ANALYSIS

There are reasons to doubt the coherence of a process-oriented
participation right in civil adjudication, but I will not discuss those doubts

67

A more extreme example is the epidemiological mass tort. See supra note
30. The Vioxx litigation is an example. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 053700, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64388 (E.D. La. June 29, 2010). Vioxx is a drug
prescribed for back pain. After Vioxx was on the market for some time, medical
research established a statistically significant link to risk of cardiac abnormalities.
However, the cardiac events associated with the use of Vioxx are caused by many
other factors as well, and Vioxx leaves no signature trace linking it to the injury.
As a result, few plaintiffs can marshal the evidence necessary to prove individual
causation by a preponderance of the evidence—even though the epidemiological
studies show convincingly that the drug is responsible for a significant fraction of
cardiac injuries in the population as a whole.
Given this situation, if suits must proceed individually, many deserving
plaintiffs would choose not to sue because the chance of success is too small
compared to the cost of litigating. Moreover, many of those who did sue would
lose on the causation issue. This would result in potentially serious underenforcement of tort law, which could impair compensation and deterrence goals.
One solution is to aggregate the individual suits into a single class action and use
sampling to provide an aggregate damage award for the class as a whole. This
solution does not deal with the causation-proof problem, which will still produce
an aggregate award significantly below what is optimal, but it does deal with the
failure-to-sue problem and thus provides some relief to those injured parties who
would not otherwise choose to sue. To deal with the causation-proof problem and
provide complete relief that holds the defendant fully accountable, one must use
the epidemiological studies to craft an aggregate damage award based on the
statistical probability of injury overall. But to do this, one must ignore—or at least
skirt—doctrinal obstacles in existing tort law.
68
This condition would not be satisfied for case populations that have
observable features that strongly indicate high variance. Moreover, it might require
the use of regression for some aggregations.
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here.69 Instead, I shall assume that such a right makes sense and briefly
explore its implications, just as I did in Statistical Adjudication. The
discussion in Statistical Adjudication explained why a sampling lottery is a
just way to distribute participation opportunities when each litigant has a
right to his own day-in-court and budget constraints preclude giving
everyone a meaningful individual trial.70 It also defined the appropriate
scarcity conditions for the use of sampling and explored implications for
the choice of sampling methodology. In doing the analysis, however, I
accepted, for purposes of argument, the Supreme Court’s robust version of
the right, the so-called right to a personal day in court that guarantees broad
freedom to control strategic choices in individual litigation. With a right
defined so broadly, it followed that sampling could be used only in
relatively narrow circumstances.71
I now believe that the best account of the day-in-court right, as that
right is reflected in settled features of litigation procedure and practice, is
much more limited. The particular version of the right that fits the
participation opportunities parties actually enjoy falls far short of the
relatively unchecked freedom of strategic choice and party control usually
associated with the broad version of the day-in-court right.72 For example, a
plaintiff can be forced to consolidate her case with hundreds, even
thousands, of others under the Multi-District Litigation Act.73 The MDL
judge often appoints a litigation committee to control litigation strategy on
behalf of the group. The result is that attorneys for most plaintiffs have
very little, if any, control over litigation strategy. In effect, plaintiffs are
forced to accept a group rather than an individual day in court and they are
often forced to do so for reasons that sound in efficiency.74 Another
example is the (b)(3) class action that binds absent class members to
achieve judicial economy gains and often does so without giving those
69

See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 279-88 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Rethinking]
(explaining the reasons for doubt).
70
See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 628-50 (arguing that
since sampling distributes participation opportunities by lottery, it is justified
whenever a lottery is a just distributional device).
71
Id. at 628-34.
72
I have described some of these limitations in a recent article. Bone, The
Puzzling Idea, supra note 66, at 614-24.
73
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2008); see Bone, The Puzzling Idea, supra note 66, at
620-22.
74
Bone, The Puzzling Idea, supra note 66, at 620-22.
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absentees realistic opportunities to participate.75 To be sure, notice must be
sent to class members and absentees have a right to opt out, but they are
still bound even if notice fails to reach them and even if they do not
understand the notice they receive. Moreover, class representatives and the
class attorney represent the interests of the class as a whole, not the
individual interests of each class member.76
These examples and others like them point to a flexible conception
of the day-in-court right, one defined by a balance of considerations
relevant to assuring that adjudication works fairly and justly for all
litigants.77 The fact that the day in court is a right still rules out routine
reliance on minimizing social costs, but as the MDL and class action
examples indicate, it does not rule out social cost arguments altogether.
This flexible and institutional conception allows greater room for
sampling. To be sure, the right bars routine use of sampling, just as it bars
ordinary utilitarian justifications for its use. At the same time, however,
sampling might be reconciled with a process-oriented day-in-court right on
broader grounds than avoiding serious unfairness. For example, substantial
enough litigation cost savings might justify sampling in the same way
judicial economy gains sometimes justify truncated participation in MDL
and (b)(3) class actions. In fact, the argument for sampling is stronger in
some respects than the argument for the class action on process-oriented
participation grounds. Sampling allows more individual participation than
the class action, since all litigants make some litigation choices before the
sampling procedure is implemented.78 Also, sampling can be designed to
guarantee even more participation, although doing so increases costs. For
example, each party in the larger aggregation might be given a chance to
object to the sampling protocol before implementation, and perhaps to

75

Id. at 592-95.
Id.
77
For a more extensive discussion, see id. at 615-17.
78
In fact, there are notable similarities between sampling and the class action.
Sample cases usually share many common questions with cases not chosen for the
sample. Moreover, the plaintiffs in non-sample cases should be able to point to a
case in the sample that is typical of their own, at least if the overall aggregation is
not too heterogeneous and the sample is large enough. In addition, there is no
reason to believe that the sample cases would not be litigated vigorously or that
lawyers litigating those cases would sell out the aggregation, at least no more
reason than already exists without sampling.
76
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argue against application of the sample average to her particular case
afterward.79
It is important to be clear, however, that squaring sampling with
process-oriented participation is only one step in justifying its use. As
discussed in Part II above, sampling must also pass an outcome-oriented
analysis under a utilitarian or rights-based metric. Furthermore, if there is
any sense to the methodological legitimacy critique, sampling must be
justified separately on legitimacy grounds as well. Part IV addresses this
last topic.
V.

THE METHODOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY OBJECTION

To set the stage for the legitimacy objection, imagine that the
defendant and all the plaintiffs genuinely consent to the use of a sampling
procedure and their consent is their own and not just their attorney’s.80
Also, assume that the sampling procedure is carefully designed to generate
a reliable expected outcome for the population of cases as a whole, and
suppose too that it significantly reduces litigation costs and does not
adversely affect third parties. In other words, sampling in our hypothetical
preserves deterrence benefits without harming others and does so at a
significantly lower cost than individual litigation. Is there any reason left to
object to it?
Many people—and I count myself among them—would answer no.
Nevertheless, one has reason to feel a bit uneasy. After all, deciding cases
by extrapolating from a sample is a rather strange way to do adjudication.
In the traditional ideal, judges focus on the facts of each individual case

79

There is one more potential obstacle to sampling: the jury trial right. See,
e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319-21 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that trial judge’s sampling plan violates the defendant’s Seventh
Amendment jury trial right). Sampling provides jury trials only for the sample
cases. Still, if the sample is large enough, each case in the larger aggregation
should have at least one case in the sample that is very similar to it and tried to a
jury. Moreover, it is not clear that jury trial must be extended to each separate
party. After all, the class action binds absent class members without giving them an
individual jury trial, and offensive nonmutual issue preclusion can bind a party to a
judge decision in a case where that party would otherwise be entitled to a jury trial.
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979). I leave an
analysis of the jury trial objection for another occasion.
80
Suppose the parties prefer a speedier resolution at a lower cost.
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and reason from those facts to a decision for that case.81 There are
exceptions, of course—the class action being the most notable—but the
fact that these are exceptions, and some of them rather controversial, tends
to prove the general rule.
This uneasiness with sampling might just be a result of
unfamiliarity with its use, but I suspect that more is involved. For example,
some critics of large-scale aggregation object to procedures like sampling
because they believe that aggregative procedure is somehow at odds with
what adjudication is about as an institution.82 This type of objection might
be about adverse effects on outcome-based rights or process-based
individual participation, already dealt with in Parts II and III above.83 But it
is also possible that the objection runs deeper, that it rests on a view that
aggregative procedures like sampling are institutionally incompatible with
civil litigation because they force courts to act in ways that are foreign to
adjudication.
To illustrate this point, consider the Supreme Court’s gratuitous
indictment of sampling as “Trial by Formula” in the recent Wal-Mart
case.84 The Court’s explicit argument invoked Wal-Mart’s supposed
entitlement to “litigate its statutory [Title VII] defenses to individual
claims”, noted that sampling abridges this entitlement, and concluded that
sampling violates the Rules Enabling Act for this reason.85 This argument
81

By the traditional ideal, I mean something like Professor Chayes’s
traditional model of litigation. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (describing two polar models of
litigation—traditional and public law).
82
See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009). I also
suspect that objections based on the symbolic or expressive value of individual
trial fall into this category. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1391-93
(1971). These objections tend to focus on the institutional benefits of
individualized procedure rather than on party rights.
83
For example, Professor Redish invokes the right to individual participation
and fits it into a broader theory of democratic legitimacy. He argues, in effect, that
many uses of the class action do violence to democratic legitimacy because they
deprive class members of the right to individually litigate their own claims, a right
that instantiates democratic participation in adjudication. See REDISH, supra note
82.
84
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
85
Id.
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is weak and not well defended in the case.86 Moreover, the Court could
have made the argument perfectly well without going out of its way to take
a gratuitous rhetorical swipe at sampling.
The Court’s use of the phrase “Trial by Formula” suggests a
strong aversion to sampling on the ground that it substitutes a statistical
formula for an individual trial. But why is the use of a formula such a
problem? We can only guess at the answer. It is difficult to see how it can
be about bad outcomes or about participation rights that the parties would
otherwise have exercised. Wal-Mart has no legitimate reason to complain
about the outcome. This is because a properly designed sampling procedure
will generate a total amount of backpay damages for the class that closely
approximates Wal-Mart’s aggregate liability—perhaps even more closely
than individual trials.87 Moreover, although Wal-Mart is not able to litigate
its defense to each individual suit with sampling, it does get to participate
fully in each sample case.88 Furthermore, because each plaintiff probably
has too little backpay at stake to justify an individual suit, all plaintiffs
share a strong interest in aggregate resolution, which can be accomplished
only through some type of aggregate procedure like sampling. So neither
outcome quality nor participation rights seem capable of providing an
answer to our question. But there is another possibility. Perhaps the Court
believes that sampling just does not belong in adjudication because it
86

For example, although Title VII recognizes a substantive right to individual
defenses against backpay awards, it is not clear that the statute also confers a right
to litigate those defenses individually. If it does not, it is unclear what “substantive
right” is being “abridged . . . or modified” within the meaning of the Rules
Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
87
To be sure, the averaging effect of sampling almost certainly will give some
class members a smaller, and some a larger, backpay award than their substantive
entitlements guarantee, but that does not affect Wal-Mart. It is also worth noting
that, while the Court does not refer to the rights of class members, the distribution
of backpay among class members can be justified from a rights-based perspective.
The typical backpay amount would not support an individual suit and the
possibility of qualifying for a (b)(3) class action is remote without the use of
sampling. Thus, one can argue that all plaintiffs have an interest in sampling so
they can recover at least some backpay award.
88
Also, any claim that Wal-Mart might have to process-based participation
must take account of the adverse effect on the participation rights of class
members, most of whom would probably not be able to bring their backpay claims
at all without sampling. Indeed, it is fairly obvious that Wal-Mart seeks individual
litigation precisely because it is likely to discourage the pursuit of individual
backpay claims.
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involves trying cases with a “formula” and not attending individually to the
facts of each case.
In any event, I believe that the institutional argument has sufficient
intuitive appeal that it should be addressed separately. Even if judges and
scholars do not invoke it explicitly, they could still be influenced by it
implicitly while formulating their express objections on outcome quality or
participation grounds.89 In a world of institutional differentiation and
specialization, the legitimacy of an institution depends in large part on the
presence of structural elements that fit the institution’s distinctive purpose
and function.90 Following this logic, critics of sampling might say that the
function of courts is to decide individual claims of right and that traditional
litigation procedure is essential to this function and thus essential as well to
the institution’s legitimacy.
I shall refer to this type of argument as the “methodological
legitimacy objection” since it focuses on legitimacy and supposes that
legitimacy depends on the method used to decide a case. To get a clearer
grasp on the nature of the argument, let us consider a more obvious
example than sampling. Most people bristle at the idea that a judge would
decide an issue by flipping a coin, and they are likely to object even though
the issue is in equipoise, each side has an equal chance to win, and no third
parties are harmed.91 The objection is that flipping a coin is simply not a
89

In particular, judges might be more willing to embrace an argument that
sampling violates outcome-based rights or infringes a litigant’s due process right to
a personal day in court because they also believe that sampling is simply not what
adjudication is about.
90
For example, the legitimacy of the legislative process depends on a voting
system that facilitates public participation and, in theory at least, assures
representative accountability to electorate preferences. This voting system adds
legitimacy because it fits the function of legislation in a way that accommodates
democratic values. However, voting would contribute nothing to legitimacy if the
legislature were suddenly enlisted to adjudicate individual cases as well. In fact,
many would deem it illegitimate for a legislature to take on the function of
adjudication, even if the parties agreed and even if all the legislators wanted to do
it.
91
See, e.g., In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Mich. 2003) (judge censured
for flipping a coin when neither side’s argument was more persuasive); Adam M.
Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2009)
(providing several examples). The hypothetical assumes that the decision is not
subject to a burden of persuasion that would break the tie. To make the situation
more concrete, imagine that the issue is committed entirely to the judge’s
discretion. It is worth pointing out though that the preponderance-of-the-evidence
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proper decision procedure for adjudication. If pressed to explain why, a
critic would probably focus on the close link between adjudication and
case-specific deliberation.92 She might argue that judges are supposed to
decide cases by reasoning through the implications of general rules and
principles on the facts of the particular case and that this mode of reasoning
is essential to adjudication’s legitimacy. 93
It is important to be clear about the nature of this objection. It has
nothing necessarily to do with adverse effects on the substantive or
procedural rights of the parties. Moreover, neither coin flipping nor
sampling is an arbitrary decision procedure.94 A judge can have a very
good reason to use either method. For example, flipping a coin can be
justified on moral grounds when it is impossible to tell which party is
correct and both have equally strong substantive entitlements.95 So too,
sampling makes sense when the sheer volume of cases produces serious
problems for individual litigation, as previously discussed.
The methodological legitimacy objection, I believe, has to do with
the fact that sampling, like coin flipping, disables the usual reasoning
process at the point of actual decision. The judge relies exclusively on a
statistical method rather than applying rules and principles to the facts of
each specific case. Still, the question remains why this is an illegitimate
method when the judge can provide a sensible reason for using it. The
persuasion burden, as a general rule for breaking ties, is itself based on statistical
generalizations about broad categories of cases.
92
See Shay Lavie, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the
Proceeds of Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1084-85
(2011) (arguing that people oppose lotteries because they substitute luck for
reason, and quoting the N.Y. Commission on Judicial Conduct in In re Friess,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT
88 (1984), for the proposition that: “The public has every right to expect that a
jurist will carefully weigh the matters at issue and . . . render reasoned rulings and
decisions.”).
93
See generally JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS 38 (1989) (emphasizing
that “the use of lotteries to resolve decision problems under uncertainty
presupposes an unusual willingness to admit the insufficiency of reason.”).
94
Cf. id., at 102 (noting that randomness in legal decisions is often associated
with arbitrariness or whimsy).
95
See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27
RATIONALITY & SOCIETY 483, 495-505 (1988) (discussing equal entitlement and
scarcity conditions for using the lottery as an exclusive or nonexclusive method of
allocation and noting that using the lottery under these conditions is supported by
reasons).
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answer must be that the application of reason at the point of case-specific
decision is a fundamental aspect of adjudication that neither the parties nor
the judge can change without risking the institution’s legitimacy.
It is quite common to view adjudication as intimately tied to a
special reasoning process that combines general principles with casespecific facts.96 For example, Lon Fuller characterized common law
reasoning in this way. He described a decision process that closely
resembles the method of reflective equilibrium.97 Roughly, judges interpret
the law by placing existing legal principles and norms alongside the facts
of the particular case. The judge moves back and forth between her best
understanding of the law and whatever moral or practical intuitions the
facts generate, adjusting law and intuition until they fit together in
reflective equilibrium.
However, even if this account of adjudicative reasoning is correct,
as I believe it is, there remains the question why exceptions are not
permitted when they respond in a sensible way to serious litigation
problems. One possible reason to worry about exceptions has to do with
public perception. The concern on this account is that the public will lose
faith in the legitimacy of adjudication if judges employ unfamiliar methods
to resolve cases. But this concern is exaggerated and ultimately
unpersuasive. For one thing, public perceptions are malleable. For example,
the public might accept coin flipping as legitimate in a particular case if
they knew that the parties requested it and understood that it was supported
by good reasons. In addition, public perception is circular. People tend to
equate what is legitimate with what is familiar.98 If judges routinely flip
coins, for example, public opinion could shift toward accepting coin
flipping as a proper decision method. Finally, it is simply implausible that
the public would give up on the court system just because judges

96

See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986); Lon L. Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 372-81 (1978).
97
See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75
B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995) (describing Fuller’s views in terms of reflective
equilibrium). On the method of reflective equilibrium more generally, see JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42-45 (rev. ed. 1999).
98
The other alternative is to base their opinion on what they believe courts
should do. But in that case, it is not the perception that matters, but the underlying
normative theory that supports the perception.
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occasionally used sampling to decide large case aggregations, especially if
they also provided good reasons for doing so.99
This leaves only one reason I can think of for worrying about
exceptions. This has to with the adverse effect of occasional use on the
quality of adjudicative decisions over the long run. The concern is that
allowing some exceptions will invite more exceptions and send
adjudication down a slippery slope, transforming the institution in
undesirable ways. This concern might have force for coin flips. Maybe a
few coin flips would not be a problem, but if judges became accustomed to
flipping coins, they might relax constraints on its use and make coin
flipping a more general practice. Also, a judge faced with a difficult
decision might be tempted to give up too soon and resort to flipping a coin
when a more careful analysis would show that a reasoned decision is
feasible. This could be particularly problematic if hard cases are the ones
where principled decision is most valuable for the development of the law.
Whatever merit it might have for coin flips, this slippery slope
argument is much less convincing for sampling. No matter how frequently
sampling is used, there will always be sample cases decided in the ordinary
way. Thus, judges never completely escape individualized decisions.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that every case must be adjudicated
individually in order to produce good common law rules and principles or
sound interpretations of statutes or constitutional provisions. Finally, the
use of sampling is limited to large case aggregations and requires much
more deliberation and preparation than coin flipping. Thus, the slippery
slope is a lot less slippery for sampling than for coin flipping.
In sum, it is not at all clear that the methodological legitimacy
objection has force against a well-justified use of sampling in mass tort
aggregations. Sampling is sufficiently different from coin flipping even
though both employ probabilistic techniques and randomized decision
procedures.

99

There is a closely related argument that deserves brief mention. According
to this argument, adjudication has social value as a symbol of our collective
commitment to principled reason in government and that this symbol’s message
would be diluted if judges flipped coins or used sampling. Even if the premise is
true, the conclusion does not necessarily follow. I find it rather far-fetched to
believe that the message would be lost if judges sometimes used sampling. Indeed,
the fact that sampling is itself supported by good reasons should reinforce the
message of reason’s importance in government.

266
VI.

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

CONCLUSION

Sampling is an extremely useful tool for litigating large
aggregations of cases. Squaring it with adjudication, however, raises a
number of complicated normative questions. In this Article and in my
earlier work, I have attempted to address three types of challenges:
challenges directed to sampling’s effect on outcome quality, challenges
directed to its effect on process-based participation, and challenges based
on sampling’s supposed incompatibility with adjudication’s distinctive
mode of decisionmaking.
In the end, sampling can be justified in many more situations than
courts currently apply it, and society is paying a very high price for
ignoring this insight. Courts should be more receptive to the benefits of
sampling and judges should engage the task of justifying its use more
carefully. The system of adjudication would be much the better for it.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix models the settlement decision under a no-sampling
regime and under two different sampling scenarios. The point is to show
that sampling can often reduce the likelihood of settlement and skew the
settlement amount.
The analysis considers settlement incentives before any cases are
actually sampled on the assumption that all parties know that sampling will
take place and also know the court’s sampling protocol. I consider the
results when each plaintiff controls her own settlement decision, and then
when an attorney representing all plaintiffs in the case aggregation on
contingency makes the settlement decision in her own self-interest.
I.

MODEL AND TERMINOLOGY

Let N be the total number of cases in the aggregation. Let be the
fraction of cases that will be sampled. So N is the number of cases in the
sample. Assume that each case has a single plaintiff and a single defendant
and that the plaintiffs are all different but the defendant is the same.
Suppose there are two types of claims in the aggregation, high-value claims
(H) and low value claims (L). To simplify the analysis, assume that these
two types of claims vary only with respect to the amount of damages and
not the objective likelihood of plaintiff’s success.100 Let wH and wL be the
damages for a high-value and a low-value claim, respectively.
Suppose that the plaintiffs and the defendant know w, but disagree
about plaintiff’s likelihood of success in proving liability or damages, or
both, at trial. This type of disagreement can occur, for example, when there
is asymmetric information so that one party has information about the
claim not yet known to the other side. Assume all the plaintiffs share the
same estimates of likely success, which we shall denote p . Let p be the
defendant’s estimate of plaintiff’s likelihood of success and assume that it
is the same for all the cases.101

100

This is just for purposes of simplification. One can also vary likelihood of
success and get similar qualitative results.
101
Therefore, the parties might have different information about liability or
they might view generally known evidence of liability differently. Alternatively,
they might agree on the probability of liability but disagree on the likely fraction of
full damages that the plaintiff will be able to prove. In this case, p can be
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Now let be the fraction of high-value claims in the aggregation.
Also, let CP be each plaintiff’s cost of litigating her individual case all the
way through trial and let CD be the defendant’s cost.102 To simplify the
analysis, assume that the parties have equal bargaining power in settlement
negotiations, so they split the settlement surplus evenly.103 Finally, it will
be convenient to have a variable to denote the average damage amount over
the entire class. Let v be this average, so v = wH + (1- )wL.
It is worth noting that the assumption that both parties know
whether a case is high or low value – and therefore agree on w – is rather
strong. It is more realistic to assume that the plaintiff has private
information about the value of w for her particular case. Nevertheless, the
strong assumption simplifies the analysis and conveys the essential insight.
In footnotes, I explain why the results are likely to be similar when
information about w is asymmetric.104
II. THE NO-SAMPLING BASELINE
First, we need to determine the results in a litigation world without
sampling. These results will serve as a baseline against which to compare
the impact of sampling.
A. PLAINTIFFS CONTROL SETTLEMENT DECISION
Suppose that each plaintiff makes the decision whether to settle
and for how much. Without sampling, the conditions for settlement being
feasible for a high-value and a low-value claim, respectively, are:
p wH + CD
p wL + CD

p wH - CP
p wL - CP

interpreted as the probability of success on liability times the fraction of a full
damage recovery the plaintiff is likely to receive.
102
For simplicity, I assume that CP and CD are the same for high-value and
low-value claims. I could relax this assumption, but it would complicate the
analysis unnecessarily.
103
We could generalize by letting be the plaintiff’s relative bargaining
power; that is, would be the fraction of the settlement surplus that the plaintiff
can capture. In this model, I set = 0.5.
104
See infra notes 105-108, 110.
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These are just the standard settlement feasibility conditions. The
defendant’s expected trial loss must be greater than or equal to the
plaintiff’s expected trial gain for the defendant to be willing to offer a
settlement that the plaintiff is willing to accept.
Rearranging, we get:
(p - p )wH + CP + CD
(p - p )wL + CP + CD

0
0

(1)
(2)

The expression on the left hand side is the settlement surplus, which must
be nonnegative for settlement to be feasible.105
When bargaining power is equal, as we assume it is, the expected
settlement is likely to be at the midpoint of the settlement range. Letting
SH* and SL* be the expected settlement for a high-value and a low-value
case, respectively, we have:
SH* = (p + p )wH/2 + (CD – CP)/2
SL* = (p + p )wL/2 + (CD – CP)/2

(3)
(4)

B. ATTORNEY FOR ALL PLAINTIFFS CONTROLS SETTLEMENT
DECISION AND SETTLES EN MASSE
Now assume that all the plaintiffs in the aggregation are
represented by the same attorney, who is hired on contingency with a
contract that specifies a contingency percentage of r. Suppose that the
attorney only settles en masse and that she makes the settlement decision to
maximize her own fee; in other words, assume that agency costs are high.

105

Suppose instead that information about w is asymmetric: the plaintiff
knows whether her case is high or low value, but the defendant only knows the
background fraction, , of high value claims. In this situation, the defendant will
assign the average value, v, to all cases. Let zH = wH – v and zL = v – wL. Then the
conditions for settlement being feasible without sampling, for a high-value and a
low-value claim, respectively, are:
(p – p )wH – p zH + CP + CD 0
(p – p )wL + p zL + CP + CD 0
Thus, the settlement surplus differs from the symmetric information case
by a factor equal to the amount by which the true value of w differs from the
average value, discounted by p .
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The smallest settlement the attorney will accept, S, is one that
makes her indifferent between settling or going to trial. This condition is:
rS = rnp v – nCP. Thus, the attorney’s minimum settlement demand is:
np v – nCP/r
The most the defendant is willing to offer is a settlement that
makes it indifferent between settling and going to trial. Therefore the
defendant’s maximum offer for the whole aggregation is:
np v + nCD
The feasibility condition for settlement if settlement takes place en masse
is:
np v + nCD – np v + nCP/r

0

Simplifying, we get:
(p - p )v + CP/r + CD

0

(5)

And S* for an en masse settlement with attorney control is:
S* = n[(p + p )v + CD - CP/r]/2

(6)

III. WITH SAMPLING
The parties’ expectations change with sampling. A plaintiff knows that if
she is chosen for the sample, she will receive either her own trial verdict or
the sample average depending on the sampling protocol – and the
defendant knows the same thing. If the sample plaintiffs’ costs are shared
equally by all plaintiffs, then each plaintiff’s litigation costs are the same
and equal to CP. However, if sample plaintiffs must pay their own
litigation costs, then the litigation costs for each of the sample plaintiffs are
CP and the litigation costs for each of the remaining plaintiffs are 0.
Let us assume that the defendant in all the scenarios averages total
litigation costs for the sampled cases over all the cases in the aggregation.
It follows that the defendant’s anticipated litigation costs are the same for
all cases; namely CD.
The following discussion analyzes only Scenarios I and II. The
other two scenarios can be analyzed in the same way.
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A. SCENARIO I: SAMPLE PLAINTIFFS RECEIVE SAMPLE AVERAGE AND
COSTS ARE SHARED EQUALLY
1. When the Plaintiffs Control the Settlement Decision
a. Effect on Settlement Feasibility
With these assumptions in place, we can set forth the feasibility
conditions for settlement before any sample is chosen. In Scenario I, all the
plaintiffs get the sample average and share the sample plaintiffs’ litigation
costs equally. Therefore, a plaintiff’s expected value of litigating through
trial when she knows sampling will take place is: p v – CP. The
defendant’s expected loss is: p v + CD. Therefore, the feasibility condition
for settlement in Scenario I is:
(p - p )v + (CP + CD)

0

(7)

Given this, let us examine whether the use of sampling is likely to
reduce, increase, or leave unaffected the likelihood of settlement compared
with the no-sampling baseline. To determine this, we must compare (7)
with (1) and (2). It is useful to consider cases where p
p and cases
where p < p separately.
First, suppose p
p . Comparing (1) and (2) with (7), it is easy to
see that settlement is feasible for all cases with and without sampling.
However, sampling might affect the probability of successful settlement for
high value and low value claims. For high value claims, sampling reduces
the settlement surplus. This follows directly from the fact that v < wH and
< 1. Whether this is likely to reduce or increase the frequency of settlement
depends on how the size of the surplus affects the likelihood of settlement.
One view is that a larger surplus creates more points of potential agreement
for the parties, which makes settlement more likely. Another view is that a
larger surplus invites harder bargaining because there is more to gain,
which makes settlement less likely. Under the first view, sampling is likely
to reduce the probability of settlement for high-value claims. Under the
second view, it is likely to increase the probability.
For low-value claims, the effects depend on the magnitude of p p . In particular, using sampling increases the surplus if p - p > (1)(CP+CD)/(v–wL), which is, after rearranging,
> 1 – [(p - p )(v–wL)(CP+CD)]. For any realistic , such as a 10% or 15%
sample size, this condition is not likely to be satisfied unless v > wL, which
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in turn is not likely unless wH > wL. It follows that using sampling is likely
to reduce the settlement surplus for most low-value cases as well.106
Second, suppose p < p . When this condition holds, some cases
that can settle without sampling cannot settle with sampling. To see this
point, note that the following two conditions must be satisfied if a case can
be settled without sampling but not with sampling, if the claim is high
value:
(p - p )wH + CP + CD 0
(p - p )v + (CP + CD) < 0
Let q = p - p . Solving for q in each inequality and putting the
inequalities together, we get:
(CP + CD)/v < q

(CP + CD)/wH

For this to be possible, (CP + CD)/v < (CP + CD)/wH, which implies that
< v/wH.
Therefore, for high-value claims with p < p (i.e., q > 0), the case
can settle without sampling but not with sampling if and only if:
< v/wH, and
(CP + CD)/v < q

(CP + CD)/wH

If q
(CP + CD)/v, then the case can settle with or without sampling, and if
q > (CP + CD)/wH, then the case cannot settle whether or not sampling is
used.

106

The results are a bit different when information about w is asymmetric. See
supra note 105. One must compare (7) with (p – p )wH – p zH + CP + CD for highvalue claims and with (p – p )wL + p zL + CP + CD for low-value claims. When p
> p , it is theoretically possible for sampling to enable settlement for high value
claims (but never for low value claims) when settlement is not otherwise feasible.
For this to hold true for a high value claim, two conditions must be satisfied:
(p – p )wH – p zH + CP + CD < 0 and
(p - p )v + (CP + CD) 0
The latter condition is always satisfied and the former is satisfied if zH > [(p p )wH + CP + CD]/p . In other words, the case must be quite far out on the tail of
the distribution before sampling enables settlement.
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The opposite result—i.e., that sampling makes settlement
feasible—is also possible but highly unlikely for most aggregations. It can
be easily shown that for sampling to enable settlement when it would not
otherwise occur, the following condition must be satisfied: (CP + CD)/wH <
q
(CP + CD)/v. This condition can hold only if > v/wH. But this
constraint on (the sample size) is not likely to hold for most aggregations.
As long as the standard deviation of the aggregation is not unusually large,
v/wH will be a reasonably large fraction and no court is likely to sample a
large fraction of cases from the aggregation.107
One can do the same analysis for low-value claims. It is easy to see
that the switch to sampling can never make settlement possible for a lowvalue claim if it is not possible without sampling. This is because (p - p )v
+ (CP + CD) < (p - p )wL + CP + CD whenever p < p (since v > wL).
However, the switch to sampling scuttles settlement for low-value cases
whenever (CP + CD)/v < q (CP + CD)/wL.108
To summarize, we have the following two results for cases where
p <p:
For realistic values of and aggregations that are not
too widely dispersed about the mean, switching from
no-sampling to sampling never turns a case that cannot
settle into one that can.
More importantly, using sampling turns some cases
that can settle into ones that cannot. These are cases
where (CP + CD)/v < q (CP + CD)/wi (i = H or L).

107

When information about w is asymmetric, similar results obtain. See supra
note 105. It is easy to derive the parallel conditions for sampling to scuttle
settlement for high value claims, assuming p < p :
< [1 – p zH/(CP + CD)]v/wH, and
(CP + CD)/v < q (CP + CD – p zH)/wH
H
If > [1 – p z /( CP + CD)]v/wH, there is a range of q for which sampling
enables settlement of high value claims, just as for the symmetric information case.
However, as long as p zH /( CP + CD) is relatively small, is very unlikely to
exceed this threshold and sampling will only scuttle settlement of high-value
claims.
108
Similar results obtain for low-value claims when information about w is
asymmetric. Sampling never enables settlement no matter what is. Moreover,
sampling scuttles settlement when (CP + CD)/v < q (CP + CD + p zL)/wL.

274

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

To give a concrete example of the second result, suppose a highvalue claim is worth $1,000,000 and a low-value claim is worth $600,000
and 20% of the aggregation is high-value claims. Suppose CP = CD =
$150,000, and a 10% sample is used, so = 0.1. Then v = .2×1,000,000 +
.8×600,000 = 680,000, and v/wH = 0.68. Therefore, the condition < v/wH
is satisfied (and, of course, < v/wL for all , since v/wL > 1). In this case,
(CP + CD)/v = 30,000/680,000 = .044. For high-value claims, (CP + CD)/wH
= 300,000/1,000,000 = 0.3. For low-value claims, (CP + CD)/wL =
300,000/600,000 = 0.5. Assume p < p . If the difference between the
plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of p is between 0.044 and 0.3, using
sampling will turn all claims into ones that cannot settle.
b. Effect on Settlement Amount
Next, consider the effect of sampling on the expected settlement
amount. Assuming equal bargaining power, so the parties split the surplus
evenly, the expected settlement amount with Scenario #1 is:
S* = [(p + p )v + (CD – CP)]/2

(8)

We must compare (8) with (3) and (4). It is easy to see that
sampling always reduces the settlement amount of high-value claims –
from [(p + p )wH + (CD – CP)]/2 to [(p + p )v + (CD – CP)]/2. Sampling
also increases the expected settlement for low-value claims if > 1 - [(p +
p )(v-wL)/(CD – CP)], which should (almost) always hold true.
2. When the Attorney Controls the Settlement Decision and
Settles En-Masse
a. Effect on Settlement Feasibility
The condition for a feasible settlement under Scenario I when the
attorney is in control is:
(p – p )v + (CP/r + CD)

0

(9)

We must compare (9) with (5). Doing so yields the following results:
If p p , the aggregation can settle en-masse with and
without sampling, but the surplus is less with
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sampling. The surplus is (p – p )v + CP/r + CD without
sampling and (p – p )v + (CP/r + CD) with sampling.
If p < p , then for all (with q = p – p ), a case that
cannot settle without sampling cannot settle with
sampling. But there are cases where settlement is
scuttled with sampling. These are cases where (CP/r +
CD)/v < q (CP/r + CD)/v.109
To illustrate, consider the same example as we analyzed above: wH
= $1,000,000; wL = $600,000; 20% of the aggregation is high-value claims;
CP = CD = $150,000, = 0.1, and v = 680,000. Assume r = 0.25, which is
roughly the average contingency recovery in large aggregations. Then CP/r
+ CD = 750,000.
p , then settlement is always possible, but sampling reduces
If p
the size of the surplus by $675,000. This is a significant amount given that
v is $680,000. For example, suppose p – p = 0.4. Then the surplus falls
from $1,022,000 to $347,000.
If p < p , then using sampling will turn cases that can settle into
cases that cannot whenever 0.11 < q
1. Therefore, as long as the
divergence in estimates is large enough, every such case will turn from
feasible to impossible to settle when sampling is used.
b. Effect on Settlement Amount
The expected en masse settlement under Scenario I with the
attorney in control is:
S* = n[(p + p )v + (CD - CP/r)]/2

(9)

To determine the effect on the settlement amount, we must
compare (9) with (6). It is easy to see that sampling increases the expected
settlement amount if, as is very likely, CP/r > CD.

109

If q
(CP/r + CD)/v, then the case can settle with or without sampling. If q
(CP/r + CD)/v, then the case cannot settle whether sampling is used or not.
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B. SCENARIO II: SAMPLE PLAINTIFFS RECEIVE OWN VERDICTS AND
COSTS ARE SHARED EQUALLY
1. When the Plaintiffs Control the Settlement Decision
a. Effect on Settlement Feasibility
When sample plaintiffs receive their own verdicts, a plaintiff’s
expected value of litigating through trial knowing that sampling will be
used depends on whether the claim is high or low value. Since is the
probability a plaintiff will be selected for the sample and since a sample
plaintiff receives her own verdict, wH or wL, and a non-sample plaintiff
receives the sample average, v, the feasibility conditions with sampling
become for high-value and low-value claims, respectively:
(p - p )[ wH + (1- )v] + (CP + CD) 0
(p - p )[ wL + (1- )v] + (CP + CD) 0

(10)
(11)

We must compare (10) with (1), and (11) with (2). Doing so and
applying the same method as above yields the following results (where q =
p – p ):110
If p
p , all high-value and low-value cases can
settle, but the surplus is less with sampling for highvalue claims. The surplus is less with sampling for
low-value claims if p – p < (CP + CD)/(v – wL) and
greater with sampling if the inequality is reversed.
If p < p , then for all high-value cases and all , a
case that cannot settle without sampling also cannot
settle with sampling. But there are cases where
settlement is scuttled with sampling: a case can settle
without sampling but not with sampling if
(CP+CD)/[ wH+(1- )v] < q (CP + CD)/wH.111

110

It is possible to derive parallel conditions that apply when information
about w is asymmetric, just as in Scenario I. See supra notes 107-108.
111
If q
(CP+CD)/[ wH+(1- )v], then the case can settle with or without
sampling. If q > (CP + CD)/wH, then the case cannot settle whether sampling is used
or not.
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If p < p , then for all low-value cases and all (and
with q = p – p ), a case that cannot settle without
sampling also cannot settle with sampling. But there
are cases where settlement is scuttled with sampling: a
case can settle without sampling but not with sampling
if (CP+CD)/[ wL+(1- )v] < q < (CP + CD)/wL.112
b. Effect on Settlement Amount
Under Scenario II, the expected settlement amounts with sampling
become for high-value and low-value claims, respectively:
SH* = {(p + p )[ wH + (1- )v] + (CD - CP)}/2
SL* = {(p + p )[ wL + (1- )v] + (CD - CP)}/2

(12)
(13)

We must compare (12) with (3) and (13) with (4). It is clear from
inspection that sampling reduces SH*. Sampling increases SL* if p + p >
(CD – CP)/(v – wL), which should usually be the case unless defendant’s
litigation costs greatly exceed the plaintiff’s or the low-value case is very
close to the population average.
2. When the Attorney Controls the Settlement Decision and
Settles En-Masse
a. Effect on Settlement Feasibility
The feasibility condition with attorney control and sampling is:
(p – p )v + (CP/r + CD)

0

(14)

This is the same as for Scenario I with the attorney controlling the
settlement decision and settling en-masse. Therefore, the same results hold.

112

If q
(CP+CD)/[ wL+(1- )v], then the case can settle with or without
sampling. If q > (CP + CD)/wL, then the case cannot settle whether sampling is used
or not.
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b. Effect on Settlement Amount
The expected settlement without and with sampling are the same as
for Scenario I, so the results are the same as well. Sampling increases the
expected settlement amount if, as is very likely, CP/r > CD.

REEVALUATING COMPLEX MEDIATION
GENERALIZATIONS
EDWARD BRUNET*
***
Several generalizations dominate the mediation discourse. When
discussing mediation one often hears the almost mythic words of trust,
confidentiality, expertise, and asymmetric information advantages held by
risk neutral and data rich insurance companies. This short essay critiques
these generalizations and exposes them as incomplete and erroneous.
Mediator expertise is elusive and not always necessary. Mediators
frequently lack substantive expertise and exhibit only procedural expertise.
Their expertise is only partial and may be minimal.
Confidentiality, often deemed central to a mediation, is similarly
overblown. In truth, the mediators commitment to confidentiality is
overstated. Most mediators act to filter and then redistribute important
information gained in earlier caucus sessions. Such “noisy mediation” is
central to mediation theory and indispensable to settlement. Mediator
comments are often pregnant with new information hints. The stereotype
that data rich insurers, repeat players in dispute resolutions possess an
advantage in making and receiving offers is not universally true. The
emergence of sophisticated and efficient networks of organized plaintiffs
who operate to prevent insurers from controlling the mediation process
undercuts this generalization.
I have mixed reactions to trust, often claimed a mediation
essential. To be sure, trust remains a helpful and useful characteristic that
plays a major role in settlement, particularly in the early stages of
mediation. However, units of trust are difficult to create and do not
guaranty a successful mediated settlement.
***

*

Henry J. Casey Professor, Lewis and Clark. I thank Jessie Young for
research help and Jeff Jones and Kate Lichter for comments. Any errors remain
mine. Readers should be aware that I plead guilty to mediating over 75 disputes,
mostly environmental insurance coverage and employment disputes.
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INTRODUCTION

Several generalizations dominate mediation discourse, particularly
in complex litigation. These commonly accepted generalizations, often
involving insurance companies, have almost been transformed into myth
and appear to be too widely accepted. In fact, these generalizations appear
to lack reliable proof.
Consider the following generalized assertions regarding expertise,
trust and success. For example, one often hears that the mediator is or
should be an expert.1 Expertise is the coinage with which we assess
mediator hiring and competence. Similarly, the mediator appears clothed in
a tunic of trust and is esteemed by the disputants because of such potential
trust.2 Trust has become a crucial ingredient of mediation and is the subject
that takes center-stage in the parties’ vetting process in mediator selection.
Success represents yet another mediator homily. We often hear that a
particular mediator is successful or, conversely, is no longer successful.3
Never mind that defining success which might be described in a variety of
ways,4 including leading the disputants to dismiss a pending lawsuit but
also just achieving new respect and a degree of self-awareness that will
facilitate an ability to more properly evaluate settlement possibilities.
This list of mediation generalities goes on. One frequently hears
that the presence of an insurance company skews the relative levels of
information or, put more bluntly, creates information asymmetries.5 Some
1

Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 12 n.15 (1996)
(“Most parties who are serious about resolving the dispute will choose a mediator
who can give a strong, credible and objective evaluation of the legal and factual
issues in the case.”).
2
See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation- A Preferred Method of Dispute
Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S5, S29 (1989).
3
See, e.g., Susan S. Silbey, Mediation Mythology, 9 NEG. J. 349 (1993);
Riskin, supra note 1, at 12 n.15 (noting that Richard Ralston, a Kansas City
lawyer-mediator, who has extensive experience as a lawyer and U.S. Magistrate
judge, asserts that the disputants will select a mediator “who can close the
negotiations.”).
4
See Note, Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action Mediation, 119
HARV. L. REV. 587, 608 (2005).
5
Id. at 595 n.39 (“[D]escribing how ‘attorneys who run portfolios of cases
(including class actions)’ hope to ‘diversify the risk’ of new information causing
bad outcomes in cases by assuming it will cause good outcomes in other cases in
their portfolios.”) (quoting Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty:
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characterize insurance companies as data rich because they accumulate and
save information from earlier disputes.6 As repeat players, insurers might
have access to more information relevant to the dispute and be able to more
accurately predict the probable outcome of a case.7 Of course, insurance
companies invest in the business of collecting data and possess huge
incentives to reap a return on this investment.
This advantage, or informational asymmetry, is allegedly of
tremendous value when making settlement overtures to the possibly illinformed plaintiff. In this world of complex mediation generalities,
defendant insurers are often data-rich “repeat players”8 who know the score
due often to access to much more information than their opponents
regarding the past relevant judgments and settlements. Myth holds that
these experienced these insurers possess an important advantage in
settlement negotiations because of their data-edge.9
Yet another generalization triggers the “Parable of Lucky Uncle
Joe.” Plaintiffs or their attorneys have earned a contrasting generalized
reputation for eschewing the data-based probabilities advanced in
mediation or negotiation by defendants. Instead, the reigning generalization
suggests that plaintiff or her attorney is prone to feel lucky and to ignore
the data with the attitude that probability assessments are wholly wrong and
“just won’t apply to me.” In this generalization the plaintiff Uncle Joe
ignores the fact-based offer advanced by the data-rich, repeat player
insurance company defendant because he feels lucky. Like the luck or
hunch dominated fisherman who decides to go fishing with confidence on a
day or a time that is unlikely to achieve success, Uncle Joe formulates his
settlement offers and case analysis on hoped for good fortune rather than
fact.
This essay exposes and critiques these mediation generalities. In a
very real sense, these generalities seem to have derived from a type of
Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 113
(2004)).
6
Gregory D. Ewig, Using the Internet as a Resource for Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1217, 1220-21
(2002).
7
Id. at 1223.
8
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
9
Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 663, 701 n.173 (2001)
(arguing that “repeat players in the settlement game” have the ability to absorb
information about how particular types of cases settle).
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mythology. Very little in the way of actual proof or data supports the
generalities discussed. Instead, the propositions focused upon seem vague
and can often be challenged as incomplete, questionable or overstated. I
conclude by urging students and users of mediation services to avoid
generality and, wherever possible, to challenge the use of hyperbole.
While I am writing about mediation of complex cases generally, there is no
question that the prime audience of this essay should be the insurance
industry particularly. The generalities here addressed plague both counsel
for defending insurers and their insurance clients.
II.

GENERALIZATION #1: HIRE THE MEDIATOR WHO IS A
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT.

A great amount of ink has been spilled extolling the need for
mediator expertise.10 Several problems exist with the notion that disputants
should seek an expert mediator. First, determining the degree of mediator
expertise is deceptively difficult. For disputants who have not used the
particular mediator being vetted, the normal problem of lack of first hand
experience routinely occurs. Unfortunately, it normally takes a
considerable amount of time to assess the true level of mediator expertise
and that time, of course, is spent in the mediation process itself, well after
mediator expertise is assessed.
A related problem is that much of the information garnered
regarding the possible mediator is entirely second-hand and indirect. This
means that what a party learns about the mediator is not really based upon
more reliable first-hand observation or direct assessment.11 What one learns
about expertise is all too frequently dependent on the filter of a third party
who comes close to monopolizing accurate assessment.12 Professor Robert
Bone characterizes settlement process as a form of monopoly.13 This
10

See e.g., Riskin, supra note 1, at 46 (“The need for subject-matter expertise
typically increases in direct proportion to the parties' need for the mediator's
evaluations…[and] the kind of subject-matter expertise needed depends on the
kind of evaluation or direction the parties seek.”).
11
Fromm, supra note 9, at 698 (“The most thorough, useful, and exclusive
resource of settlement is a person’s own firsthand knowledge of settlements.”).
12
Id. (describing the “virtual monopoly over information about confidential
settlements”).
13
See generally Robert G. Bone, The Economics of Civil Procedure 79-80
(2003) (asserting that “settlement is a bilateral monopoly”). The logic of this pont
seems obvious, but contracting parties are free to negotiate with oher potential
partners, provided that competition exists. Once two potential contract partners
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problem pervades the process of mediator selection and is not unlike the
all-to-common problem of building a case entirely upon circumstantial
evidence.
Then there is the obvious difficulty of defining a measure of
mediator expertise or competence. Substantive knowledge of the law
underlying the dispute differs greatly from the procedural nuances that
become good mediation practice. So-called “evaluative mediation” often
stems from a mediator’s substantive knowledge.14 Some disputants might
desire such “expertise,” while others may react negatively to anything
beyond procedural sophistication.15
Questions of the mediator’s procedural expertise also should be
addressed with a factually sensitive approach. Mediators develop
specialties that can facilitate their roles. For example, some mediators are
experienced in complex litigation and others bring a full plate of
employment law to the ADR table. It seems obvious that disputants select
the mediator who is an appropriate fit.16
Korobkin and Guthrie challenge the ability of lawyers to
accurately value assets and question whether repetition of key negotiation
dynamics will improve lawyer performance.17 Others fail to rely on the
ability of the so-called repeat player to control valuable information

spend time and money assessing a possible deal, the sunk costs might rule out
tuning away to another contractint entity.
14
See Leonard Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and
The New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 14 (2003); Leonard Riskin,
Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 11 (1994).
15
See Jeffry Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from
Ideology, 2000 J. DIS. RES. 247, 264 (2000) (“In practice, however, it appears that
the most highly sought mediators are those who provide exactly this sort of
evaluative feedback to the parties and use some measure of evaluation as part of
their facilitation of reasonable party dialogue leading to settlement.”).
16
See, e.g., Maria R. Volpe, Taking Stock: ADR Responses in Post-Disaster
Situations, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 381, 389 (2008) (criticizing recent BP
Gulf oil spill system because the infrastructure for conducting these large scale
events was created and implemented by those mainly outside the field in the
disaster areas).
17
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement:
A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 83 (1997).
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essential to a settlement.18 Taken together, these influential studies make
assessments of mediator expertise elusive and difficult to achieve.19
III.

GENERALIZATION #2: THE MEDIATOR WILL KEEP SECRET
OR PRIVATE THE INFORMATION LEARNED DURING A
CONFIDENTIAL CAUCUS CONTEXT.

Perhaps no other mediation generalization strikes such a sharp,
focused note as the notion that the mediator will keep confidential all the
information learned during the mediation session. This confidentiality
pledge goes to the very core of a mediated dispute and is often reasserted
during the mediation session by the mediator. The typical mediator will
cover and promise the need for mediator confidentiality at the opening
phase of the mediation and reaffirm his obligation to be confidential also in
caucuses. These uses of confidentiality are internal to the mediation in that
they recur within the mediation process at the opening and curing caucuses.
They are much different uses of confidentiality than those “external” to the
phases of mediation such as questions of mediation privilege that may arise
following a mediation.20
Belief in the sanctity of this platitude permits a party to freely
discuss the true issues in the case and to disclose the “interest” of the
disputant to the mediator.21 If such party disclosures fail to occur, the
crucial information flow that fuels the mediation process atrophies and
chances of settlement diminish. Aptly put by Ellen Deason, “if parties are
to participate in mediation wholeheartedly, they need to have confidence
that they can predict the extent to which their statements will be protected
from disclosure.”22
There is little doubt that many mediators scrupulously follow this
respected generalization in what has been labeled an “understanding”
18

Fromm, supra note 9, at 698-700.
Stempel, supra note 15, at 265 (“If, in actual use of what is generally
considered mediation, participants frequently prefer mediators who being
evaluative techniques to the process, it is needlessly bucking reality to insist that
‘real’ mediation must be devoid of any evaluative component.”).
20
See generally Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements:
Contract Law Collides With Confidentiality, 35 U. DAVIS L. REV. 38 (2001)
(describing a post-mediation problem unlike the internal promises of
confidentiality that occur during a mediation).
21
Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation
and Mediation—Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 563-64 (2005).
22
Id. at 564.
19
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model of mediation.23 The model focuses on the mediator purely as a
listener, and as a trainer whose goal is to empower the disputants to resolve
their own conflicts. Yet, many mediators appear to depart substantially
from this reluctance to “filter” and “leak” the forbidden and learned fruits
of private caucusing. In a process labeled “noisy mediation,” these
mediators often find themselves revealing some of the data learned in a
prior caucus session.24
In their 1994 classic article emphasizing the economic implications
of mediation, Professors Brown and Ayres suggested that such a “noisy
mediation” would significantly help to settle the dispute.25 In contrast to the
understanding-based model of mediation, an economic analysis emphasizes
caucusing in analyzing the value a mediator brings to a negotiation by
controlling the flow of information. Hidden information can be a major
impediment to settlement. “By shuttling back and forth between meetings
with individual disputants, mediators can collect and distribute private
information.”26 Brown and Ayres explain that mediators do this by sending
“noisy translations of information disclosed during private caucuses.”27 For
example, a mediator might determine based on caucuses that there is a zone
23

See, e.g., GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT:
MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008) (asserting that the “understanding”
model of mediation focuses on the parties as being in control of the mediation
process and outcome; or the parties themselves are in the best position to find a
solution because they are the ones who created, and are living in the problem
context); Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict Together: the
Understanding-Based Model of Mediation, 4 J. AM. ARB. 225, 226-30 (2005)
(asserting that increase of “understanding” regarding an adversary will help to
resolve a dispute creatively).
24
See, e.g., John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 69-70 (1997).
25
See Jennifer Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80
VA. L. REV. 323, 329 (1994) (setting forth a theoretical need for the mediator to use
leaked information that will be filtered and formulated by the mediator to aid in
settling a case).
26
Id. at 326.
27
Id. at 328. See also Douglas E. Noll, The Myth of the Mediator As
Settlement Broker, DISP. RESOL. J. 42, 46-47 (May-July 2009) (discussing the
procedural and real-life implications of the fine line between trust and
confidentiality and explaining how they must be broken to reach a settlement);
Janis Sue Porter, Mediation of Personal Injury Cases: Mediation Can Settle Most
Personal Injury Cases, 52 OR. ST. B. BULL. 34, 35 (Feb.-Mar. 1992) (describing
the confidential nature of mediation and how it eventually must yield to be able to
secure a settlement).
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of agreement between the parties or that a set of trade-offs might bring the
parties closer to agreement. “Revealing that there are gains from trade or
that a particular set of trades might be acceptable to the other side has the
effect of indirectly disclosing to each party some of the mediator’s private
discussions with the other side.”28 Without such filtering and information
transfer the mediator will be the only person in the process to achieve true
“understanding.”29
This economic theory helps to explain the important aspect of
mediation practice. While mediators need to keep certain information
confidential, they also need to evaluate and then transfer new, valuable
information to disputants. Some of the new “filtered” information
transferred will not be in the same form as it was when the mediator gained
access to it. As transferred to a disputant, selected information may be
“noisy.” The mediator may take X, a piece of information learned in
confidence from disputant A, and later ask disputant B “how would you
react if your disputant A had decided to do X?” This process of filtering
and conveying ideas to get negotiation movement and to transfer new
information from a disputant lies at the heart of the mediation process.
Brown and Ayres observed that mediators acted as information
brokers who collected valuable information about the strengths and
weaknesses of a dispute and the relating settlement value. This theory of
noisy mediation relies upon the mediator’s willingness to intentionally
transfer data and to do so in a way that facilitates settlement. Strict
confidentiality represents a lack of sharing of information between parties
and “greatly decreases the likelihood that any claim will be filed.”30
Some degree of noisy mediation appears essential to settlement.
Nevertheless, some commentators criticize such behavior as “most
problematic” because a mediator’s proposal will likely involve “a possible
settlement option that implicitly contains messages about the preferences or

28

Brown & Ayres, supra note 25, at 327. See also Fran L. Tetunic, Mediation
Myths and Urban Legends, 82 FLA. B.J. 52, 52-53 (May 2008) (asserting that total
confidentiality is a myth in Florida’s court-mandated mediation).
29
See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Charles B. Craver & Ellen E. Deason, ADR: THE
ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 231-37 (4th ed. 2011) (setting forth mediator goals of
achieving fairness, respect and ability to understand one’s opponent as above all
other mediation purposes).
30
Laurie Kratky Dor, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time to Let
Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463,
488 (2006).
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facts of the other party.”31 This criticism essentially accuses noisy
mediators of unethical conduct, a serious accusation beyond the scope of
this essay.
IV.

GENERALIZATION #3: THE DISPUTANTS’ SELECTION AND
FUNCTIONAL USE OF THE MEDIATOR IS BASED AND
DEPENDENT ON TRUST

One frequently hears that trust is the foundation of mediation.32
Without trust, a mediation is doomed to failure. The presence of trust
creates an open information environment in which the parties feel free to
disclose their interests to the mediator. The building of trust provides a
safe environment in which the mediator can increase information flow and
make efficient use of trust.
All-star mediator Ken Feinberg maintains that neutrality and trust
are essential characteristics of an effective mediator.33 The mediation
process can only work effectively when there is a trust relationship between
the parties and their mediator, and where each party develops a quantum of
trust allowing information to flow to the mediator.34
These generalizations regarding trust are difficult to challenge. I
salute and acknowledge the crucial role of trust in the mediation process.
At the same time, however, the notion that trust can be massed produced in
a cookbook, mechanical recipe that can be sold to all potential buyers
strikes me as highly questionable. We are not all All-star mediators with a
rich background and long resume capable of creating trust as early in the
31

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities,
38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 443 (1997) (asserting that “[s]uch issues cannot be
resolved easily either by broad protections of confidentiality or by reference to the
lawyers' (and even other professionals') duties of confidentiality.”).
32
Feinberg, supra note 2, at S29 (Trust in a mediator is essential because if the
parties believe that a mediator may be required to divulge information of the
mediation, parties would be deterred from choosing mediation as a means of
conflict resolution); see also, e.g., Christopher Harper, Mediator As Peacemaker:
The Case for Activist Transformative-Narrative Mediation, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL.
595, 602 (2006) (describing, inter alia, mediator trust and non-intervention or
neutrality as a pervasive myth in mediation).
33
Feinberg, supra note 2, at S29.
34
Id. (“Any suspicion that the mediator may become an adversary or witness
against one of the parties in future litigation will undermine the parties’ trust in the
mediator.”).
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mediator vetting stage. Respected mediators are few and far between and
even they need to earn the nuggets of trust needed to grease the units of
information flow essential to mediation success.
The timing associated with building trust merits careful attention.
I stress that early trust building is essential to a winning mediation
formula.35 If high levels of trust are present early in a mediation context,
the parties will offer the mediator critical information to be filtered and
perhaps distributed in the form of noisy mediation comments by the
mediator. However, the absence of any trust early in the mediation will
delay information flow and related symmetrical data possession essential to
resolving the dispute.
Trust is not created magically or mechanically. What factors cause
the growth and emergence of trust essential to mediation? A brief review of
scholarly thinking reveals a less than clear answer. Some mediators stress
the value of reputation as the main path to enhanced trust.36 In great
contrast, others regard trust as an ill-defined foundational concept of
mediation because “it hides the normative judgments that a mediator must
make about what are good and bad agreements under the practical
circumstances at hand.”37
The relationship between trust and mediation can be depicted
graphically. Consider the triangle below which illustrates the critical role of
trust in the mediation process. The space within and without this triangle
represents a negotiation context and is designed to help understand how the
interjection of the mediator and units of trust into the disputing fray will
heavily influence the settlement process.

35

Christophe Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 569
(2009) (noting that “goodwill gestures start the evolution of a relationship from
suspicious competitors to trusting partners”).
36
See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 2; Leslie, supra note 35, at 570 (assesrting
that “honoring ones word and staying out of ones way” help trust building).
37
See James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination
on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 73 (2004) (setting forth a less than enthusiastic view of trust
in mediation).
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Graph #1: No Information, No Deal

In Graph #1 the parties are engaged in negotiation but unable to
agree to a deal. The mediator is of little or nor help because she is located
far from the action and is playing “catch-up” due to a lack of information.
The mediator is “out of it”, well outside the information-rich triangle and
incapable of linking the adversaries without a better structural position and
without additional intake of information and production of trust. In
contrast, the parties in this graph are positioned inside the triangle, a
position that yields access to incentives and information. They have more
information than the mediator and the incentives to negotiate and
ultimately resolve the dispute. Yet, they lack the high level of information
essential to reduce risk and to agree to settle. No adequate information, no
deal.
Graph #2, below shows an overall lack of trust. In Graph #2 below
the parties do not trust the mediator nor one another. Not surprisingly, no
trust effectively means no deal. Settlement fails to happen. Note the
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structural position of the mediator who is now within the negotiation
triangle where information might be traded and the disputed facts might
become more clear. Some potential for settlement exists. Yet, the mediator,
perhaps new to the process, has not created trust essential to settlement. No
trust, no deal.
Graph #2: No Trust, No Deal

Graph #2, however, contains a structure that is supportive of
settlement, which focuses on the need for both party respect and trust to
make a deal. Of course, at times there will be the resources and a healthy
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environment for agreement. In Graph #2 the mediator has assimilated
additional information and is structured to aid in settlement inside the
negotiation triangle. The mediator of Graph #2 is no longer “out of it” in
terms of lacking information. Yet, a mediated deal remains impossible
because trust seems nonexistent, preventing settlement.
In contrast, Graph #3, below, illustrates the impact of trust. The
parties trust the mediator. Information appears to flow and risk may
decrease.
Graph #3: Mediator Trust Results in Settlement

In Graph #3 the impact of mediation operates in a more positive
way. The plaintiff and defendant are within the negotiation triangle, dealing
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with each other. This dynamic is shown by the horizontal lines at the
bottom of the triangle. Also note the position of the mediator within the
triangle, meaning that the neutral is well-stocked with information and
assessment abilities. The mediator is depicted as an insider who in Graph
#3 is “with it,” able to help the parties deal with one another. The diagonal
lines at the sides of the triangle show that the parties are playing the
negotiation game with the mediator. This is inevitable. Yet, the parties are
greatly aided by the presence of trust, here shown as a vertical line first
connecting the adversary parties and then vertically influencing the
negotiation itself by connecting the formerly distrustful adversaries.
The ingredient of trust seems the most important in the recipe of
settlement. Peace is close at hand and trust has done its magic. The
adversary parties trust and respect the mediator. In essence the graph
demonstrates a mediator who enters into process well-informed (inside the
negotiation triangle) and has the ability to produce trust which, in turn,
facilitates settlement.
Here the adversary parties settle using probability assessments or
values and the mediator is using evaluative mediation. The mediator hired
is capable of collecting information to accurately assign probability
assessments and appears well into the fray as an active participant. The
mediator understands risk and is capable of communicating risks and
evaluations to the disputants. Note also that the mediator has an incentive
to help settle the case which should facilitate increases in mediator
reputation.
The need to create trust is essential but elusive as well as
complicated. Reputation appears the gold standard in the creation of early
trust.38 The achievement of a strong reputation as a neutral surely creates a
degree of trust. The beauty of reputation-created trust is it can be triggered
early in the multiple phases of litigation. Early trust based on reputation
need not be prepared at or near the beginning of litigation. Reputation
based upon trust exists without any need for a mediator to do much; it
belongs to the mediator and typically is the mediator’s to lose. Reputation
will decrease where the parties observe untrustworthy actions.39
There are other means of creating trust units, each difficult and
each demanding. Some mediators strive for open and transparent events
38

Ellen E. Deason, The Need for Trust As A Justification for Confidentiality in
Mediation: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1387, 1401 (2006)
(“Reputation is one of the key variables in this calculus, for it will be enhanced by
trustworthy behavior.”).
39
Id.
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held early in the dispute.40 These events provide the disputants with an
opportunity to see the mediator in action and hold the potential for either
reducing or increasing trust. Caucusing will, of course, be undervalued in
these events due to its placement of the mediator in secret positions that can
worry the parties and decrease the quantum of mediator trust. Nonetheless,
an early caucus gives a mediator opportunity to permit the clients to vent
emotionally charged feelings and to begin to earn a reputation as an
empathetic and active listener. These early trust enhancing events seem
more appropriate for caucus contexts and are riskier if done in open
session.
V.

GENERALIZATION #4: INSURERS DOMINATE DATA RICH
DISPUTES BECAUSE THEY POSSESS ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION AND LACK THE PLAINTIFF’S RISK-TAKER
ATTITUDE

Data rich disputes, often defended by insurance companies, present
the classic battle between parties differentiated by asymmetric information.
One frequently hears the generalization that insurer’s possess a rich mine of
information which creates a significant advantage.41 The insurance industry
files likely contain relevant information from previous disputes, such as
settlement amounts of similar cases, judicial judgments, or mediator
predispositions.42

40

See, e.g., Christopher Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV.
515, 573-75 (2004) (noting that “Transparacy Facilitiest trust”).
41
See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984)
(“All plaintiffs want their damages immediately, but an indigent plaintiff may be
exploited by a rich defendant because his need is so great that the defendant can
force him to accept a sum that is less than the ordinary present value of the
judgment . . . It might seem that settlement benefits the plaintiff by allowing him to
avoid the costs of litigation, but this is not so. The defendant can anticipate the
plaintiff's costs if the case were to be tried fully and decrease his offer by that
amount. The indigent plaintiff is a victim of the costs of litigation even if he
settles.”).
42
See Howard M. Erichson, The End of the Defendant Advantage in Tobacco
Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 129 (2001) (“While in
the past, one might have started with the assumption that the defendant had the
resources to swamp the plaintiff, these [plaintiff] firms have accumulated sufficient
capital through major victories in cases such as asbestos, tobacco, Dalkon Shield,
etc., so that it may well be the plaintiff that is in the stronger resource position.”).
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Popular thought dictates that the insurer’s asymmetric information
creates a negotiation edge for defendants simply because they hold more
relevant information. The myth posits that the insured defendant will be
able to bargain more effectively by enabling more accurate assessments
that are actually grounded in reality.43
Part of this mythology suggests that the plaintiff and her attorney
will take excessive risk and be classified as risk takers in decisions relating
to trial or settlement. Consider the Parable of Uncle Joe, a risk-taking
fisherman who tends to feel lucky and invincible. Uncle Joe is utterly
confident and unable to compromise or to bargain realistically. He thinks
that he will catch a big fish regardless of fishing conditions. Translating
this Parable to the litigation context is not difficult. Some plaintiffs ignore
bad news and turn down attractive offers by exercising risk-taking
behavior.
But is the Parable of Uncle Joe universally accurate? Unlikely.
Today’s plaintiffs are represented by resourceful attorneys well connected
with others with similar cases. Professors Issacharoff and Klonoff describe
networks of plaintiffs’ counsel who efficiently coordinate briefing and
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procedural proficiency of mediation practice. Others selected as mediators
may lack much substantive knowledge in the topic to be mediated. A
healthy skepticism towards mediation expertise prevails and actually aids
the vetting process.
Confidentiality, likewise, is a well-respected notion, almost a
mantra of mediation practice, heard repeatedly at the beginning phases of a
mediation. Like many clichés or mantras, this commitment to
confidentiality seems to be either overstated or unrealistic. It fails to
recognize that the mediator acts as a filter who analyzes and then
distributes selected information learned in caucus session. Even Judge
Posner has acknowledged the efficient use of noisy mediator comments
that can facilitate settlement. The classic 1994 article by Brown and Ayres
correctly justifies the process values of noisy mediator comments. A clear
demand for evaluative mediation exists45 and relies on this process of
mediator assimilation and subsequent leaking or distribution of information
collected from the adversary parties.
Moreover, the need for trust in the meditative process seems
universally accepted and valid. It is hard to be critical of such a valuable
and important tenet of dispute resolution. My comments on trust seem
somewhat more measured and prudent. Mediation needs and depends on
trust for its success.
Lastly, Generalization #4 combines two notions, one that the
defending party, often represented by a data rich insurance company,
possesses an advantage in making and receiving offers grounded in reality,
and a second axiom, the Parable of Lucky Uncle Joe, the lucky fishermanplaintiff who is a classic risk-taker who thinks that he can beat the odds
habitually. When these two generalizations are combined, settlement
mythology predicts that the defendant will evaluate settlement offers more
accurately and will prepare and transmit to the mediator offers containing a
patina of legitimacy. The mediator, in turn, may be impressed and thankful
for this reality based information and might find herself subconsciously
siding with the data rich party.
This scenario, while surely possible, occurs less with every passing
day. Modern Uncle Joes appear, but with less frequency. Instead,
individual plaintiffs’ attorneys join forces to aggregate their discovery,
monetary judgment information, and settlement data. Uncle Joe, while he
still exists, is increasingly isolated. The nature of dispute resolution (or
45

See Eric Green, Reexamining Mediator and Judicial Roles in Large,
Complex Litigation: Lessons From the Microsoft and Other Mega-Cases, 86 B.U.
L. Rev. 1171, 1186 (2006).
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fishing) has changed greatly and now invites collaboration but on the
plaintiff side of a dispute. Increased collective action has produced a new
group of data-rich plaintiffs who are able to challenge the former
information surplus held by insurance companies. Although I do not
suggest that consortiums of collaborating plaintiff’s attorneys hold
information that is at the level of data-deep insurance companies, I do agree
with those who have questioned the generalization that asymmetric
information inevitably aids the insurance industry. Those times are past and
a new era of collaboration on the plaintiff’s side clearly has emerged.

PROBABILITY SAMPLING IN LITIGATION
JOSEPH B. KADANE*

***
Random sampling is a widely used and well-established techniques
used to reduce the cost of providing interpretable data. This paper discusses
examples in the several different kinds of litigation in which random
sampling has been useful. The paper concludes with speculation about the
possible use of random sampling in mass tort litigation.
***
This paper aims to contribute to a discussion of the possibility of
using statistical methods to handle mass tort cases efficiently. After
reviewing the basics of sampling, the paper summarizes cases involving
sampling that the author participated in. The conclusion gives some thoughts
on how mass tort litigation might be approached statistically.
I.

PROBABILITY SAMPLING

The purpose of random sampling is to allow inference from the
items observed to items unobserved. It is usually used to save the effort of
having to observe each member of a population.
It is important to distinguish random sampling from other kinds of
sampling. The hall-mark of random sampling is the use of a random number
table or an equivalent computer program to choose units. The reason for the
use of random numbers is to make transparent the process by which items
are chosen for observation. This is important because without
randomization, biases can creep in, whether advertent or inadvertent, that
can destroy the validity of the inference to unobserved members of the
population. While often random sampling is implemented in which each
item has the same probability of selection, this is not necessary. What is
necessary is that the probability of selection of each item be known in
advance.1
*

Leonard J. Savage University Professor of Statistics and Social Sciences,
Emeritus, at Carnegie Mellon University. His most recent books are "Statistics in the
Law" (Oxford University Press 2008) and "Principles of Uncertainty" (Chapman
and Hall 2011), also free on the web at www.stat.cmu.edu/~heidi/uncertaintykadane.pdf .
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Perhaps an example would illustrate this important point. Imagine a
clinical trial of two treatments for a particular medical condition. Suppose
that the physician (we'll call her Phyllis) who actually treats the patients
observes the health of the patients in two categories, healthy and not, but this
observation will not be available to those responsible for analyzing the
results. Suppose also that healthy patients do better, whatever treatment is
assigned to them, than do unhealthy patients. If Phyllis believes that one
treatment is suitable for healthy patients and the other for unhealthy patients,
and assigns treatments that way, the results of the trial will favor the
treatment she assigns to healthy patients. If Phyllis wishes one treatment to
be favored in the results, she can achieve this by her treatment assignments.
In the first case her motives were pure, she was simply assigning treatments
to help her patients as best she could. In the second case, her motives could
be malign, for example, if she had a financial stake in her favored treatment.
But her actions would be the same, and the consequences would be the same.
Only by random sampling, where the decision of which treatment is assigned
to a patient is removed from Phyllis, can outside observers be confident of
lack of bias in the result.2
A relative of random sampling is systematic sampling, in which
every kth member of a list is used as a sample, starting with some arbitrary
member of the list. 3 Whether this is an adequate substitute for random
sampling depends on the circumstances and the ordering of items in the list.
Often the use of systematic sampling is benign. However, I remember one
case in which systematic sampling was used to choose jury venires in
Atlantic County, New Jersey.4 This has the effect that all persons with the
same last name are adjacent in the list. Jurors were listed alphabetically
starting with the fifth letter of their last name. There had been a previous
system found to be discriminatory. A local bank proposed the following
replacement. Often the choice of k was small, like 2 or 3. The consequence
of this was that there were, more often than would have been true had the
sampling been random, people in the same family, with the same last name,
chosen for the same jury venire. Attorneys facing such a venire felt that they
had to use peremptory challenges on every member of such a family if they
challenged any member, to avoid offending potential jurors. The effect was
1

See WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 10-11 (J. Wiley & Sons
1977).
2
For more on this example, see Scott M. Berry & Joseph B. Kadane, Optimal
Bayesian Randomization, J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y B (1997).
3
See COCHRAN, supra note 1, at ch. 8.
4
State v. Long, 499 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).

2011

PROBABILITY SAMPLING IN LITIGATION

299

to reduce the number of useable peremptory challenges available to the
parties. This jury challenge was successful.
Sometimes there are special considerations that make it wise to
separate a population of interest into various subpopulations, called strata,
and to sample from each stratum. This, not surprisingly, is called stratified
sampling. There are useful formulae to guide the choice of sample sizes for
each such stratum.5
Another useful technique is sampling proportional to size. This is
especially useful in sampling financial transactions in which the questions of
interest center on dollar amounts rather than on typical items. Then if items
are chosen for analysis according to the size of the transactions, a more
accurate estimate of the dollar consequences of the transactions can result.6
Two standard references on random sampling are Cochran (1977)7
and Kish (1995).8
II.

AN EARLY LEGAL EXAMPLE

Like new members of many organizations, new scientific methods
go through a period of hazing by the legal system before accepted. For
example, in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. City of Inglewood, a random sample
of days was selected to determine the proportion of sales made to
non-residents of Inglewood (and therefore not subject to a sales tax). The
best estimate from that sample was $28,250 with a standard deviation of
$2,100, or a 95% confidence interval of $24,000 to $32,400 (per quarter for
11 quarters). The judge in the case rejected the sampling evidence, but
permitted Sears to do a complete audit, which found the figure of $26,750
per quarter (not counting some unavailable sales tickets).9
III.

MORE RECENT EXAMPLES

This section is a brief survey of some cases that involve sampling, to
display the wide variety of situations in which the technique is a
cost-effective method of determining the approximate truth. I begin with
5

See COCHRAN, supra note 1, at ch. 5.
Id. at 250.
7
Id.
8
LESLIE KISH, SURVEY SAMPLING (J. Wiley & Sons 1995).
9
See R. Clay Sprowls, The Admissibility of Sample Data into a Court of Law: a
Case History, 4 UCLA L. REV. 222 (1956-57) I did not participate in this case, and
have no other source about it than Sprowls.
6
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some disclaimers. First, this is nothing like a random sample of cases. Many
of them are cases about which I have personal knowledge, because I was
involved in them as an expert witness. Because many cases settle without a
public record and few legal opinions say much about the sampling methods
used, personal experience with cases seems an essential source of
information. Second, some of the cases alluded to are still being litigated,
and I am necessarily restricted in what I can say about them. Table 1 displays
the topics to be discussed.
A. REMITTITURS
When a plaintiff has won a tort case, and damages have been
awarded by a jury, the defendant can ask for a remittitur, under which the
judge requires the plaintiff to accept a smaller damage award or a new trial,
sometimes only on damages, sometimes on liability as well. The choice of a
new trial seems required by the Seventh Amendment in federal cases,
although this choice has been criticized as a sham.10 While the traditional
criterion for awarding a remittitur is whether the jury award “shocks the
conscience of the court”, New York, in a new law adopted in 1986 requires
comparison with other similar cases. This requires the court to identify the
cases it considers to be comparable, and then to analyze the amounts
awarded to find the appropriate amount of remittitur in the case before it.
Judge Weinstein, applying New York law, did this in the case of Geressy v.
Digital Equipment Corporation.11
There are several issues raised by this procedure. The first is the
criteria used to determine comparability. A second is the database of cases
available for study. This is usually cases of record, which omit cases that
settled under conditions of confidentiality. Since plaintiffs are one-time
players, while insurance companies are not, this asymmetry gives an
incentive for secret settlement of cases with large damages. Third, when a
list of comparable cases has been assembled, what remittitur should result?12

10

Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J., 731 (2003); Joseph B. Kadane, Calculating
Remittiturs, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 125-31 (2009).
11
Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
12
On the latter point, see Kadane, supra note 10; Joseph B. Kadane, Response
to Professor Haug, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 137 (2009); Mark Haug, Comment on
Calculating Remittiturs by Kadane, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 133-35 (2009).
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B. CROSS-SECTIONAL JURY CHALLENGES
A jury challenge is a motion to enforce the constitutional right to a
jury venire composed of a representative cross-section of the community.
Only some groups of people are considered “cognizable”, notably those
based on race, sex and ethnic origin. Usually such a claim compares the
proportion of a cognizable group in a series of venires to the proportion in
the community often using census data.13 Data on the race, sex and ethnic
origin of jury venires is often difficult to obtain, even concerning federal
juries.14
C. STOPS ON THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE
The issue in this case is whether blacks were being stopped for
traffic violations on the southern end of the New Jersey Turnpike at
extraordinarily high rates.
A study from a stationary vantage-point (a bridge over the turnpike)
yielded an estimate of 13.5% black drivers. A moving survey (from a car set
on cruise-control at or near the speed limit) found roughly 15% black
drivers, and that nearly all drivers were speeding, so the police, in principle,
could stop whomever they wished. The proportion of black drivers among
those stopped was about 46.2%, so the disparity was large, supporting a
claim of differential enforcement of the law. The upshot was (1) evidence
seized in about 15 stops was suppressed; (2) a consent decree with the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department; and (3) some reform of the
practices of the New Jersey State Police.15

13

For more on jury challenges generally, see David Kairys, Joseph B. Kadane
& John P. Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 776 (1977).
14
N. Chernoff & Joseph B. Kadane, Preempting Jury Challenges: Strategies
for Courts and Jury System Administrators, JUST. SYSTEMS J. (forthcoming 2012).
15
See Joseph B. Kadane & Norma Terrin, Missing Data in the Forensic
Context, 160 J. ROYAL. STAT. SOC’Y A 351-57 (1997); Joseph B. Kadane & John
Lamberth, Are Blacks Egregious Speeding Violators at Extraordinary Rates in New
Jersey?, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 139 (2009); JOSEPH COLLUM, THE BLACK
DRAGON: RACIAL PROFILING EXPOSED (2010); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 ( N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
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D. WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE
The law in many states requires employers to carry worker's
compensation insurance, in case of an injury in the work-place. Private
insurers offer such insurance, and participate in a high-risk pool in
proportion to the premia for workers compensation insurance written by that
insurer in that year. This gives each insurance company an incentive to under
report. In a series of lawsuits, several insurance companies are accused of
having done so, for example by attributing more premium to related auto and
general liability insurance, so as to minimize their apparent workers
compensation premium. Policy/years are being sampled to determine the
truth of such allegations, and, if true, their extent. I serve as a
court-appointed neutral expert to guide such sampling.
E. SALES TAXES
Pennsylvania sales tax excludes medication. Thus, Scope, which has
no medication, is taxed, but Listerine, which has medication, is not taxed.
The law requires retailers to collect sales tax. If the retailer fails to collect the
tax owed, it must pay the missing tax to the state. If it erroneously collects
tax, it must pay those funds to the state as well.
In a sales tax audit, the auditor told his team to be sure to include in
the sample any Scope transactions they ran across. Thus, the sample was not
random. In defense, I testified that I thought the retailer owed the $6 found in
uncollected tax, but not the $300,000 the state wished to extrapolate from the
$6 they found. This case raises a general issue that the cost that might be
gleaned from a random sample of transactions is a probability distribution
for how much the taxpayer owes. But this does not specify how much the
check should be.16
F. DISABILITY ACCESSIBILITY OF APARTMENTS
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires that apartments be
accessible to the handicapped. To enforce this, architects sent to apartment
complexes and select certain apartments to be assessed. If the selection of
those apartments is not done by a random sample, the results cannot be
reliably extrapolated to the apartments that were not inspected.
16

For commentary on this issue, see Joseph C. Bright, Joseph B. Kadane &
Daniel S. Nagin, Statistical Sampling in Tax Audits, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 305
(1988).
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G. INDIAN OIL AND GAS CLAIMS
The federal government has a fiduciary responsibility to collect
royalties for oil and gas leases on Indian tribal lands. The tribes allege that it
has not done so correctly, and have sued. To asses these claims, a random
sample of leases is taken, and audited. An important difficulty is that the
records kept by the Interior Department are incomplete.17
H. MEDICARE FRAUD
This case involved the defense of a physician who was accused of
requiring medically unnecessary testing of patients in a laboratory he owned.
The government wished to establish its case using a random sample of the
patient records of the physician in question. Since the government's case was
essentially an allegation of pattern or practice, it seemed that a random
sample of carefully reviewed cases could be more informative than a hasty
examination of every record. I was asked to testify that this sampling was an
inherently unscientific approach, and the government should be required to
examine every patient record. This I declined to do. It is possible to me that
the law might require every patient record to be examined; scientifically a
random sample of adequate size is sufficient.18 The defendant spent some
time in prison.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Random sampling is now widely used in litigation. Properly applied,
it is an efficient way to find reasonable estimates of the facts, and the theory
permits estimation of the sampling error.
There is interest in applying statistical sampling to mass tort
litigation. In these cases, a large number of injured people are joined in a
class, and liability has been found. The issue is how much to award to each
person. Their circumstances and extent of injury (financial, physical, etc.)
typically vary. The standard of the law, that each injured person deserves to
have their individual case heard and judged, is administratively impossibly
burdensome. Roughly the idea is to try a few cases, and use the outcome of
17

For one aspect of this work, see Mary S. Fowler & Joseph B. Kadane, Oil and
Gas on Indian Reservations: Statistical Methods Help to Establish Value for Royalty
Purposes, 14 J. STAT. EDUC. 3 (2006).
18
Joseph B. Kadane, Ethical Issues in Being an Expert Witness, 4 L.
PROBABILITY & RISK 21 (2005).
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those cases as guides to settle the rest. An argument is made19 that deliberate
choice would better serve the ends of justice than the present system that
allows the parties to speed or delay trials they deem to be helpful or harmful
to their clients' interests. I believe that statistical ideas could be used in this
setting, but just how to do it would depend on the specific context. I would
look for variables that are believed to be important to determining the
liability and the extent of damages. These might be used to create strata to be
sampled from. More parsimoniously, a regression model (linear or
non-linear) might be used. Until there is an actual case to address, these ideas
should be taken as speculations.
Table 1: Brief description of the cases discussed
Sampled
Items

Special
Consideration

remittiturs

is award in line
with awards in
comparable
cases?

comparabl
e cases

which cases are
comparable? 7th
amendment vs.
due process

b.

cross-sectional
jury challenge

is the jury
venire an
adequate
cross-section
of the
population?

jurors
(race, sex,
etc.)

date hard to get
standards of
adequacy

c.

stops on the NJ
turnpike

racially
differential law
enforcement

drivers
(race)

mind of officer
missing race data

a.

19

Nature of
Case

Legal
Question

References
Thomas
(2003);
Kadane
(2009a);
Kadane
(2009b)
Jury work;
Kairys,
Kadane &
Lehoczky
(1977); NJ
cases;
Chernoff and
Kadane
(2011)
NJ v. Soto
(1996);
Kadane &
Terrin
(1997);
Kadane &
Lamberth
(2009);
Collum
(2010)

Alexandra Lahav, Rough Justice (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal).
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d.

workers
compensation
insurance

premiums
appropriately
reported to
pool

WC
insurance
contract

availability of
hard copy records

in litigation

e.

sales taxes

properly
collected?

items sold
and taxes
collected

right of defendant
to have all records
examined

Bright,
Kadane &
Nagin (1988)

f.

disability
accessibility of
apartments

apartment
complex in
compliance
with ADA?

apartment
units

safe harbors

In litigation

g.

Indian oil and
gas claims
against federal
government

proper
collection of
royalties

lease years

adequacy of
records

Fowler &
Kadane
(2006)

h.

Medicare fraud

patient
treatments
appropriately
billed

patient
records

ethical issue

Kadane
(2005)

IMPERMISSIBLE WINDFALLS?: UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE, BACK PAY, AND THE TWO CLASSES OF
TITLE VII PLAINTIFFS
WYATT R. JANSEN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prevailing plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be entitled to an award
of back pay relief,1 intended “to make the victims of discrimination whole
by restoring them so far as possible . . . to the position where they would
have been were it not for unlawful discrimination.”2 Back pay relief under
Title VII compensates plaintiff-employees for loss of pay attributable to
discriminatory employment acts, including losses due to unemployment,
underemployment, and failure to promote. Most common are suits alleging
discriminatory firings,3 in which case back pay relief compensates, in
whole or in part, for loss of income suffered during the period when the
plaintiff was unemployed or underemployed due to an improper
termination. Since many employees bringing Title VII firing suits qualify

* B.A., New York University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, The University of
Connecticut School of Law, 2012. Many thanks to Professor Peter Siegelman.
1

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006)); see also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-22 (1975) (holding that back pay, though
an equitable remedy, may only be denied infrequently and for reasons that do no
frustrate the purposes of Title VII).
2
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982) (noting that this
compensatory goal, while important, is a purpose that is secondary to the primary
goal of Title VII to stop illegal employment discrimination) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d
733, 746 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Title VII is not designed to provide a windfall to
plaintiffs, but rather serves to put the plaintiff in the same position he or she would
have been in absent discrimination.”).
3
See LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
CONTESTING WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION IN COURT 6 (2008), available at
http://www/americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nielsen_abf_edl_r
eport_08_final.pdf (noting that 60% of all employment discrimination cases are
brought because the plaintiff was fired, allegedly because of illegal
discrimination).
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for unemployment insurance,4 prevailing plaintiffs in such suits are likely
to receive back pay awards that cover periods during which the plaintiff
also received unemployment insurance benefits.
The overlap of back pay and unemployment insurance benefits
described above is widely acknowledged to be a double recovery or
“windfall” for plaintiffs.5 Consider the following illustration: employee
“E”, living and working in Connecticut, suffers a discriminatory firing
causing six weeks of unemployment. If E previously earned $1,000 per
week, her loss of pay from the firing is $6,000, and she would likely collect
$6,000 in back pay under Title VII. If E also receives unemployment
insurance benefits, she will be paid about $462 for each week that she is
unemployed,6 totaling $2,772 over the six-week period of unemployment.
Absent intervention, E collects a total of $8,772 in compensation for the
six-week period during which she actually lost $6,000 of income. That is,
from the perspective that unemployment insurance benefits stand in the
shoes of a claimant’s ordinary wages, E actually lost $3,2887 due to the
discriminatory firing, and was overcompensated by the back pay award to
the tune of $2,722. On the other hand, if unemployment insurance benefits
are not fully or truly paid for by employers, or if the benefits should not
stand in the shoes of back pay as a matter of public policy, the $8,772 in
compensation may not be an overpayment.

4

A basic requirement to receive unemployment insurance benefits is that the
applicant be involuntarily unemployed—a condition that an employee who is fired
clearly meets. See generally infra Part II.B.
5
See, e.g., Thomas W. Lee, Deducting Unemployment Compensation and
Ending Employment Discrimination: Continuing Conflict, 43 EMORY L.J. 325, 335
(1994) (“[W]hile the deduction of unemployment compensation from back pay
may provide a windfall for the employer . . . failure to offset unemployment
benefits similarly provides a windfall for the employee.”) (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
6
See CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS –
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/progsupt/unemplt/ucelig
b.htm#Basic%20Eligibility%20Requirements (last updated Oct. 11, 2011) (stating
in Connecticut, a weekly unemployment insurance benefit entitlement is calculated
by averaging the claimant’s income in the two highest of the four most recent
quarters, and dividing that average by 26). Therefore, in E’s case, assuming a
stable salary for the calculation period, E is entitled to [((2*$12,000)/2)/26], or
$461.54 per week.
7
The difference between E’s ordinary weekly salary and her unemployment
insurance entitlement.
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This conflict has been divisive and remains unresolved by the
Supreme Court. Absent controlling precedent, the lower federal courts have
taken two distinct approaches.8 Some circuit courts of appeals have held
that unemployment insurance benefits must be ignored when calculating a
back pay award (the “restrictive rule”). In other circuits, the established
rule allows district court judges to consider such benefits in their sound
discretion (the “discretionary rule”), in which case the court may choose to
either deduct unemployment insurance benefits from a back pay award or
leave the back pay award undisturbed. (No circuit requires that the benefits
be deducted.)
Much of the difference of opinion regarding the treatment of
unemployment insurance benefits centers on whether or not those benefits
are rightly considered “collateral sources.” Collateral sources are, in the
simplest sense, benefits received by plaintiffs that are independent of—that
is, collateral to—the defendant, and courts have traditionally been barred
from considering such benefits when calculating a plaintiff’s damages.9 For
example, a plaintiff who receives $100 in support from his mother to
compensate for a tortious loss of $100 would be allowed under the
collateral source rule to collect the full amount of damages from the
tortfeasor, as those benefits were not sourced from, and are thus collateral
to, the tortfeasor. Unemployment insurance benefits, on the other hand, are
superficially not collateral to employers, since those employers are
responsible for funding the unemployment insurance program.
Complicating this field further is what this Note terms “subrogation
statutes,” which have been enacted in a significant minority of states.
Subrogation statutes automatically reduce back pay awards by the amount
of unemployment insurance benefits received during the same time period
covered by a back pay award, and repay the recovered funds directly to the
unemployment insurance fund.10 In those circuits with a discretionary rule,
there is some evidence that district court judges consider whether or not a
plaintiff will be subject to subrogation when calculating his or her back pay
award.11 On the other hand, district court judges in circuits following the
restrictive rule are barred from considering the effect of subrogation.

8

See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.C.
10
See infra Part II.D.
11
See infra Part III.B.2.
9
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The effect of the circuit courts’ approaches is illustrated in the
following table,12 assuming the same income and unemployment insurance
benefit figures from the aforementioned illustration of plaintiff E:
Table 1 – Subrogation and the Circuit Courts
Plaintiff A
Plaintiff B
Plaintiff C
Not subject
Subject to a
Subject to
to
subrogation,
subrogation,
subrogation,
in a
in a
in a
restrictive
discretionary
discretionary
circuit.
circuit.
circuit.
Total lost
income.
Unemployment
insurance
benefits
received.
Amount
recovered by
unemployment
insurance fund
through
subrogation.
Back pay
awarded by the
court as
damages in
Title VII suit.
Total
compensation
received by
plaintiff.

12

Plaintiff D
Not subject to
subrogation,
in a restrictive
circuit.

$6,000

$6,000

$6,000

$6,000

$2,772

$2,772

$2,772

$2,772

($2,772)

($2,772)

$0

$0

$6,000

$6,000

$3,228

$6,000

$6,000

$6,000

$6,00013

$8,772

This table assumes that judges with the discretion to reduce a back pay
award by unemployment benefits received will always reduce back pay in the
absence of a subrogation statute and never do so when the plaintiff is subject to
subrogation.
13
In the discretion of the district court judge, the $6,000 back pay award is
reduced by the amount of unemployment insurance benefits received, resulting in
the prevailing plaintiff collecting a total of $6,000 of both unemployment
insurance benefits and back pay.
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As is evident from the above table, three out of four combinations
of circuit court approach and state law ensure that a plaintiff will receive
the “right” amount of total compensation.14 But in states that do not have
subrogation statutes in circuits following the restrictive rule, the prevailing
plaintiff receives nearly 50% more compensation than otherwise similarlysituated plaintiffs.15 Though this result only occurs in one possible
combination of state and federal law, a restrictive approach without
subrogation is the governing legal standard in as many as twenty states,
including California and Florida,16 and it is therefore likely that the
majority of Title VII plaintiffs who have collected unemployment
insurance benefits receive this double recovery.
This result is due exclusively to the complex and sometimes
contradictory statutory and doctrinal frameworks that underlie this area of
the law, particularly from the delegation of unemployment insurance
regulation to the states and the resultant lack of a centralized policy
regarding treatment of such benefits. This Note first discusses these
discrete frameworks: Title VII,17 unemployment insurance, the collateral
source rule, and state subrogation statutes. The approach by the federal
appeals courts is subsequently discussed, as well as how the federal district
courts exercise their discretion to consider back pay awards where they
may lawfully do so. This Note then recommends an approach that may
bring coherence to these inconsistent and often colliding structures and the
approaches taken by the circuit courts, in the absence of a major reform of
the unemployment insurance system.
II. THE STATUTORY AND DOCTRINAL STRUCTURE
14

That is, the back pay award that is necessary to replace the wages that the
plaintiff actually lost due to a discriminatory employment action but not including
unemployment insurance benefits, without regard for, as discussed infra Part II.B,
the incidence of the unemployment insurance tax on employers.
15
This figure, of course, will vary based on factors including replacement rate,
length of unemployment period, and salary. For example, since unemployment
insurance benefits typically have an individual weekly benefit ceiling employees
with high salaries will be overpaid by unemployment insurance benefits by much
less than medium- and low-income plaintiffs as a proportion of their ordinary
wages. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 6 (in
Connecticut as of October 2011, $573).
16
See infra note 74, Part III.A.
17
For purposes of simplicity, this Note focuses on actions brought under Title
VII, though the debate is relevant to other forms of employment discrimination,
including suits arising under Section 1981 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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This Note addresses the deductibility of unemployment insurance
benefits from back pay awards in Title VII suits through analysis of the
legal structures operating in the foreground and background of such cases.
This Part will generally discuss the purpose of Title VII and remedies
available under that statute, the system of unemployment insurance in the
United States, the origins and rationale of the collateral source rule, and
state subrogation statutes.
A. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, national origin, religion, or sex by private employers.18
Through express language, judicial interpretation, and congressional
revision, the Act proscribes both intentional discrimination by employers as
well as employment actions that lack discriminatory intent, but which have
a disparate impact on persons from a protected class.19
While the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the
official enforcement agency for Title VII,20 the Commission brings only a
small fraction of the employment discrimination cases that it reviews. It
follows that most Title VII suits are brought by individuals hiring private
counsel or proceeding pro se.21 As a result, plaintiffs have an important role
under Title VII as private attorneys general, both asserting their individual
right to be free from discriminatory employment actions and policing
employers to vindicate the broader purposes of the statute—namely, to
eliminate employment discrimination.22

18

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 6 (2d ed. 2007).
19
See generally RUTHERGLEN, supra note 18.
20
See id. at 8.
21
See NIELSEN, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that the EEOC intervenes as
plaintiff in just 3% of all employment discrimination cases).
22
See Donald T. Kramer, Factors or Conditions Said to Justify Increase in
Attorney’s Fees Awarded Under § 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 140
A.L.R. FED. 301 (1997) (stating the private attorney general model serves as the
justification for Title VII’s fee shifting structure, which awards attorney’s fees to
prevailing plaintiffs, but not to prevailing plaintiff’s under ordinary circumstances).
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Section 706(g) of Title VII permits courts to award back pay as an
equitable remedy for illegal employment discrimination.23 Though Title
VII back pay sounds in equity and the plain language of Title VII is
permissive, the Supreme Court has indicated that judges are significantly
limited in their discretion to decide not to award back pay relief.24 In
addition to back pay, prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII suits have available a
broad range of statutory relief: reinstatement or, if reinstatement is
impossible, front pay;25 additional compensatory damages for both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses like job search expenses, reputational
damage, and emotional pain and suffering;26 punitive damages in
circumstances where a defendant acts with malice or reckless indifference
to the federally-protected rights of the plaintiff;27 and finally, reasonable
attorney’s fees.28
Part and parcel of using back pay as the primary remedy under
Title VII is that suits brought under the statute tend to be low in value.29
23

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261
(current version at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006)) (“If the court finds that the
respondents has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an illegal
employment practice, the court may . . . order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but not limited to, reinstatement, or hiring or
employees, with or without back pay”); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 415-22 (1975) (stating back pay has become the presumptive remedy for
employment discrimination).
24
See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 421 (“[B]ackpay should be denied
only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating employment discrimination throughout the
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past
discrimination.”).
25
42 U.S.C. § 706(g), 78 Stat. at 261 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2006)).
26
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 1071,
1073 (1991) (current version at 42 U.S. 1981a (2006)).
27
Id. (stating punitive damages are only available in certain forms of
employment discrimination cases and subject to the same caps as compensatory
damages); see Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 529-40 (1999)
(stating the standard for whether punitive damages are appropriate is not
egregiousness, but rather whether the employer has engaged in discriminatory act
despite perceiving that the act is in violation of federal law).
28
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 103, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)).
29
Discrimination Law in the 1990’s, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 261, 265 (Laura Beth Nielsen
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While the size of damages awards increased after the 1991 amendment of
Title VII, which made available compensatory relief, punitive damages,
and jury trials,30 the median Title VII back pay award remains under
$50,000.31
B. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
The Social Security Act of 1935 first enabled the unemployment
insurance system. Rather than creating a federal regime, the Act instead
encouraged the states to enact their own unemployment insurance
programs, so long as they operated within certain federal guidelines (such
as minimum tax rates).32 This joint federal and state statutory scheme has
resulted in state unemployment insurance programs that are often widely
divergent with respect to coverage, benefits, funding, and administration.33
Despite this divergence, there are points of congruence among the
state systems. Across all states, unemployment insurance benefits share a
common aim of providing partial and temporary wage replacement for
involuntarily unemployed workers meeting certain conditions regarding
continuity and type of employment.34 These benefits primarily serve two
goals: narrowly, to stabilize the standard of living for unemployed
individuals during those individuals’ periods of unemployment, and
broadly, to reduce overall economic volatility during periods of widespread
unemployment.35

& Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (showing that pre-1991, employment
discrimination back pay awards were usually small and positively related to an
employee’s pay).
30
Id. at 268 tbl.3.
31
Id. at 279 tbl.8. The $50,000 figure is one that is not per plaintiff, but rather
per case; because a not-insignificant number of cases are brought with more than
one plaintiff. See NIELSEN, supra note 3, at 12 (6% of employment discrimination
cases involved 2-10 plaintiffs); it is likely that plaintiffs’ actual awards are
somewhat lower.
32
Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE
L.J. 21, 22 (1945); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-440,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 3 (2010).
33
Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49
UCLA L. REV. 335, 344 (2001).
34
See id. at 344-46.
35
Id. at 341-42.
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The unemployment insurance system is directly financed by both
state and federal payroll taxes, paid solely by qualifying employers,36
which together constitute as much as 15% of an employer’s total annual tax
bill.37 The structure of tax rates is twofold: first, a federal rate that is as low
as .8% and is applied to a base of an employee’s first $7,000 of wages;
second, a state tax, with rate and base terms that vary widely among the
states, but that must remain within certain federal guidelines.38 These state
tax rates are typically adjusted annually and calculated relative to a state’s
unemployment insurance fund balance, with a lower balance triggering
higher overall rates and a higher balance resulting in generally lower
rates.39
Through a process known as the “experience rating,” market-wide
state tax rates are adjusted for each employer based on that employer’s
history of firing its employees, with the resultant individualized tax rate

36

With the notable exceptions of Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania,
which withhold unemployment insurance taxes from employee wages in addition
to taxing employers. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 4
n.9. For the purposes of simplicity and coherence, this Note ignores these
exceptions to the general rule.
37
Lester, supra note 33, at 340. The employer-funded model used by the
United States is distinctly different from the financing of unemployment insurance
in other countries, where funds come from a variety of sources exogenous to
employers. See Steven Jurajda, Unemployment Outflow and Unemployment
Insurance Taxes, CERGE-IE Working Paper Series No. 143 at 2 (1999).
38
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 5.
In Connecticut, for example, the tax rate for newly established employers is
3.7% as applied to the first $15,000 of each employee’s wages, with rates for
established employers ranging from 1.9% to 6.8%. See Employer Information
Notice, CT Unemployment Insurance Tax, Connecticut Department of Labor, Sept.
2011, available at http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/uitax/EmplNotices/EmplNotic
e0911.pdf. Thus, newly-established Connecticut employers employing employees
making $15,000 or more per year pay $555 in unemployment insurance taxes per
employee per year. See id.
In Texas, for another example, the rate for a new employer is .78%, with
maximum and average tax rates of 8.25% and 2.03%, respectively, applied to a
base of $9,000 of wages. Unemployment Tax Rates, Texas Workforce
Commission,
http://www.twc.state.tx.us/ui/tax/unemployment-tax-rates.html.
Thus, an employer would pay (per year and per employee earning $9,000 or more
in annual wages) unemployment insurance taxes of $70.2 at the minimum rate and
$182.70 at the average rate.
39
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 7.
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called the “experience-rated component.”40 Through use of the experience
rating, an employer with a history of many firings (and one that has thus
imposed a high cost on the unemployment insurance pool) is subject to a
higher tax rate than an employer without such a history. Use of the
experience rating can adjust the effective tax rate on an employer to as high
as 10.5%,41 though states typically set a maximum rate. Because the
experience rating can thereby impose significant financial consequences on
an employer for firing employees, the rating is believed to have the effect
of deterring layoffs,42 and may be a means of controlling employer-side
moral hazard in unemployment insurance generally.
To be sure, the cost of unemployment insurance benefits may be
indirectly paid, in whole or part, by employees in the form of reduced
earnings—that is, the ultimate incidence of the unemployment insurance
tax may fall on employees. The significance of tax incidence is that, to the
extent that the cost of unemployment insurance is borne by employees
instead of employers, the benefits are less clearly categorized as
independent of (that is, not collateral to) employers, and public policy and
collateral source rule doctrine thus may more strongly favor treating the
benefits as collateral.
The unemployment insurance system appears designed for the
incidence of the tax to apply fully to employers, by not requiring
contribution from employees and through use of the experience rating.43
Despite this intention, however, it may be that employers shift the
incidence of the unemployment insurance tax forward, by charging
consumers more for goods or services, or backwards, by reducing the price
they pay for labor input.44 There is no consensus that the unemployment
insurance tax is back-shifted, and those studies that have attempted to
isolate the effect of the unemployment insurance tax have come up with
divergent results.45 Recent data suggests that the costs may be shared
between employers and employees, with one study showing that employers

40

Id. at 5.
Lester, supra note 33, at 345 (in Pennsylvania).
42
See Jurajda, supra note 37, at 2 (the experience-rated component has been
demonstrated to influence employer decision-making in regards to both initially
laying off workers and recalling previously laid-off workers).
43
See generally Lester, supra note 33.
44
Id.
45
See id. at 382.
41
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are not able to shift the costs of inter-firm experience rating variances, but
may be able to shift some portion of the “market rate”, or base tax burden.46
Cost shifting, if it does occur, may not be so simple in the case of
unemployment insurance, however. Since the experience rating means that
a firing costs an employer money in the form of higher tax rates, and, as
discussed above, that upward adjustment is not shown to be back-shifted,
any employee contribution to the unemployment insurance tax may be
negated by the cost of his firing to the employer. For example, Texas
calculates its experience rating by dividing the last three years of
unemployment insurance benefits paid out over three years of an
employer’s taxable wages, and multiplying that by a flat tax rate.47 For
example, suppose a new Texas employer employs three workers at $10,000
per year for a period of three years, but fires one worker at the end of year
2, entitling that worker to collect a 50% unemployment insurance benefit.
That employer’s effective unemployment tax rate will resultantly increase
from 2.72% to 8%;48 on the Texas taxable wage base of $9,000, the
employer would pay $1,440 in unemployment insurance tax in year three
per employee, as compared to $482 in year two. That is, the firing will cost
the employer nearly $1,000 per employee per year for the three years that
the firing is computed in the employer’s experience rating. This is all to
demonstrate that the back-shifting of tax may be mitigated by the

46

Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, Effects of the Unemployment
Insurance Payroll Tax on Wages, Employment, Claims and Denials, 78 J. PUB.
ECONOMICS 81, 95 (2000) (noting, however, that “large standard errors preclude
[the authors] from drawing strong conclusions”).
In Texas, for example, the “market” tax rate is .78%, while the average
experience rating tax rate is 1.96%, both applied to $9,000 of wages. If employees
are responsible for the entire market rate (as opposed to partial responsibility, as
demonstrated by the above-referenced study), and employers were responsible for
the experience rate, the proportion of employee to employer contribution would be
roughly 1:3. See Texas Workforce Commission, supra note 38.
There is an intuitive logic to the findings by Anderson and Boyer, if backshifting does in fact occur. Since the experience rating is determined based on an
employer’s past history of layoffs, firms that reduced employee wages to account
for higher unemployment taxes that result from the experience rating would
essentially expect employees to be paid less to work for an employer that is more
likely to cause them to be unemployed.
47
See TWC TAX DEPT., Your Tax Rates – 2011, http://www.twc.state.tx.us/ui/t
ax/unemptax2011.html#oa (Sept. 30, 2011).
48
Id. (That is, [$5,000/$8000] * [1.28]).
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concomitant increase in tax burden caused by a firing, which itself appears
to be fully absorbed by the employer.
Unemployment insurance funds have been in financial peril in
recent years. At the close of the fourth quarter of 2009, state unemployment
insurance fund balances were the lowest they have ever been in the history
of unemployment insurance,49 and this undercapitalization is expected to
worsen with the ongoing recession.50 Compounding these historically low
funding levels is the reality that loans from the federal government are
currently buoying the balances of many state unemployment funds; because
these loans are reflected in the historically low fund balances, state funds
are likely even more weakly positioned than they appear at first glance.51
C. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
Circuits that follow the restrictive rule typically do so on the basis
that considering unemployment insurance benefits violates the collateral
source rule. As a general principle of tort law (treated as both a rule of
evidence and as substantive law), the collateral source rule proscribes
courts from considering benefits received by a plaintiff that are
independent of (i.e., collateral to) a defendant when calculating a plaintiff’s
damages.52 The collateral source rule typically does not protect benefits
provided by a defendant or a party identified with a defendant,53 but rather
only applies to truly independent or third-party sources, such as gratuitous
support from family members or an unintended benefit arising from a
defendant’s wrongful act.54
Perhaps the quintessential application of the collateral source rule
is to exclude evidence of plaintiff-purchased insurance benefits covering a
loss for which that plaintiff is later awarded damages. For instance, due to a
negligent act by tortfeasor “T”, plaintiff “P” incurs medical expenses that
are covered by P’s insurer. In a later suit against T, P may still collect
damages for medical expenses when the collateral source rule is applied,
even though P did not pay for those expenses out of pocket. In this
49

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 9 (after figures
were adjusted for inflation).
50
Id. at 13-14.
51
See id. at 9 (overall balance of state fund reserves was negative $15 billion).
52
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (9th ed. 2009) (defining Collateral-Source
Rule).
53
Linda L. House, Section 1983 and the Collateral Source Rule, 40 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 101, 103 (1992).
54
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 143 (1987).
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circumstance, P effectively receives a double recovery—one from the
insurer and another from the tortfeasor, both purporting to compensate for
the same injury. It is in reaction to such results that proponents of “tort
reform” efforts have sought to abrogate the collateral source rule.55
This common application of the collateral source rule may not in
fact result in a windfall,56 however, despite the mechanism of P receiving
two payments for one injury. In the above example, P purchased insurance
coverage and paid insurance premiums in exchange for the contractual
right for payment upon the occurrence of the tortious act at issue. Because
the insurance coverage was purchased in order to cover the cost of the
injury, presumably the premiums were calculated so as to pay for the cost
of covered events, plus overhead.57 By charging P a rate calculated to the
risk and cost of a covered event, the insurance policy primarily changes the
timing of the payment for the injury to the period when P makes premium
payments, but does not alter that P has a cost associated with the injury that
will require compensation in order for P to be made whole.
Further preventing a windfall in many traditional insurance
applications of the collateral source rule is the effect of a subrogation right,
held by many or even most insurers.58 Where this right exists, a collateral
source is entitled to the rights and remedies belonging to the plaintiff for
which the plaintiff was compensated by the collateral source, eliminating
any windfall ex post.59 Thus, if P’s insurance contract includes a
subrogation right (and it likely does), his insurer may seek to collect the
medical damages awarded to P to the extent that it reimbursed P for such

55

See Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating the Collateral
Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 349 (2008).
56
For the purposes of this note, “windfall” and “double recovery” are
distinguished. Windfall will describe the situation where a plaintiff collects more
than his actual losses, and is thus overcompensated or “profits” from a defendant’s
wrongdoing. Double recovery will mean that a plaintiff receives two payments for
the same injury, which, as this Note explores, may or may not result in a windfall.
See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 1738 (9th ed. 2009) (defining windfall as “[a]n
unanticipated benefit, usu. in the form of a profit and not caused by the recipient”).
Compare id. at 1389, Double Recovery (“a judgment that erroneously awards
damages twice for the same loss . . . [or] recovery by a part of more than the
maximum recoverable loss . . .”).
57
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 253 (8th ed. 2011).
58
Wershbale, supra note 55, at 349-50 (noting, however, that subrogation
rights are rarely asserted).
59
See id. at 349.
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expenses, and P will (theoretically) have paid lower premiums to account
for this.60
Aside from factors that mitigate the occurrence of a windfall, there
are public policy justifications that favor the collateral source rule even
when it does result in a windfall. Windfalls can serve as a rough means of
providing for attorney’s fees, which, if not otherwise available, would
detract from the make-whole nature of compensatory relief.61 Similarly, a
windfall may be used to award punitive damages when they are not
provided by law.62
Perhaps more convincing are those policy arguments related to the
redistributive and deterrent uses of windfalls. For one, allowing insurance
coverage to reduce a wrongdoer’s cost for his wrongs reduces the
concomitant incentive to prevent future wrongdoing to avoid future costs of
similar wrongs.63 The collateral source rule thus furthers the deterrent
function of compensatory relief.64 There is also an intuitive preference to
award windfalls, where they must exist, to the victim and not the violator.65
Finally, if insurance reduces a plaintiff’s tort award dollar-for-dollar, there
is significantly less reason to buy insurance in the first place, and there are
strong reasons for favoring insurance coverage.
There are, however, several competing considerations. Any
windfall may be inappropriate in a make-whole relief scheme, which is
focused on compensating plaintiffs for actual losses, and is less concerned
with the source of that compensation.66 Where statute or other relevant law
speaks clearly on the issue, using the collateral source rule to roughly
60

POSNER, supra note 57, at 253.
That is, a plaintiff with paid counsel will either pay an hourly fee or will
have a contingency agreement, costs of which may not be accounted for in an
ordinary damages award that is not accompanied by attorney’s fees. Since
unreimbursed fees either indirectly (in the case of an hourly rate) or directly (in the
case of a contingency agreement) reduce the amount of damages actually
recovered by the plaintiff, the award may no longer put the plaintiff in the position
he or she would have been in but for the wrongdoing. See, e.g., Daena A.
Goldsmith, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The Effects of Tort Reform and
Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COMM. 799, 802 (1988); Robert
Hernquist & Arthur v. Catour, An Examination of the Collateral Source Rule in
Illinois, 38 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. 169, 172-73 (2006).
62
See Hernquist, supra note 61, at 181.
63
POSNER, supra note 57, at 253.
64
Goldsmith, supra note 61, at 801; POSNER, supra note 57, at 253.
65
House, supra note 53, at 104; Hernquist, supra note 61, at 188.
66
Hernquist, supra note 61, at 182.
61
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provide attorney’s fees and punitive damages may be unnecessary or
improper.67 Finally, subrogation rights may be an inefficient solution to
preventing windfalls,68 and the collateral source rule may, by increasing
damage awards, artificially inflate insurance premiums.69
Perhaps as a result of these concerns, the collateral source rule has
been steadily weakened: erosion of the rule began almost immediately
following its adoption by the Supreme Court in the 19th Century,70 and by
2007 all but 12 states had created some statutory alteration to the common
law rule.71 For example, a number of states now allow post-verdict
reduction of a defendant’s liability for collateral benefits received that are
not subject to subrogation, while refusing such a reduction where the
collateral source does hold a subrogation right.72
D. STATE SUBROGATION STATUTES
States have taken several statutory approaches to the double
recovery that can result when back pay awards overlap with unemployment
insurance benefits,73 but by far the most common is to invest a legal
subrogation right in the state’s unemployment insurance fund. At least 16
states accomplish this through statutes requiring reimbursement of state
unemployment funds for insurance benefits paid that overlap with back pay
awards, typically by the employer repaying the fund directly and then
67

See id. at 186.
This is said to result from the additional litigation costs incurred by both
private and public actors in order to enforce subrogation rights. House, supra note
53, at 105-06.
69
House, supra note 53, at 106.
70
Hernquist, supra note 61, at 177.
71
Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The
Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare and
Medicaid Write-Offs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 463 (2007).
72
Wershbale, supra note 55, at 353-54 (noting that these post-verdict hearings
likely increase the litigation and administrative costs of actions subject to the
collateral source rule).
73
Some states require that an employer repay state unemployment funds if a
plaintiff’s back pay award is reduced by the amount of unemployment insurance
benefits received. See, e.g., TEX. LABOR CODE § 210.001 (2011); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 151A, § 69C (2004); CAL.UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1382 (2010). At least one
state does not set off unemployment insurance benefits from back pay awards, but
allows back pay to be considered employment such that it serves to toll the accrual
of unemployment benefits. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-303(e) (2008).
68
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giving the plaintiff a reduced award.74 Thus, in states with subrogation
statutes, a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded back pay damages for a
period in which that plaintiff also collected unemployment insurance
benefits would typically receive as his back pay damages the difference
between his total lost wages and the unemployment benefits he had
received during the benefit period. The defendant-employer is then
required to directly remit to the unemployment insurance fund an amount
equal to the overlapping benefits.75
The following table illustrates the effect of subrogation, using the
same income, back pay damages, and unemployment insurance
compensation figures as Table 1:

74

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-110 (2011) (“[A]n individual who
has an award for any week and for which week he, at a subsequent date, received a
pay award by reason of a decision of the national labor relations board or other
source, as a result of the action taken by the National Labor Relations Board or
other source, shall immediately repay to the division such amounts as will
reimburse the division for all benefit payments made for the period during which
he drew benefits and for which the national labor relations board or other source
has caused a payment to be made in the form of back pay award to the claimant;
and the employer's account charged for such benefits shall be credited
accordingly.”); see also ALA. CODE § 25-4-78 (LexisNexis 2011); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 3325 (2005); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/900 (West 2011);
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-13-1 (LexisNexis 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.3 (2011);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-719 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.415 (West 2011);
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-809 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
268.085 (West 2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.381 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 612.371 (LexisNexis 2011); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 874 (2011); VA. CODE
ANN. § 60.2-634 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.190 (West 2002); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 27-3-306 (2011).
75
Though this Note refers to statutes having this effect as “subrogation
statutes,” they may share some characteristics with repayment arrangements
(agreements by which a victim agrees to pay back an insurer for benefits received
when he sues and collects from an injurer). See SHAVELL, supra note 54, at 23839.
In traditional insurance relationships, it may be that a repayment
arrangement would be a disincentive to bringing suit, since most or all of the award
would necessarily be repaid to the insurer. Id. at 239. This does not likely hold true
in the case of repayment of unemployment insurance benefits in Title VII firing
suits, since those benefits are typically 50% or less of a claimant’s salary.
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Table 2 – Subrogation and Back Pay
With subrogation
statute

Without subrogation
statute

Back pay award

$6,000

$6,000

Unemployment benefits
received

$2,772

$2,772

Amount paid by
Defendant to Plaintiff

$3,228

$6,000

Amount reimbursed to
unemployment insurance
fund

$2,772

$0

Total damages paid by
Defendant

$6,000

$6,000

$0

($2,272)

Change in unemployment
insurance fund balance

As demonstrated in Table 2, subrogation ensures both that the
plaintiff receives the “correct” amount of compensation for loss of wages
and that the unemployment insurance fund balance remains as if a
discriminatory firing had not occurred. Moreover, the employer is still
responsible for the full cost of his discriminatory firing. It is also evident
that without subrogation, with the plaintiff receiving both unemployment
insurance benefits and a back pay award, the assets of the unemployment
insurance fund are impaired.76
Though subrogation is the most common statutory approach to the
problem discussed in this Note, the majority of states do not vest any legal
subrogation right in their unemployment insurance funds. In these states,
prevailing Title VII plaintiffs receive both a full back pay award and
unemployment insurance benefits absent judicial intervention. As described
earlier in this Note, many of such states are located in federal circuits that
follow the restrictive rule, where district court judges cannot consider
unemployment insurance benefits received by plaintiffs and, as a result, the
76

Though, of course, this impairment is not necessarily a problem:
unemployment insurance funds exist to pay out benefits to the unemployed.
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plaintiff receives both the unemployment insurance benefits and the full
back pay award.
III. APPROACH BY THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS
The Supreme Court has simply never resolved the question
presented by this Note. The most frequently cited Supreme Court case in
this area is NLRB v. Gullet Gin, in which the Court held that the National
Labor Relations Board did not abuse its discretion when it refused to
reduce a settlement under the National Labor Relations Act by amounts
received as unemployment insurance benefits; but even there, the Court
made no affirmative holding on the Board’s discretion to make such a
deduction.77 The Court stated only in dicta that unemployment insurance
benefits were collateral sources, on the basis that the state, not the
employer, made such payments, and because the NLRB had a longstanding practice of refusing to deduct such benefits.78
The Gullet Gin ruling has failed, however, to elucidate this area of
the law. It has been interpreted both as supporting the discretion to deduct
unemployment insurance benefits, since it upheld the NLRB’s
discretionary approach to withholding,79 and as prohibiting discretion by its
dicta regarding the collateral source rule.80 In the absence of a clear
directive from the Supreme Court, the federal circuit courts of appeals
remain split as to whether or not district courts are prohibited from
considering unemployment benefits when calculating back pay awards, or
whether the those courts may, in their discretion, reduce back pay awards
by unemployment insurance benefits received. This Part examines each
approach in turn.

77

NLRB v. Gullet Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951).
Id. at 365-66.
79
See, e.g., EEOC v. Fin. Assur., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 686, 694 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (quoting Gullet Gin, and stating that, “by analogy, one might well argue that
a similar discretion—either to deduct or to refuse to deduct—is vested in the courts
in connection with administering Title VII.”).
80
See, e.g., Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Manu. Co., 715 F.2d 1549, 1550-51 (11th
Cir. 1983).
78
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A. THE RESTRICTIVE RULE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN CALCULATING BACK PAY AWARDS
The Third,81 Fourth,82 Sixth,83 Eighth,84 Ninth,85 and Eleventh86
Circuits have held that unemployment insurance benefits are collateral
sources that courts cannot consider when calculating a plaintiff’s back pay
damages. The cases rely on the traditional definition and treatment of
collateral sources;87 legislative intent;88 preference for shifting any double
recovery to plaintiffs over defendants;89 and furthering the statutory
objective to end employment discrimination.90
Typical is the approach of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. That court strongly opposed
allowing the district courts discretion to consider unemployment insurance
benefits, holding that that such benefits were plainly a collateral source that
were paid to serve a social policy of the state, rather than to discharge an
obligation of the employer.91 The court there also based its holding on its

81

See Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 82 (3d Cir. 1983).
See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 195-96 (4th Cir. 1981)
(reversed on other grounds).
83
See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1170-71 (6th
Cir. 1996).
84
See Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1114 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting that the state had a subrogation statute).
85
See Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 696 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982).
86
See Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Mfg. Co., 715 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1983)
(reversing prior 11th Circuit precedent allowing the district courts to make such a
deduction on the basis that, at the time Gullet Gin was decided, it was the NLRB’s
practice to always refuse to make such deductions, and as such the refusal to
deduct had become “settled back pay law” under the NLRA, which served as the
model for the Title VII back pay provision).
87
See McKenna v. City of Phila., 636 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (2009).
88
See Maxfield v. Sinclair Int’l., 766 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that
Congress included a deduction for interim earnings and amounts reasonably
earnable, but failed to provide for other setoffs).
89
Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 1983) (“There is no
reason why the [unemployment] benefit should be shifted to the defendant, thereby
depriving the plaintiff of the advantage it confers.”).
90
Id. at 84.
91
See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1170-71 (6th Cir.
1996).
82
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belief that two “identically situated claimants” could not be made whole by
“radically different backpay awards.”92
In accord with Thurman was the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Group, where the court reversed a
district court ruling deducting unemployment benefits from a back pay
award.93 The court held that the collateral source rule applied even when
the employer contributes to the unemployment insurance fund,94 and noted
that the deterrence purpose of back pay awards was ill-served by deduction
of unemployment insurance benefits because it made discrimination less
costly for defendant-employers.95
Though it found the question “extremely close and one over which
reasonable persons could differ,” the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc. reversed a district court’s reduction of a back
pay award by unemployment benefits received.96 The reversal was, in large
part, grounded on the Craig court’s finding that unemployment insurance
benefits were collateral and intended for the benefit of employees, not
employers.97 Craig went further to declare that deductibility should never
be left to the discretion of district court judges, relying on the Supreme
Court’s holding that the courts of appeals must apply the back pay
provision in a “consistent and principled” manner,98 and noting that while
back pay might ordinarily be discretionary because it sounds in equity, it
has become a presumptive and near-mandatory remedy for prevailing
plaintiffs in Title VII suits.99 Significantly, however, the court also noted

92

Id. (quoting Rasimas v. Mich. Dept. of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th
Cir. 1983)). It should be noted that it is not clear that a plaintiff who has received
unemployment insurance benefits is identically situated to a plaintiff who has not
received said benefits.
93
See Gaworski, 17 F.3d at 1114.
94
Id. at 1112 (quoting Chi. Great W. Ry. v. Peeler, 140 F.2d 865, 868 (8th Cir.
1944) (holding that insurance or Workmen’s Compensation Act funds were
collateral sources)). The Gaworski Court does not indicate whether it believes that
the funds are collateral despite employer contribution because: (a) of the incidence
of the unemployment insurer tax; (b) direct employee contributions; or (c)
regardless of incidence or direct contribution.
95
Id. at 1113.
96
Craig, 721 F.2d at 82.
97
See id. at 82-85.
98
Id. at 85 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(1975)).
99
Id.

2011

IMPERMISSIBLE WINDFALLS?

327

that the plaintiffs in that case were subject to a state subrogation statute,100
so that their back pay would later be reduced by operation of law.101
B. THE DISCRETIONARY RULE: THE WITHHOLDING OF
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FROM BACK PAY AWARDS IS LEFT TO
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT COURTS.
The First,102 Second,103 Fifth,104 Seventh,105 and Tenth106 Circuits
have held that deduction of unemployment benefits is properly left to the
discretion of the district courts. This Part examines both the reasoning for
this conclusion and the practices of the district courts in exercising this
discretion.
1. Reasoning
Circuits adopting the discretionary approach generally do so with
the goal of preventing double recoveries. A robust example is the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in EEOC v. Enterprise Steamfitters:
We see no compelling reason for providing the injured
party with double recovery for his lost employment; no
compelling reason of deterrence or retribution against the
responsible party in this case; and we are not in the
business of redistributing the wealth beyond the goal of
making the victim of discrimination whole.107
The holding in Enterprise Steamfitters was cited favorably and
clarified by the Second Circuit in Dailey v. Societé General. There, the
100

Id. at 83-84.
That is, the Craig court could not have possibly reduced the plaintiff’s back
pay award without interfering with the operation of the state unemployment
insurance statute or causing a double reduction of back pay.
102
See Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1115 (1st Cir. 1995) (construing
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i)).
103
See EEOC v. Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters Local No. 638 of U. A., 542 F.2d
579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976).
104
See Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980).
105
See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969).
106
See EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 639 (10th Cir. 1980).
107
Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d at 592.
101
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court declined to mandate that unemployment funds be deducted from back
pay awards, acknowledging “compelling reasons” for why such benefits
should not be deducted,108 but ultimately left the deduction of said benefits
to the “sound discretion” of the district courts instead of following the
restrictive rule.109
Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Ostapowicz v.
Johnson Bronze Co. upheld a district court decision reducing a plaintiff’s
back pay award by the amount of unemployment compensation that either
was or reasonably could have been received by the plaintiff, holding that
the district court’s deduction represented a “conscientious effort to
calculate reasonable and equitable awards under conditions which do not
allow for absolute precision.”110
2. Discretion in the District Courts
District courts in circuits following the discretionary rule have
focused on several factors to determine whether or not to deduct
unemployment insurance benefits from back pay awards. Significantly,
some courts have recognized the existence of state subrogation statutes and
chosen not to deduct insurance benefits when a plaintiff is subject to
subrogation, because the plaintiff’s award will later be reduced by
operation of law.111 In addition to the effect of subrogation, district courts
have refused to reduce a plaintiff’s back pay award where, in the particular
circumstances of the case, the plaintiff did not receive a windfall,112 and
where the court generally preferred awarding windfalls to plaintiffs rather
than defendants.113
108

Dailey v. Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1997) (giving, as
an example, that where the choice lies with awarding either the plaintiff or the
defendant a windfall, the windfall should inure to the plaintiff).
109
Id.
110
Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 1976).
111
See, e.g., Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1555 (10th
Cir. 1988) (holding that an offset for unemployment insurance benefits was
“particularly inappropriate . . . because, under Colorado law, an employee who
receives a back pay award must repay the Colorado Division of Employment and
Training all unemployment benefit payments received for the period covered by
the back pay award”).
112
See Brooks v. Fonda-Fultonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 938 F. Supp. 1094, 1110
(N.D.N.Y. 1996).
113
See Shannon v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
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Those district courts that have chosen to reduce back pay awards to
account for unemployment insurance benefits have done so for a variety of
reasons: because unemployment insurance benefits are not a collateral
source;114 because the purpose of the back pay remedy is not to punish
employers or to provide windfalls for employees, but rather solely to
compensate for a plaintiff’s actual economic losses;115 because deduction
would have a negligible effect on deterrence;116 and, significantly, because
unemployment compensation was not recoverable by the unemployment
insurance fund because the jurisdiction lacked a subrogation statute, and “a
double recovery was not necessary to make [the] plaintiff whole.”117
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part concludes that unemployment insurance benefits should
not be treated as traditional collateral sources for the purposes of Title VII
back pay awards, both as a matter of law and public policy. Next, this Part
reaffirms that the restrictive approach has effected to arbitrarily favor
certain plaintiffs over others. Finally, this Part concludes by proposing that
all circuits adopt the discretionary approach.
A. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS SHOULD
TREATED AS SOURCES COLLATERAL TO EMPLOYERS.

NOT

BE

Unemployment insurance benefits should not be treated as sources
collateral to employers for two reasons. First, insurance coverage paid for
by an employer cannot be collateral to that employer, even if employees
indirectly pay for a portion of coverage. Second, the policy justifications
that underlie the collateral source rule in its traditional applications are
inconsistent with the nature of back pay relief under Title VII and in the
context of unemployment insurance benefits.
114

Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (D. Conn. 1993) (“While
collateral sources are not offset, unemployment compensation is not from a source
independent of the employer . . . [m]aking a person discriminated against whole is
not achieved by awarding damages in excess of the actual loss when the excess
does not come from a collateral source.”).
115
See Cole v. Uni-Marts, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 67, 76 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
116
See Wilcox v. Stratton Lumber Co., 921 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D. Me. 1996).
117
Thurber v. Jack Reilly's Inc., 521 F. Supp. 238, 243 (D. Mass. 1981)
(“[E]quitable considerations militate in favor of a reduction of the gross back pay
award here [where] [t]he unemployment compensation paid to the plaintiff is not
recoverable from her by the commonwealth.”).
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1. Unemployment Insurance Benefits Are Not Collateral
Sources as Traditionally Defined
Collateral benefits are “compensation . . . from a source
independent of the tortfeasor,”118 that is, a collateral source is one “other
than the injurer.”119 In the context of Title VII, however, it is the employer
who is the injurer. And though unemployment insurance benefits are
actually paid out by the government, to the extent that the source of
compensation is an employer, these payments cannot be considered
“collateral.”
True, state governments act as administrators of unemployment
insurance funds and collect premiums through taxation. But relying on this
aspect of the unemployment insurance relationship to characterize
unemployment benefits as collateral privileges form over function. First,
the state’s role as intermediary has no bearing on the fact that employers
are the sole direct source of funding that provides for the unemployment
insurance benefits. Indeed, we would consider ordinary insurance
premiums paid by an individual insured to be sourced from that individual,
even though the premiums are later intermingled with other insureds’
premiums and invested by an insurer, as the states similarly do with
employer unemployment insurance tax proceeds. Second, insurance
relationships are nearly always characterized by the presence of an
intermediary—typically, insurance contracts create a principal-agent
relationship, with the purchaser of insurance acting as principal, appointing
the insurer as his agent to take care of insured losses on his behalf.120
Through a slight variation of this familiar agent/principal lens, states are
the agents designated by federal and state law to represent the employerprincipal and to discharge its obligations to the employee-beneficiaries.
This intermediary relationship does not alter the fact that unemployment
insurance payments made by the agent-state are still attributable to the
principal-employer, and represent the discharge of liability.121
118

BLACK’S, supra note 52.
SHAVELL, supra note 54, at 142-43.
120
See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 5 (2d ed. 2008).
121
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. g (2006) (“Employee
and nonemployee agents who represent their principal in transactions with third
parties on the principal’s account and behalf. Employee-agents whose work does
not involve transaction interactions with third parties also act ‘on behalf of’ their
employer-principal.”). But note, however, that while the employer/state
relationship in the unemployment context may lack the required control element.
(“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when . . . the agent shall act on
119
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Of course, as discussed earlier in this Note, the incidence of
unemployment insurance taxes may play an important role in resolving this
dispute. That is, employees may bear some of the cost of unemployment
insurance programs to the extent that the cost of the tax is back-shifted
through reduced earnings. But although there is no consensus as to the
incidence of the tax, the best estimates find that employees are responsible
for no more than a portion of the market tax rate, so that ultimately,
employers almost certainly pay for most of the unemployment insurance
program. Moreover, it is not clear that unemployment insurance benefits
are rendered collateral simply because the employer adjusts employee
wages to reflect the cost of unemployment insurance. Even if so, the cost
remains shared between the employee and employer, with the average
employer responsible for the majority of the cost; the benefits can only
colorably be considered collateral to the extent that the employee is
responsible for paying for the benefits through a reduced wage. Further, the
reasoning for excluding bargained-for insurance coverage as a collateral
source—that the insured has paid for the covered event through premiums
calculated to that plaintiff’s level of risk—does not hold true when only the
base-rate, and not the experience rating, is back-shifted to an employee. In
that case, there is no guarantee that the employee has made a contribution
proportional to the risk and cost of loss.
With the exception of administration by state governments and, as
described above, that risk is not related to premium, the unemployment
insurance system closely tracks traditional forms of insurance in its
operation and structure. Unemployment insurance, like traditional
insurance, has as one of its primary functions risk-spreading; in this
context, it is attempting to ensure that the risks posed by unemployment to
both individuals and society as a whole are spread among employers.122
And, as in insurance generally, risk-classification is undertaken by
unemployment insurers through the experience rating (in traditional
insurance, “underwriting”), in order to charge participants for the amount
of risk that they bring to the insurance pool. In addition, the structure of
unemployment insurance gestures to concerns about moral hazard and

the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control. . . .” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01), in some instances “relationships that are less than
fully consensual and, therefore, not common-law agency relations trigger legal
consequences equivalent to those of agency.” Id. at cmt. d.
122
Tax incidence may, as discussed infra Part II.B., distort the effect of this
intention.
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adverse selection,123 both of which are familiar concepts in ordinary
insurance. Though participation in the unemployment insurance system is
mandatory, and though unemployment insurance may serve broader social
goals, neither is unusual in the insurance context. Many ordinary forms of
insurance require mandatory participation,124 and have at least a partial
function of providing social stability and other positive externalities.125
Even if one is inclined to the view that unemployment insurance
benefits are payments made as a kind of social welfare, funded, like similar
programs, through taxation linked to employment, it is not clear that such
payments should be immune from deduction from back pay awards. Judge
Richard Posner, for example, posits that such benefits, to the extent that
they are financed by the government, should be deducted from back pay
awards and that the government should have a right to recovery.126 The
government, in his view, is another victim (in this case, of a discriminatory
firing) and should not alone bear the burden of damages.
Thus, unemployment insurance is most closely associated with the
employer, perhaps best analogized as a traditional insurance product that is
bought and paid for by employers for the benefit of employees. In the case
123

Policing of insured-side moral hazard – the theoretical tendency of
insurance to minimize incentives to protect against or minimize the costs or risks
of a loss—is reflected in unemployment insurance requirements that those
collecting unemployment benefits actively look for jobs and request their insurance
benefit anew each week. (Both of these requirements encourage the unemployed to
find new employment, and to stop receiving insurance benefits, faster than they
might without the requirements.) Insurer-side moral hazard is less of a concern
with unemployment insurance than it is with traditional insurance because
unemployment insurance is administered by the states, which lack the profit
motive driving insurer-side moral hazard.
Adverse selection – the theoretical tendency for high risk insureds to overconsume insurance and for insurers to screen out high-consumption insureds – is
controlled by measures that force employers to “purchase” insurance through
mandatory taxation and by “enrolling” all involuntarily unemployed persons who
apply for benefits and meet unemployment insurance requirements.
124
For example, auto insurance is required in almost every state. BAKER,
supra note 120, at 451.
125
Examples of these positive externalities include liability insurance, which
ensures that plaintiffs are guaranteed remuneration for covered losses, thus
avoiding an insolvent or unwilling defendant from avoiding responsibility for his
bad acts, and property insurance, which is universally required by mortgagors in
order to secure their collateral, but which also provides the positive externality of
neighborhood stability. See id. at 8.
126
POSNER, supra note 57.
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of Title VII, however—where the employer is both the source of funds and
the defendant—these funds cannot be considered collateral.
2. Public Policy Does Not Support Extending the Collateral
Source Rule to Unemployment Insurance Benefits in the
Title VII Context
It is not seriously disputed that application of the collateral source
rule usually results in a plaintiff receiving a double recovery, which itself
often, but not always, results in a windfall for the plaintiff. This Note has
explored many of the various policy rationales that have been used to
justify both the initial double recovery and the windfall that may result. But
in the particular context of Title VII and unemployment insurance benefits,
most of these rationales are simply inapposite.
To start, a double recovery cannot be justified as a means of
indirectly awarding punitive damages or providing attorney’s fees in Title
VII suits. Both punitive damages and attorney’s fees are explicitly available
in the (relatively recently revised) text of Title VII,127 a clear expression of
Congress’s intent as to how and when fees and damages should be
awarded.128 Indeed, punitive damages are available on only a limited basis
under Title VII;129 by so limiting their availability, Congress has indicated
it almost surely did not intend punitive damages to be awarded to plaintiffs
on the sole (and irrelevant to Title VII) basis of the plaintiff previously
having collected unemployment insurance benefits. Attorney’s fees, on the
other hand, are widely available under Title VII, even (after its 1991
revision) for certain plaintiffs who lose their cases,130 and thus it is simply
not necessary to account for them by “rounding up” a damages award.
127

The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b), 105 Stat.
1071, 1073 (1991) (current version at 42 U.S.C 1981a (2006)).
128
See ANDREW S. BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF
CONTRACT 162-63 (3d ed. 2005) (“[I]f punishment is desired, it is surely better to
administer it through punitive damages [rather than the collateral source rule],
where the punishment is explicit and where the amount awarded can be fixed in
accordance with the extent to which it is felt the defendant deserves punishment.”).
129
See infra Part II.A.
130
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241,
261 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006)) (defendant is liable for
attorneys fees if the plaintiff can show that a protected characteristic was
considered by the defendant in taking an unlawful employment action, even if the
defendant can show that the same decision would have been made without
consideration of the protected characteristic, thereby avoiding liability).
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Ordinary insurers avoid a double-recovery with the near-universal
contractual assertion of a subrogation right, which eliminates the risk of a
windfall to the insured by virtue of having obtained a collateral benefit.
But, as this Note points out, the majority of states do not hold a statutory
subrogation right, and thus have no means of collecting benefits for which
there exists an overlap. In those states that have asserted a subrogation
right, the concern that employers will not bear the full cost of their
wrongdoing has been eliminated, along with the need to choose between
awarding a windfall to either the employee or employer, because though
unemployment benefits are deducted from a plaintiff’s back pay award,
they are then remitted to the unemployment fund by the employer.131
Similarly, deterrence and social responsibility for wrongdoing are not
weakened as against the employer, since it remains fully responsible for
lost wages. Indeed, subrogation has the effect of preserving the strength of
the insurance pool, as compared to windfalls, which have the opposite
effect.132
To be sure, in those states lacking subrogation statutes, deducting
unemployment benefits from an award favors defendants, because it
reduces the amount of damages that he will have to pay the plaintiff and, in
that sense, lowers the cost of its discriminatory act. But unlike other
applications of the collateral source rule, in which the defendant’s reduced
award is not mitigated by an associated cost, unemployment insurance
administration is designed so that each firing has a commensurate effect on
the unemployment insurance tax rate. Thus, there remains a disincentive to
taking the wrongful action that, to some degree, mitigates forces impairing
the deterrence effect of damages and social cost of a firing to an
employer.133
131

See infra Part II.D.
See infra Table 2. It is feasible that this approach would also provide a
benefit to some employers in the form of reduced premiums by, as discussed
earlier in this Note, increasing the overall strength of the unemployment fund.
133
It is very important to note, however, that this may not compensate for the
full costs of discriminatory firings on society, the elimination of which is a primary
interest of Title VII. Since the true social cost of such firings is not easily
calculated, it is difficult or impossible to determine precisely whether or not the
experience rating can capture these costs.
Another potential concern regarding the discretionary rule, even in a
system with a subrogation right, is that it may create an incentive to settle cases for
less than the full cost of the discriminatory act (though at least equal to or more
than the amount of a back pay award less any unemployment insurance benefits
received). That is, the defendant-employer knows that in a system with subrogation
132
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B. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SHOULD NOT BE UNIFORMLY
DISALLOWED AS DEDUCTIONS FROM BACK PAY AWARDS.
Because of the divergent approaches taken by both the circuit
courts of appeals and of the state legislatures, prevailing plaintiffs in Title
VII suits are placed on very different footings solely on the basis of
residency. District court judges in at least 20 states are required to award
plaintiffs what this Note has shown should be considered a windfall.134 In
many other states, on the other hand, plaintiffs are subject to subrogation
statutes or to judicial reduction of their back pay award. The basis of this
differing treatment, however—essentially, disharmony in the law—has
nothing to do with Title VII’s aim of making victims of discrimination
whole and ending employment discrimination.
Take one example: the Fourth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes
Virginia and Maryland, which have subrogation statutes,135 and North
Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia, which do not, has adopted the
restrictive approach. Suppose that an employer located in Virginia
discriminatorily fires employees living in West Virginia, Maryland, and
Virginia. Further suppose that the firing causes all of the employees
identical loss of pay, and that the employees collect identical amounts of
unemployment insurance benefits as a result of the firing.136 Upon
prevailing in a Title VII suit, the plaintiff-employees would each receive
the same amount in back pay damages. Following the suit, however, those
plaintiffs living in West Virginia are not subject to subrogation and enjoy
both unemployment insurance benefits and a back pay award; their
identically situated coworkers residing in Virginia and Maryland, on the
it will remain fully responsible for the loss upon a verdict for the plaintiffemployee. The employee, however, knows that it will only receive the amount of
back pay minus the unemployment insurance benefits upon prevailing, and
resultantly has an incentive to accept a settlement for anything more than that
amount.
Of course, a plaintiff who believes that he or she will be entitled to punitive or
special compensatory damages may be less swayed to settle, as may a high-income
plaintiff, for whom the deduction of back pay benefits represents a smaller
proportion of the overall award.
134
That is, in states that lack subrogation statutes that are located in circuits
that do not allow the district courts the discretion to deduct unemployment
insurance benefits from back pay awards. See infra Table 2.
135
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-809 (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE
ANN. § 60.2-634 (2006).
136
They would not, in reality, since they all live in different states.
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other hand, repay the unemployment fund and receive the excess of back
pay over amounts received as unemployment insurance compensation. As
demonstrated in Table 1,137 this difference is significant: unreduced awards
may be more than 50% higher than that of plaintiffs whose award is
reduced by a court or through subrogation.
The result is indefensible in the context of the rule of law in
general and of Title VII in particular, which mandates principled and
uniform application of the back pay provision.138 In fact, while many circuit
courts of appeals have gestured to the ideal of uniform application of Title
VII when refusing to allow the discretionary approach, denial of discretion
has, as illustrated above, produced the opposite effect of widening
differences between similarly-situated plaintiffs.
C. THE DEDUCTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE DISTRICT COURTS.
As just described, statutory methods of subrogation are incoherent
across states, rendering identical back pay awards drastically different
depending on a prevailing plaintiff’s state of residence. The restrictive rule,
uniformly banning consideration of unemployment compensation when
determining back pay awards, ignores and enables this incoherence. The
federal district courts, however, are well-situated—both as fact finders and
as a relatively localized adjudicative body—to ensure uniformity of back
pay awards. The circuit courts of appeals can, and should, accomplish
uniformity by adopting the discretionary rule, allowing district courts to
consider evidence of unemployment benefits when calculating a Title VII
plaintiff’s back pay damages. District courts, in turn, should leave
unchanged awards for those plaintiffs whose unemployment insurance
benefits will be subject to subrogation, but should reduce back pay awards
when such benefits will result in a windfall, perhaps to the extent that those
benefits are attributable solely to an employer and not to employees
through back-shifting, when and if such a calculation can be reliably made.
The abandonment of the restrictive rule is necessary because the
present two-tiered system of compensation for Title VII plaintiffs is in
conflict with the “consistent and principled application of the [Title VII]
backpay provision” required by the Supreme Court.139 And ensuring that
Title VII is consistently applied by adopting the discretionary approach is
137

Infra Table 1.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421-22 (1975).
139
Id.
138
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unlikely to diminish the attainment of the statute’s ultimate goal: to reduce
employment discrimination. Defendants do not receive a windfall in those
states that have subrogation statutes, because the employer remains
responsible for the entire amount awarded by the court; in states without
subrogation statutes, the reduced awards likely have at most a minor impact
on the deterrent effect of the back pay provision due to the increased costs
associated with a firing for which unemployment insurance benefits and
Title VII back pay damages are claimed.
In fact, reducing back pay awards is plainly consistent with
congressional intent to put plaintiffs in the “position where they would
have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.”140 In a Title VII
firing suit, the position that the plaintiff would have been in absent
discrimination is employed; were the plaintiff employed, she would not
have received unemployment compensation. Awarding a plaintiff the total
amount of back pay that she would have received if she were not fired,
while refusing to reimburse the plaintiff to the extent that she received a
benefit as a result of a firing, is consistent with the make-whole nature of
back pay relief under Title VII.
It cannot be ignored that employment discrimination suits are
relatively low value, and that the private attorney general model is likely
weakened by the lower incentives to sue that may result from reduced back
pay awards. This incentive structure, however, was strengthened by the
addition of attorney’s fees and punitive damages under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, both of which (perhaps unlike the windfalls at issue here)
furthered Congress’s expressed intent that the back pay provision make
plaintiffs whole, but go no further.
The discretionary approach is also in accord with the purposes of
unemployment insurance. Recall that unemployment benefits are paid both
to sustain individuals and their families during periods of temporary
unemployment and to stabilize the economy during periods of high
unemployment. The first purpose is fulfilled when the plaintiff is able to
access his or her insurance benefits during unemployment, and is not
nullified when those benefits are later recouped. At that point, the plaintiff
has either found employment or no longer qualifies as “temporarily”
unemployed; in either case, the insurance benefits have accomplished their
income-flow-smoothing function. Nor does reduction of back pay awards
impact the economy-wide purposes of unemployment insurance, which,
again, is important during the actual period of volatility, but does not have
its stabilizing function impaired when later recouped. On the contrary, the
140

118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).
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restrictive rule, by lowering unemployment insurance fund balances as
demonstrated in Table 2, may have the effect of reducing compensation,
increasing the duration of unemployment and decreasing labor force
participation.141
Allowing the federal district courts to consider the amount of
unemployment insurance benefits a prevailing plaintiff has received will
help to ensure that Title VII back pay awards are truly compensatory.
While in some cases a discretionary approach may result in some benefit to
defendant-employers, in all cases it will ensure that the back pay provision
is consistently applied in accord with congressional and Supreme Court
mandates.
V. CONCLUSION
The nature of unemployment insurance and the text of Title VII
counsel that the circuit courts of appeals allow the district courts the
discretion to consider unemployment insurance benefits when calculating
back pay awards for plaintiffs. In states that have subrogation statutes, the
district courts should impose no offset, but rather allow reimbursement of
the state fund by operation of law. This result ensures plaintiffs receive
their entitled make-whole relief, holds defendant-employers liable for the
full costs of their discriminatory acts, and benefits the entire pool of
insureds by not contributing to the further destabilization of state
unemployment insurance funds. Even in states that do not assert
subrogation rights, consistent application of Title VII suggests that
unemployment insurance benefits should be offset from a prevailing
plaintiff’s back pay award.
Those states that do not have subrogation statutes should consider
their role as a large-scale insurer and act to pass laws that guarantee fair
and appropriate benefit payouts while considering the rights of all
participating insureds to a stable and fairly administered fund. As 16 states
have realized, the best way to accomplish this is, like the majority of
conventional private insurers, vesting the unemployment insurance funds
with a subrogation right.

141

See Anderson, supra note 46. As discussed earlier in this Note, market rates
for the unemployment tax are calculated by reference to the balance, income, and
expenses of the unemployment insurance fund.

LESSONS FROM THE PRICE-ANDERSON NUCLEAR
INDUSTRY INDEMNITY ACT FOR FUTURE CLEAN ENERGY
COMPENSATORY MODELS
TAYLOR MEEHAN
***
The following note discusses the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industry
Indemnity Act as a model liability insurance system for future clean energy
technologies and sources such as carbon sequestration and geothermal
energy. The Price-Anderson Act implements a tiered insurance system that
requires individual commercial nuclear power plants to secure private
insurance policies for site-specific incidents up to a certain threshold. This
first layer of indemnity is then supplemented by an industry-wide pooling
system that provides indemnification in the event of an incident that
accrues greater financial losses than the initial, primary insurance layer
obtained by the responsible nuclear plant. In the event the industry-wide
insurance pool funds are exhausted, the federal government is the final
indemnifier, providing additional compensation to affected individuals
when deemed appropriate. This note considers the history of the PriceAnderson Act, its development and subsequent amendments since its
enactment in 1957, and highlights the specific aspects of the system that
should be adopted in the future. In particular, the note argues that carbon
sequestration technology and geothermal energy are presently situated in a
similar situation as the nuclear industry was in the early 1950s. The
parallels between the industries – most notably the low risk of an industrial
accident, yet extensive consequences in the event of an incident – invite
comparison and analysis into whether the nuclear industry indemnity
system is a transferable model to future clean energy technologies.
Ultimately, the note argues that a number of the key components of the
Price-Anderson Act – particularly its liability cap, federal involvement, nofault liability, federal jurisdiction, and continually written policies – not
only are suitable for future systems, but in fact should be implemented by
the insurance industry when underwriting the carbon sequestration and
geothermal energy insurance system. The note concludes that the United
States is in dire need of restructuring its national energy policy and an
essential aspect to this national policy is creating an underlying system of
liability that can be applicable, with specific adaptations in lieu of inherent
University of Connecticut School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate for the
Class of 2012.
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differences in these technologies, to new clean energy sources. The current
system of the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industry Indemnity Act is America’s
best solution.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the increasing energy demand in the United States and the
diminishing supply of traditional domestic fossil fuels,1 the nation is
confronted with serious energy concerns that necessitate a review of our
national energy policy. Not only is the United States the largest energy
producer, consumer and net importer per capita in the world,2 but the
1

Energy production from fossil fuels (e.g., coal, oil and natural gas) is
expected to continue to dominate U.S. energy production for years to come.
Naturally, the continual production of fossil fuel reserves and the increased energy
demand within the United States has led to significant concerns of a diminishing
domestic supply of such resources. While the energy industry is alarmed at the
potential diminution in domestic fossil fuel resources, the United States has
witnessed a boom in the exploration, development and early production of natural
gas reserves located in deep, shale rock formations around the country. These shale
formations contain natural gas reserves that were previously considered
inaccessible and uneconomical for energy production. However, with the
increasing development and use of a technological drilling process called hydraulic
fracturing (fracking) these shale fields are opening up a vast amount of potential
for natural gas production within the United States. The practice, however, is
highly controversial. The energy industry currently heralds fracking as the answer
to U.S. energy needs while environmental groups and legislators are concerned
with potential groundwater contamination and increased seismic activity within
surrounding drilling areas. The national debate on the practice is presently
unfolding. See J. DANIEL ARTHUR, P.E., BRIAN BOHM, P.G. & MARK LAYNE,
PH.D., P.E., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATURAL GAS
WELLS OF THE MARECELLUS SHALE, Ground Water Protection Council 2008
Annual Forum 7-9 (Sept. 21-24, 2008).
2
See International Energy Statistics, UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, INDEPENDENT STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, http://www.eia.gov
/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=44&pid=44&aid=2 (last visited Aug. 21,
2011). But see China Overtakes the United States to Become World’s Largest
Energy Consumer, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (July 20, 2010),
http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479 (finding China has recently surpassed
the United States in total energy consumption, however the United States remains
the largest energy consumer per capita).
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country also boasts the world’s largest coal reserves – making the United
States extremely dependent on fossil fuel energy for short-term and longterm economic growth.3 Concerns over energy security and foreign
dependence are exacerbated by scientific and social apprehension
surrounding the leakage of greenhouse gas from these fossil fuel energy
sources into the environment.4
Accordingly, the United States must continue to focus on its
development of clean energy sources that can help mitigate many of the
risks and problems associated with fossil fuel energy. Headlining these
developments are clean energy sources and technologies such as nuclear
energy, carbon sequestration and geothermal energy. In order to properly
support the clean energy movement, the United States must attract
significant financial investment from the private sector as well as provide a
system of adequate insurance coverage in order to mitigate any associated
risks.
The following commentary examines the benefits and deficiencies
of the current financial protection program of the nuclear energy industry,
which was established by the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industry Indemnity
Act. It continues, arguing in support of the development of a similar, yet
varied version of the underlying nuclear industry indemnity system to
insure future clean energy sources and technologies.
Analysis of the Price-Anderson Act reveals a variety of important
issues and concerns for insurers attempting to provide coverage for clean
energy technologies and sources such as carbon sequestration and
geothermal energy. While these technologies are each distinct and consist
of specific, technical issues that are unique to their own field, the PriceAnderson Act offers a general model of a public-private partnership that
has successfully insured the nuclear industry for over fifty years.
The following commentary will begin by discussing the history and
development of the Price-Anderson system, as it has been amended and
renewed four times since its original enactment. The note will then provide
analysis of the long-term liability issues associated with the nuclear
3

See Guri Bang, Energy Security and Climate Change Concerns: Triggers for
Energy Policy Change in the United States?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1645, 1645
(2010).
4
KEVIN A. BAUMERT, TIMOTHY HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING,
NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE POLICY 12 (World Resources Institute 2005) (The United States is among
the leading emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, most notably carbon
dioxide. In 2000, the United States amounted for 20.6% of the world’s greenhouse
gas emissions.).
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industry, carbon sequestration and geothermal energy. In particular, the
note will argue in support of the establishment of a similar, private-public
tiered insurance pool system for future clean energy industries.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
The United States is in a similar position today as it was in the
1950s. In the 1950s, the nation was confronted with the harsh realities of
the aftermath of World War II and the increasing industrial growth of the
nation. The need for a rise and diversification in its energy production to
meet the demand was essential. Therefore, the federal government
encouraged energy diversification, invested in research and development of
alternative energy sources, and provided regulatory incentives to advance
oil, coal and nuclear development within the private sector.5
In 1954, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act, which provided
for the development and regulation of civilian and military uses of nuclear
materials in the United States.6 The Act marked the first time the private
sector was encouraged to become a player in the development of
commercial nuclear power plants. The initial version of the statute,
however, did not establish a system of indemnification for, or limits on,
private licensee liability in case of offsite injury to individuals or damage to
property.7
Thus, the private sector approached the invitation with both caution
and uncertainty. The private sector was concerned with the lack of nuclear
experience – not only from a technological standpoint but also from an
insurance perspective. The lack of certainty prompted a resistance from
insurance companies to provide commercial liability coverage for private

5

See Roger H. Bezdek & Robert M. Wendling, A Half Century of US Federal
Government Energy Incentives: Value, Distribution, and Policy Implications, 27
INT’L J. GLOBAL ENERGY ISSUES 42, 43 (2007).
6
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006) (The Act is the
fundamental U.S. law on both the civilian and the military uses of nuclear
materials. It provides for the development and regulation of nuclear materials and
facilities in the United States. The Act declares that "the development, use, and
control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve
the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition
in private enterprise.").
7
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954),
amended by the Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (2006)).
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sector nuclear development.8 Accordingly, representatives from the private
sector stressed to Congress that they would be forced to withdraw from the
field if their liability was not limited by legislation.9
III. THE PRICE-ANDERSON NUCLEAR INDUSTRY INDEMNITY
ACT
In response to such concerns, Congress passed the Price-Anderson
Act in 1957 as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. The PriceAnderson Act established a nuclear liability indemnity system and
encouraged further development of the nuclear industry within America.10
This system included a liability cap in the event of a nuclear incident – a
provision that was necessary for initiating private investment and
development of nuclear energy within the United States.11
The nuclear industry is an area in which large amounts of energy
production is accompanied with low, yet devastating, potentials of risk,
especially during early developments. Thus, the Price-Anderson Act sought
8

See Barry Brownstein, The Price-Anderson Act: Is It Consistent with a
Sound Energy Policy?, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 17, 1984), http://www.cato.org/pu
b_display.php?pub_id=902 (“Consider the following statements from the 1956
and 1957 hearings on the then-proposed Price-Anderson amendment. A vice
president of Westinghouse, Charles Weaver, stated: ‘Obviously we cannot risk the
financial stability of our company for a relatively small project no matter how
important it is to the country's reactor development effort, if it could result in a
major liability in relation to our assets.’”) (quoting Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Governmental Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors
Against Reactor Hazards-Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956, p. 110); see also id. (“General Electric also indicated
during the hearings that it was prepared to halt its work in the nuclear industry
should a limitation on liability not be passed.”) (citing Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental
Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, p. 148); and id.
(“Suppliers of reactor shields also indicated their unwillingness ‘to undertake
contracts in this field without being relieved of uninsurable liability in some
way.’”) (quoting Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings Before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety,
85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, p. 148).
9
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 64 (1978).
10
Act of September 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
11
42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(b)(4)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006).
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to implement a sufficient liability and compensation framework to both
protect the American public in the event of a nuclear incident as well as
advance financial investment and development of the industry.12 The Act is
essentially an insurance program that encourages private development of
nuclear power, establishes a legal framework for handling potential liability
claims, and provides a ready source of funds to compensate injured victims
of nuclear accidents.13
In drafting the indemnity plan, Congress initially established a twotiered insurance system. The primary layer of the system required each
commercial nuclear power plant to secure its own insurance coverage up to
a certain threshold. In the event that the primary layer was exhausted, the
federal government would provide an additional layer of financial
protection.14
The initial two-tiered model has since been bolstered to include an
additional industry-wide pool that requires nuclear reactors to collectively
contribute to a separate insurance pool.15 Accordingly, the current system
consists of a three-tiered system. To date, the primary layer requires each
nuclear plant to secure $375 million in financial protection.16 In the event
of an incident exceeding the primary layer’s coverage, the industry-wide
pool kicks in and each reactor is assessed a prorated share of the excess up
to $111.9 million.17 The $111.9 million is adjusted every five years for
12

The original act implemented a system that would last for ten years. This
was an attempt by legislators and nuclear industry actors to readdress the
Amendment once significant development within the nuclear field and commercial
liability industry could occur. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
13
National Energy Issues: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat.
Resources, 107th Cong. 53, 54 (2001) (statement of John L. Quattrocchi, Senior
Vice President, Underwriting, American Nuclear Insurers, West Hartford, CT)
[hereinafter Quattrocchi].
14
The Price-Anderson Act: Background Information, AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y
(Nov. 2005), http://www.new.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf.
15
The Insurance Institute defines an insurance pool as “a group of insurance
companies that pool assets, enabling them to provide an amount of insurance
substantially more than can be provided by individual companies to insure large
risks such as nuclear power stations.” See Insurance Pools Definition, INSURANCE
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www2.iii.org/glossary/i/ (last visited Aug. 22,
2011).
16
Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds Nuclear
Insurance: Price-Anderson Act, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION (Jun. 2011), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheets/funds-fs.html.
17
Id.
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inflation and represents the maximum retrospective assessment that each
insured licensee can be assigned per incident.18
The additional pool, also known as the Secondary Financial
Protection program, is currently comprised of 104 power reactors and
amounts to nearly $12.6 billion dollars.19 This industry-wide retrospective
rating program will be used in the event that a loss exceeds the primary
insurance limit.20 In turn, if the second tier is fully exhausted, Congress is
committed to determine whether additional relief is needed.21 If Congress
determines additional relief is necessary, the federal government is the final
indemnifier.22
Since its enactment, the Price-Anderson Act has been amended in
1966, 1975, and 1988. Recently, the Act was renewed with the passage of
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which extended the program until
December 31, 2025.23 The following sections discuss the development and
amendments to the Price-Anderson Act and their significance to the legal
and insurance framework of the nuclear industry.
A. 1957 PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
In 1957, Dwight Eisenhower signed into law the Price-Anderson
Act, establishing the first nuclear indemnification plan for commercial
nuclear power plants within the United States.24 The Act initially required a
commercial nuclear power plant licensee with energy capacities of 100,000
electrical kilowatts or more to obtain $60 million of financial protection –
18

See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 56.
Need for Nuclear Liability Insurance, AMERICAN NUCLEAR INSURERS 2
(Jul. 2011), http://www.amnucins.com/library/Nuclear%20Liability%20in%20t
he%20US.pdf [hereinafter ANI Liability Insurance].
20
See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 59; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2014(k) (2006).
21
42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (2006).
22
42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (2006). (The federal indemnity agreement covers
liability for any bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or loss of or damage to
property by a nuclear incident occurring within the United States. See 42 U.S.C. §
2214(q) (2006)).
23
Cole Mahone Adams, Damages and Injury: Smith v. Carbide and
Chemicals Corporation and the Application of Kentucky Law under the PriceAnderson Act, 22 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 175, 177 (2008-2009).
24
See S. REP. NO. 85-296, at 8 (1957) (The Act provides the United States
with “a practical approach to the necessity of providing adequate protection against
liability arising from atomic hazards, as well as a sound basis for compensating the
public for any possible injury or damage arising from such hazards.”).
19
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the maximum amount of private insurance potentially available at the time
– in order to remain in operation.25 In the event of a nuclear incident, the
Atomic Energy Commission agreed to indemnify the nuclear operators or
manufacturers for all liability up to, but not in excess of, $500 million.26
The initial act established the precedent for a liability cap for the
federal government and also included “omnibus coverage,” which extended
coverage not only to a person with whom an agreement of indemnification
was executed but also to any person or persons deemed liable under state
tort law.27 While the original $500 million proved to be a rough estimation
of liability, each successive amendment Congress has addressed, and
raised, the liability cap to reflect an appropriate balance between industry
capacity and potential harm.28
B. PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: 1966 AND 1975 AMENDMENTS
In accordance to the 1957 version of the Price-Anderson Act, the
statute was to expire following a ten-year trial period.29 Congress, however,
extended the bill in 196630 and again in 1975.31 The 1966 amendment
addressed three major concerns of legal impediments claimants faced when
seeking relief under the Act – proving legal causation, state statutes of
limitations and jurisdictional variances.
The Joint Committee tasked to remedy the deficiencies of the Act
was concerned that the burden of establishing causation was too stringent,
as many state tort laws required findings of fault or negligence.32 The
argument followed that proving the fault or negligence standard was too
difficult of a burden on the individual victim. Thus, in order to address the
uncertainty in state tort law regarding the applicability of causation, the
25

Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 577 (1957) (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 2210(b) (2006)).
26
Dan M. Berkovitz., Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation
Legislation?–The Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 7 (1989).
27
Id. at 8.
28
See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 58.
29
See Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006)).
30
See Act of September 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855.
31
See Act of December 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111.
32
David M. Rocchio, The Price-Anderson Act: Allocation of the
Extraordinary Risk of Nuclear Generated Electricity: A Model Punitive Damage
Provision, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 521, 538 (1987).
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1966 amendments included a provision for the waiver of various defenses
under state tort law in the event of a major accident termed an
“extraordinary nuclear occurrence.”33 This provision was enacted in order
to assure that the victim’s entitlement to compensation would be
determined under a strict liability standard, instead of the negligence
standard that most state courts require.34
In addition, the Committee addressed the fact that due to the latent
nature of injury, harm and damage caused by exposure to radioactive
material, state statutes of limitation would most likely invalidate any claims
as untimely.35 As a result, the 1966 Amendment provided a provision that
waived the application of state statutes of limitations that were more
restrictive than the three-year limit specified by the Act.36 Finally, the 1966
amendment invoked a removal provision, which brought claims arising out
of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence within the jurisdiction of federal
district courts.37All claims resulting from the same “extraordinary nuclear
occurrence” were to be consolidated into one federal court. The court
would then be responsible for adjudicating all claims, distributing any
compensatory damages if necessary and prioritizing any payouts in the
event of fiduciary exhaustion.38
In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act through 1987. The 1975
amendments drastically changed the system by beginning to phase out the
$500 million layer of federal indemnity. The amendment shifted the
secondary layer of protection instead to the nuclear industry and private
33

42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1982) (An extraordinary nuclear occurrence is defined
“any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing
radiation levels offsite, which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Secretary
of Energy, as appropriate, determines to be substantial, and which the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, determines has
resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or
property offsite.” When determining whether an incident is to be considered an
extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission established
a set of criteria that can be found in 10 C.F.R. §§ 140.81-140.85 (1988)).
34
See S. REP. NO. 89-1605, at 3-4 (1966).
35
See Rocchio, supra note 32, at 525.
36
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(1)(F)(iii) (2006) (The Act allows “any issue or
defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is instituted within three years
from the date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably could have known,
of his injury or damage and the cause thereof.”).
37
42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2006).
38
42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(3)(A)-(C) (2006).
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insurance companies.39 The Act required each nuclear plant to contribute
up to $5 million of retrospective premiums in the event of a nuclear
accident at any commercial nuclear plant within the United States for
which damages exceeded the required $60 million amount of private
insurance for each site.40 The total amount of financial protection in this
secondary layer depended on the number of operating power plants,
however the government retained the assurance that it would provide
compensation in the event that the total protection was less than the
previous amount of $560 million.41
C. 1988 AMENDMENTS
In the aftermath of the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island
nuclear power plant,42 Congress opted to further increase the liability cap
and financial protections of the Act.43 In the 1988 amendment, Congress
increased the liability of the nuclear industry to $9.87 billion dollars, nearly
ten times greater than the original liability cap.44
Following the Three Mile Island incident, lawsuits were filed in
state and federal courts due to the language of the Act – that is, only
“extraordinary nuclear occurrences” could be consolidated in federal
court.45 Thus, Congress amended the Act in 1988 by granting United States
district courts with original removal jurisdiction over all “public liability
39

Berkovitz, supra note 26, at 14.
Id. at 14-15.
41
Id. at 15.
42
See Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Three Mile Island Accident:
Backgrounder, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, available at http://www.nr
c.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (last visited Aug. 22,
2011) (On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near
Middletown, Pa., suffered a severe core meltdown, leading to the most serious
nuclear incident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history. No
deaths or injuries to plant workers or members of the nearby community occurred,
but it brought widespread change to the security, operation, emergency response
and regulations of the nuclear industry).
43
Id.
44
Berkovitz, supra note 26, at 41.
45
See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 486 (1999) (The
Supreme Court held, among other issues, that the Price-Anderson Act’s terms “are
underscored by its legislative history, which expressly refers to the multitude of
separate cases brought 'in various state and Federal courts' in the aftermath of the
Three Mile Island accident.”).
40
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actions” arising under the Price-Anderson Act.46 This amendment,
combined with the waiver of defense provisions, the omnibus coverage and
the predetermined sources of funding, provided individuals seeking legal
recourse significant advantages in federal court that might not otherwise be
offered under state tort law.47 The substantive rules for decision, however,
remain derived from state law in which the nuclear incident occurs, unless
such law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act.48
D. PRICE-ANDERSON ACT SINCE 2005
With strong bipartisan support, Congress passed the Energy Policy
Act (EPAct) of 2005, which, among other provisions, provided for the
extension of the Price-Anderson Act from 2005 until December 31, 2025.49
This is the longest extension of the program since its enactment. The most
significant amendment from EPAct is the increase in the amount of annual
financial contributions from commercial reactors.50 The Act now requires
individual site operators to provide $375 million of primary financial
protection and to contribute $111.9 million to the Secondary Financial
Protection Program, plus 5% for legal costs per reactor.51
THE REGULATING AGENCY: THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMITTEE
Congress established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
as an independent regulating agency designed to license and regulate the
nation’s civilian use of nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of
public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, and
to protect the environment.52 An essential component of the NRC’s role as
46

42 U. S. C. § 2210(n)(2) (2006).
O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1100 (7th Cir.
1994) (citing S. REP. NO. 100-218, at 4 (1987)).
48
42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2006).
49
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 602-608,
119 Stat. 779, 779-781 (2005).
50
70 FR 61885-01, Rules and Regulations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(2005) (codified in scattered sections of 10 C.F.R.).
51
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, supra note 16, at 1.
52
William C. Ostendorff, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
Keynote Address at the Emerging Issues Policy Forum, Powering the Future 2010:
Nuclear Regulation and the Nuclear Renaissance 1-2 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1027/ML102790151.pdf.
47
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a federal agency is that it is not an entity that promotes the use of nuclear
and radiation technologies,53 but instead is one that regulates the use of
such technologies to ensure the safety and security of the nuclear
industry.54
As stated by Commissioner William C. Ostendorff during a
keynote address on the nuclear renaissance in Amelia, FL,55 the agency
strives to adhere to its principles of good regulation through independence,
transparency, efficiency, clarity, and reliability.56 If the nation is to proceed
with clean, alternative energies as an integral part of our national energy
policy, then the clean energy technologies will also need an independent
regulatory agency similar to the NRC. Such an agency would ensure best
practice techniques, regulation of licenses and operations, and uniformity
across the industry as well as provide direction as an oversight committee
in promoting safety and the public interest.
V.

THE INSURERS: THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR INSURERS

Since the establishment of the Price-Anderson system, a group of
member insurance companies – the American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) – has
been responsible for all of the nuclear liability policies.57 American Nuclear
Insurers is an unincorporated voluntary joint underwriting association that
directly writes nuclear liability insurance for nuclear facilities.58 In order to
be a member company of ANI, insurers are required to contain an A.M.
53

Id. at 2. The role of promoting nuclear technologies was assigned to the
Department of Energy and its predecessor, the Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA), in the 1970s.
54
Id.
55
Commissioner Ostendorff is one of the five head members (commissioners)
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, The
Commission, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commfuncdesc.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2011).
56
See Ostendorff, supra note 52, at 2.
57
As of January 1, 1998, the insurance pools had underwritten the following
policies: Operating power reactors: 69 sites; Non-power reactors: 27; Fuel
fabrication facilities: 6; Waste disposal and storage facilities: 12; Miscellaneous
facilities including nuclear laundries and research laboratories: 55; Discontinued
nuclear facilities: 20; Suppliers and transporters: 225. See Paul Bailey, THE PRICEANDERSON ACT - CROSSING THE BRIDGE TO THE NEXT CENTURY: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, ICF INCORPORATED FOR THE NRC 75 (Oct. 1998).
58
American Nuclear Insurers, Overview, http://www.amnucins.com/About
Ani.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) [hereinafter ANI].
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Best Rating of “A-” or better, possess a policyholder surplus (PHS) of at
least $100 million, and release unqualified, audited financial statements for
the latest financial reporting period.59 Currently, there are 21 insurance
companies that are member companies of ANI.60
American Nuclear Insurers manages both domestic and foreign
underwriting syndicates.61 The domestic syndicate provides third party
nuclear liability insurance to every commercial nuclear power plant in the
United States as well as other entities that support the operation of power
plants such as fabricators of nuclear fuel, nuclear research facilities, waste
management and disposal facilities, and companies that supply any goods
and services to the nuclear industry.62
Under the foreign underwriting syndicate, ANI participates in
reinsurance programs in 18 foreign countries.63 ANI retains around a third
of the liability exposure under each policy while ceding the remaining
amount to insurers around the world.64 This approach allows ANI to
organize the resources of the worldwide insurance community and spread
the uncertainties of the risk over a large financial base.
American Nuclear Insurers provide four specific liability policies
in order to satisfy nuclear plant’s requirements under the Price-Anderson
Act. These policies include a Facility Form Policy, Secondary Financial
Protection Program, Facility Worker Form Policy, and Supplier’s and
Transporter’s Policy.65 The Facility Form Policy is the site-specific
insurance coverage that owners or operators of commercial nuclear power
plant are required to have under the Price-Anderson Act.66 This coverage is
strictly limited to liability for bodily injury or offsite property damage

59

Richard Jones, Nuclear Insurance: Where Does it Fit in the Green
Generation?, 16 J. REINSURANCE 71, 74 (Spring 2009).
60
Id. at 75. These insurance companies include Ace American Insurance
Company, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, AXIS Reinsurance Company,
Federal Insurance Company (Chubb), Swiss Re America, and State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co., among others.
61
Id. at 76.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Ian Hore-Lacey, World Nuclear Association, The Encyclopedia of Earth,
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, United States (Dec. 7, 2009, 10:35 PM),
http://www.eoeart h.org/article/Price-Anderson_Act_of_1957_United_States (last
accessed Aug. 22, 2011).
65
See ANI Liability Insurance, supra note 19, at 1-4.
66
Id. at 1-2.
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caused by nuclear material.67
Underwriters for the Facility Form Policies included two distinct
provisions in order to tailor it to the nuclear industry. First, the policies are
written on a continuous basis with no explicit end date. The insurance
coverage ends only when the owner or operator of the commercial nuclear
power plant or ANI cancels the terms.68 Any claims resulting from the
policy term remains under the coverage. This takes into account the latent
nature of any damage or harm stemming from nuclear exposure.69 Second,
the policies cover not only the owner or operator of the plant but also any
entity connected with the nuclear plant, thus assuring all third party nuclear
liability claims will be covered while also preventing potential stacking of
limits.70
The Secondary Financial Protection Program, discussed
previously, provides for the industry-wide indemnification in the event of a
nuclear incident that exceeds the site-specific insurance policy. The
structure of the insurance coverage under the Price-Anderson Act has
enabled insurers to provide stable, high quality coverage for nuclear risks.
VI. PRICE-ANDERSON ACT AS MODEL COMPENSATION
The Price-Anderson Act represents the balancing of the interests
and needs of the public not only as private citizens but also as consumers in
and beneficiaries of the private business enterprise of nuclear energy.71
The following sections highlight the components of the Act that make it a
model compensation system for clean energy technologies that have not yet
enjoyed the long history and maturity of the nuclear industry.
A. NECESSITY OF A LIABILITY CAP
In order to encourage development of the nuclear industry as well
as provide adequate protection for the American public, Congress
implemented the liability cap for the nuclear industry in order to strike the
appropriate balance of accountability and development. This limitation,
however, does not directly limit the ability of individual claimants affected
by any nuclear incident from recovering. As discussed in Duke Power v.
67

See Jones, supra note 59, at 77.
Id.
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Id. at 78.
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Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., the legislative history of the
Act clearly indicates that the primary – and secondary insurance pools – are
not figures that were arrived at on the supposition that it alone would be
sufficient to guarantee full compensation in the event of a nuclear
accident.72 The initial primary insurance was conceived of as a “starting
point” or “a working hypothesis” derived from expert appraisals of the
exceedingly small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of
that figure.73 This figure has risen from $560 million to $12.6 billion over
the past four decades in order to ensure public protection. In addition,
legislative history indicates that Congress would likely enact extraordinary
relief provisions in order to provide for additional relief.
[T]his limitation does not, as a practical matter, detract
from the public protection afforded by this legislation. In
the first place, the likelihood of an accident occurring,
which would result in claims exceeding the sum of the
financial protection, required and the governmental
indemnity is exceedingly remote, albeit theoretically
possible. Perhaps more important, in the event of a
national disaster of this magnitude, it is obvious that
Congress would have to review the problem and take
appropriate action. The history of other natural or manmade disasters, such as the Texas City incident,[74] bear
this out. The limitation of liability serves primarily as a
device for facilitating further congressional review of such
a situation, rather than as an ultimate bar to further relief of
72

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 85 (1978).
Id.
74
See Hugh W. Stephens, The Texas City Disaster, 1947 (1997). The Texas
City incident was the worst industrial accident in United States history, killing at
least 581 people, injuring over 5,000 individuals and causing extraordinary
amounts of property damage from ammonium nitrate blasts in the Port of Texas
City. Following the incident, a class action was filed against the federal
government under the Torts Claim Act, however the Courts refused to provide
compensation for the victims because the Act may be invoked only on a "negligent
or wrongful act or omission" of an employee, which created no absolute liability of
the Government by virtue of its ownership of an "inherently dangerous
commodity" or property, or of its engaging in an "extrahazardous" activity. After
the court decision, Congress acted to provide compensation through Public Law
378, 69 Stat. 707 (1955). The last claim was processed in 1957, resulting in federal
compensation of nearly $17 million.
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the public.75
While upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court duly
noted the legitimacy of and need for the cap on liability by stating “the
limit on liability [is] ‘a classic example of an economic regulation—a
legislative effort to structure and accommodate ‘the burdens and benefits of
economic life.’”76
The limit on liability remains the most controversial component of
the Act, as critics argue that it constitutes a subsidy for the nuclear industry
by not requiring unlimited liability. First of all, there is no record of the
federal government ever paying a direct subsidy to any private licensees
under Price-Anderson. The nuclear industry not only has paid the costs of
the private, and secondary financial protection, insurance fees but it has
also “paid millions of dollars in indemnity fees and has assumed more than
$9 billion in potential retrospective assessments to compensate injured
accident victims – all of this at no cost to the government.”77
In exchange for the limit on liability, the Price-Anderson Act
provides a large, readily available source of compensation for any
individuals affected from a nuclear incident that would otherwise not
exist.78 To the contrary, the Bhopal Disaster in India in 1984 demonstrates
the problems with a system that fails to assure an available pool of funds in
the event of an industrial accident, despite having no liability cap. The
Bhopal Disaster is considered the world’s worst industrial catastrophe, as a
leak of methyl isocyanate gas and other chemicals from a pesticide plant in
Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India resulted in the exposure of hundreds of
thousands of people to hazardous toxins.79 The Indian government panel
charged with tabulating the deaths and injuries determined that over 3,800
individuals died as a result of the leakage, 11,000 were disabled and an
additional 150,000 to 600,00080 were affected.81
Following years of litigation, the operating company, Union
Carbide Corporation, settled with the Indian Government for $470 million,
75

Duke Power at 85-86 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-883, at 6-7 (1965)).
Id. at 83.
77
See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 59.
78
Id.
79
Jackson B. Browning, Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal, in CRISIS
RESPONSE: INSIDE STORIES ON MANAGING IMAGE UNDER SIEGE 365 (Jack A.
Gottschalk ed., 1993).
80
See AMNESTY INT’L, CLOUDS OF INJUSTICE: BHOPAL DISASTER 20 YEARS
ON 61 (2004).
81
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approximately $1,000 in compensation for each individual killed, disabled
or injured from the disaster.82 The Price-Anderson Act represents not only a
balancing of the risks of the nuclear industry but also of the protection of
the American public. The truth of the matter is “that there is always a limit
on liability – that limit equal to the assets of the company at fault.”83 Those
who drafted the Price-Anderson Act understood this and the legislative
branch appropriately determined the private-public partnership, which
established a liability threshold for the industry, was the most reliable
system to ensure financial protection to the American people.
Throughout the five decades of the Price-Anderson Act, the public
has never had to bear the economic brunt of any nuclear incident within the
United States. Thus far, the insurance pools of the nuclear industry have
paid more than $200 million in claims and litigation costs since Congress
passed the Act.84 Out of this assessment, $71 million in costs were
disbursed following the Three Mile Island Accident in 1979.85 The cost of
nuclear commercial power plant insurance is borne by the industry, which
is unlike various other energy sources within the United States. For
example, the hydropower electricity industry is not responsible for
incidents such as dam failure or resultant flooding; instead the public is the
one to bear the burden of such costs.86 This example is illuminated by the
1977 failure of the Teton Dam in Idaho, which caused approximately $500
million in property damage, however the individuals affected from the
failure were only compensated $200 million of low-cost government
loans.87
In contrast, under the Price-Anderson Act, the insurance pools have
absorbed $200 million of the costs and the nuclear industry has paid $21
million in indemnity fees to the federal government.88 The success of this
program has led Congress to extend the model to protect the public from
other hazards or harm, such as medical malpractice, faulty vaccinations,
toxic waste and terrorist attacks.89 Congress should again adopt such a
82

See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 59.
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84
Nuclear Energy Inst., Price-Anderson Act Provides Effective Liability
Insurance at No Cost to the Public, (Jun. 2010), http://www.nei.org/resour
cesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/factsheet/priceandersonact/.
85
Id.
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GWYNETH CRAVENS, POWER TO SAVE THE WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT
NUCLEAR ENERGY 214 (Alfred A. Knopf 2007).
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model to extend towards clean energy technologies and production in order
to properly encourage investment, development and innovation while also
maintaining a high level of protection to the public.
B. NO-FAULT LIABILITY
In 1966, the legislative branch addressed concerns that many state
tort laws required findings of fault or negligence in order to establish
liability. This created a major obstacle for individual’s seeking relief from
the nuclear industry, as the technicalities and even knowledge of
radioactive leakage, the nuclear industry and the proximate cause of an
injury proved evasive. To appropriately resolve this issue, the Act
implemented a waiver of defenses under state tort law in the event of a
nuclear incident that shifted the standard essentially to one of strict
liability.
Under this regime, claimants are legally required to only
demonstrate that the injury or property damage sustained was caused by the
release of nuclear material from the insured facility, however fault on a
particular defendant does not have to be established.90 The result of this
provision is to effectively ensure a strict liability standard that provides the
public with necessary protections from the judicial system. Such
protections are essential in areas in which legal causation is difficult to
prove.
C. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
State tort laws have historically governed nuclear liability
determinations,91 however amendments to the Price-Anderson Act
following the events at Three Miles Island revised the system in order to
provide a federal overlay. Currently, the Act contains a pre-emption
provision,92 which gives federal district courts jurisdiction over tort actions
arising out of nuclear accidents and “expressly provides for removal of
such actions brought in state court even when they assert only state-law
claims.”93 The removal of such claims eliminates confusion and
90

See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 57.
John L. Quattrocchi, Nuclear Liability Insurance in the United States: An
Insurer’s Perspective, in REFORM OF CIVIL NUCLEAR LIABILITY: INTERNATIONAL
BUDAPEST SYMPOSIUM 1999 (OECD 2000).
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42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2006).
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uncertainties surrounding the applicability of the Price-Anderson Act and
establishes a level of assurance in how the judicial system will approach
such claims.
Furthermore, as discussed in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
the Price-Anderson Act “provides clear indications of the congressional
aims of speed and efficiency.”94 The chief judge of a district court is given
the authority to appoint a special caseload management panel to oversee all
filings and court hearings associated with a nuclear incident case.95 These
panels are designed to consolidate cases, set priorities, expedite cases or
allow more equitable considerations of claims, and implement any
measures as “as will encourage the equitable, prompt, and efficient
resolution of cases arising out of the nuclear incident.”96 Each of these
provisions is in place to reduce the legal costs as well as promote efficiency
and efficacy of the compensation process.
D. LIABILITY IS CHANNELED TO THE PARTICULAR LICENSEE
RESPONSIBLE
The Price-Anderson Act channels financial responsibility and
liability insurance obligations to the particular nuclear power plant
responsible for the incident.97 This mechanism helps assure that claimants
will be provided financial compensation in the event of sustaining injury or
property damage.98 Under the Act, contractors, subcontractors, and
suppliers to DOE contractors and NRC licensees, as well as the DOE
contractors themselves, are fully indemnified for all liability.99 These
operators, however, are all connected with, or “channeled” to, a particular
nuclear power plant. Accordingly, each power plant is responsible for
indemnifying any accidents or incidents arising from its contractors,
subcontractors, or suppliers activities. This is crucial in order to ensure full
protection as well as development of the nuclear industry from all sectors.
Without such assurance – both the economic assurance of indemnification
for the public and legal insulation from individual liability for participating
entities in the nuclear industry – the development of nuclear energy would
certainly have faltered.
94
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E. GUARANTEED POOL OF FUNDS; CONTINUOUSLY WRITTEN
While criticism surrounds the liability cap of the Price-Anderson
Act, the alternative of the Act is that the nuclear power plants would need
to secure their own source of coverage. Not only, as mentioned already,
would this detract most, if not all insurance companies, but in fact it would
place the public in an extraordinarily unsettling situation. Establishing
liability without the Price-Anderson Act would, in theory, place no legal
limit on liability, however each claim would depend on state tort law and
procedures, which may or may not provide for no-fault liability.100 Even in
the event that defenses are waived, a defendant with theoretically no
liability limit might not be able to pay a judgment if obtained.101 Thus, the
Price-Anderson Act establishes “assurance of prompt and equitable
compensation under a pre-structured and nationally applicable protective
system [which gives] way to uncertainties, variations and potentially
lengthy delays in recovery.”102
Under the Price-Anderson Act, compensation is evenly distributed
over the entirety of those affected, however in an alternative system, such
as a claim-based system, when the defendant’s assets are exhausted by
earlier judgments, future claimants will be left without any compensatory
relief or redress through judicial system.103 Such a system would create an
onslaught of lawsuits in order for claimants to be the first to express their
grievances, rather than appropriately assuring the public a system that will
orderly and equitably compensate those affected by any nuclear incident.104
This sentiment was expressed in Duke Power, as the Supreme
Court noted that
. . . the congressional assurance of a $560 million[105]
fund for recovery, accompanied by an express statutory
commitment, to “take whatever action is deemed
100

See H.R. 8631: To Amend and Extend the Price-Anderson Act Before Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong. 69 (1975) (statement of William A. Anders,
Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
101
See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 59 (“The simple fact is that there is
always a limit on liability—that limit equal to the assets of the company at fault.”).
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Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp, 438 U.S. 59, 89 (1978).
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Id. at 90.
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H.R. 8631: To Amend and Extend the Price-Anderson Act, supra note 101.
105
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necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the
consequences of” a nuclear accident, [is] a fair and
reasonable substitute for the uncertain recovery of
damages of this magnitude from a utility or component
manufacturer, whose resources might well be exhausted
at an early stage.106
Furthermore, the American Nuclear Insurer policies are written on
a continual basis and contain no expiration date.107 Claims based during the
time of the policy are accounted for and the licensee is still held responsible
if the claim is found valid, even if they are no longer in operation.
F. LITIGATION AND INVESTIGATION COSTS INCLUDED
Under the Price-Anderson Act, the expenses of investigating and
defending claims or suits against the nuclear industry are included in the
limit of liability.108 The legal costs for defending many of these actions can
be quite expensive. By including the legal and investigation costs in the
Act, Congress established definite confines for liability costs that insurance
companies providing the financial protection plans to the nuclear industry
could rely upon. In essence, the inclusion of these costs enables insurers to
offer their maximum capacity commitments without fear of exceeding such
commitments.109 This provision is crucial in enabling insurers to maintain
and, most likely, increase the assets they place at risk.110
G. THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT PROVIDES STABILITY IN THE MARKET
Finally, the requirement of the Price-Anderson Act that each
nuclear commercial power plant must obtain a specified amount of private
insurance as well as participate in the secondary financial protection
program provides stability in the market that might otherwise not be there.
Not only was the private insurance industry precarious in providing
financial protection for the nuclear industry at the dawn of its development,
but the liability insurance market is also a volatile entity by nature.
106
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This very instability was demonstrated by the liability insurance
crisis from late 1984 through 1986, when major economic disruptions in
the commercial liability insurance market created concerns over the
availability and affordability of a number of commercial insurance policies
– notably for chemical and pharmaceutical companies, the medical system
and municipalities.111 However, when the liability insurance crisis hit the
nation in the mid-1980s, the nuclear liability insurers continued to provide
a stable market for their limited customer base as a result of the system
provided by the Price-Anderson Act.112 The nuclear industry was shielded
from any increase in liability premiums, cancellation of policy coverage or
diminishment in scope of coverage113 – not only was this critical for the
nuclear industry but it also protected the public from any exposure to an
uninsured, or volatile, nuclear industry.

VII.

CARBON SEQUESTRATION: AN OVERVIEW

With the growing demand and development of carbon
sequestration technology, insurers are beginning to determine the best
approach in providing liability frameworks for private, state and federal
projects using this new technology. Briefly, carbon sequestration is the
process that involves capturing carbon dioxide at the point of combustion –
most notably from coal power plants – and injecting it into geological
formations beneath the surface of the earth.114 Essentially, the technology is
the reverse of pumping oil or natural gas from a confined geological
aquifer.115 The life-cycle of a carbon sequestration project can last over a
couple of centuries as the process involves several phases from site
selection, characterization, and regulatory review;116 to CO2 injection and
well closure;117 to post-closure monitoring;118 and finally to long-term
111

G.C. Lai et al., “On Liability Insurance Crisis”, Risk Theory Seminar
Conference, Univ. of Ala. 1 (Apr. 1997).
112
See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 58.
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INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP: CARBON CAPTURE AND
STORAGE 8-9 (2009).
115
Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon
Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103, 115 (2008).
116
Id. This phase is expected to last anywhere from one to ten years.
117
Id. (twenty to thirty year life-span).
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Id. (estimating that this phase of the life-cycle lasts for a period of fifteen to
thirty years).
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stewardship.119
To date, carbon dioxide is the most abundant anthropogenic
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere largely due to human activities.120 The
release of these gases into the atmosphere has contributed to global
warming and increasing concerns of altering climatic, biological, and
natural environments. The demand, and necessity, for solutions to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions are the propellant behind carbon sequestration
projects.
While the technology is only increasing, carbon capture and
storage projects are technically ready – but the associated costs, including
insurance, need to be lowered and investment needs to increase in order for
large-scale implementation of this technology.121 In essence, the industry
today parallels the circumstances of the nuclear industry in the 1950s, when
the Atomic Energy Act was originally enacted. The manner in which the
insurance industry approaches the long-term liability with carbon
sequestration could significantly affect the development and investment in
the technology.

119

years).

120

Id. (estimating that CO2 remains sequestered underground for hundreds of

Carbon dioxide is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas (see
Figure SPM.2). The global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has
increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 ppm to 379 ppm in 2005. The
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in 2005 exceeds by far the
natural range over the last 650,000 years (180 to 300 ppm) as determined from ice
cores. The annual carbon dioxide concentration growth rate was larger during the
last 10 years (1995–2005 average: 1.9 ppm per year), than it has been since the
beginning of continuous direct atmospheric measurements (1960–2005 average:
1.4 ppm per year) although there is year-to-year variability in growth rates. The
primary source of the increased atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide since
the pre-industrial period results from fossil fuel use, with land-use change
providing another significant but smaller contribution. Eleven of the last twelve
years (1995–2006) rank among the 12 warmest years in the instrumental record of
global surface temperature (since 1850). See INTERGOVERMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis,
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (S. Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge
University Press 2007).
121
Id.
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CARBON SEQUESTRATION RISK ASSESSMENT
COMPARISON TO THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

&

In regards to insurance necessities, policy writers must first
understand the risks in which the technology presents. The inquiry first
begins with what is to be protected and what threshold of risk mitigation
required or desired by the client.122 In general, insurance policies are
structured, priced and conditioned based on the frequency and the severity
of potential loss.123 In developing such policies, insurers look towards past
events and historical trends within the insured’s field and practice area.
The difficult part of carbon sequestration is that the infancy of the
technology does not lend itself to any insight in its past history. As a result,
the insurance industry has reluctantly provided coverage for the risks and
trends of the technology. However, this should not detract insurers, as the
underlying liabilities and risks of carbon sequestration technology are
analogous to the same uncertainties that faced the nuclear industry in the
1950s.
First, the main concern with carbon sequestration is the release of
carbon dioxide from the project site. In its natural state carbon dioxide is
non-toxic, however concentrations of 5-10% by volume is harmful to the
life and health of plants, humans and animals.124 Thus, there is a direct and
measurable potential for damage resulting from the release of large
quantities of carbon dioxide in the event of a site failure or storage site
leakage due to a number of reasons such as equipment or construction
failure, unexpected tectonic movements or unforeseen large-scale
migration.125 The inherent risks associated with the storage of carbon
dioxide are similar, although much smaller, to radioactive exposure
resulting from a nuclear power plant failure.
Secondly, there is general consensus that potential leakage of
hazardous pollutants from storage reservoirs is very low – the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that for wellselected sites, there is a 90-99% probability that over 99% of liquefied CO2
122

PA. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RES., ASSESSMENT OF RISK,
LEGAL ISSUES, AND INSURANCE FOR GEOLOGIC CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN
PENNSYLVANIA 5-1 (2009).
123
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injected into underground wells will remain underground for over 100
years.126 Again, this is analogous to the nuclear industry’s low-frequency
yet high-risk nature.
Also, while immediate injuries and harm can arise from industrial
incidents with carbon sequestration at the time of the failure, the associated
liability is often a result of storage leakage. In turn, this leads to injuries
and harm that are latent in nature, as leakages tend to arise over long-term,
chronic exposure to low-levels of hazardous materials. Likewise, a
radiological incident can result in acute, short-term exposure as well as
chronic, long-term exposure to surrounding communities and
environments.127 In both cases, victims are hindered with the difficulty of
proving causation arising from both nuclear incidents and carbon
sequestration failures. Finally, carbon sequestration is beginning to solidify
itself as a crucial part in our national energy policy similar, albeit on a
smaller scale, to the nuclear industry’s rapid accent to the forefront of the
energy sector in the middle of the twentieth century.128 This commitment
from the federal government intensifies the need to create an indemnity
scheme that can serve the dual purpose of promoting the technology while
also protecting the public.
Admittedly the release of radioactive materials is far more
damaging to the public than concentrated volumes of carbon dioxide,
126

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON DIOXIDE
CAPTURE AND STORAGE 14 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2005).
127
NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, THE PUBLIC HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTERS 405 (Eric K.
Noji ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (Acute effects from radiological exposure vary
in dosage from individual showing no outward symptoms, but instead having
increased chromosomal aberrations in blood lymphocytes and lower blood count to
high doses, which may affect the central nervous system causing seizures, gait
disturbances and coma, almost always resulting in death. However, this highdosage acute exposure is extremely rare in nuclear incidents; instead it is seen in
intentional nuclear warfare.).
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See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 26 U.S.C. § 46
(2009) (The Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit, also known as Internal
Revenue Code Section 48C, provides a 30% tax credit for future expenditures to
support new, expanded, or re-equipped domestic manufacturing facilities for
advanced energy projects. The tax credit was promulgated pursuant to the
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) section 1302, which
authorized the Department of Treasury to extend $2.3 billion for qualified
investments in domestic manufacturing facilities that can be completed within a
four year period. Credits are available for a two year period, or until the maximum
dollar amount of credits has been reached.).

364

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

however the risk that is being covered by both industries mirror each other
in associated problems – leakage of material causing exposure to
individuals; groundwater contamination; wind-blown migration of the
elements; and property damage due to an industrial meltdown or explosion.
The Price-Anderson Act has already accounted for the similarities in the
problems associated with each industry through, among other provisions,
its liability channeling, no-fault causation standard, and removal to federal
jurisdictions.
In addition, the private-public partnership of the Price-Anderson
Act provides suitable incentives such as a liability cap, industry-wide
pooling, and policies written on a continual basis that would attract greater
financial investment, insurance coverage and ultimately employment of
carbon sequestration technology.
A. NECESSITY OF A LIABILITY CAP
First of all, the liability cap is essential in attracting private
insurance interest in new, clean energy sources that have yet to reach
maturity within the market. This was an essential component for the
nuclear industry, as the potential liability costs associated with a nuclear
incident detracted private insurance companies from providing coverage
for nuclear power plants. Likewise, the long-term risks associated with
carbon sequestration concern insurance underwriters today. Thus, there
needs to be incentives for private investment to generate the necessary
development of the field – the liability cap is the first step in doing so. As
was the case with the Price-Anderson Act, the federal government should
implement a preliminary system that caps site-specific liability at a certain
threshold while also ensuring federal indemnification in the event of an
incident exceeding the primary, site-specific insurance. Then, once the
industry begins to mature, the federal government can slowly turn the
second-tier of the indemnification system over to private insurers that begin
to adapt to and draw interest in the technology.
The tiered-system that blends site-specific insurance and an
industry-wide pool of funds “both provide[s] site-tailored risk management
and ensures[s] that adequate funds are available to cover damage in the
post-closure period.”129 In addition, an industry-wide pool would allow for
risk sharing on a national scale and financial protection for a variety of
different projects. If indemnification was instead based on a state-level then
proper financial protection might quickly be exhausted without the same
129
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amount of diversity, contribution and risk sharing that occurs in a tiered,
mutual insurance pool.130
Federal involvement is even more crucial with carbon
sequestration because the technology does not tend to yield intensive
amounts of revenues. In fact, the main concern of the technology is in
diminishing the amount of carbon emissions in the atmosphere, not in
turning a profit. Therefore, if there is to be individual and private
investment in such projects, monetary or regulatory incentives must be in
place for further development.131
B. REMOVAL OF CLAIMS TO FEDERAL COURT
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was signed
into law by President Obama on February 17, 2009 and provided the Office
of Fossil Energy with $3.4 billion in the attempt to fund initiatives focused
on research, development and deployment of technologies to use coal more
cleanly and efficiently.132 In order to accomplish these goals, federal
agencies have invested significantly in carbon capture and storage projects
across the nation. When dealing with issues such as our national energy
policy, federal courts should be the forum for settling disputes, rather than
in a plethora of state courts, especially if the technologies are targeted to
decrease national carbon emission standards. Such an approach maintains
cohesiveness as well as ensures an unbiased, equitable forum. The PriceAnderson Act contains a preemption provision133 that not only gives federal
courts jurisdiction over tort action arising out of nuclear accidents, but it
also provides for removal of such actions brought in state court even when
they assert only state-law claims.134 This provision is essential for carbon
sequestration claims.
First, the provision will limit the consequences of arriving at
different conclusions on the applicable law as a result of a inherent
differences throughout jurisdictions and variances in state tort law.
Second, the tension between state law and federal preemption is a constant
theme for CCS, especially due to the potential damages occurring in
130
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domains with strong state laws governing groundwater protection, mineral
rights, or surface rights.135 Carbon sequestration claims, however, should be
heard under a federal overlay due to the fact that a lot of the water and
mineral resources that will be in question involve several states as well as
multiple state interests such as agriculture, urban development, tax
revenues and wildlife preservation.136 Thus, an indemnity system must
include a provision that removes any claims from state court in order to
preserve all interests in the matter, provide for efficiency and efficacy, and
establish cohesive law regarding carbon sequestration facilities and
events.137
Federal jurisdiction eliminates many of the uncertainties individual
victims might encounter in state courts, such as more stringent causation
standards or heightened burdens of proof. Additionally, the carbon
sequestration liability scheme should adopt similar provisions to the PriceAnderson Act that give the chief judge of the federal district court the
authority to consolidate cases, set priorities, expedite cases or allow more
equitable considerations of claims, and implement any measures as that
will encourage the equitable, prompt, and efficient resolution of cases
arising out of the nuclear incident.138 Such provisions will expedite
compensation for affected individuals, which is in essence, the entire
objective of the system.
C. CAUSATION: NO-FAULT IS GOOD
In order to provide proper protection to the public in the case of a
storage leakage, the insurance policy should be written in such a manner
that establishes a strict liability standard. Due to the long duration of carbon
storage facilities, it will be much more difficult to detect and assign
responsibility for any harm that might occur.139 Furthermore, the latent
nature of injury or property damage associated with carbon storage leakage
hinders individual claimants from providing any other standard of legal
causation.
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In addition, the judicial system has already established a long
history of strict liability standard for torts similar to carbon sequestration
leakages. This principal stems from Rylands v. Fletcher, the English
decision which held that an individual “who for his own purposes brings on
his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequences of its
escape.”140
This body of tort law has been extended in United States laws
regarding cases of abnormally dangerous activities, and also, hazardous
materials. Thus, in order to maintain consistency with legal precedent as
well as ensure that affected individuals are duly compensated, a no-fault
liability system is essential in carbon leakage claims.
D. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
The Price-Anderson system contains several other provisions that
would be highly beneficial for the carbon sequestration system to
incorporate. First, the Act channels liability to the particular facility that is
responsible for any industrial incident. Carbon sequestration technology
has the potential of including a large network of individuals due to its
operating, post-injection and long-term stewardship phase. Thus, a large
number of individuals are exposed throughout the phases of the technology,
creating issues of widespread liability. Thus, an “omnibus” liability system,
which allows for all suppliers, transporters, and participants of the carbon
sequestration industry to be covered under the insurance system would not
only be instrumental for the industry, but also for the public as an
“omnibus” feature “permits a more unified and efficient approach to
processing and settlement of claims.”141 Additionally, this establishes a
centralized defendant in the event that affected individuals are unsure as to
the negligent, or directly responsible party.
Second, the Price-Anderson Act provides a mutual insurance
program that guarantees a certain amount of available funds in the event of
an incident. This system provides for compensation to be evenly distributed
140

Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] 1 L.R. Exch. 265 at 279 (Eng.).
OMER F. BROWN, II, ENERGY CONTRACTORS PRICE-ANDERSON GRP.,
REPLY COMMENTS ON U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NOTICE OF INQUIRY
CONCERNING PREPARATION OF REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PRICE-ANDERSON
ACT 4 (Dec. 31, 1997), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/gcprod/documents/REP
LY_PAGroup.pdf.
141

368

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.1

to all affected individuals, while also assuring federal indemnification
when necessary. This is more functional that having multiple state systems,
which may not sufficiently spread risk and may not be adequately
capitalized to cover actual damages incurred above insurance coverage
limits.142 Also, the Price-Anderson Act policies are written on a continual
basis, ensuring the public that regardless of the timing of an incident the
policy will cover any injuries, harm, or property damage so long as the
claims are filed within a timely manner as provided for by the statute of
limitations.
Finally, the Price-Anderson system includes litigation and
investigating costs. This is crucial in order for the insurance industry to be
fully aware of the risks that they are taking. Companies are able to properly
assess the amount of financial protection they want to provide, while also
allowing them to secure reinsurance to spread the risk over an even greater
base.
IX. GEOTHERMAL ENERGY
In the past couple of years, investor interest in geothermal
technology has increased significantly. This rapid increase in investment
has been accelerated by growing demand for energy sources, increases in
the price and scarcity of oil, and the developing awareness of the risks
presented by carbon emissions.
With Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS), a well known as a
production-injection well is drilled into hot basement rock that has limited
permeability and fluid content.143 Hot, dry rock that is closer to the earth’s
surface is ideal for this technology. The production-injection well consists
of two drill points, the first being the injection well that serves to pump
water under high pressure into the earth’s core. Pumping the water under
high pressure is to ensure fracturing or increase fracturing within the
geological environment, thus creating an artificial geothermal reservoir.144
Water is then circulated through the reservoir and the hot water is extracted
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from the production well, which is drilled with the intent to intersect the
stimulated fracture system created by the injection well in a manner in
which the most amount of the artificial reservoir is in contact with the well.
In turn, the water extracted, known as brine, is pumped through an
electrical power plant and the brine heats a working fluid that produces
vapor to drive a turbine-generator.145 The original water is then recycled
through a cooling facility and is re-injected into the reservoir, thus
completing the cycle.146
With the increase in investment in geothermal interest and the
growing development of geothermal energy facilities, policy providers
must be concerned and appropriately assess the inherent technical perils in
the testing, construction and maintenance of these geothermal facilities.
Most geothermal power projects take five to seven years to be operational,
as each phase of the project has its own set of requirements and risks
attached.147 This concern is further exacerbated by installation, operation
and development of projects in harsh unstable terrain, proximity to marine
environments, and drilling necessities.
The current investment market for geothermal technologies is
relatively weak. The length of the projects combined with the nascent
history of the technology deters investors of these projects. The success of
drilling – determined by the volume, temperature and pressure of the fluids
discovered – is crucial to the financial stability of the project, as it consists
of up to 30-40% of the entire project.148 Therefore, in some cases
government support and subsidies are necessary to help get the project off
the ground.149 Investors that then have to worry about insurance costs
associated not only with the building but also with the maintenance and
operation of the project are further deterred, as additional costs must be
accounted for. Therefore, the Price-Anderson Act, which would provide
incentive for financial investment by implementing liability caps in the
event of an incident, failure in project development, and other instances, is
crucial to incentivize financial investment.
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X. CONCLUSION
The rapidly rising demand for electricity, increasing costs of oil
and gas, and concerns about energy security demonstrate the need not only
for the “nuclear renaissance,” but also for investment in alternative, clean
energy technologies and sources.150 The past few years have illuminated a
heightened national interest and political commitment, from both sides of
the aisle, regarding these objectives.
If the United States expects to continue to be atop the global
pyramid, then it must reassess its current energy policy – especially its
commitments to nuclear energy as well as alternative, clean energy
technologies. Currently, the nuclear industry accounts for 19.4% of
electrical production within the United States, while at the same time
accounting for 73.6% of the emission-free electricity production.151 In 2006
alone, the nuclear industry saved the United States and the world 681.2
million metric tons of CO2 emissions while providing the lowest-cost
producer of base-load electricity at 1.72 cents per kilowatt-hour.152
However, the United States’ nuclear production is ninth in the world in
percent of its total domestic electricity generation.153
Clean energy technologies, such as nuclear energy, are at the
forefront of the national discourse on energy policy, while others, such as
solar and wind power, geothermal developments, and carbon sequestration,
are being pushed into the discussion. It is in these developments that the
proper financial instruments and insurance policies must adequately
support and protect this increasing development.
Accordingly, analysis of the Price-Anderson Act provides insight
into an underlying insurance indemnification system that would provide a
well-suited framework in addressing the growth of clean energy
technologies, such as geothermal energy and carbon sequestration
technology. These and similar technologies are currently struggling for the
necessary financial backing and protection in order to become a key
contributor to our national energy policy. As such, the liability cap
150
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instituted under the Price-Anderson Act is essential in encouraging growth
within the clean energy sector.
Likewise, a no-fault system in which liability is channeled to the
particular operator or owner of the facility is crucial in upholding
accountability and protection to the American public. Finally, once a
national market is established, creating a tiered system that requires site
specific private insurance, a secondary, industry-wide pool, and finally
federal indemnification in the event of exhaustion of the initial two layers
will create a reliable network of compensation in the event of an industrial
incident while also balancing the competitive needs of the clean energy
sector. In addition to these components, future clean energy
indemnification systems should include written insurance policies;
inclusion of litigation and investigation costs in the liability limitations; and
removal and consolidation of all claims to one federal district court.
Clean energy technologies are the future in American power
production. Such technologies offer a number of similarities – most notably
the inherent nature of high-impact, low frequency risk in their
development, maintenance and production processes. Accordingly, these
energy sources invite a more in-depth analysis into the best practices in
promoting and developing the proper technological advancements,
financial investments, and insurance policies to protect and promote the
development of clean energy while safeguarding the American public. The
Price-Anderson Act should be at the forefront of this analysis.

